The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 665 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 665.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

संयोगमात्रसापेक्षा यदि तु स्युर्जलादयः ।
योगानन्तरमेव स्यात्कार्यमेतेन वा भवेत् ॥ ६६५ ॥

saṃyogamātrasāpekṣā yadi tu syurjalādayaḥ |
yogānantarameva syātkāryametena vā bhavet || 665 ||

If the water, etc. needed the conjunction only, then they would appear immediately on their coming together (conjunction),—or not appear at all.—(665)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

If the Soil, Water and the rest needed only their Conjunction to bring about their effect in the shape of the sprout, then it should come about as soon as they come into contact with one another; because the Cause would be there in its perfect form,—exactly as it does later on. If the effect does not appear immediately on their first contact, then it should not appear at ah, even later on; as the Cause would even then be as defective as on the previous occasion. Nor would it be reasonable to suppose that the soil, etc. are dependent upon Conjunction which does not help them at all; as such a theory would lead to absurdities.—Nor again is it right to regard the Con-junction as appearing only occasionally; as the cause (basis) in the shape of the soil, etc. is always there.—It might be held that—“in the bringing about of the Conjunction also, there is need for such forces as those of ‘Destiny’ and the like—Rut this cannot be right; because the same objection would be applicable against that view also. For instance, what would be the answer to the question—‘Why does not the said Destiny bring about the effect at once?’—The answer might be that—“it does not do so, because the requisite urge is absent in the Cause”,—Then comes the Question—why should there be this absence of the requisite urge?—Such Questions would be everywhere inevitable under the theory of Causes being permanent entities.—For one, on the other hand, who holds all things to be impermanent (momentary),—as the chain of all (momentary) causes is beginningless, there can be no possibility of the anomaly of all things being produced at one and the same time; because the succeeding causes would all be restricted by the preceding ones (in the same Chain), and hence the Causes of these could not be present at the same time by reason of their own causes not being present in their perfect condition. Thus it is only under your doctrine that there is possibility of the anomaly of the Soil, etc. producing the sprout at all times; hence it becomes established that the Soü, etc. do not require any such distinct thing as ‘Conjunction—(665)

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