Verse 213-214

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तदयुक्तमहङ्कारे तद्रूपानवभासनात् ।
न हि नित्यविभुत्वादिनिर्भासस्तत्र लक्ष्यते ॥ २१३ ॥
गौरवर्णादिनिर्भासो व्यक्तं तत्र तु विद्यते ।
तत्स्वभावो न चाऽऽत्मेष्टो नायं तद्विषयस्ततः ॥ २१४ ॥

tadayuktamahaṅkāre tadrūpānavabhāsanāt |
na hi nityavibhutvādinirbhāsastatra lakṣyate || 213 ||
gauravarṇādinirbhāso vyaktaṃ tatra tu vidyate |
tatsvabhāvo na cā''tmeṣṭo nāyaṃ tadviṣayastataḥ || 214 ||

This is not right; because as a matter of fact, the form of the ‘soul’ does hot become manifest in ‘I-consciousness’; therein is not perceived any manifestation of eternality, omnipresence and such properties (postulated of the soul); what is clearly present therein, on the other hand, is the ‘fair complexion’, etc.; and the ‘soul’ is not held to be of the nature of these latter;—hence the ‘soul’ cannot be an object of ‘I-consciousness’.—(213-214)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The fact of ‘I-consciousness’ having the ‘Soul’ for its object cannot be regarded as proved; as the form of the ‘Soul’ is not present in it. This argument may be formulated as follows:—When one thing is devoid of the form of another, it cannot have this latter for its object; e.g. Sound is not an object of visual perception;—the notion of ‘I’ is devoid of the form of the Soul; hence if it were regarded as its object, it would be contrary to the universal proposition stated above.—That the Probans of this argument is not ‘unproven’ is shown by the Text in the words—‘There is not perceived any manifestation of Eterrmlity and Omnipresence, etc. etc.’;—that is to say, the Soul is held to be eternal, omnipresent, intelligent and so forth; not the slightest manifestation of these characters is perceived in ‘I-consciousness’; the manifestation that is perceived in ‘I-consciousness’ is all in connection with ‘fair-complexion’ and other conditions of the body,—as is apparent in such expressions as ‘I am fair,—with weak powers of vision,—lean,—beset with acute pain’ and so forth. From this it is deduced that I-consciousness, which is thus found to appear as connected with the conditions of the Body, envisages the Body.—‘Clearly present’;—it is said to be clear, because it is never found to fail.

This argument serves to reject the following statement made by Uddyotakara and others:—“The character of ‘Soul’ is figuratively (indirectly) attributed to the Body which is only the locus of experience,—just as when speaking of a satisfactory servant, the King says—‘He is what I am’”.—This assertion becomes rejected; because if such an attribution (notion) were figurative and indirect, then it would be liable to be false; because in the case of the Lion and the Boy, when the Boy is figuratively spoken of as the ‘Lion’,—the notion of ‘Lion’ can never be true in ref erence to both the Boy and the Lion.—It might be urged that “the Body and the Soul are actually spoken of as distinct, in such expressions as ‘My body, etc.’; and to that extent, the said figurative attribution does become false—But it is not so; as it might be possible to regard the notion of ‘Soul’ with regard to the Soul also as false; as in this connection also, we find such expressions as ‘My Soul’, where there is a distinction made between the two.—If it be urged that “in this case the distinction is assumed”,—then the same may be said in regard to the other case also.

“Even if the expression ‘I am fair’ is used in its direct sense, why should not the Soul be the object of this notion?”

The answer is—The Soul is not held to be of the nature, etc.—i.e. of the nature of ‘fair-complexioned’, etc.; for the simple reason that it is not possible for the Soul to have any such qualities as Colour and the like.—(213-214)