The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page describes verse 694-695 of the Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita (8th century), including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: both dealing with philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattva-sangraha (aka Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 verses.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तथाहि कारणाऽऽश्लेषः सामान्यस्याभिव्यञ्जनम् ।
स्वावयवे ततः कर्म विभागस्तदनन्तरम् ॥ ६९४ ॥
संयोगस्य विनाशश्च ततो द्रव्यस्य संक्षयः ।
षट्क्षणस्थायितैवेष्टा दीपादावपि वस्तुनि ॥ ६९५ ॥

tathāhi kāraṇā''śleṣaḥ sāmānyasyābhivyañjanam |
svāvayave tataḥ karma vibhāgastadanantaram || 694 ||
saṃyogasya vināśaśca tato dravyasya saṃkṣayaḥ |
ṣaṭkṣaṇasthāyitaiveṣṭā dīpādāvapi vastuni || 695 ||

(1) (At the first moment) there is contact with the cause, (2) then the appearance of the generic character,—then (3) some commotion in the parts of the object,—then (4) the disruption of the parts,—then (5) the destruction of the contact,—then (6) the destruction of the object;—in this way, even in the case of the lamp-flame and such things, what has been held is that they last for six moments only.—(694-695)


Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

For instance: (1) what comes first is the moment of contact with the Cause,—(2) then the moment of the appearance of the generic character of the Thing produced,—(3) then action among the component parts,—then (4) the moment of disjunction of the Composite,—then (5) the destruction of the Conjunction that produced the object,—then (6) the destruction of the object itself;—in this way, in the case of things like the Lamp-flame, what has been held is that they last for six moments only. Thus, there being no momentary object (for the Opponent) which could have any action, the Action of all active objects must be such as appears after the birth of the objects.—So that our Reason is not ‘unproven’, as there can be nothing else that could be momentary (for the other party).—(694-695)

It might be asked—“Even if we admit the momentary character of Things, why cannot their action appear at the time of their birth?”

The answer to this is provided in the following—[see verses 696-697 next]