Verse 3338

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

प्रत्यक्षीकृतनैरात्म्ये न दोषो लभते स्थितिम् ।
तद्विरुद्धतया दीप्रे प्रदीपे तिमिरं यथा ॥ ३३३८ ॥

pratyakṣīkṛtanairātmye na doṣo labhate sthitim |
tadviruddhatayā dīpre pradīpe timiraṃ yathā || 3338 ||

When one has perceived the fact of there being no soul,—no defect can obtain a footing in him; because it is its contradictory. Just as when the bright lamp is there, there can be no darkness.—(3338)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Question:—“Even though He knows the World as soul-less, etc. how does he become omniscient?”

Answer:—[see verse 3338 above]

As a matter of fact, Omniscience follows from the removal of Hindrance of Afflictions and the Hindrance of cognisable things;—it is the Afflictions themselves, in the form of Love, Hate, etc.—which obstruct the perception of the real nature of things,—which are called ‘the cover of the Afflictions’; and ‘the cover of cognisable things’ consists in the want of capacity to discern all about things to be secured and to be rejected, and also the inability to describe them. Of these two, ‘the cover of the Afflictions’ is removed by the direct perception of the fact of there being no-Soul; and ‘the cover of cognisable things’ is removed by the faithful and intense and long-continued meditation upon the said Soul-less-ness* All these Afflictions—Love, Hate and the rest—have their root in wrong notions of the Soul, as has been found through positive and negative concomitance; and they do not proceed from the external things; because, even when the external thing is there, the said Afflictions do not appear without feelings of agreeableness, etc. (?); and conversely, even when the external thing is not there, they appear, when the man is face to face with agreeableness, etc. (?); and when the presence and absence of one thing do not follow the presence and absence of another thing, this latter cannot be the cause of the former; if it were so, there would be incongruities.

Nor can these Afflictions subsist in the Soul postulated by other philosophers; because such a Soul has been already rejected.—But even if such a Soul existed, there would be constant appearance of the Afflictions of Love, etc.; because the Soul, which ex-hypothesi, is the cause of the appearance and continuance of the Afflictions, would be always present in its perfect form; specially as the Eternal Cause cannot have any potencies imposed upon it by anything else, it could not stand in need of the help of anything else. All this has been discussed in several places.—Further, as one and the same thing has been denied to be the substratum of both the existent and the non-existent, it cannot be right to hold that these Afflictions subsist in anything.—From all this it follows that these Afflictions cannot be related to any Eternal Cause.

Nor can they proceed from the external things. They really proceed from the wrong notion of the ‘Soul For instance, unless one has the notion of ‘I’, he cannot have self-love; and unless he has the notion of ‘mine’, he cannot have the idea of anything being conducive to bringing pleasure to himself, and he cannot be attached to it as his ‘own’; Hatred also towards anything does not appear unless one recognises that it is conducive to

bringing pain to himself; because there can be hatred against what is not harmful to what is his own, or against what removes that harm.

Similarly with regard to Name, etc. also.

From all this it is clear that the notion of ‘Soul’, which has persisted from time without beginning, having been brought about, the repeated notion of similar ‘Souls’ is what produces the notion of ‘one’s own’; these two produce Love for ‘one’s own’; this produces Hatred and the rest; from this positive and negative concomitance, it is clearly known to all men, down to the very cowherd, that all these Afflictions—Love, etc.—have their root in the notion of ‘one’s own’, which proceeds from the notion of one’s self or soul.

Contrary to this idea of ‘Soul’ is the idea of ‘No-Soul’; because this rests upon a form quite the reverse of the former. It is incompatible too that both these—Soul and No-Soul—should be identical or co-exist in any one ‘Chain’; because these are as contrary to each other as the notions of ‘serpent’ and ‘rope’ with regard to the same object. Thus the doctrine of ‘No-soul’ being contrary to the doctrine of ‘Soul’, it becomes contrary to—incompatible with—Love, Hatred and other Afflictions also; just as Fire is contrary to the shivering caused by cold.:—Consequently, when one has directly realised the doctrine of ‘No-soul’—which is incompatible with all Defects and Aberrations,—its contrary—in the shape of the whole host Love and other defects—ceases to exist; just as Darkness ceases in a place flooded with light. It is in this way that the ‘cover of Afflictions’ becomes set aside by the realisation of the doctrine of ‘No-soul’.

