Verse 680-681

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

निःस्वभावतया तस्य तत्त्वतोऽम्बरपद्मवत् ।
न सिद्धा नियता धर्माः कल्पनारोपितास्तु ते ॥ ६८० ॥
तथैवोक्तावनेकान्तो वियत्पद्मादिभिर्यतः ।
अभेदो व्यतिरेकश्च वस्तुन्येव व्यवस्थितः ॥ ६८१ ॥

niḥsvabhāvatayā tasya tattvato'mbarapadmavat |
na siddhā niyatā dharmāḥ kalpanāropitāstu te || 680 ||
tathaivoktāvanekānto viyatpadmādibhiryataḥ |
abhedo vyatirekaśca vastunyeva vyavasthitaḥ || 681 ||

In reality, the ‘group’ is absolutely feature-less; hence, like the ‘sky-lotus’, it can have no specific properties; they are all figments of imagination.—Even when stated in this form, the reasoning adduced would be ‘fallible’, in view of things like the ‘sky-lotus in fact, ‘non-difference’ as well as ‘difference’ rests always in an object.—(680-681)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

If what is meant to be the Reason is the presence of real specific properties, then it cannot be regarded as ‘admitted’ (by both parties); because for the Bauddha, it cannot be admitted that the ‘Chain’ and other things which have merely ‘illusory existence’ are endowed with any real specific properties.—If however the Reason is meant to be put forward only in a vague general sort of way, then such imaginary properties as ‘non-existence’, ‘incorporeality’ etc. are present also in the ‘sky-lotus’ and such things;—hence the Reason adduced becomes ‘fallible’, ‘inconclusive

‘Even when stated in this form’,—i.e. if the assertion is made in a vague general sort of way, without reference to any well-determined specific properties.

For the following reason also the Reason is ‘fallible—inconclusive’:—Because ‘non-difference’—sameness—and ‘difference’—being something else,—rest always in an object,—not anywhere else. The ‘Chain’ and other things have a mere ‘ideal’ existence, and as such are not objects; how then could there be any difference or non-difference from these?

Thus then, it has been shown that, in the first argument (propounded by Aviddhakarṇa), if what is meant to be proved is merely the denial of the non-difference of Number, etc. from Substance,—then there is ‘futility’.—(680-681)

It might be argued that—“it is not mere denial of non-difference, that we seek to establish, but, in view of the fact that two negatives make one affirmative, by means of the two negatives we are seeking to prove the difference of Number, etc. from Substance”.

This is the reasoning that is refuted in the following text:—[see verse 682 next]