Enumeration of Phenomena

400 B.C. | 124,932 words

*english translation* The first book of the Abhidhamma (Part 3 of the Tipitaka). The Dhammasangani enumerates all the paramattha dhamma (ultimate realities) to be found in the world. According to one such enumeration these amount to: * 52 cetasikas (mental factors), which, arising together in various combination, give rise to any one of... * ......

Part II - The Suttanta Pairs Of Terms



[1296, 1297] Which are the states that

(a) partake of wisdom?[2]

States which are the associates of wisdom.

(b) partake of ignorance?[3]

States which are the associates of ignorance.

[1298, 1299] Which are the states that have

(a) the likeness of lightning?[4]

The science[5] of the three lowest of the Noble Paths.

(b) the likeness of the thunderbolt?

The science of the topmost Path, the Path of Arahatship.

[1300, 1301] Which are the states that are

(a) foolish?[6]

Unconscientiousness and disregard of blame. Besides, all bad states are foolish.

(b) discreet?

Conscientiousness and fear of blame. Besides, all good states are discreet.

[1302, 1303] Which are the states that are

(a) dark?[7]

Unconscientiousness and disregard of blame. Besides, all bad states are dark.

(b) bright?

Conscientiousness and fear of blame. Besides, all good states are bright.

[1304, 1305] Which are the states that

(a) conduce to remorse?[8]

Misconduct in act, word and thought. Besides, all bad states conduce to remorse.

(b) do not conduce to remorse?

Good conduct in act, word and thought. Besides, no good states conduce to remorse.

[1306] Which are the states that are synonymous?[9]

That which is an enumeration, that which is a designation, an expression, a current term, a name, a denomination, the assigning of a name, an interpretation, a distinctive mark of discourse on this or that state.

[1306a] All states are processes of synonymous nomenclature.

[1307] Which are the states that are interpretative?

Answer as in § 1306.

[1307a] All states are processes of interpretation.

[1308] Which are the states that are expressions?

Answer as in § 1306.

[1308a] All states are processes of expression.

In this connexion,

[1309] What is name?[10]

The four skandhas and uncompounded element.

[1310] What is form?

The four great phenomena and the form which is derived from them.[11]

[1311] What is ignorance?

Ansiver as for 'dulness', § 390 (omitting 'on that occasion').[12]

[1312] What is the craving for renewed existence?

Answer as for the 'Fetter of the passion for renewed existence', § 1120.

[1313] What is speculative opinion about renewed existence?

Theories that both soul and world will be re-born, etc.

[1314] What is speculative opinion about existence not being renewed?

Theories that both soul and world will not be re-born, etc.

[1315] What is the sort of speculation known as Eternalism?

That both soul and world are eternal, etc.

[1316] What is the sort of speculation known as Annihilation?

That both soul and world will be dissolved, etc.

[1317] What is the sort of speculation known as the Finite Theory . . . [1318] the Infinite Theory?

That both soul and world are finite . . . infinite, etc.

[1319] What is the sort of speculation known as the Theory of Origins . . . [1320] the Theory of the Hereafter?

Theories concerning the ultimate past . . . concerning futurity.

All this sort of opinion,
walking in opinion,
jungle of opinion,
wilderness of opinion,
puppet-show of opinion,
scuffling of opinion,
the Fetter of opinion,
the grip and tenacity of it,
the inclination towards it,
the being infected by it,
this by-path,
wrong road,
this 'fordingplace',
this shiftiness of grasp

— this is what is called speculative opinion about renewed existence, and the rest.[13]

[1321] What is unconscientiousness? . . . [1322] disregard of blame?

Answers as for the ninth and tenth 'bases of corruption', §§ 1238, 1239.

[1323] What is conscientiousness?

The feeling of conscientious scruple when scruples ought to be felt, conscientious scruple at attaining to bad and evil states.

[1324] What is the fear of blame?

The sense of guilt where a sense of guilt ought to be felt, a sense of guilt at attaining to bad and evil states.[14]

[1825] What is contumacy?[15]

The being surly, refractious, contumacious when that which is in accordance with the Law has been said, contrariness, captiousness, want of regard, of consideration, of reverence, of deference.[16]

[1326] What is friendship with evil?

To follow after, to frequent the company of, and associate with,[17] such persons as are unbelievers, immoral, uneducated, meanspirited[18] and witless[19] to resort to and consort with them, to be devoted to them, enthusiastic about them,[20] and entangled with them.[21]

[1327] What is suavity?

The being gentle, tractable, amenable[22] when that which is in accordance with the Law has been said, the refraining from contradiction and from captiousness; the showing regard and consideration,[23] reverence and deference.

