The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 686 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 686.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

भावनाख्यस्तु संस्कारश्चेतसो वासनात्मकः ।
युक्तो नात्मगुणश्चेदं युज्यते तन्निराकृतेः ॥ ६८६ ॥

bhāvanākhyastu saṃskāraścetaso vāsanātmakaḥ |
yukto nātmaguṇaścedaṃ yujyate tannirākṛteḥ || 686 ||

The momentum called ‘impression’ is of the nature of an impress on the mind. it cannot be a quality of the soul; because this has been rejected.—(686)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following Text states the objections against the Momentum named ‘Impression’:—[see verse 686 above]

If Impression is postulated only in a general way as the cause of Remembrance, then the argument proves what is already admitted and is therefore futile. Because it is already admitted (by us) that the cause of Remembrance consists in Impression which is a form of the Mind itself,

being a potency produced in it by a previous apprehension; this is known by the name of ‘Vāsanā’, ‘Conception’.—If what is meant to be proved is Impression as a Quality of the Soul, then, as such an impression will never have been found to be concomitant with Remembrance, the Reason would be Inconclusive; and the Conclusion also would be one that is annulled by Inference. And inasmuch as its intended substratum, the Soul, has already been discarded before, and hence cannot exist, its quality also would be non-existent.—This argument may be formulated as follows:—When a number of things subsist in another thing, they can have no subsistence if the latter thing is non-existent,—e.g. the picture cannot exist if the wall is not there;—and under the Opposite party’s view, the Momentum in question is subsistent in the Soul;—hence there is found in it a character that is contrary to what is concomitant with the Probandum. Hence what is desired is not proved. Specially as the Soul itself has been previously discarded. Thus the net result of the means of Right Cognition bearing upon the matter is that Impression should be regarded as being of the nature of an impress upon the Mind, and not a quality of the Soul. The sense is that while the former view is supported by proofs, the latter is not so supported.—(686)

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