The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 750-754 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 750-754.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

न पाचकादिबुद्धीनामस्ति किञ्चिन्निबन्धनम् ।
कर्मास्ति चेत्प्रतिव्यक्ति ननु तद्भिद्यते तथा ॥ ७५० ॥
भिन्नेष्वन्वयिनोऽसत्वे न युक्ताऽन्वयिनी मतिः ।
इत्येकमिष्टं सामान्यं सर्वव्यक्त्यनुवृत्तिमत् ॥ ७५१ ॥
कर्मान्वयदरिद्रं च यदि हेतुः प्रकल्प्यते ।
तदा व्यक्तय एवास्याः किमितीष्टा न हेतवः ॥ ७५२ ॥
पाचकादिमतिर्न स्यात्तत्र चोपरतक्रिये ।
न सदासन्निधानं हि कर्मेष्टं जातिवत्परैः ॥ ७५३ ॥
अतीतानागतं कर्म निमित्तीकृत्य तेषु चेत् ।
पाचकादिषु धीशब्दौ, तन्न हेतुरसत्त्वतः ॥ ७५४ ॥

na pācakādibuddhīnāmasti kiñcinnibandhanam |
karmāsti cetprativyakti nanu tadbhidyate tathā || 750 ||
bhinneṣvanvayino'satve na yuktā'nvayinī matiḥ |
ityekamiṣṭaṃ sāmānyaṃ sarvavyaktyanuvṛttimat || 751 ||
karmānvayadaridraṃ ca yadi hetuḥ prakalpyate |
tadā vyaktaya evāsyāḥ kimitīṣṭā na hetavaḥ || 752 ||
pācakādimatirna syāttatra coparatakriye |
na sadāsannidhānaṃ hi karmeṣṭaṃ jātivatparaiḥ || 753 ||
atītānāgataṃ karma nimittīkṛtya teṣu cet |
pācakādiṣu dhīśabdau, tanna heturasattvataḥ || 754 ||

In fact, there is no single basis for the notions of ‘cook’ and the rest.—If it be said that “the act (of cooking) is the basis”,—then, the answer is that the act varies with each individual person; and you have postulated the ‘universal’ as embracing all individuals only, on the ground that unless there is an all-embracing entity, there can be no comprehensive notion of things which are different.—If, even without such all-embracing character, the act be regarded as the basis (of the comprehensive notion) then why should not the individuals themselves be regarded as causes of it?—Further (if the act were the basis, then) the notion of ‘cook’ could not appear in regard to the man after he has desisted from the act (of cooking); surely even the other party do not regard the act as present there at all times,—like the ‘universal’,—if it be held that “the notion and name of the cook, etc. is based on past and future action”,—then such an act cannot be the cause at all, for the simple reason that it is not present at the time.—(750-754)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following Texts explain the notions of the ‘Cook’, etc.:—[see verses 750-754 above]

It cannot be right to say that the notion in. regard to the Cook is due to the act of cooking; because this Action also is held to be different with each person,—just like the individuality.

You postulate the ‘Universal’ as embracing all individuals, on the ground that, in regard to diverse things, there could not appear any comprehensive notion, in the absence of an all-embracing entity. Under the circumstances, if even without this all-embracing character, the Action were the basis of regarding diversengs as one,—then why should there be an aversion to the individuals, whereby ignoring these, the ‘Universal’ has been postulated as the basis of that notion?

Then again, if the notion in regard to the Cook were due to the Action, then after the man has desisted from the Action, and is not doing any cooking, the notion of Cook could not appear in regard to him. You do not regard the Action to be ever present, like the ‘Universal’, by virtue of which the notion could appear even when the Action had ceased. When one thing is due to another, it cannot appear in the absence of this latter.

Nor can past and future Action be rightly regarded as the basis of the said notion; because what is past or yet to come cannot be there, and what is not there cannot serve as the cause of anything.—(750-754)

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