[1328] What is friendship with good?

To follow after, frequent the company of, and associate with, such persons as are believers, virtuous, well educated, generous and intellectual; to resort to and consort with them, to be devoted to them, enthusiastic about them, mixed up with them.

[1329-1332] What is skill in

arrow left  (a) the Offences?
  (b) restoration from the Offences?

arrow left  (c) the Attainments?
  (d) recovery from the Attainments?

That skill which is science, understanding, search, research, etc.,[24] when applied to

arrow left  (a) the Offences termed the Five Groups of Offences
        and the Seven Groups of Offences;[25]
   (b) restoration from [the effects of] those Offences;[26]

arrow left  (c) a case of Attainment[27] where 'conception works and thought discursive',
        a case of Attainment 'wherein is no working of conception, but only of thought discursive',
        a case of Attainment 'void of the working of conception and of thought discursive';
  (d) recovery from those Attainments.[28]

[1333] What is proficiency in the Elements?[29]

That proficiency which is


when applied to the eighteen elements, viz.:

sight, visual object and visual cognition,
hearing, sound and auditory cognition,
smell, odour and olfactory cognition,
taste, sapid object and gustatory cognition,
bodysensibility, the tangible and tactile cognition,
mind, mental object and representative cognition.

[1334] What is proficiency in attention?[30]

That proficiency in attention which is science, understanding, etc., when applied to those elements.

[1335] What is skill in the spheres?[31]

That skill which is science, understanding, etc., when applied to the twelve spheres, namely, sight and visual form, hearing and sound, smell and odorous object, taste and sapid object, bodysensibility and the tangible, mind and mental object.[32]

[1336] What is skill in the 'Conditioned Geneses'?

Science, understanding, etc., when applied to the formula:

'The syntheses come to pass because of ignorance;
cognition comes to pass because of syntheses;
name and form come to pass because of cognition;
the sixfold sphere comes to pass because of name and form;

contact comes to pass because of the sixfold sphere,
feeling because of contact,
craving because of feeling,
grasping because of craving,
renewed existence because of grasping,
birth because of renewed existence,
old age and death, grief, lamentation, distress, melancholy and despair come to pass because of birth.

Such is the uprising of this whole mass of Ill'.[33]

[1337, 1338] What is skill in affirming ... in negating [causal conjuncture]?

Science, understanding, etc., when applied to discerning that, in a given conjuncture, certain states are . . . are not, the cause and conditions of certain other states.[34]

[1339] What is upright?

Uprightness, without deflexion, twist, or crookedness.

[1340] What is soft?

That which is plasticity, gentleness, smoothness, pliancy, lowliness of heart.[35]

[1341] What is patience?

That patience which is long-suffering, compliance, absence of rudeness and abruptness, complacency of heart.[36]

[1342] What is temperance?

That which is the absence of excess in deed, in word, and in deed and word together.[37]

Besides, all moral self-restraint is temperance.

[1343] What is amity?[38]

When all such speech as is

harsh to others,
vituperative to others,
bordering upon anger,
not conducive to concentration,
is put away,

and when all such speech as is

pleasant to the ear,[41]
such as goes to the heart,
is urbane,[42]
sweet and acceptable to people generally

— when speech of this sort is spoken — polished, friendly and gentle language — this is what is called amity.

[1344] What is courtesy?

The two forms of courtesy: hospitality towards bodily needs and considerateness in matters of doctrine. When anyone shows courtesy it is in one or other of these two forms.[43]

[1345] What is it to have the door of the faculties unguarded?[44]

When a certain individual[45] sees an object with the eye[46] he is entranced with the general appearance, or in the details of it.[47] He does not set himself to restrain that which might give occasion for wicked states, covetous, dejected, to flow in over him, were he to dwell unrestrained as to the sense of sight. He keeps no watch over his faculty of sight, nor does he attain to mastery over it.

And so in like manner when he hears a sound with the ear . . . smells an odour with the nose . . . tastes a sapid with the tongue . . . feels a tangible with the body . . . recognises a mental object with the mind, he is entranced with the general appearance and in the details of it.

He does not set himself to restrain that which might give occasion for wicked states, covetous, dejected, to flow in over him, were he to dwell unrestrained as to the mental faculty.

He keeps no watch over the mental faculty, nor does he attain to mastery over it.

That these six faculties should be thus unguarded, untended, unwatched over, unrestrained, is what is called having the door of the faculties unguarded.

[1346] What is immoderation in diet?[48]

When anyone, through carelessness and without judgment, takes food[49] for purposes of sport,[50] sensual excess, personal charm and adornment, his insatiableness, immoderation, and want of judgment are what is called immoderation in diet.

