Some Aspects of Muslim Polity

BY PROF. S. V. PUNTAMBEKAR, M.A. (OXON),

BAR-AT-LAW

The revolt of Turkey against the Muslim conception of polity, society and religion, is one of the outstanding facts of modern Asiatic history. Writers like Amir Ali have claimed an extremely democratic character to the political and the social institutions of Islam. But today we find Muslim Turkey, the home and seat of Khalifas for the last four hundred years or more, revolts against the idea of Khilafat in the interests of true democracy and progress. The Khilafat theory and organisation are the very roots of the Muslim polity and society, rule and religion. Hence in order to understand the political value of Muslim ideas of polity, we must understand the Khilafat theory and organisation and see critically the real elements of political democracy in the Muslim polity as conceived by the early Arabs and their prophets and the Khalifas.

The modern State is not based on ideas of religious uniformity or racial identity. It is primarily a territorial and not a credal or tribal conception or unit. The forces which give it a unity, an organisation and a distinctness are partly geographical, partly historical and partly cultural. The feeling of neighbourhood and common attachment to the land dominate its mould. Common spirit and a feeling of common danger underlie its political activities. A feeling of common citizenship actuates its internal policy.

None of these elements are visible in the true Muslim State and polity. The idea of religion as laid down in the Kuran and the injunctions laid down therein to spread and to maintain that religion are the basic principles of Muslim polity and society. It is really a religious brotherhood or community. Within the community, every true Muslim is equal to the others religiously and to a large extent socially, though racial differences like those of Arabs and non-Arabs may raise some aristocratic tendencies in some racial groups. But the community never recognised a democratic form of government in its political activities and organisation.

Outside the religious community, as against the non-Muslims, there is no sanctioned feeling of real neighbourhood or common citizenship. On the contrary, the attitude is to be one of continuous warfare against unbelievers or ‘infidels’ till they are converted, enslaved or rooted out. Toleration of non-Muslims is a religious lapse on behalf of the Muslim sovereign. Only men of ‘the book’ could be allowed to live on payment of a capitation tax. But they are not real citizens, but subjects only tolerated and not loved or associated with or served as fellowmen. Others who may be polytheists, idolaters, atheists, etc. may be forcibly converted or murdered. There is no third alternative.

Muslim polity grew out of the needs of self-preservation of a primarily religious community. Therefore the aim of the polity, in theory and practice; was first to preserve and defend and then to spread and maintain the new religion. It did not arise out of the necessity of preserving or defending economic needs or advantages nor political ambitions nor ideals. The conception of religion being inspired by and laid out in the other world, is authoritarian and does not change. Hence whatever is laid down or enjoined upon in the inspired ‘Book of Utterances’ is not subject to discussion, change, or the influences and needs of environment. But a political community and its polity which grows out of economic needs and political ambitions, or the social needs of safety and security, cannot acquire an authoritarian character. Economic needs and political aims are laid out and based on earthly considerations and environment. Therefore its form and organisation cannot be permanently sanctioned but have an adaptable and alterable character. Here people's needs and individual ambitions and ideals count. Therefore in the case of a religious community growing into a political community, the polity of a theocracy naturally develops and its form and character remain authoritarian and imposed; while in the case of a real political community which has grown out of economic needs, or need of tribal security and safety, the forms of polity become various and acquire their monarchic, aristocratic or democratic character according to the dominance and wisdom of the classes who compose that particular community.

Any people who claim to be ruled by God or a God's representative in the interests of a particular Divine dispensation possesses a theocratic polity. With them, the ruler is the chief priest, and the chief priest is the ruler. Political power is the handmaid of the religious power.

Persons who govern claim a special authority to declare the Divine Will or to interpret it if it is already known. There is no place for individual conscience or interpretation. The right of free worship or free thought in religious and social affairs does not exist. The political authority which empowers order and discipline is therefore in the hands of such a special authority, uncontrolled by popular will or unrelieved by popular wisdom. The conception is authoritarian and not democratic.

Thus among the Muslims, the conception of the State and the Church is not differentiated, and when it becomes differentiated owing to the political conquests of the Turks, the State is only the police of the spiritual power. God is really the ruler. Khalifa is His agent on earth. He is to carry out the Kuranic Commands. Political power is for the maintenance and promotion of true religion. Both powers are in the hands of the Khalifa. But he exercises the lower one in the interests of the higher one. Thus politics is subordinated to religion. Sinners and apostates are considered to be seditionists and rebels. Non-Muslims cannot be full citizens.

This theocratic conception of the State and its ruler left no chance for the development of any democratic ideas of government. Modern democracy is a territorial representative democracy. Ancient democracy was a direct democracy. But the Muslim Khilafat or monarchy was an irresponsible monarchy. Excepting the Kuran, to none was allegiance due by the ruler. There was no right to rebel against Kuranic injunctions or Khalifa's orders and interpretations. It was both a sin and a sedition to do so. Thus it is evident that it was primarily an allegiance to a particular religion and its leader and not to the State and its ruler. There is no State apart from the religious community or church. It is only its temporal aspect and its police.