The argument may be formulated thus:—When the contrary of a certain thing obtains a footing at a certain place, then that thing itself cannot secure a footing,—e.g. Darkness does not secure a footing at a place flooded with lamp-light;—there is perception of ‘No-soul’, which is contrary to the whole host of defects, in the Person who has realised the doctrine of ‘No-soul’; hence there is apprehension of the contrary.

The following might be urged—“When the mind is obsessed with the idea of ‘No-Soul’, there is no room for the appearance of its contrary, the idea of the ‘Soul’; similarly there is no room for the appearance of the idea of ‘No-soul’ when the Mind is obsessed with the idea of the ‘Soul’; because the incompatibility rests equally in both. Consequently (as practically all men have their minds obsessed with the idea of ‘Soul’) no one could have the idea of ‘No-soul’ at all; and to that extent your Reason is ‘inadmissible’.—There may or may not be the idea of ‘No-soul’; even as these two—‘Soul’ and ‘No-soul’ are not absolutely destructive of one another,—as is the case with Love and Hate, or Pleasure and Pain. Then again, what you have sought to prove is the absolute destruction (removal) of one by the other, and not mere absence of, co-existence; hence your Reason is also ‘Inconclusive As a matter of fact, too, we find Love, Hate and the rest appearing in their full force even in good men. For this reason also, your Reason is ‘Inconclusive’.”

It is not so,—we reply. If it were absolutely impossible for the conception of the doctrine of ‘No-soul’ to appear in the ‘chain’ of a man whose

Afflictions have not been destroyed,—then there would be no room for the appearance of the notion of ‘No-soul’; as a matter of fact, however, it is a fact of common experience that the notion of ‘No-soul’ presents itself before all men; and when this same notion is pondered over, it reaches to high stages,—just like the conception of a young woman,—and subsequently becomes quite clearly perceptible, and ultimately reaches the stage of direct perception,—as envisaging a directly perceived thing; how then can it be impossible for the notion of ‘no-soul’ to appear in the mind of men?

Then again, in a place wrapped in darkness, there is possibility of light appearing after some time;—so here also why should not there be the possibility of the appearance of the notion of ‘No-soul’?

It cannot be said that “the said conception of ‘No-soul’ cannot appear in any man;—which could lead to the appearance of the perceptional Cognition -Because, the reason has to be pointed out why this is not possible.

For instance, what would be the reason for no use being made of the said conception? Would it lie in the fact of no one wanting it,—and all activity of sane men being accompanied by some desire?—Or, even if they desire it, the sane man does not have recourse to activity, because he has no knowledge of what has got to be avoided,—and unless a Defect is known, it cannot be avoided.—Or, even though he knows the Defect, the man knows that the Defect is permanent and hence does not put forth any effort to remove it, because what is permanent cannot be removed.—Or, even if the Defects are not permanent, one recognises the fact of their having no cause and desists from any activity towards their removal,—because what is self-sufficient can never be set aside.—Or, even though they have causes, there is no certain knowledge of such causes, and hence one does not pay any heed to the said conception,—because, as in the case of disease, it could not be removed until its cause were definitely ascertained?—Or, even if their cause is known, is it that the intelligent man knows that cause to be eternal and hence does not dare to try to remove it,—because if the cause is present in its efficient condition, the effect cannot be restrained?—Or even though the cause is non-eternal, the man, seeing that Defects are inherent in all living beings, does not make an attempt to remove them,—because what forms the very nature of the thing cannot be set aside.—Or, if the Defects do not form part of the nature of the beings, the man desists because there are no means of removing them,—because unless the means is there, the end cannot be attained;—or, even if the means are there, its use would be impossible, because the man does not know them,—because what is not known cannot be used.—Or even though he knows the means, he does not employ them because he considers it impossible for the conception to reach—by jumping as it were,—the highest stage, on account of there being no re-birth, and hence the conception would continue to remain at the same stage at which it has already reached,—Or even granting that the conception does reach the highest stage, and by this appearance of their contrary, the Defects become destroyed;—but even so, he thinks that, like the solidity of Copper and other metals, it may be that the Defects are bound to appear again and hence he does not try to remove them?