[1347] What is it to have the doors of the faculties guarded?

When a certain individual sees an object with the eye he is not entranced with the general appearance or the details of it.

He sets himself to restrain that which might give occasion for wicked states, covetous, dejected, to flow in over him, were he to dwell unrestrained as to the sense of sight.

He keeps watch over this faculty of sight, and attains to mastery over it. And so in like manner, when he hears a sound with the ear . . . smells an odour with the nose . . . tastes a sapid with the tongue . . . feels a tangible with the body . . . recognises an idea with the mind, he is not entranced with the general appearance and the details of it.

He sets himself to restrain that which might give occasion for wicked states, covetous, dejected, to flow in over him, were he to dwell unrestrained as to the mental faculty.

He keeps watch over the mental faculty, and attains to mastery over it.

That these six faculties should be thus guarded, tended, watched over, restrained, is what is called having the doors of the faculties guarded.

[1348] What is moderation in diet?

When anyone takes food with reflection and judgment, not for purposes of sport, excess, personal charm and attractions, but so as to suffice for the sustenance and preservation of the body, for allaying the pangs [of hunger][51] and for aiding the practice of the higher life,[52] and thinking the while,

'I shall subdue that which I have been feeling and shall cause no new feeling to arise,[53] and maintenance shall be mine, blamelessness also and comfort'

— this content, moderation, judgment in diet is what is called moderation in diet.

[1349] What is forgetfulness?[54]

lapse of memory,
not bearing in mind,

[1350] What is lack of intelligence?

Answer as for 'ignorance' or 'dulness', § 1311, etc.

[1351] What is mindfulness?

Answer as in § 14, omitting 'on that occasion'.[55]

[1352] What is intelligence?

Answer as for 'wisdom' or 'science', § 16. And see § 53.

[1353] What is the power of computation?[56]

Answer as for 'wisdom', § 16.

[1354] What is the power of cultivation?

That which is the pursuing, the cultivating, the multiplying of good states.

Moreover, the seven factors in the Great Awakening[57] are the power of cultivation.

[1355] What is composure?

Answer as for 'quiet', §§ 11, 54.[58]

[1356] What is insight?

Answer as for 'insight' and 'wisdom', §§ 55, 16.

[1357] What is 'the mark of composure'?[59]

Answer as for 'quiet', § 1357.

[1358] What is 'the mark of grasp'?

Answer as for 'grasp' and 'energy', §§ 56, 13.

[1359] What is grasp?

Answer as for 'the mark of grasp', § 1358.

[1360] What is balance?

Answer as for 'balance', § 57.

[1361] What is moral failure?[60]

Excess in deed, excess in word, excess in both together. Moreover, all immorality is moral failure.

[1362] What is theoretic fallacy?[61]

'There is no such thing as alms, or sacrifice, or offering; there is neither fruit, nor result of good or evil deeds;
there is no such thing as this world or the next;
there is no such thing as mother, or father, or beings springing into birth without them;
there are in the world no recluses or brahmins who have reached the highest point, who have attained the height, who, having understood and realized by themselves alone both this world and the next, make known the same'

— all this sort of speculation . . . this is what is called theoretic fallacy. Moreover, all wrong views are theoretic fallacies.

[1363] What is moral progress?

Absence of excess in deed, in word, and in deed and word together'.[62]

[1364] What is progress in theory?

'There is such a thing as alms, sacrifice, and offering;
. . . fruit, and the result of good and evil deeds;
. . . this world and the next;
mother, father and beings springing into birth without them;
. . . recluses and brahmins who have reached the highest, who have attained the height, who having understood and realized by themselves alone both this world and the other world, make known the same'

— all this sort of

etc.[63] . . .

this is what is called progress in theory. Moreover, all right views are progress in theory.

[1365] What is purity in morals?

Absence of excess in deed, in word, and in deed and word together.[64]

[1366] What is purity in theory?

Knowledge of the specific nature of Karma;[65] knowledge of the Truths in their due order; the knowledge of him who holds the Path; the knowledge of him who holds the Fruit of the Path.

(i.)[66] The phrase 'Now purity of theory' is equivalent to that science, understanding . . . right theory (views) [described above, § 16].

(ii) In the phrase 'And as the struggle of him who holds certain views',[67] 'struggle' means that inception of energy etc. [described above, § 13].

(iii.) The phrase 'agitation' implies dread of birth, dread of old age, dread of sickness, dread of death.

(iv.) The phrase 'occasion of agitation' means birth, old age, sickness, death.

