The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1658-1659 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1658-1659.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अभावशब्दवाच्यत्वात्प्रत्यक्षादेश्च भिद्यते ।
प्रमाणानामभावो हि प्रमेयाणामभाववत् ॥ १६५८ ॥
अभावो वा प्रमाणेन स्वानुरूपेण मीयते ।
प्रमेयत्वाद्यथा भावस्तस्माद्भावात्मकात्पृथक् ॥ १६५९ ॥

abhāvaśabdavācyatvātpratyakṣādeśca bhidyate |
pramāṇānāmabhāvo hi prameyāṇāmabhāvavat || 1658 ||
abhāvo vā pramāṇena svānurūpeṇa mīyate |
prameyatvādyathā bhāvastasmādbhāvātmakātpṛthak || 1659 ||

“The negation of the means of cognition must be different from perception and the rest,—because it is spoken of by the name ‘negation’,—like the negation of cognisable things.—Or the negation (of things) must be cognised through a means which is of the same nature as itself,—because it is something cognisable,—just like the positive entity. For these reasons, this means of cognition must be of a nature different from the positive.”—[Ślokavārtika-negation, 54-55].—(1658-1659)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Question:—Negation may be a Means of Cognition; but why should it be different from Perception and the rest?

Answer:—[see verses 1658-1659 above]

The ‘Negation of Perception and the other Means of Cognition’ must be regarded as a Means of Cognition different from Perception and the rest,—because it is spoken of by the name ‘Negation’,—just like the negation of cognisable things.

Or, the cognisable object named ‘Negation’ may be the subject (Minor Term),—the Probandum regarding it being that ‘it is cognisable through a Means of Cognition of the same nature as itself’;—‘because it is a cognisable object’ is the Probans;—the cognisable object called ‘positive’ is the Corroborative Instance. From this it follows that the Means of Cognition which is of the same nature as the cognisable ‘negation’ must be distinct from Perception and the rest which are positive in character,—(1658-1659)

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