Verse 873-874

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

व्यक्त्यात्मानोऽनुयन्त्येते न परस्पररूपतः ।
देशकालक्रियाशक्तिप्रतिभासादिभेदतः ॥ ८७३ ॥
तस्मात्सङ्केतदृष्टोऽर्थो व्यवहारे न दृश्यते ।
नचागृहीतसङ्केतो (बोध्येता)न्य इव ध्वनेः ॥ ८७४ ॥

vyaktyātmāno'nuyantyete na paraspararūpataḥ |
deśakālakriyāśaktipratibhāsādibhedataḥ || 873 ||
tasmātsaṅketadṛṣṭo'rtho vyavahāre na dṛśyate |
nacāgṛhītasaṅketo (bodhyetā)nya iva dhvaneḥ || 874 ||

Things of the nature of individuals cannot become inter-related among themselves,—because there are differences (among them) of place, time, action, potency, manifestation and the rest.—For this reason, the thing conceived by convention is never met with in actual usage; and that in regard to which no convention has been apprehended can never be comprehended through words,—like any other thing.—(873-874)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Question:—“Why is it not possible for the Specific Individuality to be present at the time of Convention and Usage?”

Answer:—[see verses 873-874 above]

The variegated Cow, etc. are so many distinct Individuals,—and as such have their individual forms excluded from each other, through differences of place, etc.; and as such, they never become inter-related among themselves. Consequently, when a man has set up a Convention in regard to one of these individuals, he could not carry on usage, on that basis, in regard to other individuals.—In the phrase ‘manifestation and the rest’, the term ‘the rest’ is meant to include Colour, Shape, Condition and other peculiarities.

‘Is never met with in actual usage’;—what is meant is that, in this way, there being no Convention in regard to it, the Reason adduced by the Author cannot be said to be ‘unproven’.

That the Reason is not ‘Inconclusive’ is shown by the words—‘That in regard to which no Convention has been comprehended, etc. etc.’

‘Like any other thing’,—i.e. like things of other kinds.

‘Dhvaneḥ’,—Through Words.

What is meant is as follows:—If the Word denoted a thing in regard to which no Convention has been apprehended, then the term ‘Cow’ also should denote the Horse; and in that case, the making of Conventions would be useless. Hence the possibility of this anomaly annuls the contrary conclusion; and thereby the Author’s Premiss becomes established.

This same Reason, ‘Because no Convention can be made’, has been indicated by the Teacher Diṅnāga in the declaration—‘The Word denoting a Universal cannot be denotative of Individuals, because of endlessness’; what is meant by ‘endlessness’ is the impossibility of Convention.

This also sets aside the following argument of Uddyotakara (Nyāyavārtika 2. 2. 63, p. 327):—“If you make ‘Words’ the subject of your argument, then, as endlessness is a property of things (denoted by words), it would be a Reason that subsists elsewhere than the Subject. If, on the other hand, the diverse things themselves are the Subject, then neither affirmative nor negative corroborative Instances would be available. So that ‘endlessness’ cannot serve as a valid Reason”.

The same writer has also urged as follows (in Nyāyavartika 2. 2. 63, page 326)“The objection urged is applicable to those (Buddhists) who hold that what are denoted by words are things without any qualifications; as for ourselves, what are denoted by words are Substances, Qualities and Actions as qualified by Being, etc.; so that wherever one perceives the Universal ‘Being’, etc., one uses the word ‘existent’ and so forth. The Universal ‘Being’ is one only; hence in regard to things characterised by that Universal, it is quite possible to set up Conventions. So that endlessness cannot serve as a valid reason for you.”

This is not right. It has been already proved that there are no such real entities as Universals like ‘Being’ and the rest which are either different or non-different from individual things.—But even granting that there is such a thing as the Universal;—even so, as it is possible for several Universals to subsist in one Individual, there could be no use of such words as ‘Being’ and the like, free from confusion. Further, until it has been explained by means of words that ‘Being’ is so and so’, the person making the Convention could not indicate the things denoted by those words by means of ‘Being’ and other Universals;—and until the Convention has been made, words like ‘Being’, etc. cannot be used. So that there would be the incongruity of mutual interdependence.

The following argument might be urged:—“The person concerned himself comes by the usage and then, through affirmative and negative concomitance, comes to establish the connection between the word and its denotation and therefrom becomes cognisant of the relevant Convention.”

This cannot be right. No one person can ever come by the entire usage bearing upon any subsequent thing.

“What happens is that having once found that the term ‘existing’ is frequently applied to things endowed with existence, he concludes that the same word is applicable to even unseen things of the same kind.”

That cannot be true; as such is not found to be the case. In fact no Convention can apply to unseen things which are endless and which differ widely regarding their being past and future. If Convention were applicable to such things, it would lead to an absurdity.

“One really does comprehend such Convention in regard to the things when he speaks of them as conceived of by Determinate (conceptual) Cognition (which involves verbal expression also).”

If that is so, then it comes to this that the application of words appertains to only such things as are purely fanciful—and not to real things. So that the past and future not being before the man at the time, if there did appear a ‘determinate cognition’ of those, it could only be objectless, and hence what is made known by it must be a non-entity.—How then could the Convention relating to such things be anything real? We desist from further augmentation on this point.

Lastly, as our Reason is present in all cases where the Probandum is present, it cannot be said to be Contradictory.

Thus it becomes established that words cannot have ‘Specific Individualities’ for their ‘import’ (denotation).—(873-874)