The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 2037-2038 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2037-2038.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

ज्ञानादव्यतिरिक्तत्वान्नाकारबहुता भवेत् ।
ततश्च तद्बलेनास्ति नार्थसंवेदनस्थितिः ॥ २०३७ ॥
आकाराव्यतिरिक्तत्वात् ज्ञाने वाऽनेकता भवेत् ।
अन्यथा कथमेकत्वमनयोः परिकल्प्यते ॥ २०३८ ॥

jñānādavyatiriktatvānnākārabahutā bhavet |
tataśca tadbalenāsti nārthasaṃvedanasthitiḥ || 2037 ||
ākārāvyatiriktatvāt jñāne vā'nekatā bhavet |
anyathā kathamekatvamanayoḥ parikalpyate || 2038 ||

As the form would be not-different from the cognition, there could not be a multiplicity (variety) of forms;—consequently, on the basis of that there can be no apprehension.—Or, the cognition, being not-different from the forms, should be many (multiple). if not, then how can these two be regarded as one and the same?—(2037-2038)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Question “Why should, Cognitions with forms be unreal?”

Answer:—[see verse 2036 above]

When one sees a bedspread of variegated colour, there should not be a multiplicity of forms (colours),—because, like the form of the Cognition itself, they are all not-different from the Cognition, which is one only.—Similarly, as the Cognition is not-different from the forms, it should be more than one.

There are some people who argue thus:—“In the case of the Bedspread of variegated colours, what happens is that there do appear simultaneously several homogeneous Cognitions, as many in number as there are forms (colours); as there is in the case of the Cognition of several diverse sounds. Hence the Reductio ad Absurdum that has been urged is futile”.

For these people, just as, in the ease of the Bedspread of variegated Colour, there are several forms that are cognised,—so in the case of the white sheet also which has only one form (colour),—as there are several forms in the shape of the nearer, remoter and middle parts of the sheet,—the Cognition would have to be multiple.

It might be said—“Yes; that is certainly our view”.

Well, then, it behoves you to explain which is the Cognition that is one.

“It is the Cognition that apprehends the Atom which has no parts.”

This is contrary to all experience. In no Cognition is the impartite atomic form ever found to appear.

In the case of incorporeal things, there can be no priority or posteriority due to space,—for the justification of which there would be some ground for assuming a multiplicity of Cognitions. The idea of extension in space being false, how can the forms be real? And yet there is no Cognition of the Cognition of Blue, etc. apart from the appearance of the Blue, etc. that have extension in space. Hence the assuming of a multiplicity of Cognitions is entirely futile.—(2037-2038)

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