(v.) The phrase 'And the earnest struggle of him who is agitated' refers to [the four Eight Struggles]:

— When a bhikkhu brings forth the desire

(a) that bad and wicked states which have not arisen should not arise,
(b) that bad and wicked states which have arisen should be put away,
(c) that good states which have not arisen should arise,
(d) that good states which have arisen should stand firm, should not get confused, should be frequently practised, made to abound, cultivated, and perfected

— then he uses endeavour, sets energy a-going, reaches forward in thought and struggles.[68]

(vi.) The phrase 'And discontent in good states' means the longing for higher achievement in one who is dissatisfied over the cultivation of good states.[69]

(vii.) The phrase 'And the not shrinking back in the struggle' means the thorough and persevering and unresting performance, the absence of stagnation, the unfaltering volition, the unflinching endurance,[70] the assiduous pursuit, exercise and repetition which attend the cultivation of good states.

(viii.) The phrase 'Wisdom' means the threefold wisdom, namely

(a) reminiscent knowledge of one's former births,
(b) knowledge of the relapse and renascence of beings,
(c) the knowledge that makes an end of the Intoxicants.

(ix.) The phrase 'Emancipation' means the twofold emancipation, namely,

(a) detachment of thought,[71] and
(b) Nirvana.[72]

(x.) The phrase 'knowledge in making an end' means the knowledge he has who holds the Path.

(xi.) The phrase 'knowledge in origins' means the knowledge he has who holds the Fruit of the Path.

End of the Division entitled 'Elimination'.

Footnotes and references:


This title is discussed in my Introduction.


Vijjabhagino, i.e.,

"they (the dhamma) partake (bhajanti) of wisdom by way of association with it, they versantur (vattanti) as parts or divisions of wisdom"

(Asl. 50).

Of the eight modes of Buddhist vijja, viz.: knowledge born of insight (vipassanananam), the potency (iddhi) of the 'mental image', and the six forms of intuition (abhinna) — the first only is here referred to (cf D. i., p. 76 et seq., and Childers, s.vv.).

The reader will remember that vijja is a term borrowed by Buddhist ethics from Brahmanic doctrine. Cf. the expression tisso vijja, p. 358. It is almost equivalent to our ' lore'.

Six states are in the Anguttara (iii. 334) said to be vij ja-bhagiya.


Ignorance respecting the Four Truths. Asl. 51.


This and the following simile are gone into at some length (Asl. 388), as follows: Stage

  1. The traveller sets out in the gloom.
  2. He loses his way.
  3. Lightning flashes out and illumines.
  4. The road is made plain again.

So to the 'noble' disciple there is:

  1. the inception of insight making for the first (second or third) Paths;
  2. the obliteration of truth by darkness;
  3. the glory of the Path is revealed;
  4. the Four Truths are made plain.

But in the thunderbolt of the might of Arahatship won we get the simile of

  1. an all -penetrating power,
  2. the mystery of its coming.

Cf that of the wind as applied to Eegeneration, John iii. 8.


Panna, elsewhere rendered 'wisdom'. See § 17 and cf. n. 3.

'Science' is here to be understood, not so much in its modern sense of organized knowledge and organized methods of investigation and verification for the attaining and establishing that knowledge, as in the Platonic and Aristotelian sense of έπιστήμη, or the intellectual antithesis to opinion.


Bala, its opposite being pandit a, which partakes of paiina. See § 16, where the substantival form, pand ice am, is rendered 'erudition', and paraphrased (Asl. 147) as panditassa bhavo, the state of a icise person, one who has discernment, discretion, one who has 'chosen that good part' as contrasted with the 'average sensual person' or foolish youth.

With the answers cf. §§ 30, 31.


On kanha and sukka, used with ethical significance, see M. i., 389; Dhp., ver. 87; Mil. 200. (Cf 'Questions of King Milinda', i. 284, n. 2.)


Tapaniya. Whereas we, in 'remorse', bring into relief the 'ayenbite of inwyt', the Buddhist term refers to the flush of heat when the deed ill done is realized as such.


This and the subjects of the two following questions are adhivacana, nirutti and pannatti respectively.

The three are said (Asl. 51) to 'converge in meaning' (atthato ninnakarana), though their form is diverse.

In the phrase

'An increaser of luck is an increaser of wealth'

the terms are mutually delimitated. This is adhivacanam. . . .

In the phrase

'They construct (or combine, abhisankharonti), brethren, and are therefore "syntheses"',

there is a statement of fact together with the cause, as in discourse (abhilapa). . . .

In the phrase

'the ratiocination, conception, disposition [of the mind]' (see above, § 7),

something is set out on this wise or that; and this is pannatti.