Now, it cannot be admitted that the man does not want it (the removal of Defects). Because those persons whose minds are beset with sufferings due to Birth and other causes, and frightened at the prospect of Births and Rebirths,—do certainly want to have peace of mind; and when these people have acquired the true understanding of Disciples, this fear of Birth and Rebirth itself becomes the cause of their desire to seek for the conception of ‘Nosoul’, Those people who, by reason of belonging to a particular family, are by their nature bent upon doing good to others,—when they find the world suffering from the three kinds of Pain beginning with Tendencies and Dispositions, they are moved to compassion and begin to suffer for the sufferings of others; and giving up all idea of benefiting themselves, they come to look upon all living beings as their own ‘self’, and then concentrate themselves upon removing their sufferings; and in the case of these men, the said compassion itself is the cause of the appearance of the conception in question, Because it is extremely difficult to know and speak of what is imperceptible and its cause.—If it is asked—“What is the use in any sane man doing what is good for others?”—the answer is that the same doing good is the use or purpose; as this is highly desirable in itself.—Nor will this mean dependence upon others. Because the wish to do good to one’s self is based upon the assumed knowledge of the Soul; and doing good to others has been regarded by all good men as leading to desirable results. Then again, what the other party began to prove was the impossibility of any one wishing to proceed with the conception; well, even if he were an unintelligent person, why should he not wish to undertake even this much of activity? Hence he should have to say that “no one ever acts towards helping others, because it does not serve any useful purpose for himself”. And the impossibility of such a view has been already explained.—Further, while there are some people who are found to be past masters in the art of cruelty, taking delight in injuring others, without rhyme or reason, and pleased at the suffering of others,—there are yet others who are past masters in the art of mercy, taking delight in the happiness of others, pained at the suffering of others,—without any other cause; why should this not be possible?

Nor is there no knowledge of the nature of the Defects (to be removed). Because all such Afflictions and Defects as Love, Hatred, Delusion, Pride, Arrogance, Jealousy, Envy, etc.—following upon Calamities, Disappointments, the prosperity of one’s own self and that of persons related to him,—are such as have their nature fully known, as they continue to appear and disappear.

Nor are these Defects eternal; because they are always found to appear occasionally.—For the same reason, they cannot be without cause; because what has no cause does not depend upon anything else and hence cannot suffer any restrictions of time, place and character.—This same reason also sets aside the idea that their causes are eternal. Because the cause, in the shape of the Soul, etc., would be always there, and they would be independent of other things, as being eternal, they could not have any peculiar potency added to them; and under the circumstances, all the effects emanating from those causes themselves would be liable to be appearing simultaneously. From all this it follows, by implication, that their causes must be non-eternal.—And this non-eternal cause of the Defects also is one whose form is well-known.

Because the host of Defects like Love, Hatred and the like have their cause in the reverses experienced by one’s own self and also by people related to himself; as they always appear in accordance with the positive and negative concomitance of these latter.

Nor can the Defects be regarded as inherent in all living beings; because those living beings themselves are not admitted; in fact there is no object in the shape of the ‘living being’, whose properties these Defects—Love, etc.—could be. It is only something set up by Conception as something spoken of as ‘this’, as the whole idea of quality and qualified is purely conceptual, (fanciful).—If it be held that the Defects are to be regarded as the properties of living beings, because they are subjective in character—or because they are produced in the mind,—then also there is ‘inadmissibility’ and ‘inconclusiveness’. For instance, if the other party wishes to regard the Defects as objects and the Mind as the subject,—then he has to admit that the Mind is of the nature of the apprehension of things; as otherwise the Mind and the Thing could not be related as object and subject. And when the Mind is admitted to be of the nature of the apprehension of things,—it will have to be asserted that it is apprehended by a part of that same nature of itself; how else could it be apprehended? If it were apprehended by a form that did not exist, then there could not be the relation of object and subject. For instance, the Object does not exist in the form in which it is envisaged by the Cognition; and the Thing is not envisaged by the Cognition in the form in which it exists; so Cognitions would become objectless, and this would lead to the absurdity of all things being unknown.—From all this it follows that the character of apprehending things in their well-known forms constitutes its very nature; and it has been explained that the well -known form of things consists in being momentary, soul-less and so forth. Thus Cognition is of the nature of the apprehension of soul-lessness, not of the nature of the apprehension of the Soul.

As regards any other character of it, that can be postulated only by deluded people; and can proceed only from some adventitious circumstances; and not because that is its very nature; in fact it is like the notion of ‘serpent’ in regard to the Rope. It is for this reason that the host of Afflictions, even in their most blatant forms, are unable to shake the strength of the doctrine of ‘No-soul Because being due to adventitious causes, the Afflictions are never very firm. As regards the idea of ‘No-soul’, on the other hand, it forms the very nature of things and is also helped by Means of Cognition; hence it is strong and firm. Hence even though the hostility rests equally in both, yet it is the idea of the ‘Soul’ on which its contrary fastens itself,—not so the idea of the ‘Soul’ upon the other, because it is contrary to that.

