Verse 216

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तथा हि निश्चयात्माऽयमहङ्कारः प्रवर्त्तते ।
निश्चयारोपबुद्ध्योश्च बाध्यबाधकता स्थिता ॥ २१६ ॥

tathā hi niścayātmā'yamahaṅkāraḥ pravarttate |
niścayāropabuddhyośca bādhyabādhakatā sthitā || 216 ||

The ‘I-consciousness’ always functions in the form of a definite cognition; and between a definite cognition and a mere indefinite conception, there is always the relation of ‘the annuller and the annulled’,—(216)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following might be urged—“Just as, for you, even though the Blue and other things are actually perceived, yet disputes arise in regard to their momentariness and other characters, which are held to be non-difîerent from the nature of those things in the same manner, there might be dispute regarding the Existence, etc. of the Soul also”.

The answer to this is provided in the following Text:—[see verse 216 above]

In the case of Blue and the rest, it is only right that even though they are apprehended by Perception, there should be a dispute regarding their momentariness and other properties; because the Perception of these things is always indeterminate (vague, undefined) in character, and as such not conducive to any definitely certain cognition; and hence there can be no definitely certain cognition of their momentariness and such other properties.—In your case however, it would not be right; because the notion of ‘I’ is well-defined and definite (according to you) and hence of the nature of a definitely certain cognition,—so that the notion of the Soul also would be definitely certain;—and where a thing has been the object of a definitely certain cognition, there can be no room for any assumed conception to the contrary; by virtue of which any dispute could arise; specially as when there are two contrary notions, one must annul the other. In fact, it is in the very nature of definitely certain cognitions regarding their objects, that they bring about well-ascertained notions of their objects; so that, if they do not bring about these well-ascertained notions, it follows that they do not apprehend the objects at all.—(216)