It seems inferable from the foregoing that by adhivacanarn a simple equipollence of terms is to be effected. 'Is' or 'are', in translating, must be understood simply as = , and not as implying inclusion under a more general notion. The word occurs at every turn in the Cy., and has usually been rendered, in these footnotes, 'equivalent to'. Cf. a good instance in Jat. i. 117; Div. 491.

The second example and the comment adumbrate what we mean by explanation. But in the absence of the context it is not easy to gather much respecting pafinatti from the third passage cited.

Coming to the answer common to all three questions, the Cy. instances as the things which are classed (sankha), designated (samanna), expressed, and current (voharo) the names 'I', 'another', 'a man', 'cattle', 'Tisso', 'a bed', 'a house', etc.

Name is fourfold from the point of view of the grounds on which it is bestowed, viz.:

  1. given by general consent on a special occasion (samanfia-namam), e.g., that of the first King Mahasammato;
  2. given because of a personal quality (guna-namam), e.g., versed in the Vinaya;
  3. given because of a private wish or fancy (kittimanamam), e.g., naming of an infant;
  4. not given; of primeval origin; primordially fortuitous (opapatikanamani), e.g., 'moon', 'earth', etc.

See further § 1309, n.

Processes of nomenclature, etc. — adhivacanapatha, etc.

There is no being, no compound, concludes the Commentator, that is not somehow nameable. The very trees in desert and hill country will be named by country-folk. And if they admit to not knowing the name of any one kind, it will get the name of the 'nameless'. Cf. our OS innominatum, or the Pic Sans-nom, and the like.

'Distinctive mark' is vyanjanam.


Here the Cy. makes use of its foregoing classification of name-kinds to show under which head to rank nam a when distinguished from rupa. Nam a must, namely, be understood as opapatika-name, thatis, all its constituents must be so understood. Feeling, e.g., when it arises, is not named on the grounds on which a new individual, or an 'artificial kind' — table, etc. — might be named.

'One has not to take a name for it, saying, "Be thou called feeling!" The name has arisen together with it'

(p. 392).

'Uncompounded element' is here spoken of again a Nirvana. Ibid. See above, p. 166, n. 1.


Cf. § 584. The more concise form of question: tattha katamaip ... is now sustained till the end. Hitherto it has only been used to cross-question the student on the details of a given answer, on 'name', for instance, as part of the contents of the preceding answer. Hence the translation of tattha by 'in this connexion' (whatever the term in question may mean elsewhere). It is not clear, however, what is the force of tattha in these last fiftyseven questions, the greater part of the subjects not having occurred in the foregoing part of the manual.


This pair of questions 'is included to show' how the mass of views in the following pairs is

'an upgrowth from the root of the Round of Re-birth'.

Asl. 392.


This, the Ditthi-formula (see §§ 381, 1099), is appended as well to each of the foregoing answers on speculative opinions. Of these, the first two (bhava and vibhava) are, in the Cy. (p. 392), connected with the next two respectively (cf. § 1099). All the eight are enumerated and discussed in the Brahmajala Sutta. D. i. 13-40. The Cy. itself refers to this Sutta in connexion with the last two theories.

See also 'Dialogues of the Buddha', i. 26, n. 3.


See §§ 80, 31.


Dovacassata. For 'surly' the Cy. (p. 398) and K. read dovacassayam.


The three first terms in the answer are in the original simply different forms of the same abstract noun, viz.: dovacassayam, dovacassiyam, dovacassata.

The fourth term is literally ' taking the opposite side'.

The fifth is literally 'gratification in antagonism'.

The last is described as due to a lack of the habit of placing others before one's self. Asl. 393.

The term in question the Cy. finally dismisses with the remark that, if persisted in in the foregoing fashion, it involves the four skandhas, especially that of syntheses. So for the complex generalizations in the following questions. They are not relatively simple states involving one skandha only. (The editing in the Cy. is here again very unfortunate.)


Sevana, nisevana, samsevana. The prefixes, according to the Cy., merely act as augmentatives.


Maccharino; addicted to the five sorts of meanness. Asl. 394. See § 1122, n.




Bhajana, sambhajana, bhatti, sambhatti; all meaning originally 'forming a part of', 'belonging to'. But the two former are paraphrased by upasankamana. In the sense of devotion bhatti does not, I believe, occur in the Nikayas. Perhaps its oldest appearance with this import is in Jat. v. 340 — where the Cy. gives as equivalent sineho — and in the Svet. Upanishad 6. 23.


Tarn sampavankata (so K. and the Cy.), i.e., entanglement; lit., hooked along with them — with those persons, both in thought and deed. Asl. 394.


