The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 376 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 376.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

वस्त्वनन्तरभावित्वं न तत्र त्वस्ति तादृशि ।
चलभावस्वरूपस्य भावेनैव सहोदयात् ॥ ३७६ ॥

vastvanantarabhāvitvaṃ na tatra tvasti tādṛśi |
calabhāvasvarūpasya bhāvenaiva sahodayāt || 376 ||

The character of ‘coming immediately after the thing’ does not subsist in the destruction as described; because the destruction in the form of the mobile (momentary) thing appears along with the thing itself.—(376)


Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The Subject (of the inference) in the form of ‘Destruction’ being as explained, the two Reasons,—‘because it is occasional’ and ‘because not having been in existence, it comes into existence’,—are duly admitted (by us also). As regards the character of ‘coming immediately after the thing’, if that is intended to be true only in a general way, then that too is duly admitted (by us), because its existence immediately after that thing which is the Cause is admitted by us.—If, however, what the other party means by ‘the Destruction coming immediately after the thing’ is that it comes immediately after that thing which forms its own self (essence),—then such a Reason is not admitted.—This is what is shown in the following—[see verse 376 above]

In the Destruction as described’, i.e. in the form not different from the nature of the mobile thing itself. There can be no ‘parts’ of a thing which is devoid of parts, by virtue of which such Destruction could come immediately after such a thing: because, like the nature of the Thing itself, its Destruction also comes about on the coming about of the thing itself; otherwise its forming the very nature of the thing would not be true; as already explained.—(376)

It has been argued above that ‘There is no basis for the notion that all Properties are destructible’ (under Text 371);—this also becomes rejected by what has been just said.—This is what is shown in the following—[see verse 377 next]

Like what you read? Consider supporting this website: