Proportional Representation

BY K V. KRISHNASWAMI AIYAR B.A., B.L.

We are all familiar with the ideas of ‘vote’ and ‘voting’. We vote for or against a measure or a rule which is to be made binding on us. By our vote we signify either approval or disapproval. We vote ‘aye’ or ‘nay’. We divide in opinion on the matter. In fact, the result is arrived at in some cases even by a physical division. Those who approve stand together, and those against form another group. This division may be expressed by a ballot as well. It is obvious that we divide the voters and the majority in the division wins.

We again vote to an office, a Mayor, a town councilor, a chairman or the like. Here we choose between two or more and again divide the voters to arrive at the result. When only two candidates compete for the office, an ordinary single shot ballot is all that is needed. But when more than two compete, we may not, by a single ballot, predicate the support of an absolute majority of those that go to the poll in favour of the chosen individual. In order to secure the decision of such a majority, many devices or methods are adopted.

A third object for which voting is resorted to is to constitute deliberative bodies to represent larger groups, like representative assemblies, committees, etc. In such cases the object is to constitute a body competent to make a decision on behalf of the electorate; in other words, instead of the electorate voicing forth its views directly on any matter, their voices are echoed by representatives of theirs. To carry the idea further, the electorate of many views send up their spokesmen, each to represent a view, to deliberate in the smaller representative body. It follows that each representative who is chosen represents a view i.e. is the representative of a class of people having a like view. The object of the voting, therefore, when we are constituting such a body, is to enable the discovery of like-minded people and help them to group together to choose spokesmen. The object is to condense together, by some process, all like-minded people, instead of dividing them. This object of voting, it will be perceived, is wholly different from its functions in the two other cases we have referred to above, and in order therefore that ‘voting’ may achieve this purpose, it will be necessary to adopt a system or method different from the one suited to the other two cases. But let us begin by considering first if the same methods would not serve the purpose.

If we utilise the ballot we are familiar with, when we accept or reject a measure or choose for an office, it has to be adapted to suit the conditions existing in constituting a body of many. There are many persons to be chosen, and consequently either the electorate should be divided into as many groups as there are persons to be chosen, giving each such group the right to choose its nominee, or we should retain the integrity of the electorate and give to each voter as many votes as there are seats to be filled.

Taking the second alternative first, it is obvious that we shall not be achieving the result we have in view by resorting to this method. Those among the electorate that form the largest majority among them, will monopolise all the seats with candidates of their own viewpoint, and the result will be that the constituted body will be one that will have nothing to deliberate upon but will consist of persons who are all of one view. It is certain that we are not constituting a body consisting of the spokesmen of the different views that may prevail in the electorate.

On the other hand, in some cases, even a majority rule may not be assured. If the party in majority misconceive their strength and put up too many candidates, it may happen that a discreet minority elect candidates of their own.

Let us now consider the first alternative viz., the system of dividing the electorate into groups. The first idea that one gets herein is the division into as many groups only as there are seats to be filled. The next and consequential idea is to divide the electorate into so many geographical divisions, each one of which will contain more or less an equal number of voters. That is to say, we divide the electorate into so many quotas by physical, territorial division, each quota being entitled to send a representative. Would this satisfactorily work? It is submitted it will not.

In the first place, we should remember each quota or division elects by the single-shot system, the representative being the man chosen by the majority. That means the minority who stood for a different representative have really not had their representative. They have not influenced the election. They have wasted their votes. And, as we have seen, those that constitute the largest majority in that group will alone command the election.

Then, in so choosing the several representatives, it may even happen that the party in majority in the constituency as a whole, may not even secure its due share of representation. To illustrate this last statement, let us assume that the total of the constituency is 450 and 5 members have to be elected. We divide the 450 into 5 divisions of 90 each. Suppose there are 4 groups of like-minded people, viz., reds, whites, greens and blues: and the result of the voting is as follows :-

1st division 50 whites and 40 reds.

2nd division 40 whites, 30 reds and 20 blues.

3rd division 50 greens and 40 reds.

4th division 40 greens, 30 reds and 20 blues.

5th division 50 blues and 40 reds.

Now, in the entire constituency, there are 180 reds and 90 each of whites, greens and blues. But the result of the election, as above shown, is that two whites, two greens and one blue have been elected, and no reds, though they are in a large majority. This is certainly an undesirable consequence.

Apart from this possibility, there are also other defects incidental to the single-shot ballot system. Firstly, it does not enable each voter to express his free choice. For example when one party runs two candidates against a third of another party, the voter in order to win his secondary object, viz., that the other party shall not win, may be tempted to give up the candidate of his own and vote for the other candidate of his party for the reason that he is more popular with the rest.