Sovacassayamn (sic lege), sovacassiyam, sovacassata.


Adariyam, adarata; omitted in the text, but supplied in K. Cf. § 1325.


The passage elided here and in the following sections is no doubt that in which science (panna) is described, §16 and passim. On 'skill' or 'proficiency' (kusalata) see Introduction viii., on 'good'.


That is, the group of 'Apatti's termed Parajika, Sanghadisesa, Pacittiya, Patidesaniya and Dukkata offences, and the group which, besides these, includes Thullaccaya and Dubbhasita offences. Asl. 394; cf. Vin. V. 91. The scientific procedure is described in the Cy. as -pariccheda-janana-panna.


Apatti-vutthana, or rising up from an offence. Buddhaghosa does not in this connexion explain the term, but in his Cy. on the passage, found in nearly identical words at Vin. iii. 112, and iv. 225 (which Cy. is found in Minayeff, Pat. 69), he uses vutthana as a general term covering all the three methods (parivasa, manatta, abbhana) of expiation of, and release from, an offence committed by a member of the Order. Cf. Childers, s.v, sanghadiseso; Vin. v. 118. See also infra, § 1332.


The Samapattis, or various stages of self-concentration, include the Jhanas — as here — and other forms of s am ad hi, all pre-Buddhistic and all utilized in the body of Buddhist doctrine and culture. It is noteworthy that they are not here referred to as only eight in number — see Childers, s.v. (for that matter, neither do they find a place in the Atthaka-nipata of the Anguttara). Neither is it clear that the three Samapattis quoted in the answer coincide in all respects with the first three stages of fivefold Jhana.

If they do, and if we are to assume that the term includes more than those three stages, then, by Subhuti's inclusion of four Vimokhas, this would give us nine samapattis. Again, in M. i. 301, a fifth Vimokha — the last — is spoken of as a Samapatti, this bringing the number up to ten. Cf. M. i. 398-400.


The kind of ability in emerging from (lit., rising out of -vutthana; see supra, § 1330) one or another kind of samadhi is, by the Cy., specified as a predetermination of the time when the subject wished to arouse himself, and the carrying out of this act of will — a time stated in terms of the motions of celestial bodies.

'When the moon, sun, constellations have gone to such and such a position I shall awake'.

See, on this use of vutthana, M. i. 302; A. iii. 311; S. iii. 270. On the modes of Jhana here specified, see supra, § 160 et seq. Skill in the Attainment (samapatti) itself is explained as the science of effecting discernment of the appana or central concept (in Jhana) as well as of the parikamma or preliminaries.


Dhatuyo. The skill in this case is said to comprise acquisition, attention, hearing and remembering (instruction being entirely oral) and discrimination. Asl. 395.


Seep. 5, n. 1.


See § 597 et seq.


In the last three modes of ability six factors common to all are distinguished:

comparison (lit., measuring),

Of these, all but the fifth are exercised on mundane objects of thought; penetration is concerned with supramundane matters; attention and comparison can be exercised about a mixture of both spheres of thought. Asl. 395. (To get this or any meaning out of the passage in question some emendation of the Cy. as edited has been necessary.)


On this famous formula the Cy. merely remarks that

'it will appear in the Vibhanga on the Paticcasamuppada'.

Asl. 395.


This species of skill (thanakusalata, atthanakusalata) constituted one of the Ten Powers of the Buddha. See M. i. 69. The Cy. (p. 395) takes for illustration sense-cognition as a series of specific results from specific processes; also cause and effect in the vegetable kingdom.


Ajjavo and maddavo, the terms in this and the foregoing question, are synonymous with uj(j)ukata and muduta, §§ 50, 51, 44, 45. The one additional term — the last — is paraphrased as 'absence of conceit'. Asl. 395.


Patience (khanti) is one of the ten Paramitas. Jat. i., pp. 22, 23. See also A. iii. 254, 255. The last three synonyms are the opposites of the last three synonyms of 'hate'. See supra, §§ 418, 1060. Ajjavo, Java no, maddavo, khanti and soraccam are, in A. iii. 248, given as the dhamma of a thoroughbred horse.


Temperance (soraccam) is defined as 'to be well on the hither side of wickedness', to avoid transgression in the three kinds in deed, in the four kinds in speech and in one's mode of livelihood. See Khys Davids, 'Manual of Buddhism', p. 142. The three transgressions of the mind are omitted, hence soraccam applies apparently only to the self-expression of the individual. Asl. 396.


Sakhalyam, paraphrased by sammodaka and mudu. Ibid. Cf, the usual formula for the exchange of courtesies on greeting, e.g., M. i. 16.


