The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 490-491 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 490-491.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

क्षणस्थायी घटादिश्चेन्नोपलभ्येत चक्षुषा ।
न हि नष्टाः प्रतीयन्ते चिरातीतपदार्थवत् ॥ ४९० ॥
कार्यकारणभावोऽपि प्रत्यक्षानुपलम्भतः ।
ते पूर्त्ति(नैवैति?)सिद्धिं भावानां स्वभावानुपलम्भनात् ॥ ४९१ ॥

kṣaṇasthāyī ghaṭādiścennopalabhyeta cakṣuṣā |
na hi naṣṭāḥ pratīyante cirātītapadārthavat || 490 ||
kāryakāraṇabhāvo'pi pratyakṣānupalambhataḥ |
te pūrtti(naivaiti?)siddhiṃ bhāvānāṃ svabhāvānupalambhanāt || 491 ||

“If the jar and such things existed only for one moment, then they could not be perceived by the eye; as things that have been destroyed are never cognised,—as is found in the case op things long past.—The relation op ‘cause and effect’ cannot be apprehended by means op ‘perception and non-apprehension’, because the nature of things is not apprehended at all”.—(490-491)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Having thus shown the impossibility of the relation of ‘Cause and Effect’, the Opponent proceeds to show the impossibility of any Means of Cognising such relation:—[see verses 490-491 above]

The Relation of Cause and Effect is sought to be proved through Perception (of Effect only when the Cause is present) and Non-apprehension (of the Effect when the Cause is absent). Under the circumstances, if Things were momentary, as they could not be in existence at the moment of their cognition, they could not be perceptible; as the relation of Cause and Effect is not possible between things existing at the same moment. Thus there is no possibility of Perception or Non-apprehension (in support of the momentariness of things); specially because ‘Non-apprehension’ also is only a form of ‘Perception’, being, as it is, of the nature of the apprehension of a Thing as not related to anything else; and hence there being no use for it when there is no apprehension of any thing. Such being the case, how could the relation of Cause and Effect be proved through Perception and Non-apprehension?—(490-491)

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