Then, even those who are not members of a party, subject to party discipline, and who, as members of the electorate, are free to choose the best amongst the candidates, may not be enabled to exercise their free choice. If they feel that a candidate of their own choice has poorer chances than another who, according to them, is only next best, they should be tempted to vote for that other candidate in preference, for the simple reason that no voter desires his votes to be wasted. This is a famliar idea to us, upon which unscrupulous candidates oftentimes play at the polling booth and even succeed. It is a psychology which is easily understandable and if any system should be commendable, it should respect this attitude of mind of the voter, and provide against the wastage of votes. The system must be one in which every vote will tell at the election.

Then there is the possibility of the creation of an immoral atmosphere due to the corruption and undue influence which party machines, and those that work them, are oftentimes responsible for. As we have said, there is a large mass of busily occupied and fairly-intelligent men who form a respectable portion in any electorate, and these are not allowed to make their free choice but are dragged with the current which specialists in the art of working party machines bring into existence. It often happens that "a little group of pot-house politicians, wire-pullers, busy-bodies, local journalists and small lawyers working for various monetary interests" capture a local organisation and put up a candidate not acceptable to the large unorganised mass above referred to. And yet these will find themselves almost compelled to vote for them. The system we have been dealing with might also encourage monetary corruptions in divisions in the electorate where the difference in strength between the two strongest parties is very small.

Lastly, it would be obvious that this system does not conduce in the slightest to carry out the principle of condensation of voters into spokesmen, to any extent. Within each division, it may be that many do not go to the poll at all, either by reason of indifference or for any other cause. Another section may vote, but having voted in the wrong way, would have wasted their votes.

We have thus seen that this system cannot yield the result that we seek to attain and we should therefore invent a system which would satisfy the following conditions:-

(1) Each voter must be represented by the man he wants. Towards that end he should be enabled to exercise his free choice in his vote without fear of any kind we have referred to earlier. He must have the assurance that his vote will have its effect in the make-up of the representative body and that it will not be wasted.

(2) Any citizen, not a member of any organised party and busy with his own occupation, must be in a position to make his will effective without much effort on his part or spending much time.

(3) The result should be such that, while majority rule is assured, minority representation would be safeguarded.

(4) The process, as we have seen, must, in order to result in the election of representatives in the electorate in every sense, be to group together like-minded persons and help them to choose spokesmen of their own.

It will be seen that the system of the single transferable vote fulfils all these conditions and we shall endeavour to show how that is.

Taking the idea contained in the fourth point first, it will be obvious that the representative chosen will not be a representative of the majority of the electorate but only of a share of them. That share would be the group of men of one mind in their choice of the candidate, and this constituency of like-minded voters must necessarily cut across any geographical divisions. They form a constituency by reason of their choice of the same man. Each voter in this constituency is to be reckoned only as a part of a group of persons standing up for one candidate and electing one, and consequently each voter need have only one vote and no more. That is how the idea of a single vote is derived. Each voter, understood and counted as a member of a group electing one, has only to vote for that one, and therefore has one and only one vote. If each voter can only vote for one and does so vote, all those who vote for the same candidate will be grouping themselves together by this expression of common will, though they may be miles apart and not members of any common, or even any, organisation.

Having developed the idea of the single vote, the conception of its transferability is an unavoidable consequence. Where groups are very large, the one man representation is obviously wholly inadequate. We cannot for that reason go upon the single vote to give multiple votes to some alone of the larger electorate. Consequently the idea of the same single vote being available, and of validity to elect other candidates as well, had to be thought of and the result was the giving to it the character of transferability at the option of the voter.

Now these two characters, the single vote and its transferability, satisfy also all the other conditions we have set forth above. The single vote ensures that minorities, while they get representation, can never rule. The transferability of the vote provides for the proportional representation of majorities. Majority rule is assured and minorities are not, at the same time, ignored.

Each man has his representative, for, either his first or his second or his third, etc., nominee will be chosen. He is free to exercise his choice without any fear that he is advancing the interests of a rival candidate or even of a candidate whom he does not prefer to his own favorite one. He would not be marking a preference for the rival candidate and so there is no fear that his vote will influence his rival's election. In fact, the rival has to depend on his own strength. As between two candidates of one's own party, the voter by giving his first preference to his favourite, but the less popular candidate, will not advance the interest of the rival, for, when the favourite is found to have no chance, the vote will go to the popular candidate who will be the second nominee. He may be certain he will never split the party vote.

The voter will not be hustled by any party machine or those that work there. His vote must tell in the election and the representative chosen is the representative of his choice. He is assured that his vote will not be wasted, as it must count for some one of his nominees and he has therefore the incentive also to go to the poll and thereby discharge his duties of citizenship.

No organization is needed amongst the voters. The organisation arises by reason of their voting for the same man. No time need be spent in ascertaining the chances of candidates or deliberating how one's vote will operate. You may vote as you will, and your will, will have its effect.