II, 2, 38

38. And on account of the impossibility of the connexion (of the Lord with the souls and the pradhāna).

Against the doctrine which we are at present discussing there lies the further objection that a Lord distinct from the pradhāna and the souls cannot be the ruler of the latter without being connected with them in a certain way. But of what nature is that connexion to be? It cannot be conjunction (saṃyoga), because the Lord, as well as the pradhāna and the souls, is of infinite extent and devoid of parts. Nor can it be inherence, since it would be impossible to define who should be the abode and who the abiding thing. Nor is it possible to assume some other connexion, the special nature of which would have to be inferred from the effect, because the relation of cause and effect is just what is not settled as yet^[1].--How, then, it may be asked, do you--the Vedāntins--establish the relation of cause and effect (between the Lord and the world)?--There is, we reply, no difficulty in our case, as the connexion we assume is that of identity (tādātmya). The adherent of Brahman, moreover, defines the nature of the cause, and so on, on the basis of Scripture, and is therefore not obliged to render his tenets throughout conformable to observation. Our adversary, on the other hand, who defines the nature of the cause and the like according to instances furnished by experience, may be expected to maintain only such doctrines as agree with experience. Nor can he put forward the claim that Scripture, because it is the production of the omniscient Lord, may be used to confirm his doctrine as well as that of the Vedāntin; for that would involve him in a logical see-saw, the omniscience of the Lord being established on the doctrine of Scripture, and the authority of Scripture again being established on the omniscience of the Lord.--For all these reasons the Sāṅkhya-yoga hypothesis about the Lord is devoid of foundation. Other similar hypotheses which likewise are not based on the Veda are to be refuted by corresponding arguments.