Verse 664

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

उच्यते क्षणिकत्वेन नाविशेषा जलादयः ।
सत्त्वेऽप्यव्यवधानादि तेऽपेक्षन्ते दशान्तरम् ॥ ६६४ ॥

ucyate kṣaṇikatvena nāviśeṣā jalādayaḥ |
sattve'pyavyavadhānādi te'pekṣante daśāntaram || 664 ||

The answer to the above is as follows:—The water and the rest do not remain the same, as all things are momentary.—Even when existent, they stand in need of that condition in which there is nothing intervening between them.—(664)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

With the following Text, the Author proceeds to answer the above arguments of Uddyotakara:—[see verse 664 above]

It has been argued under Text 654 above that—“Seed, etc. would always be producing their effects”; but the reason that has been urged—that they are not differentiated—i.e. they remain the same,—is not true, not admitted by us; because all things being in ‘perpetual flux’, it is only in a particularly differentiated condition that they are productive of their effects.

It has been argued under Text 655 above, that—“The soil, etc. are dependent upon something else, etc.”.—If this is meant to prove merely the general fact that they are ‘dependent’,—then the argument is superfluous (proving what is already admitted by us); this is what is shown by the words ‘Even when existent, etc. etc.’; that is, it is held by us also that the seed, etc.—even when existent,—become capable of producing their effects in the shape of the sprout only when they are in that condition in which there is nothing intervening between them and so forth; so that on this point the argument of the Opponent is superfluous.—The term ‘avyavadhāna’ means that condition in which there is nothing intervening and so forth.—The phrase ‘so forth’ includes such factors as the absence of obstruction, etc.; that is to say, that particular condition in which (a) there is nothing intervening, (b) there is no remoteness among them, (c) there is no obstruction by a contrary force;—all these being obstacles to the appearance of the effect. And as the ‘condition’ of a thing is nothing different from the thing itself, the argument put forward does not prove the existence of Conjunction as something distinct.

If then what is intended by you to prove is the fact of the Seed, etc. being dependent upon a different thing in the shape of what you call ‘Conjunction’,—then, as your Reason, not being found to be concomitant with any such character, becomes ‘Inconclusive’; and the Corroborative instance also is devoid of the Probandum. This is what is meant by the Text.—(664)

The following might be urged:—“How do you know that the soil and the rest are dependent upon a particular condition of their own, in becoming the cause of producing the effect in the shape of the sprout,—and they are not dependent upon the Conjunction of something different from themselves? and it is on the strength of this that you urge against us the fact of our argument being superfluous if mere dependence is meant to be proved”.

The answer to this is provided in the following—[see verse 665 next]