Verse 1304-1305

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तत्त्वान्यत्वोभयात्मानः सन्ति जात्यादयो न च ।
यद्विकल्पकविज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षत्वं प्रयास्यति ॥ १३०४ ॥
अन्वयासत्वतो भेदाद्भेदेनाप्रतिभासनात् ।
अन्योन्यपरिहारेण स्थितेश्चान्यत्वतत्त्वयोः ॥ १३०५ ॥

tattvānyatvobhayātmānaḥ santi jātyādayo na ca |
yadvikalpakavijñānaṃ pratyakṣatvaṃ prayāsyati || 1304 ||
anvayāsatvato bhedādbhedenāpratibhāsanāt |
anyonyaparihāreṇa sthiteścānyatvatattvayoḥ || 1305 ||

As a matter of fact, universal and the rest do not exist, either as non-different, or as different, from (individuals),—by virtue of which the conceptual cognition of those could have the character of ‘perception’.—(a) [They cannot be the same as the individuals] because there is no comprehensiveness. (b) [Nor can they be different from the individuals] because they do not appear as different from the individual.—(c) [Nor can they be both different and non-different] because difference and non-difference always remain mutually exclusive.—(1304-1305)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The Universal and the rest (if they existed) could be either (a) non-different from the Individuals,—or (6) different from them,—or (c) both, different and non-different.

(1) The first alternative cannot be right; because there is no comprehensiveness; i.e. there is absence or negation of pervasion; that form is called ‘Universal’ which pervades over several things; there is no such ‘pervasion’ among individuals, whereby they themselves could become the ‘Universal’; if there were such pervasion, the entire universe would come to be of the same form; so that there could be no Universal at all; as the Universal must subsist in several things.

(2) Nor is the second alternative possible [i.e. the Universal, etc. cannot be different from the Individuals]; ‘because they do not appear as different from the Individuals’;—the term ‘bhedāt’ stands for Individuals;—and what does not appear cannot be perceived. This has been thus declared—‘Individuals do not pervade over one another; there is no other pervasive entity; how then can anything be different from Cognition?’

(3) Nor is the third alternative possible; ‘became the two views of difference and non-difference are mutually exclusive’,—that is to say, when two things are mutually exclusive, the negation of one must mean the affirmation of the other; and difference and non-difference are so mutually exclusive, because the nature of one is such that it must preclude the nature of the other. Hence there can be no third alternative (in addition to difference and non-difference).—(1304-1305)