Verse 217-218

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तस्मादिच्छादयः सर्वे नैवात्मसमवायिनः ।
क्रमेणोत्पद्यमानत्वाद्बीजाङ्कुरलतादिवत् ॥ २१७ ॥
अथ वाऽऽध्यात्मिकाः सर्वे नैरात्म्याक्रान्तमूर्त्तयः ।
वस्तुसत्त्वादिहेतुभ्यो यथा बाह्या घटादयः ॥ २१८ ॥

tasmādicchādayaḥ sarve naivātmasamavāyinaḥ |
krameṇotpadyamānatvādbījāṅkuralatādivat || 217 ||
atha vā''dhyātmikāḥ sarve nairātmyākrāntamūrttayaḥ |
vastusattvādihetubhyo yathā bāhyā ghaṭādayaḥ || 218 ||

Thus it follows that desire and all the rest cannot subsist in the ‘soul’;—because they appear successively,—like the ‘seed—sprout—creeper’.—Or, all psychical (subjective) concepts must be regarded as having their forms obsessed by ‘absence of soul’,—because of such reasons as ‘being things’, ‘being existent’ and so forth,—just like the jar and other external objects.—(217-218)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Having thus demolished the Opponent’s doctrine, the Author proceeds to set forth his own view:—[see verses 217-218 above]

The argument is to be formulated as follows:—Things that are produced successively can not subsist in the Soul,—e.g. Seed—Sprout—Creeper;—Pleasure and the rest are produced successively; hence they are found to be beset by a concomitance to what is denied, (by the Opponent); because ‘successive origination’ is invariably concomitant with ‘subsistence in what is not-Soul’, which is contrary to ‘subsistence in the Soul’ (which is what is desired by the other party). A reason annulling the desired conclusion is also available in the fact that the appearance of effects must be simultaneous when the cause is present in its perfect form.

Or,—there is also a more direct reason:—Things that are endowed with the character of being things, being products, having origin, and so forth,—all these are devoid of the ‘Soul’,—as is found in the case of such things as the Jar and the like;—and all such subjective (psychical) concepts as the Mind, Intellect, Pleasure, Pain and the rest appearing in the Living Body, are endowed with the said character of being things and the rest; [hence they cannot have any connection with any such thing as the Soul],—(217-218)