Verse 1513-1514

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

वचसां प्रतिबन्धो वा को बाह्येष्वपि वस्तुषु ।
प्रतिपादयतां तानि येनैषां स्यात्प्रमाणता ॥ १५१३ ॥
भिन्नाक्षग्रहणादिभ्यो नैकात्म्यं न तदुद्भवः ।
व्यभिचारान्न चान्यस्य युज्यतेऽव्यभिचारिता ॥ १५१४ ॥

vacasāṃ pratibandho vā ko bāhyeṣvapi vastuṣu |
pratipādayatāṃ tāni yenaiṣāṃ syātpramāṇatā || 1513 ||
bhinnākṣagrahaṇādibhyo naikātmyaṃ na tadudbhavaḥ |
vyabhicārānna cānyasya yujyate'vyabhicāritā || 1514 ||

What is the connection between words and external objects, by expressing which latter the words would be ‘true’ (valid)?—The connection between them cannot be of the nature of being the same in essence,—because they are apprehended by different sense-organs, and for other reasons. nor can the connection between them be that of one being produced from the other; because this is not true. Nor is there any other connection possible which could be true.—(1513-1514)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Having thus proved that both definitions of Verbal Cognition are defective, the Author points out objections to Verbal Cognition in general:—[see verses 1513-1514 above]

As a matter of fact, between Words and External Things, there is no such relation as that of sameness or of being produced,—by virtue of which relation, the words expressing such things would be regarded as true. For instance, the relation of sameness is not possible between them,—because of such reasons as their being apprehended by different sense-organs; i.e. words are apprehended by a sense-organ which is different from that by which the things are apprehended; for instance, word is apprehended by the Auditory organ, while things are apprehended by the Visual and other organs.—By ‘other reasons’ are included differences of Time, Place, Appearance, Causes.

Kumārila has argued as follows:—“The argument that, ‘one thing is different from another because they are apprehended by different sense-organs’, is not Conclusive; because in a case where the same colour is seen by several persons, the Colour will have to be regarded as different, because it is apprehended by different sense-organs. It might be argued that ‘all the sense-organs apprehending the Colour belong to the same universal ‘Eye’, so that the Colour is really perceived by a single sense-organ But, in that case, though ‘Being’ is perceived by several sense-organs, yet the Universal ‘Sense-organ’ being one, it would be perceived by the same sense-organ, and hence have to be regarded as one. For these reasons things have to be regarded as same or different, according as their cognitions are same or different,—and not according to the sameness or diversity of the sense-organs concerned”.

The actual words of Kumārila are as follows:—“That which is cognised by more sense-organs than one does not (on that account) become diverse; for, if it were so, then any and every object would have to be regarded as diverse on the ground of its being cognised by the sense-organs located in the bodies of different persons.—If it be urged that ‘in this case the sense-organs of all persons would be of the same category or class, and as such, in a way, identical’,—then we could have the same in the other ease also, the class ‘sense-organ’ being one and the same. The class ‘Being’ also is not regarded as diverse, even though it is perceived by diverse sense-organs,—because it is always recognised as the same”. (Ślokavārtika—Sense-perception, 156-157.)

This however is not right. Even when the difference is based upon the difference of cognitions, what has been urged remains equally applicable to what is meant to be proved (by the Opponent). For instance, in regard to the case in question also, the following might be said:—That the difference among things is due to the difference in cognitions is not true (conclusive); for instance, when several persons perceive Colour, there is diversity of cognitions,—and yet the Colour is not diverse; if one-ness (sameness of the Sense-organs) is assumed on the basis of the eyes of all persons belonging to the same class ‘Eye’, then the same sameness may be attributed to Colour, Taste and other things also, because even though these Cognitions are diverse, yet they all belong to the one class ‘Cognition’; and this would be a direct contradiction of the assertion that ‘Colour, etc. cannot be regarded as one,—because their cognitions are different’ (found in Ślokavārtika—Sense-perception, 158).

Thus the answer provided (by Kumārila) is of the nature of a ‘Futile Rejoinder’.

If it be urged that—“Just as, even -when there is difference in the Specific Individualities, there are certain characteristics upon the difference or non-difference of which people regard things as different or non-different, and treat them as the basis of conceiving of things as one or diverse; this is what we mean by the difference and non-difference of cognitions”,—all this would be equally applicable to the case of Sense-organs also. So enough of this.

‘Nor can the connection, etc, etc,’;—that is, the relation between Words and Things expressed by them cannot be that of being produced by them; as this would be not true; because even wdien the Thing is not there, the Word may be there, through the mere wish of the speaker.

Nor is there any other kind of inseparability between the two, except that of Cause and Effect; if any such were postulated, it would lead to absurdity.

From all this we conclude that the Word cannot serve as a valid means of cognition of the thing spoken of by it.—(1513-1514)