The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 142-143 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 142-143.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अतद्रूपपरावृत्तमृद्रूपत्वोपलब्धितः ।
कुम्भकोशादिभेदेषु मृदात्मैकोऽत्र कल्पते ॥ १४२ ॥
नीलपीतादिभावानां नत्वेवमुपलभ्यते ।
अशब्दात्मपरावृत्तिरबीजा कल्पनाऽपि तत् ॥ १४३ ॥

atadrūpaparāvṛttamṛdrūpatvopalabdhitaḥ |
kumbhakośādibhedeṣu mṛdātmaiko'tra kalpate || 142 ||
nīlapītādibhāvānāṃ natvevamupalabhyate |
aśabdātmaparāvṛttirabījā kalpanā'pi tat || 143 ||

In the case of such diverse things as the jar, the pail and the like, it is found that all of them are of the nature of clay, which differentiates them from all that is not-clay; and on the basis of this it is assumed that in all these there subsists the one ‘clay-nature’—no such nature however is perceived in the case of such things as the blue, the yellow and so forth; hence the assumption of any such one nature as is preclusive of all that is not-sound would be absolutely baseless.—


Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Another reason put forward (in support of the view that the World is produced out of Sound) is—“because all things are permeated with Sound-forms”; the following Text proceeds to show that this Reason is ‘unproven’, ‘Inadmissible’:—[see verses 142-143 above]

As a matter of fact, there can be no one comprehensive notion of all things; everything has its own specific character, and thereby differentiated from homogeneous as well as heterogeneous things; whenever they are regarded as permeated by a common character, it is only an assumption based upon the fact of that character serving to differentiate them from such, other things as are heterogeneous; for instance, in the case of such things as the Jar, the öup and the Pail, etc.—even though these are really distinct from, each other,—the common character of ‘Clay’ is assumed, on the basis of the exclusion of all that is not-Clay. Even this assumed ‘uniformness’, consisting of being permeated by the nature of Sound, is not possible in the case of the things in question,—such as, the Blue, the Yellow and the like because we do not perceive the Sound-character in the Blue, the Yellow and such things; and when you do not perceive such a uniform character in them, how can it be assumed that, being permeated by Sound-character is due to the preclusion of what is not of the nature of Sound? Thus the assumption is entirely baseless and hence the reason is ‘unproven’, ‘Inadmissible’.—(142-143)

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