Even for the man who holds the view that the external world does not exist, Cognition is of the nature of the apprehension of ‘No-soul’, not of the nature of the apprehension of the ‘Soul’; because this Soul does not exist. For instance, if, on the ground of the object (No-soul) not being existent, the Cognition be not regarded as of the nature of the apprehension of that,—then it must be admitted that the Cognition is of the nature of its own apprehension. Otherwise there would be no fixity regarding the Cognition either. The Soul too can be cognised only in the form of ‘No-soul’, ‘without a second’ and so forth,—not in any other form; as there would be incongruities as before.

From all this it follows that the Defects and Afflictions are not properties of living beings.

If the mere fact of the Afflictions being produced in the living beings leads to the assumption that they constitute the nature of these beings,—then there could be no possibility of getting rid of them, because there would be nothing definite and absolute regarding them. For instance, the notion of ‘Serpent’ is produced in the Rope, and yet it is set aside by the true Cognition when it appears.

Nor is the means of destroying the Afflictions impossible; because the means is always possible in the shape of the repeated Cognition of the character contrary to the cause of the Afflictions. For instance, those Afflictions, the repeated Cognition of the character contrary to which is quite possible, are capable of having their ‘Chain’ entirely cut off; as in the case of the Vñhi and other corns;—to this same category belong Love, Hatred and the rest;—hence the means of their destruction is quite possible.

Nor is it right that there can be no knowledge of these Means; because the knowledge of the cause of the Afflictions themselves provides the clear idea of what is hostile to them, in the form of the thing having a form contrary to those. And it has been already shown that it is the idea of ‘No-soul’ that envisages a form hostile to the Afflictions and destroys them.

Nor again is the upward trend rigidly fixed, as in jumping, because what is generated by each preceding repetition becomes observed in its very nature and hence indestructible, and as such it goes on producing fresh peculiarities in the subsequent efforts; and the reason for this lies in the fact that the substratum is a fixed one. Wisdom and the rest also are produced out of previous homogeneous seeds; not so jumping, etc. (?)—as is going to be explained later on.

Nor is another birth impossible; because it has been proved that the present life is an effect of the previous birth.

Nor is it possible for the Defects to come up again,—like the solidity of Copper and other metals. Because when their contrary, in the shape of the idea of ‘No-soul’, has become totally absorbed, it can never cease. In the case of the solidity of Copper and other metals on the other hand, its contrary consists in Fire; and as this can be there only occasionally, the solidity is there only when the Fire is not there; so that when the Fire disappears, it is only natural that the solidity should re-appear. The same cannot be the case with Impurities (Defects); even on the ceasing of the ‘Path’, the reappearance of the Defects does not always follow; as such a possibility would be annulled by the instance of Ashes, That is to say, after the Wood has been reduced to ashes by contact with Fire,—even if the Fire is removed, there is no reappearance of the Wood; so also in the case of the Defects, Hence your argument is inconclusive.

Then again, being adventitious, the Defects, from the very outset, are inefficient; how then could they have the capacity to set aside the ‘Soul-lessness’ that has become entirely absorbed? Certainly the nature of things cannot be set aside without special effort;—and no effort of intelligent men is possible towards the rejecting or acquiring of anything until the good and bad points of the things to be acquired and rejected have been duly perceived. And until the man has become very much upset, he cannot perceive good points in Defects and bad points in their contrary; for the simple reason that he has not been upset. People whose minds have not become perverted do not acquire things free from Defects as defective; they do not acquire the defective thing as gold. The idea of ‘No-soul’, however, can never be defective; because it is always free from all discrepancies and hence always good. For instance, when all impurities have totally disappeared, there cannot come in any discrepancies on the basis of the past perception of things;—nor can the presence of Love, Hatred and the rest bring about discrepancies in the shape of the burning of the Body and the Mind (?); nor any discrepancies relating to Birth, in the shape of Disease, etc. Because there are no Afflictions which alone bring about Birth. Nor is there any discrepancy in the shape of insipidity, as appears in the case of worldly pleasures; because the pleasures of calm and peace are never galling. Consequently it cannot be right to make any effort to get rid of this knowledge of ‘No-soul’. In fact, if there is any effort, it should be towards not losing hold of the said knowledge; specially because the Intelligence of man is by its nature partial to what is good.—Nor should there be an effort for the acquiring of the Defects; because they are all evū, being the abode of all troubles.

