The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 696-697 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 696-697.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

पश्चिमाग्रिमदेशाभ्यां विश्लेषाऽऽश्लेषसंभवे ।
गन्ताऽपरो वा सर्वश्च कर्माधारः प्रकल्पितः ॥ ६९६ ॥
यो जन्मः क्षणमध्यास्ते नैव जातु चलात्मकः ।
तस्याण्वन्तरमात्रेऽपि देशसंक्रान्त्यसम्भवः ॥ ६९७ ॥

paścimāgrimadeśābhyāṃ viśleṣā''śleṣasaṃbhave |
gantā'paro vā sarvaśca karmādhāraḥ prakalpitaḥ || 696 ||
yo janmaḥ kṣaṇamadhyāste naiva jātu calātmakaḥ |
tasyāṇvantaramātre'pi deśasaṃkrāntyasambhavaḥ || 697 ||

It is only when there is separation from the posterior spot, and contact with the frontal spot, that the object may be assumed to be ‘going’ (‘in motion’), or to be the substratum of any other action. when the mobile person does not last even for a moment,—even though such a person be extremely small, there is no possibility of passing over to another spot removed by the minutest point.—(696-697)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

When it is possible for an object to become separated from the place behind it,—and to come into contact with the place before it, then it can be said to be ‘going’; or for another thing, to be the substratum of such actions as Expanding and the rest; all this cannot be said in regard to any otherngs—such as Ākāśa.—The object that lasts only for one moment however cannot be so long as to admit of its abandoning the place behind it and then passing over to that before it; because at the moment of its existence itself it is within the clutches of disappearance (destruction); and as such it is unable to pass over to the other place.—Hence no Action is possible even at the time of the birth (of the object). Nor is it possible at either of the two ends; because at the time in question, this cannot be determined. Thus then, as regards the object which does not last even for a single moment,—the possibility of its passing over to a remote place may rest awhile; it is not possible for it to pass over even the minutest space. Under the circumstances, how can there be any Action in what is momentary?—(696-697)

Nor can there be Action in a non-momentary object;—this is what is shown in the following—[see verse 698 next]

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