Verse 668-669

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

मिथ्याबुद्धिर्न सर्वैव प्रधानार्थानुसारिणी ।
साधर्म्यनिरपेक्षापि काचिदन्तरुपप्लवात् ॥ ६६८ ॥
अन्यत्र गतचित्तस्य द्विचन्द्रादिमतिर्यथा ।
अविच्छिन्नादिजातं वा प्रधानमिह विद्यते ॥ ६६९ ॥

mithyābuddhirna sarvaiva pradhānārthānusāriṇī |
sādharmyanirapekṣāpi kācidantarupaplavāt || 668 ||
anyatra gatacittasya dvicandrādimatiryathā |
avicchinnādijātaṃ vā pradhānamiha vidyate || 669 ||

A misconception does not appear always in accordance with a primary conception; for instance, the notion of ‘two moons’ appears independently of its similarity to any other (primary) notion, through some internal derangement, while the mind is turned elsewhere.—Or, the requisite ‘primary’ in the case in question may be that same thing which has been produced in the attached form and the like (but is misconceived as being detached or otherwise).—(668-669)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has been argued (under Text 659, above) that—“the notion of being attached that appears with regard to what is detached, etc. etc.”—The answer to this is provided in the following—[see verses 668-669 above]

That all Misconceptions appear only through the perception of similarity (to a primary) cannot be admitted; because there are some misconceptions which are produced, independently of all similarity, merely through some disorder in the sense-organs. For instance, when a man has the fancies of his Mind turned elsewhere, though what is actually before the eyes is a single Moon, yet, on account of the sense-organ concerned (the Eyes) being deranged by disease and darkness, there appears the cognition furnished by the form of two Moons; and this is quite clear and free from all taint of being entirely fanciful.

The phrase ‘while the Mind is turned elsewhere’ shows that the notion of ‘two moons’ is entirely indeterminate in character; the idea being that in an indeterminate notion, there can be no perception of similarity; as this latter is always in the form of the cognition of some sort of unity between the thing seen now and that seen previously; and as such, it must be of the nature of some verbal expression relative to the previously perceived thing.

Or, granting that the previous Misconception is in the wake of a Primary Cognition,—even so, what the other party desires cannot be proved.—This is what is shown by the words—‘Or, the requisite Primary, etc. etc.’—The phrase ‘and the like’ is meant to include the thing born in the detached form. What is meant is that the same thing,—produced as attached or detached,—when conceived of as precluding things of the other kind, comes to be spoken by a name applied to it in accordance with that (attached or detached) form which has been perceived first; and this may be regarded as the Primary (of the later misconception of the same attached thing as detached, or vice versa). So that the argument adduced by you does not prove what is desired by you.—(668-669)