Muhammad, the Prophet, developed this theocratic conception and organisation of a religio-political community after his flight to Medina in 622 A. D. And the first two Khalifas, Abu Bakr (632-634 A. D.) and Umar (634-644 A. D.) who were his able and loyal successors succeeded in spreading it over the conquered countries and also perfecting it. As long as the succession to the Khilafat remained undisputed and the Khilafat remained undivided, the force of this absolutistic theocratic theory was great. But under conflicting theories about the election and the succession of the Khalifa, and the ensuing conflicts of their followers, the Khilafat split among three Khalifas in three parts of the world and came to be claimed by a number of houses whose members thought themselves to be its rightful holders. Its political power gradually decayed and was usurped by Turkish Sultans who were ambitious governors or officers and had conquered a large part of the Khalifa's territory for themselves. Such Sultanates or Amirates were established in various parts of the Muslim world, and some of them were new conquests of non-Muslim territories. These Sultans had very little religious power of their own, but had political power over the conquered territories. Therefore though they had accepted Kuranic teachings, still they tended to become powerful rulers and to look to their own stability and interests from the political point of view. No doubt they used their religious ideas to trouble or to oppress their subjects by depriving them of their civil and political rights and financial security. Still for the safety of their rule, they had to ally themselves with dominant races in the country who were non-Muslims and give to them some of their religious rights and political privileges. They often used them against their Muslim opponents in a civil or a foreign war.

In the early history of these newly-risen Sultanates, the authority of the Khalifas was formally retained. But later on, these Sultans and Amirs began to consider themselves to be the Khalifas of the age and the country of their rule. They claimed both political and religious supremacy. Though a strong body of ‘Ulemas’ or learned theologians had gradually arisen as being the true interpreters of Kuranic injunctions, and often proved to be a great check on the heretic or liberal tendencies of a sovereign, still it often happened that the tendency of the political and the religious power to unite in the person of the ruler asserted itself according to the theory of the Khilafat, namely, that the Sultanate (political leadership) and Imamat (spiritual leadership) should be in the hands of one person. These two powers were really two aspects of one power.

The other point about the Khilafat which deserves notice here is the theory of the so- called ‘election’ of the Khalifa by the entire Muslim world. This is considered to be a democratic element in the early Muslim polity. There is hardly any such theory as well as practice found fully accepted by the learned or the laymen among the Muslims. Muhammad never laid down any such theory. The practice of the election of the Khalifa after him has neither any uniformity nor continuity. None of the first four Khalifas was regularly elected by the body of Muslims as a whole. The so-called election was confined to the relations of Muhammad and the members of the Kuresh tribe. The Shias believed in the hereditary succession of Ali and his descendants. The Sunnis had no regular theory except that the Khalifas must be of the Kuresh tribe. Kharjites or puritans alone believed that a true Muslim, whoever he may be by race, can be elected by the whole body of the true believers as the Khalifas. But this school arose at the time of Ali and no Khalifa was really elected according to it notions. There was always some manipulation by the leading men and families of Mecca and Medina regarding the succession of a new Khalifa. After the death of Ali, the fourth Khalifa, either civil war or heredity decided the issue. Thus there cannot be said to be any democratic method of election when a new Khalifa succeeded the old. The reading of his name in the Khutba or public prayer was an approval after the event.

The Khalifa's or ruler's powers were absolute. They were not checked or controlled by any group of ministers or men regularly assembled. There was no parliament or assembly of men to control his resolutions and activities. There was no body of local or personal law which he could not override. There were no democratic ideas in the organisation of the State. There was no inalienable right in power, property or person, given to anyone except the ruler himself. The ruler was all in all. What pleased him had the force of law. What displeased him had the character of crime and sedition. Whatever he allowed to exist may be tolerated. It was only a measure of necessity or expediency, not a law based on any principle of justice or equality.

The ruler interfered personally in all matters whenever he wanted to do so. The executive departments were not fixed, nor were they well organised. They increased or decreased according to a ruler's wishes. Thus the government machine emanated from him and worked under him. He was the political head, the religious head, the judicial head and the executive head.

It is not possible to accept Sir Amir Ali's statement in The Spirit of Islam that "an examination of the political condition of the Muslims under the early Caliphs brings into view a popular government, administered by an elective chief with limited powers". There was no real election nor does Kuran leave any powers to the people. Muslim polity was largely a personal despotism unchecked by the people or the people's counselors and representatives. Non-Muslims had no civic rights. There was no common citizenship amongst the ruled and there was no responsibility of the rulers to the ruled. Thus there was no democracy in any sense. The results of the assertion of the old ideas of Muslim polity are being seen in the present revolution going on in Afghanistan. They do not leave any scope for necessary changes in politics and in society, and are again maintaining Afghanistan as a medieval stationary state. Turkey has destroyed old Muslim polity for the sake of her existence and progress. Afghanistan is re-emphasizing the old ideas of Muslim polity and society, for the sake of what, we do not know. But certainly it is not for democracy, social and political.