Vakyapadiya of Bhartrihari

by K. A. Subramania Iyer | 1965 | 391,768 words

The English translation of the Vakyapadiya by Bhartrihari including commentary extracts and notes. The Vakyapadiya is an ancient Sanskrit text dealing with the philosophy of language. Bhartrhari authored this book in three parts and propounds his theory of Sphotavada (sphota-vada) which understands language as consisting of bursts of sounds conveyi...

This book contains Sanskrit text which you should never take for granted as transcription mistakes are always possible. Always confer with the final source and/or manuscript.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of verse 3.9.85-90:

सदसद् वापि वस्तु स्यात् तृतीयं नास्ति किञ्चन ।
तेन भूतभविष्यन्तौ मुक्त्वा मध्यं न विद्यते ॥ ८५ ॥
निर्वृत्तिरूपमेकस्य भेदाभावान्न कल्पते ।
सदसद् वापि तेनैकं क्रमरूपं कथं भवेत् ॥ ८६ ॥
बहूनां चानवस्थानादेकमेवोपलभ्यते ।
यथोपलब्धिस्मरणं तत्र चाप्युपपद्यते ॥ ८७ ॥
सदसद्रूपमेकं स्यात् सर्वस्यैकत्वकल्पने ।
निर्वृत्तिरूपं निर्वृत्तेः सामान्यमथवा भवेत् ॥ ८८ ॥
कार्योत्पत्तौ समर्थं वा स्वेन धर्मेण तत् तथा ।
आत्मतत्त्वे गृह्येत सा चास्मिन् वर्तमानता ॥ ८९ ॥
क्रियाप्रबन्धरूपं यदध्यात्मं विनिगृह्यते ।
सङ्क्रान्तबिम्बमेकत्र तामाहुर्वर्तमानताम् ॥ ९० ॥

sadasad vāpi vastu syāt tṛtīyaṃ nāsti kiñcana |
tena bhūtabhaviṣyantau muktvā madhyaṃ na vidyate || 85 ||
nirvṛttirūpamekasya bhedābhāvānna kalpate |
sadasad vāpi tenaikaṃ kramarūpaṃ kathaṃ bhavet || 86 ||
bahūnāṃ cānavasthānādekamevopalabhyate |
yathopalabdhismaraṇaṃ tatra cāpyupapadyate || 87 ||
sadasadrūpamekaṃ syāt sarvasyaikatvakalpane |
nirvṛttirūpaṃ nirvṛtteḥ sāmānyamathavā bhavet || 88 ||
kāryotpattau samarthaṃ vā svena dharmeṇa tat tathā |
ātmatattve gṛhyeta sā cāsmin vartamānatā || 89 ||
kriyāprabandharūpaṃ yadadhyātmaṃ vinigṛhyate |
saṅkrāntabimbamekatra tāmāhurvartamānatām || 90 ||

85. A thing either is or is not. There is no third possibility. Therefore, excepting past and future, there is no middle course.

86. A thing, being free from distinctions cannot be in the nature of a sequence. How can one thing, whether it be existent or non-existent, be in the nature of sequence?

87. As many cannot co-exist, only one is perceived. And remembrance can only be according to perception.

88. If action is regarded as one, everything would be one, consisting of partly existent and partly nonexistent elements.

89. When it is perceived in its own form, that is, that which enables it to produce the fruit, that is its present time.

90. When, the series of momentary acts is cognised within and is reflected in one act of cognition, that is said to be its one-ness and its present-ness.

Commentary

[Action has been declared to be a process, a series of moments. The moment that is past is something which has been accomplished. As far as that moment is concerned, action is past. As far as the moment that is coming is concerned, action is still in the future. There cannot be a moment which is both past and future, existent and non-existent at the same time. Therefore action cannot be anything else than past or future. It cannot be present. Therefore, the meaning of a root cannot have present-ness as its attribute. How can a suffix expressive of the present also denote action which is not directly perceptible but is to be inferred? What is called being present cannot be the same as the fact of being a sequence, a process. That which is can have no sequence and that which is not cannot have it either. And there is no third category. Therefore, there is no such thing as action consisting of sequence, much less what is called present action. Nor would it do to say that a large number of moments, arranged in a sequence, is action and that it would be called present till the production of the ultimate result Because these moments cannot be simultaneous. Only one of them can be perceived at a time and that cannot have any sequence. Nor can we remember simultaneously a large number of moments perceived separately in a sequence. Because we never perceive the sequence and we cannot, therefore, remember it. We can only remember what we perceive. Nor would it do to look upon many moments as one action. Some of the moments are past, others are yet to come, that is, some are non-existent and others exist. How can one thing be composed of opposite elements? One is thus compelled to take another position, namely, that in the different moments, there is some common feature, which is action. This common feature can only be nirvṛtti, the fact or the fitness of being produced. Action would thus become a common feature existing in each moment and not a unity of a series of moments. There would be no kriyāvyakti at all. Each moment would not be action.]

The above objection is answered as follows: Action is One, a unification of moments. A sequence of moments, all having one purpose, is action. It is one, because it has only one purpose. Actions vary with purposes. Even though some moments arc existent and the others are not, action can be said to be present also. The present should be defined as prārabdhāparisamāptatvam—‘the fact of having been begun but not yet finished. A sequence of moments, all leading to the same result, if looked upon as One, even before the result is produced, can be said to be present. It is this unity which can produce the result. Every moment in the sequence can be said to be present. The whole thing can also be looked upon as follows: When a series of moments is reflected in one cognition, it appears as one and as being present. There can be a mental unification of things which have been experienced in succession, because the impressions of what was experienced are still fresh. It is only in this way that one can explain the cognition of collections. That what is remembered must have been experienced before is accepted by all. What has been experienced in succession can, however, be remembered simultaneously.)

An objection is now raised to what is taught in P.3.3.139

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