Andaka. This and the following terms occur in M. i. 286. See Morris's Notes, J. P. T. S., 1884, 1886, 1889. Buddhaghosa's comment obviates the necessity either for Kern's hypothesis that the word, when applied to speech, should be read as kandaka, or for that of Morris, that it should be read as candaka. He says (Asl. 396): Just as in a defective (sadose) tree bosses (andakani; excrescences, warts) protrude, so through faultiness, by words of bragging and insolence, are swellings (andaka) produced.

'Disagreeable' (asata) is omitted in the M. i. 286.

'Grating' = kakkasa = (Asl. ihid.) putika.

By a somewhat forced figure grating or rasping speech is compared to the disagreeable sensation in the ear (so tarn not kanna!) by the entrance of the crumbling pulverous tissue of a rotten tree. 'Vituperative', etc. (parabhisajjani); as it were, a lurking branch of barbed thorns wounding the limbs and obstructing passage. Ihid.


Innocuous = nela = niddoa. Asl. 397.


I.e., by varied sweetness.


Pori, i.e., town-conversation, either because it is full of good points (gun a), or used by persons of breeding, or simply urban. For towndwellers use fitting terms, calling a father a father and a brother a brother. Ihid.


Patisantharo, both amisena and dhammena, is discussed at length by Buddhaghosa (Asl. 397-399). He takes, as usual, the etymology of the term — a spreading out or diffusion — and shows it as a covering or closing, through kindness and generosity, of the gap there may be between the having of the giver and the recipient of his attentions. Both are supposed to be members of the Order, and many of the hospitable and polite ministrations described occur in Vin. ii. 210, 211. See also Mil. 409.


Aguttadvarata. This and the contrary attitude in § 1347 constitute an important formula in Buddhist doctrine, and occur in D. i. 70, M. i. 180, 269, etc. It is also quoted K.V. 426, 464.


K. omits puggalo, given in the printed text. The latter omits it in the corresponding answer, § 1347.


This is a passage naturally calling for psychological qualification from the Commentator (Asl. 399, 400).

'"Eye" stands here for the total efiicient cause (karana-vasena), namely, for that visual cognition which is the generally accepted form-seeing capacity. As the Ancients have said:

The eye does not see form, not being of the nature of intellect (cittam); the intellect, not being of the nature of eye, does not see form (the Cy. has here been wrongly punctuated).

One sees with the sense-embodied mind impingeing on the 'door-object' (dvararammane samghattanena pasadavatthukena cittena passati), that is, with the aggregate organism, or apparatus, as when we say, "he shoots with the bow".'


On nimittagahi and anuvyanjanagahi, see notes relating precisely to this passage in D. i. 70, in 'Dialogues of the Buddha', i. 80. The former term is, in the Atthasalini, defined as the act of one who, not content with simply beholding what is attractive and so forth, or what is characteristically female or male, grasps at it with passionate desire.


Bhojane amattanfiuta = a sustained indulging without reflection . . . the ignoring of measure or bounds therein. Asl. 402.


Aharam 'both edible and potable'. Asl. 401.


Davaya, etc. That is to say, that he may be able to dance or do acrobatic feats, etc. Or like kings and courtiers who feed to swell their 'pride of life ' and manhood, etc. Asl. 402, 403.


Vihimsuparatiya. Vihimsa = abhutta-paccaya uppajjanaka-khuda. Asl. 403.




This formula (as Trenckner terms it, 'Pali Misc'., 74) of abstemious living occurs M. i. 355; S. iv. 104, 176, etc.; also Mil. 367. The comments in the Asl. reveal a more specific and less sublime interpretation of the vedana in question than is taken by the translator of the last-named passage (Rhys Davids, ' Questions of King Milinda', ii. 231).

According to the former, puranaii ca vedanam is simply that due to one's not having dined, and navaii ca vedanam to one's having dined too much, or to one's having dined. Asl. 403, 404. Psychologically then, the ideal state of one relieved of the craving of appetite would seem to be, not the positive sensations of surfeit or of having well dined, but the relatively negative state of nothungry, not-thirsty. Under 'comfort' (phasuviharo = bhojanisamso) gourmands, who fail to acquire the same, are described, with some gusto, under five current sobriquets — 'Hold, waistcoat!' 'Gyrator' (because unable to rise after eating), etc. Abstemious procedure is also categorized otherwise and in detail. Asl. 404.


In this answer (describing mutthasaccam) the text requires some emendation. Anussati should be asati, and the privative a should of course be dropped in apilapanata, a-sammussanata. K. reads (here only) pamussanata — not so the Cy. — and repeats asati after appatissati. See § 14 and footnote.


