Verse 1584-1586

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अन्यः प्रमान्तरास्तित्वं साधयत्यनुमाबलात् ।
प्रत्यक्षमनुमाभिन्नप्रमाणान्तरसङ्गतम्ष ॥ १५८४ ॥
अनुमावत्प्रमाणत्वादनुमाऽप्येवमेव च ।
(नैव)मप्रतिबन्धोऽयं हेतुर्बाधाप्रकाशनात् ॥ १५८५ ॥
चतुष्ट्वं च प्रमाणानां व्याहन्येतैवमेव ते ।
यत्तत्र परिहारस्ते स एवात्र भविष्यति ॥ १५८६ ॥

anyaḥ pramāntarāstitvaṃ sādhayatyanumābalāt |
pratyakṣamanumābhinnapramāṇāntarasaṅgatamṣa || 1584 ||
anumāvatpramāṇatvādanumā'pyevameva ca |
(naiva)mapratibandho'yaṃ heturbādhāprakāśanāt || 1585 ||
catuṣṭvaṃ ca pramāṇānāṃ vyāhanyetaivameva te |
yattatra parihāraste sa evātra bhaviṣyati || 1586 ||

“Another party seeks to prove the existence of another form of cognition, on the strength of inference, thus perception is connected with a form of cognition different from inference, because it is a form of cognition, like inference. Similarly inference also.”—This is not right; as the probans cited is not invariably concomitant (with the probandum); and specially because nothing is put forward which would negative the contrary of the desired conclusion.—Further, in this way, you would be running counter to the doctrine of ‘four forms of cognition’. The answer that you would have to that would also serve here.—(1584-1586)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Aviddhakarṇa notices the view that “there are only two Means (or Forms) of Cognition; and there is no object of Cognition apart from Specific Individuality and Commonalty (or the Universal)”;—and in refutation of this view, he puts forward the following arguments:—“(a) Perception has its companion in the shape of a form of Cognition in addition to Inference,—because it is a form of Cognition,—like Inference.—Or (b) Inference has its companion in the shape of a form of Cognition in addition to Perception,—because it is a form of Cognition,—like Perception. Similarly (c) Specific Individuality has for its companion a cognisable object in addition to the Universal,—because it is cognisable,—like the Universal.—Or (d) The Universal has for its companion, a cognisable object in addition to the Specific Individuality,—because it is cognisable,—like the Specific Individuality.”

This (view of Aviddhakarṇa) is what is set forth in the following—[see verses 1584-1586 above]

‘Saṅgatam’—connected, related.

This is only by way of illustration; it should be understood to apply to. the proving of the existence of other cognisable things also.

Nothing has been mentioned by way of negativing the Probans in the contrary of the Probandum; hence there can be no Invariable Concomitance between the Probans and the Probandum. Consequently all that has been cited as the Probans is Inconclusive; because their presence in the contrary of the Probandum is open to suspicion.

Then again, what is asserted goes against the doctrine that restricts the number of the Forms of Cognition to four; as in the way shown, the existence of other forms of cognition also might be proved. For instance, it can be said that—‘Perception has for its companion a Form of Cognition other than Inference, Analogical Cognition and Verbal Cognition,—because it is a Form of Cognition,—like Inference’.

Further Cognisable Things have been held to fall under three classes—viz.: Universal, Particular and Particular-Universal. This also would be contravened; as in the same way the existence of other Cognisable Things also may be proved.

Whatever answer you may have to these criticisms will serve my purpose also; so enough of this.—(1584-1586)