Thus the conception of ‘No-soul’ is quite possible; and when this reaches its highest stage, it has been found to bring about the clear Cognition of things; just as in the case of the love-lorn young man thinking of his beloved; in the case of such a man, there appear such illusory words as ‘I see her’, ‘I embrace her’ and so forth, and there are corresponding bodily reactions also.

Thus then our Reason cannot be regarded as ‘inadmissible’.

Nor is our Reason ‘Inconclusive’; because the idea of ‘No-soul’ envisages a well-established fact, and is consequently more powerful than the idea of the ‘Soul’, which is the reverse of it and hence not strong. Thus there is hostility between these two ideas.

Love and Hatred also proceed on the basis of the notion of ‘Soul’ which is not well-established; and they are not hostile to one another on account of their envisaging contrary forms. It is not due to mistake; because the two are not brought about by mistakes, and yet they are themselves mistaken, wrong. Nor is the hostility of these two well recognised; specially because both have their source in the notion of the Soul. For instance, it is only when one has the notions of ‘I’ and ‘mine’ that there appears Hatred against what hampers those, not otherwise;—and when both proceed from one and the same cause,—and are themselves of the nature of cause and effect,—they cannot be destructive of one another; just as there is none in the case of Smoke and Fire, both emanating from the same fuel; or just as in the case of the notion of ‘I’ and affection. If it were not so, there would be incongruities.—As regards their not appearing simultaneously, that is due to the Mind not having the capacity to project two similar mental images at one and the same time.—Nor is there any hostility between Pleasure and Pain. Because Pleasure and Pain are of two kinds—subjective and objective;—those that are subjective are associated with Hatred and Apologetic Spirit, and hence stand on the same footing as Love and Hatred, and hence are the reverse of one another; they envisage the same form of the Soul, and have their source in the idea of the same ‘Soul’, and they bear to each other the relation of cause and effect; hence there can be no hostility between them.—As regards the objective Pleasure and Pain, they are not restricted to different causes; hence there can be no hostility between them. Because when Pleasure proceeds from a certain thing, Pain also proceeds from the same thing when one becomes too much addicted to it; hence their causes are not necessarily different.—It is not so in the case of the ideas of the ‘No-soul’ and ‘Soul’.—Further, in the case of Pleasure and Pain, they are of equal strength, because both proceed under the influence of their objective,—not so between the ‘Path’ and the ‘Defects’; of which latter the ‘Path’ is the stronger, because it envisages an accomplished fact; not so the ‘Defects Then again, Pleasure and Pain do not continue for a long time;—not so the idea of ‘No-soul’; because having become absorbed, it never ceases; as has been explained above. Hence there is no falsity in our Premiss.—As for the two not appearing at the same time, the reason for this has been already explained.

It has been argued that even for those who have cognised the doctrine of ‘No-soul’ through Inference, Love and Hatred, etc. do appear.—But that is not right; because the idea of ‘No-soul’ consists of a mere Idea, clear and distinct, directly envisaging soul-less things, non-conceptual; and as envisaging well-ascertained things, it is not mistaken; it serves to uproot the idea of the ‘Soul’ and has, on that account, been described as ‘hostile’ to it; and it does not consist of the pondering of what has been ‘heard’ (learnt). Because the Impurities, which have become firmly rooted through repeated experience from time without beginning, go on being reduced gradually by the rise of their opposites, and hence come to be destroyed only gradually; not by merely hearing of the teaching once; as there is destruction of cold by the mere touch of Fire. When too the idea of ‘No-soul’, consisting of the cogitation of what has been heard, appears before one, the whole lot of Love and the rest do not remain there at all; in view of which our Premiss could be false. Because the Buddhists always set aside the presence of Love etc. by thinking of them as evil. It is for this reason that these people become recognised as having their greatness unbesmirched. The hostility too of the Idea of ‘No-soul’ towards love, etc. is affirmed for this same reason; because they become set aside as soon as the idea of ‘No-soul’ presents itself. When between two sets of things, one becomes set aside at the presence of the other,—then, on the rise of thé latter to its very height, the former becomes absolutely and entirely destroyed; e.g. the Fire-flame on the appearance of the rise of water;—and the Defects are liable to destruction in the presence of the idea of ‘No-soul’;—hence when this idea reaches its height, how could the Defects continue to exist?

Thus our Reason is not ‘Inconclusive’, And because it is present whenever the Probandum is present, it is not ‘contradictory’ either.—(3338)

Thus the ‘removal of the Hindrance of Afflictions’ having been established, the Author proceeds to describe the ‘removal of the Hindrance of Cognisable things’—[see verse 3339 next]