Verse 814-816

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अण्वाकाशदिगादीनामसङ्कीर्णं यदा स्थितम् ।
स्वरूपं च तदैतस्माद्वैलक्षण्योपलक्षणम् ॥ ८१४ ॥
मिश्रीभूतापरात्मानो भवेयुर्यदि ते पुनः ।
नान्यभावेऽप्यविभ्रान्तं वैलक्षण्योपलक्षणम् ॥ ८१५ ॥
कथं तेषु विशेषेषु वैलक्षण्योपलक्षणम् ।
स्वत एवेति चेन्नैवमण्वादावपि किं मतम् ॥ ८१६ ॥

aṇvākāśadigādīnāmasaṅkīrṇaṃ yadā sthitam |
svarūpaṃ ca tadaitasmādvailakṣaṇyopalakṣaṇam || 814 ||
miśrībhūtāparātmāno bhaveyuryadi te punaḥ |
nānyabhāve'pyavibhrāntaṃ vailakṣaṇyopalakṣaṇam || 815 ||
kathaṃ teṣu viśeṣeṣu vailakṣaṇyopalakṣaṇam |
svata eveti cennaivamaṇvādāvapi kiṃ matam || 816 ||

Among atoms, ākāśa, space and such things (in which the ultimate individualities are held to subsist),—if their forms are distinct from each other,—then the apprehension of distinction among them need not be due to anything else in the shape of this ultimate individuality.—If, on the other hand, they have their forms mixed up with each other, then, even though there may be difference, the apprehension of absolute distinction could not but be wrong.—How too is the distinction among ‘ultimate individualities’ apprehended? If by themselves,—then why is not the same held to be the case with atoms and other things also?—(814-816)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The existence of these ‘Ultimate Individualities’ has been sought to be proved on the basis of the peculiar experience of Mystics; but the Reason in that case is ‘inconclusive This is what is shown in the following—[see verses 814-816 above]

That is to say, the form of Atoms, etc. may be either distinct from each other, each having its own specific character, or, mixed up.—If it is the former, then, as the things would themselves be always apprehended in their unmixed—distinct—forms, the assumption of any further ‘Individualities’ for the purpose of the Mystics’ apprehending their distinct forms would be useless.—If the second alternative’ is accepted, then, even in the presence of the distinct Category of the ‘Ultimate Individualities’, how could the Mystics’ cognition of the Atoms, etc. as distinct,—when their forms are (ex hypothesi) not entirely distinct—be free from error? It would be clearly wrong, being the cognition of things as what they are not; and the Mystics, in that case, would not be true Mystics, on account of entertaining a wrong notion of things.

Then again, if the distinct cognition of things were not possible without a distinct category in the shape of ‘Ultimate Individualities’,—then, how could there be distinct cognitions regarding these Individualities themselves? As there are no further ‘Ultimate Individualities’ in them; if they were there, then there would be an infinite regress; it would also be contrary to the Opponent’s doctrine that these Individualities are ultimate and subsist in eternal substances; as these other Individualities would be subsisting in the Ultimate Individualities also (which are not Substances). If, for these reasons, it be admitted that the Ultimate Individualities themselves become the basis of the distinct cognitions of themselves,—then, in the case of Atoms, etc. also, they themselves may be regarded as the basis of their distinct cognitions; why should there be this aversion against them that, even though they have their individual forms mutually exclusive, their capacity to bring about distinct cognitions of themselves is not admitted,—while such capacity is admitted in the ‘Ultimate Individualities’? We find no reason for this aversion, except stupidity.—(814-816)