Verse 418

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

सत्तासम्बन्ध इष्टश्चेद्वस्तूनां लक्षणं न तत् ।
असिद्धेः समवायादेः कथं वाऽन्योऽन्यलक्षणम् ॥ ४१८ ॥

sattāsambandha iṣṭaścedvastūnāṃ lakṣaṇaṃ na tat |
asiddheḥ samavāyādeḥ kathaṃ vā'nyo'nyalakṣaṇam || 418 ||

If the characteristic feature of ‘entities’ be held to consist in being related to existence (being),—that cannot be right; because no such relation as that of ‘inherence’ and the like is known to subsist between them. how too could they be the characteristic feature of one another?—(418)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

[Says the Opponent]—“Capacity for effective action is not the characteristic feature of entities; it is ‘being related to existence’, i.e., the ‘Inherence of existence (Being)’, that is their characteristic feature.”

The answer to this is—That cannot be right; i.e. that cannot be the right characteristic feature of entities;—because no such relation as that of ‘Inherence’ and the like is known to subsist between them; the phase ‘and the like’ is meant to include ‘existence’. If any such relation as Inherence and the like were known to subsist between them, then ‘Inherence’ might be the characteristic feature of ‘entities as a matter of fact however, it is exactly those relations whose existence the opponent has set out to prove; and also because there are valid proofs to the contrary. Or even the proofs already adduced before may be regarded as setting aside ‘existence’ (Being) as well as ‘Inherence The reason for this lies in the fact that ‘Existence’ or ‘Being’ can have no relation with anything, as it cannot be helped by anything; and there can be no relation between things that are not helpful to one another; if there were such relation, it would lead to an absurdity.—Further, it behoves you to explain what is the characteristic feature of ‘Being’ (Existence), ‘Inherence’ and of the ‘ultimate specific Individualities’,—which feature marks them out as ‘entities’, As a matter of fact ‘Existence’ (or ‘Being’, does not inhere (subsist) in either ‘Inherence’ or in ‘the ultimate specific Individualities nor does it subsist in ‘Being’ or ‘Existence’ itself. In fact, the theory (of the opponent) is that what the presence of existence (or Being) marks out as ‘entities’ are only the three categories of Substance, Quality and Action.—Thus the characteristic feature proposed is found to be too narrow (not applicable to all the things in question).

Even granting that such entities as ‘Existence’ and the rest do exist;—the ‘inherence of existence’ cannot be the characteristic feature of entities; because it is an entirely different thing; when one thing is entirely different from another, it cannot constitute the form of the latter; and thereby serve as its characteristic feature. Thus, when a person is found whose mind is bewildered by his ignorance of the real character of ‘entities’, if a definition of their characteristic feature is provided, what should be pointed out as the required feature is some character in the thing in question itself which serves to differentiate it from something else; so that through that character, the nature of the thing could be determined; e.g. the Earth is distinguished as characterised by roughness of surface. One thing cannot constitute the form of another thing; for if it did, then it would not be anotherng at all; how then could it form its characteristic feature? Specially because the term ‘characteristic feature’ in the present context stands for the nature or character ofngs.—(418)