Verse 415-416

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तद्रूपस्यानुवृत्तौ तु कार्यमुत्पादयेत्पुनः ।
अकिञ्चित्कररूपस्य सामर्थ्यं चेष्यते कथम् ॥ ४१५ ॥
सर्वसामर्थ्यशून्यत्वात्तारापथसरोजवत् ।
असन्तोऽक्षणिकाः सर्वे शक्तिर्यद्वस्तुलक्षणम् ॥ ४१६ ॥

tadrūpasyānuvṛttau tu kāryamutpādayetpunaḥ |
akiñcitkararūpasya sāmarthyaṃ ceṣyate katham || 415 ||
sarvasāmarthyaśūnyatvāttārāpathasarojavat |
asanto'kṣaṇikāḥ sarve śaktiryadvastulakṣaṇam || 416 ||

If, on the other hand, the form of the efficient cause continues (after having brought about the effects), then it should produce the effect over again; because, how could any efficiency be attributed to what is not effective in bringing about due effects? Thus all things would be non-existent and momentary,—like the ‘sky-lotus’,—on account of their being devoid of all efficiency; because—it is efficiency (for effective action) that constitutes the characteristic of (existing) ‘things’.—(415-416)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

If the second alternative is accepted, then, as the form of the thing, in the shape of its causal efficiency, would continue,—it should produce its effect over again; because it will not have abandoned its previous form, just like its previous condition; and thus there would come about the same succession of effects. This shows that the doctrine of simultaneity is contrary to Inferential Reasoning.

It might be argued that—“It may be that the effective action of the Permanent Thing is neither successive or simultaneous; and yet its efficiency may be there all the same,”

In answer to this, it is said—‘How could any efficiency, etc. etct.’—When the efficiency of things is determined, it is only on the basis of their bringing about their effects; so that when ang does not bring about any effect, how could it be efficient? Otherwise, why could not efficiency be attributed to the ‘sky-lotus’ and other such things also?

Bays the Opponent—“Even though the efficiency of the Thing has disappeared, the existence of the Thing is still there (it still exists); and as it would be in existence, your Reason becomes Inconclusive.”

Answer:—‘Thus all things could be non-existent, etc. etc.’—The only characteristic of an existing thing is that it should have the capacity for effective action; if this capacity has disappeared, how could existence, the characteristic feature of the entity, remain there?

Thus it is established that Ākāśa and other things which are held to be non-momentary (permanent) can only be regarded as ‘non-existent’,—like ‘the son of the Barren Woman’,—because they are devoid of the capacity for effective action, functioning either successively or simultaneously.—(415-416)