Verse 3135

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तथा षड्भिः प्रमाणैर्यः षट्प्रमेयविवेकवान् ।
सोऽपि संक्षिप्तसर्वज्ञः कस्य नाम न संमतः ॥ ३१३५ ॥

tathā ṣaḍbhiḥ pramāṇairyaḥ ṣaṭprameyavivekavān |
so'pi saṃkṣiptasarvajñaḥ kasya nāma na saṃmataḥ || 3135 ||

“For instance, one who has knowledge of the six ‘objects of cognition’, through the six ‘means of cognition’, would be ‘knowing all’ in an epitomised form; who is there who would not admit such an omniscient person?”—(3135)

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It might be urged that—‘If a man, through the six Means of Cognition—Perception, Inference, Analogy, Word, Presumption and Non-apprehension—cognises the six kinds of objects, he would be regarded as omniscient’;—but this also would be futile, proving what is already admitted. Because—(a) Perception being restricted in its scope to the five objects, in the shape of Colour, etc. cannot apply to Dharma and Adharma; (6) Inference also, envisaging the subject as related to the Probans which has been cognised by Perception, cannot appertain to Dharma and Adharma; because Dharma, etc.—are beyond the reach of the senses; hence no relationship of these with anything can be apprehended by Perception;—(c) as regards the Word, even though it appertains wholly to imperceptible things, yet through verbal cognition one cannot be regarded as ‘perceiving supersensuous things’; because verbal cognition, envisaging imperceptible things, cannot be of the nature of Perception; and the man who is wholly addicted to non-perceptional cognition can never be one ‘perceiving supersensuous things’;—(d) as regards Analogy, envisaging Similarity and its adjuncts, can never apply to Dharma and Adharma; as has been thus declared—‘Hence what is remembered would be qualified by similarity,—and this would be the object of Analogical Cognition; or the similarity as resting in that thing’ (Ślokavārtika—Analogy, 37);—(e) as regards Presumption, it envisages only a thing different from the one in question, which, as heard of or seen, would be inexplicable without that other thing; hence, it cannot appertain to Dharma and Adharma; as there is nothing either seen or hoard of, which cannot be explained without the presumption of Dharma and Adharma, Even if Presumption does envisage Dharma and Adharma—it cannot be of the nature of Perception; hence one who rests upon it cannot be said to be ‘directly perceiving Dharma and Adharma’;—(f) as regards Non-apprehension, as it envisages only the absence of cognisable things, it can never envisage Dharma and Adharma.—(3135)