Verse 419-421

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

सर्वश्चार्थविचारादिव्यापारोऽर्थक्रियार्थिनः ।
निराकुलधियो युक्तो नोन्मत्तकतया पुनः ॥ ४१९ ॥
तन्न यन्नाम केषाञ्चित्कथञ्चिदुपयुज्यते ।
क्वचित्कदाचित्तत्रैव युक्ता सत्ताव्यवस्थितिः ॥ ४२० ॥
तद्रूपस्यैव चार्थस्य क्षणिकत्वं प्रसाध्यते ।
व्याप्तिः सर्वोपसंहारा तस्मिन्नेवाभिधीयते ॥ ४२१ ॥

sarvaścārthavicārādivyāpāro'rthakriyārthinaḥ |
nirākuladhiyo yukto nonmattakatayā punaḥ || 419 ||
tanna yannāma keṣāñcitkathañcidupayujyate |
kvacitkadācittatraiva yuktā sattāvyavasthitiḥ || 420 ||
tadrūpasyaiva cārthasya kṣaṇikatvaṃ prasādhyate |
vyāptiḥ sarvopasaṃhārā tasminnevābhidhīyate || 421 ||

All operations bearing upon the consideration of things are to be carried on by one who has an undisturbed intellect and seeks to accomplish a useful purpose,—not by one who is demented. hence it would be right to determine the existence of only such a thing as would be of use to some people, at some place, at some time and in some way. it is in reference to such a thing that we are proving the momentariness; and it is only with reference to such things that the universal premiss has been asserted.—(419-421)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Some people argue as follows:—“That entity which in its ultimate form does not bring about any cognition even for the Omniscient Person,—what would be the proof that would establish the non-existence of such an entity,—by virtue of which such a universal proposition could be asserted that ‘whatever exists is momentary’? Nor would the non-cognition of such an entity vitiate the omniscient character of that Person, as His omniscience applies to only such things as are cognisable; it is only when a man does not know what is knowable, that he is regarded as not omniscient; while the said entity is not knowable; because, even though its cognition could be produced, it would remain incapable of being cognised.”

Against these people, the author directs the following remarks:—[see verses 419-421]

Whenever there is any consideration as to anything being existent or non-existent, it is done by one who seeks to accomplish some useful purpose,—and not because he is addicted to the habit of considering things; as otherwise he would be regarded as a demented person. Hence an intelligent person can seek to determine the existence of only such things as could be of use to persons seeking to accomplish a useful purpose, in some way, directly or indirectly, at some place, and at some time; and not anything else; as there would be no basis for such consideration, and no useful purpose would be served by it.

The term ‘ādi’ is meant to include the consideration of such particular things as Fire, Water and the like.

Thus what we are trying to prove is the momentary character of only thosengs which are capable of accomplishing some useful purpose of intelligent men, and which alone are known as ‘entity’, ‘thing’, and which have the said character of being capable of accomplishing a useful purpose. And as what we have cited as the Reason is the ‘capacity for fruitful action’, there is no fallibility in such a Reason, and it is only such a Reason which is found to be actually invariably concomitant, in the universal form, with the Probandum (Momentarrness). That Premiss is said to be ‘universal’ which asserts the universal concomitance of the Reason, without any distinction between what is actually known to contain the Probandum and what is not so known.—(419-421)

The following texts answer the question why the character of ‘entity ‘thing,’ cannot be attributed to what is devoid of the capacity for effective action:—[see verses 422-424 next]