The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 3048-3050 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 3048-3050.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

दोषाभावस्य चाज्ञानादप्रमाद्वयनास्तिता ।
कथं प्रतीयते येन भवेत्प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः ॥ ३०४८ ॥
अथाप्रमाद्वयासत्ताऽप्रतीतावपि गम्यते ।
प्रामाण्यं स्वत एवैवं विमतिः स्यान्न पूर्ववत् ॥ ३०४९ ॥
किमस्य वचनं मानं किंवाऽमानमथाप्यदः ।
अमानमेव सर्वेषां स्वतःप्रामाण्यनिश्चयात् ॥ ३०५० ॥

doṣābhāvasya cājñānādapramādvayanāstitā |
kathaṃ pratīyate yena bhavetprāmāṇyaniścayaḥ || 3048 ||
athāpramādvayāsattā'pratītāvapi gamyate |
prāmāṇyaṃ svata evaivaṃ vimatiḥ syānna pūrvavat || 3049 ||
kimasya vacanaṃ mānaṃ kiṃvā'mānamathāpyadaḥ |
amānameva sarveṣāṃ svataḥprāmāṇyaniścayāt || 3050 ||

When there is no cognition of the absence of defects, how could there be any cognition of the absence of the two kinds of invalid cognition,—from which the certainty regarding validity could be deduced?—And if, even when there is no cognition of the absence of the two kinds of invalid cognition, the self-validity (of the cognition) were cognised,—then, as before, there would be no doubt or misconception at all.—(3048-3049)

[The contrary cognition being in the form]—(a) ‘is his assertion true or untrue?’ (Doubt),—or (b) ‘it is absolutely untrue’ (misconception); [these would be ‘contrary’] because there is the certainty that all cognitions are valid by themselves.—(3050)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

[verses 3048-3049]:

Kumārila has again argued as follows—“Thus then, from excellences follows the absence of defects,—from this absence, follows the absence of the two forms of Invalid Cognition; consequently the general law remains undenied”, and so forth.—[Ślokavārtika 1. 1. 2; 65].

This also cannot be right, when there is no certainty regarding the absence of defects.—This is what is pointed out in the following:—[see verses 3048-3049 above]

If there came about a Cognition free from the Doubt and Misconception, which are ‘contrary’ to that Cognition,—then that Cognition should be valid; otherwise, if the matter were beset with the contrary notions, how could the general law come in at all? Because the two contrary notions, Doubt and Misconception, are effects of defects; hence there can be no certainty regarding the absence of these contrary notions, unless there is certainty regarding the absence of defects.

The absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition’—i.e. the absence of Doubt and Misconception.—(3048-3049)

[verse 3050]:

The following Text points out the ‘contrary Cognition’:—[see verse 3050 above]

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