K. reads for asammussanata, appamussanata. Cf. preceding note.


Patisankhanabalam. This is not included in any set of 'powers' enumerated in the present work {cf. § 1, etc.), nor does it form part ofpannabalani(§ 29). However, it is included in the eight very different kinds of powers given in A. iv. 223, ranking as the specific balam of the erudite or bahussuto. Cf the use of patisankha in Vin. i. 213. In the present connexion it seems as a correlative term to have superseded dassanam (insight); see above, §§ 1002-1012, 1254-1267.


See §§ 285, 287, etc.


In this and the following references the phrase 'on that occasion' must be understood to be omitted.


Samatha-nimittam. Explained by Tam akaram gahetva puna pavattetabbassa samathassa nimitta-vasena. Asl. 53.


Silavipatti. Cf §§ 1363, 1342.


Ditthivipatti. Cf § 1215.


Sila-sampada. Cf § 1342.


Continue as in § 16.


Cf. § 1363. Purity in theory would seem to indicate perfection relative to progress in theory, while in moral matters a similar distinction does not apparently hold. The Cy. only explains this want of distinction by saying that in § 1363 the si la of restraint of the Patimokkha is alluded to, while in § 1365 visuddhi-sila is spoken of.


K. reads here kammassakatam iianam — a curious phrase. Buddhaghosa, to judge by his exposition, reads kamma-ssakata-nanam (Asl. 406, 407) or -ssakata-, or -ssakata m fianam (Asl. 406). The corresponding adjective to this sakata or sakatarn occurs in the passage quoted from the Sutta Pitaka by Nagasena (Mil. i. 45; cf. Khys Davids' trans., i. 101, n. 1; also Asl. 66), namely, kammassaka (satta); i.e., according to the translator's view, 'having each their own karma'.

As this passage occurs in the yet inedited 135th Sutta of the Majjhima N., the Papanca Sudani may prove to have a more lucid commentary on it than that given in the Atthasalini.

The latter is to this effect: [This phrase means] the science of knowing that this karma (or action) is sakam, that karma is not sakam. In this connexion all bad karma, whether it be done by one's self or by another, is not sakam.

How so? Because it destroys utility and creates disutility. But good karma, which has the reverse effect, is named sakam. Just as a man with a full purse in the course of a journey may stop at various cities where festivals are going on and, determining what votive outlay he will make, takes part accordingly in those festivals as his inclination prompts, and safely emerges from the jungle, even so do beings who are established in this knowledge of the sakatam of karma, when they have heaped up much karma making for transmigration, safely and at ease attain arahatship, even to the extent of numbers innumerable.

Now if sakam mean here, as it usually does, 'one's own', that still seems no explanation of the assertion that one's bad actions are not one's own. And how does the parable bear out the assertion?


With the foregoing question and answer the catechism proper of the ' Dhamma Sangani ' comes to an end. There follow eleven sundry phrases or terms, not made the subject of any part of the catechism, and appended here in the phraseology of a commentary. They are severally either referred to some reply in the catechism, or briefly expounded, and are probably all culled from the Sutta Pitaka as technicisms of Buddhist ethics.

Very possibly they form one connected sentence, giving an eloquent and concise description of the nature of Wisdom and Emancipation. Buddhaghosa has nothing very enlightening on this fraction of ancient commentary included in the text, but promises an explanation of at least the division of the subject of ' agitation ' in the Commentary on the ' Vibhanga'.


Yatha ditthissa ca padhanam. It is just possible one should read Yathaditthissa; K., however, divides the two words. The Cy. merely remarks that the energy put forth is intelligent or scientific, and can be applied either to worldly or to higher things.


See A. ii. 15, 16, 74. It will be seen that the four modes of will-culture described on p. 15 of A. ii. as the Sammapadhanani (and quoted in the Dh. S.) are, on p. 74, termed respectively the Struggles for Self-control, for Eenunciation, for Cultivation (or Development) and for Preservation. Yet on p. 16 a different connotation is given to each of these four terms.


This and the next phrase (vii.) occur consecutively in A. i. 50. The progress of sublime discontent in a pious individual from giving small donations to the Order, then greater gifts till he personally enters the Order and finally wins the goal of Arahatship, is briefly described, Asl. 407. The last attainment gives the winner the title of the Greatly Content.


Cf. § 13.


Cittassa ca adhimutti = vimutti (emancipation). D. i. 174.


This is, I believe, the only passage in the original Manual where the word occurs. This is interesting in view of the fact that it occurs in what appears to be an appendix of original Commentary, and also that the term occurs so frequently in the old digest which follows in the text. See Appendix I.

Like what you read? Consider supporting this website: