Dharmakīrti’s Vādanyāya

[Full title: Dharmakīrti’s Vādanyāya and the History of Conceptions of Debate in Indian Logic by Ryo Sasaki]

1. Introduction

Throughout the history of Indian thought in the classical period, the method of debate has been a subject of investigation side by side with philosophical ideas. A conception of “debate” can already be found at an early stage, notably in the medical treatise Caraka-saṃhitā (CaS). After passing through the Fangbianxinlun (*Upāyahṛdaya, UH, 方便心論),^[1] an early Buddhist debate treatise, the conception of debate was more systematically approached in the Nyāyasūtras (NS), and further expanded and elaborated in Vātsyāyana’s Nyāyabhāṣya (NBh) and Uddyotakara’s Nyāyavārttika (NV).

In the Vādanyāya (VN),^[2] Dharmakīrti redefined a traditional Nyāya concept related to debate, namely the idea of a “condition of defeat” (nigrahasthāna),^[3] a criterion that determines victory or defeat in a debate. In the Vādanyāya’s redefinition of nigrahasthāna, Dharmakīrti presented a new conception of debate, i.e., the “debate of well-educated people” (satāṃ vādaḥ). By doing so, he appears to have reacted to traditional ideas found in the Nyāyasūtras and Nyāyabhāṣya. His ideas in turn influenced the presentation of debate in later Nyāya works, as will be discussed below with a focus on the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa (NBhū) of Bhāsarvajña and the Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā (NVTṬ) of Vācaspati Miśra.

Prets 2000, Kang 2003, Preisendanz 2009 and others have analyzed the ancient Indian exposition of debate in the Carakasaṃhitā. Pertinent ideas in the *Upāyahṛdaya were investigated by several Japanese researchers (Ui 1925, Kajiyama 1984, Ishitobi 2006). The more systematic exposition of debate in the Nyāyasūtras and Nyāyabhāṣya was studied in detail especially by Matilal 1998, Preisendanz 2000, and Nicholson 2010. Steinkellner 1988 pointed out Dharmakīrti’s new conception of debate. Much’s translation and critical edition of the Vādanyāya in 1991, together with his comprehensive presentation of results of the Vādanyāya research up until that point, mark a significant contribution to research on this work. Ono 2004 and 2006 examined Udayana’s views on debate, and Chinchore 1990 studied reactions to the Vādanyāya by Naiyāyikas active after Udayana.

While several studies have thus been conducted on Indian debate, little attention has been given to how the Vādanyāya marks a historical transition in the conception of debate. This paper therefore aims to place the Vādanyāya in the context of expositions of debate in the above-mentioned texts, and to thereby clarify its significance.

2. Jalpa in the Carakasaṃhitā

As the first step in our analysis, we will examine the idea of debate in the Carakasaṃhitā because it is one of the earliest works in which the concept of debate is introduced in detail, even though it was not exactly explained in a systematic manner. In the Carakasaṃhitā, the parts of the eighth chapter of the Vimānasthāna dealing with debate can be divided into two sections: the section on colloquy (saṃbhāṣā) in CaS 8.8.15–26 and the section on disputation (vāda) in CaS 8.8.27–66.^[4]

In the latter section, vāda is defined as follows:

CaS 8.8.28:

tatra vādo nāma sa yat pareṇa saha śāstrapūrvakaṃ vigṛhya ka-thayati. sa ca dvividhaḥ saṃgraheṇa–jalpaḥ, vitaṇḍā ca. tatra pakṣāśritayor vacanaṃ jalpaḥ, jalpaviparyayo vitaṇḍā. yathā–ekasya pakṣaḥ punarbhavo’stīti, nāstīty aparasya; tau ca svasvapakṣahetubhiḥ svasvapakṣaṃ sthāpaya-taḥ, parapakṣam udbhāvayataḥ, eṣa jalpaḥ. jalpaviparyayo vitaṇḍā. vitaṇḍā nāma parapakṣe doṣavacanamātram eva.

Of these [44 technical terms], disputation (vāda) is [debate] in which one discusses with another in a hostile manner (vigṛhya), based on scriptures. In brief, this [disputation] is of two kinds: wrangle (jalpa) and cavil (vitaṇḍā). Of these, wrangle is the statement of two [disputants] who depend on [their respective] positions. Cavil is the opposite of wrangle. For instance, one holds the position that rebirth exists [while] the other holds [the position] that [rebirth] does not exist. In addition, both [disputants] establish their positions on the basis of logical reasons for their positions [and] point out [the fault in] the other’s position. This is wrangle. Cavil is the opposite of wrangle. Cavil is merely “indicating the fault in the other’s position.”

Disputation (vāda) is here defined as a “[debate] in which one discusses with another in a hostile manner (vigṛhya).” There are two types of vāda: wrangle (jalpa) and cavil (vitaṇḍā). As discussed below in section 4, this classification differs from the one in the Nyāyasūtras. Let us note that jalpa here involves hostility to the other disputant, and that it consists of individual assertions of a proponent and opponent, and mutual ripostes between them.

While the vāda section of the Carakasaṃhitā provides a brief account of vāda in which jalpa occurs as a subcategory of vāda, the concept of jalpa, the action of √jalp, as well as the idea of a hostile (vigṛhya) verbal confrontation are already introduced in the saṃbhāṣā section.^[5]

CaS 8.8.15:

saṃbhāṣāvidhim ata ūrdhvaṃ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ–bhiṣag bhiṣajā saha saṃbhāṣeta. tadvidyasaṃbhāṣā hi jñānābhiyogasaṃharṣakarī bhavati, vaiśāradyam api cābhinirvartayati, vacanaśaktim api cādhatte, yaśaś cābhi-dīpayati, … yac cācāryaḥ śiṣyāya śuśrūṣave prasannaḥ krameṇopadiśati guhyābhimatam arthajātaṃ tat paraspareṇa saha jalpan piṇḍena vijigīṣur āha saṃharṣāt, tasmāt tadvidyasaṃbhāṣām abhipraśaṃsanti kuśalāḥ.

CaS 8.8.16:

dvividhā tu khalu tadvidyasaṃbhāṣā bhavati–saṃdhāyasaṃ-bhāṣā, vigṛhyasaṃbhāṣā ca.

Hereafter, we shall describe the method of colloquy. A physician should discuss with a physician. Colloquy with experts (tadvidyasaṃbhāṣā) increases the pleasure of the application of knowledge, provides dexterity [in debate], gives skill of speech, illuminates fame (yaśas)…. Besides, the teacher who is pleased with the disciple desirous of hearing [teachings] teaches things intended to be kept secret in an orderly manner. [The same teacher] who disputes with another [disputant] in wrangle (√jalp) excitedly states [the secret] in one breath in order to gain victory (vijigīṣu). Therefore, the wise highly praise colloquy with experts.

One should know (khalu) that colloquy with experts (tadvidyasaṃbhāṣā) takes two forms: friendly colloquy and hostile colloquy.

The saṃbhāṣā section describes the method and purpose of colloquy with experts (tadvi-dyasaṃbhāṣā) more concretely and vividly than the brief definitions of vāda, or jalpa or vitaṇḍā in the vāda section. Although the relationship between saṃbhāṣā and jalpa is problematic, it is likely that vigṛhyasaṃbhāṣā and jalpa are the same or at least very similar concepts, considering such expressions as vigṛhyasaṃbhāṣāyāṃ jalpet (CaS 8.8.18).^[6]

Here “the person who disputes in wrangle” (jalpat) is considered to be desirous of victory (vijigīṣu). Hence, we can say that one purpose of wrangle (jalpa) is victory. This purpose deserves careful attention for two reasons: (i) the Nyāyabhāṣya adopted the same idea and (ii) the Vādanyāya criticizes the purpose of victory. Both points will be examined in more detail later.

Fame is another of the purposes listed in connection with saṃbhāṣā. It must be noted that fame or something akin to fame is not considered to be the purpose worth accomplishing in the context of debate in the *Upāyahṛdaya, the Nyāyasūtras, several commentaries of the Nyāyasūtras, and the Vādanyāya. This point will be examined later again.

Regarding the means of debate, acts by a disputant such as ridiculing the opponent are also allowed in a saṃbhāṣā:

CaS 8.8.20:

pariṣat tu khalu dvividhā–jñānavatī , mūḍhapariṣac ca. saiva dvividhā satī trividhā punar anena kāraṇavibhāgena–suhṛtpariṣat, udāsīna-pariṣat, pratiniviṣṭapariṣac ceti. tatra pratiniviṣṭāyāṃ pariṣadi jñānavijñā-navacanaprativacanaśaktisaṃpannāyāṃ mūḍhāyāṃ vā na kathaṃcit kenacit saha jalpo vidhīyate; mūḍhāyāṃ tu suhṛtpariṣady udāsīnāyāṃ vā jñānavijñā-navacanaprativacanaśaktīr antareṇāpy adīptayaśasā mahājanavidviṣṭenāpi saha jalpo vidhīyate. tadvidhena ca saha kathayatāviddhadīrghasūtrasaṃ-kulair vākyadaṇḍakaiḥ kathayitavyam, atihṛṣṭaṃ muhur muhur upahasatā paraṃ nirūpayatā ca parṣadam ākāraiḥ, bruvataś cāsya vākyāvakāśo na de-yaḥ; kaṣṭaśabdaṃ ca bruvatā vaktavyo nocyate, athavā punar hīnā te pratijñā, iti. punaś cāhvayamānaḥ7 prativaktavyaḥ–parisaṃvatsaro bhavāñ chikṣasva tāvat; na tvayā gurur upāsito nūnam, athavā paryāptam etāvat te; sakṛd api hi parikṣepikaṃ nihataṃ nihatam āhur iti nāsya yogaḥ kartavyaḥ kathaṃcit. apy evaṃ śreyasā saha vigṛhya vaktavyam ity āhur eke; na tv evaṃ jyāyasā saha vigrahaṃ praśaṃsanti kuśalāḥ.

There are two types of congregations: the intellectual [congregation] and the ignorant congregation. Even though [the congregation] takes two forms, the very same [congregation can be divided into] three kinds through the follow-ing classification based on [different] grounds–the friendly congregation, the neutral congregation and the prejudiced congregation. Among these, the prejudiced congregation consists of persons endowed with the ability to learn, understand, speak and reply, and of ignorant ones; those who [should] in no way be involved in wrangle (jalpa) with anyone else. However, in the friendly congregation or the neutral [congregation], which consists of ignorant persons, one [should] work on wrangle with [another who is] devoid of the ability to learn, understand, speak and reply, does not illumine fame (yaśas) and is hated by great men. Furthermore, while disputing with such a person, one should dispute by means of long sentences mingled with distorted and long holy scriptures and should not give the opportunity to the [opposing] speaker by ridiculing another (i.e., the opposing speaker) in high spirits again and again and making gestures in the presence of the congregation. Furthermore, [one should say,] “while [the opponent] makes a mischievous remark, he does not say what he should say,” or indeed “Your (i.e., the opponent’s) thesis has been abandoned.” Again, when [the opponent] challenges [the disputant], [the disputant] should reply, “You should learn for another year,” “You have not yet honored [your] preceptor,” or “That’s enough of your [talking]!” If [the opponent] is condemned to be defeated even once, [people will] say that he is defeated and, therefore, will lack the ability to concentrate on what he is saying. Besides, some say that one should talk in a hostile manner (vigṛhya) with a superior [opponent] in the same way, but [to begin with] the wise does not recommend the discord with a more excellent [opponent] in this manner.

Here we should note that a disputant is recommended to use incomprehensible sentences and ridicule an opponent when engaging in wrangle with a friendly but ignorant congregation, a neutral but ignorant congregation, or sometimes a superior congregation. Such a hostile manner of debate is also allowed in wrangle (jalpa) and cavil (vitaṇḍā) defined in the Nyāyasūtras and in the Nyāyabhāṣya; on the other hand, in the Vādanyāya, acts such as embarrassing others (parapaṃsana), which are regarded as bad deeds (asadvyavahāra), are not considered to be an admissible method of debate.

3. The discussion of the composition of a treatise (造論) in the *Upāya-hṛdaya

Having discussed the conception of debate in the Carakasaṃhitā, we will now consider debate in the *Upāyahṛdaya.^[7]

There is no Sanskrit text of the *Upāyahṛdaya, but the extant Chinese translations permit to conclude that the *Upāyahṛdaya contains remarkable ideas that can be connected with the Nyāyasūtras.

UH (T1632) 23b14–24: 答曰不然。今造此論不爲勝負利養名聞。但欲顯示善惡諸相故造此論。世若無論迷惑者衆、則爲世間邪智巧辯所共誑惑、起不善業、輪迴惡趣、失眞實利。若達論者則自分別善惡空相、衆魔外道邪見之人、無能惱壞作障礙也。故我爲欲利益衆生造此正論。又欲令正法流布於世。如爲修治菴婆羅果、而外廣植荊棘之林爲防果故、今我造論亦復如是、欲護正法不求名聞故。汝前説長諍論者是事不然。爲護法故、故應造論。

I will answer that [this is] not so. Now, I have not composed this treatise (造此論) for the purpose of victory, profit, or reputation (勝負利養名聞). I compose this treatise because I only wish to reveal diverse good and bad features [of debate]. If the world had no treatise [of debate], there would be many confused people. Then, [the confused] people would be deceived by the world’s perverse ideas, and wily rhetoric would give rise to bad deeds, which would be reborn in an evil world and would lose real benefits. If debate (論) is understood, [its] good, bad, and useless features are distinguished as a matter of course. [Then], evildoers, non-Buddhists, and adherents of perverse views would not be able to harm [people] and obstruct [their nirvāṇa]. Therefore, to benefit people (利益衆生), I compose this correct treatise.^[8] Furthermore, I wish to disseminate the true teaching [of Buddha] (正法) to the world. Just as in order to cultivate the fruits of mango trees one plants a thicket of thorns (荊棘之林) widely around them, so now I will compose [this] treatise in the same way because I wish to protect the true teaching [of the Buddha] and I do not seek [to enhance my] reputation. You explained earlier that [I am] good at debate (諍論), [but] this is not true. In order to protect the teaching [of the Buddha], I must compose [this] treatise.^[9]

Compared with claims made in the Carakasaṃhitā about jalpa or saṃbhāṣā, the way in which the *Upāyahṛdaya explains the purposes and methods of composing a treatise can be summed up as follows:

1) The purpose is not “victory;”

2) The purpose is not “(self-)profit” or “reputation;”

3) The purpose is the “benefit of people;”

4) The purpose is “protection of the true teaching [of the Buddha];”

5) method is expressed using the metaphor of “thorns.”

According to the author’s intention, the *Upāyahṛdaya was composed in order to protect the true teaching of the Buddha. This means of protection is metaphorically explained as planting a thicket of thorns around mango trees. As will be seen in the following section, a similar expression appears in the Nyāyasūtras.

4. Jalpa and vitaṇḍā in the Nyāyasūtras and Nyāyabhāṣya

With these considerations in mind, we will now examine the concept of debate in the Nyāyasūtras and Nyāyabhāṣya in order to trace conceptual changes in the idea of “debate.” In NS 1.2.1–3, the concept of debate is classified into three categories, namely, vāda, jalpa and vitaṇḍā, while jalpa and vitaṇḍā are presented as subcategories of vāda in CaS 8.8.28. On the other hand, NS 4.2.47–51 proposes three types of debate: saṃvāda, jalpa, and vitaṇḍā.

Although this discrepancy in terminology and classification is problematic,^[10] we will not discuss this and rather concentrate on jalpa and vitaṇḍā, which are explained with the help of metaphors as follows:

NS 4.2.50: tattvādhyavasāyasaṃrakṣaṇārthaṃ jalpavitaṇḍe bījaprarohasaṃ-rakṣaṇārthaṃ kaṇṭakaśākhāvaraṇavat //

Just as thorny branches cover [seeds] for the purpose of protecting seed germi-nation, so wrangle (jalpa) and cavil (vitaṇḍā) [are undertaken] for the purpose of protecting the ascertainment of truth.^[11]

As pointed out in Preisendanz 2000: 236, Kang 2003: 36–37 and Ishitobi 2003, this sentence parallels the very beginning of the *Upāyahṛdaya discussed above.

It can be assumed that the Nyāyasūtras adopted the metaphor of “thorns” from the *Upāyahṛdaya, or that both the Nyāyasūtras and *Upāyahṛdaya drew on another text which is their origin. In the same context of explaining jalpa and vitaṇḍā, Vātsyāyana commented on the sūtra as follows:

NS 4.2.51:

tābhyāṃ vigṛhyakathanam //

NBh 2000,2–3 (ad NS 4.2.51):

vigṛhyeti vijigīṣayā, na tattvabubhutsayeti, tad etad vidyāpālanārtham, na lābhapūjākhyātyartham iti.

By means of these two, [i.e., the wrangle (jalpa) and cavil (vitaṇḍā),] hostile (vigṛhya) dispute [is undertaken].

“Hostile” (vigṛhya) is [equivalent to] “by a desire to win” (vijigīṣayā); [how-ever] is [this] not [equivalent to] “by a desire to know truth.” This [hostile dispute is undertaken] for the purpose of defending expertise (vidyā), [but] is not [undertaken] for the purpose of profit, honor, or reputation.^[12]

As to the purpose of, respectively, jalpa/vitaṇḍā and the composition of a treatise (造論), both NBh and UH exclude (self-)profit and endorse the protection of their own doc-trine. On the other hand, the presentation in the Nyāyabhāṣya is different from that in the *Upāyahṛdaya in terms of whether the desire for victory is approved of as a legitimate purpose.

The main points regarding purpose and method of jalpa and vitaṇḍā according to the Nyāyabhāṣya can be summed up as follows:

1) The purpose is “victory;”

2) The purpose is not “(self-)profit,” “honor” or “reputation;”

3) The idea of “benefit of people” is not mentioned;

4) The purpose is “defense of expertise;”

5) The method is expressed using the metaphor of “thorns.”

5. The concept of debate in the Vādanyāya

As Ruegg 2000: 137–138, n. 41 acutely pointed out, Nāgārjuna, Bhāviveka, Dharmakīrti, and probably also Vasubandhu, reject jalpa or vitaṇḍā. Here we limit the discussion to Dhar-makīrti’s criticism of jalpa and vitaṇḍā. Dharmakīrti does not mention the thorn metaphor used in the Nyāyasūtras.

However, Śāntarakṣita quotes NS 4.2.50 in his commentary on the Vādanyāya, the Vādanyāyaṭīkā Vipañcitārthā (VA):

VA 70,25–26:

yathoktaṃ tattvādhyavasāyasaṃrakṣaṇārthaṃ jalpavitaṇḍe bījaprarohasaṃrakṣaṇārthaṃ kaṇṭakaśākhāvaraṇavad iti.

This quotation occurs in a context where Dharmakīrti criticized the traditional concept of debate–particularly wrangle (jalpa) and cavil (vitaṇḍā)–and instead promoted his own original conception.

5.1 The “debate of people with a desire to win” (vijigīṣūṇāṃ vādaḥ) in the Vādanyāya

First, Dharmakīrti criticizes jalpa and vitaṇḍā by considering these two concepts to mean “debate of people with a desire to win” (vijigīṣūṇāṃ vādaḥ).

VN 22,8–16: chalavyavahāre’pi vijigīṣūṇāṃ vāda iti cet, na, durjanaviprati-pattyadhikāre satāṃ śāstrāpravṛtteḥ. na hi parānugrahapravṛttā mithyāpra-lāpārambhātmotkarṣaparapaṃsanādīn asadvyavahārān upadiśanti. na ca paravipaṃsanena lābhasatkāraślokopārjanaṃ satām ācāraḥ. nāpi tathāpra-vṛttebhyaḥ svahastadānena prāṇinām upatāpanaṃ satsaṃmatānāṃ śāstra-kārasabhāsadāṃ yuktam. na ca nyāyaśāstrāṇi sadbhir lābhādyupārjanāya praṇīyante. tasmān na yogavihitaḥ kaścid vijigīṣuvādo nāma.

(Objection:) Even if distortion (chala) is used, the “debate of people with a desire to win” (vijigīṣūṇāṃ vādaḥ) [is undertaken]. (Answer:) [This is] not [so] because well-educated people are not engaged in the doctrinal system in consideration of bad people’s evil deeds (vipratipatti).^[13] That is to say, [well-educated] people who are engaged in the benefit of others do not teach bad deeds (asadvyavahāra), such as boasting and embarrassing others through beginning incoherent speech. Besides, winning profit, reverence, or praise by disgracing others is not [suitable] behavior for well-educated people. Further-more, troubling [other] people by giving a [helping] hand to those who are engaged in this manner [i.e., disgracing others] is not suitable for those who are considered to be well-educated people, i.e., those who are participants in the meeting of learned men (śāstrakārasabhāsad). Additionally, well-educated people don’t compose methodically written works for the purpose of gaining profit and the rest. Because of these [evil deeds, such as distortion (chala)], a so-called “debate of people with a desire to win” is not reasonable (yogavihita)^[14] at all.

On the surface, it would seem that Dharmakīrti does not directly explain the characteristics of “debate of people with a desire to win,” but merely states evil deeds that are not appropriate for well-educated people. However, Dharmakīrti here comes to the conclusion that “debate of people with a desire to win” is not reasonable. From this viewpoint, one may say that the “evil deeds” should be considered to be precisely the behavior exhibited in a debate of people with a desire to win.

Dharmakīrti does not use the terms jalpa or vitaṇḍā.^[15] However, according to the explanation in the Nyāyasūtras,^[16] “distortion” (chala) is the hostile method used in jalpa and vitaṇḍā. Additionally, with the passage of time, the terms vijigīṣukathā18 or vijigīṣuvāda came to be considered alternative expressions for jalpa and vitaṇḍā. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that Dharmakīrti criticizes the characteristics of jalpa and vitaṇḍā in these phrases.

Let me summarize the purposes and methods of “debate of people with a desire to win” presented in the Vādanyāya as follows:

1) The purpose is “victory;”

2) The purpose is “(self-)profit,” “reverence” or “praise;”

3) The purpose is not “benefit of others;”

4) The idea of “defense of expertise” and the like is not mentioned;

5) The method is “evil deeds,” “distortion,” “embarrassing others” and so forth.

5.2 The “debate of well-educated people” (satāṃ vādaḥ) in the Vādanyāya

After criticizing the debate of people with a desire to win, i.e., wrangle and cavil, Dharma-kīrti presents his original conception of debate, namely, “debate of well-educated people” (satāṃ vādaḥ).

VN 22,16–21:

parānugrahapravṛttās tu santo vipratipannaṃ pratipādayanto nyāyam anusareyuḥ satsādhanābhidhānena bhūtadoṣodbhāvanena vā, sākṣi-pratyakṣaṃ tasyaivānuprabodhāya. tad eva nyāyānusaraṇaṃ satāṃ vādaḥ, ukte nyāye tattvārthī cet pratipadyeta, tadapratipattāv apy anyo na vipratipa-dyeteti.^[18]

On the other hand, when [well-educated people] persuade one who has fal-lacious notions, well-educated people who aim at the benefit of others (pa-rānugraha) would abide by the reasonable rule (nyāya) by stating a correct piece of proof or pointing out a real fault for making him (i.e., the one who has fallacious notions) notice [his fault] in the presence of witnesses. The debate of well-educated people (satāṃ vādaḥ) is precisely that, i.e., abiding by reasonable rules if [an opponent] seeking the truth were to properly understand the logical argument (nyāya) stated [by the proponent,^[18] and] even if [he] does not understand it, others [in proximity] were not to misunderstand it.^[19]

Elsewhere, Dharmakīrti claims that the proper means for a proponent is “stating a piece of correct proof” (satsādhanābhidhāna), while the means for an opponent is “pointing out a real fault” (bhūtadoṣodbhāvana). The means of “debate of people with a desire to win” are described as “evil deeds” (vipratipatti/asadvyavahāra).

Dharmakīrti compared the former to the latter in the following passage:

VN 22,22–23,6:

tattvarakṣaṇārthaṃ sadbhir upahartavyam eva chalādi viji-gīṣubhir iti cet, na, nakhacapeṭaśastraprahārādīpanādibhir apīti vaktavyam. tasmān na jyāyān ayaṃ tattvarakṣaṇopāyaḥ. sādhanaprakhyāpanaṃ satāṃ tattvarakṣaṇopāyaḥ sādhanābhāsadūṣaṇaṃ ca, tadabhāve mithyāpralāpād atra paropatāpavidhāne’pi tattvāpratiṣṭhāpanāt. anyathāpi nyāyopavarṇane vidvatpratiṣṭhānāt. tasmāt parānugrahāya tattvakhyāpanaṃ vādino vijayaḥ, bhūtadoṣadarśanena mithyāpratipattinivartanaṃ prativādinaḥ.

(Objection:)^[20] Well-educated people with a desire to win have to offer a distor-tion (chala) and so forth^[21] in order to protect truth (tattvarakṣaṇa). (Answer:) No, [this is not true]. [If that were to be so,] it would have to be said that [well-educated people with a desire to win have to protect truth] even by attacking [an opponent] with fingernails, an open palm, or weapons, or by setting [the opponent] on fire. Therefore, this means of protecting truth [used by people with a desire to win] is not superior [to the means of protecting truth used by well-educated people]. The means of protecting truth [used by] well-educated people are the explanation of proof (sādhanaprakhyāpana) and the refutation of pseudo-proof (sādhanābhāsadūṣaṇa) because there is no establishment of truth without them (i.e., these two means)^[22] even if [the well-educated people] trouble others with incoherent speech in this case [and] because there is firm ground for the learned men in case that they tell a logical argument (nyāya) even if [they] do not [begin incoherent speech].^[23] Hence, the victory of a proponent is the explanation of truth (tattvakhyāpana)^[24] for the purpose of benefitting others (parānugraha); [on the other hand, the victory] of an opponent is the removal of misapprehension (mithyāpratipattinivartana) by showing the real fault [of the proponent’s proof].

It is important to consider the following features of “debate of well-educated people” when comparing it with the definition of “debate of people with a desire to win:”^[25]

1) Dharmakīrti does not consider the concept of “victory” in the usual sense of the word to be the purpose of debate of well-educated people, and instead reinterprets this concept. In a debate of well-educated people, a proponent is victorious when he “explains truth [to others]” and an opponent is victorious when he “removes misapprehension [of others].”

2) The purpose is not “(self-)profit,” “reverence” or “praise.”

3) Dharmakīrti considers the concept of “benefitting others” (parānugraha) to be the purpose of debate of well-educated people. The Nyāyasūtras, Nyāyabhāṣya, and Nyāyavārttika do not propose this concept to be the purpose of jalpa or vitaṇḍā, at least not in the context of debate.

4) The purpose is “protection of truth.”

5) The proponent’s method is “the explanation of proof” or “stating a piece of correct proof” and the opponent’s method is “the refutation of pseudo-proof” or “pointing out a real fault.”

Regarding the first point, we must draw attention to the condition of defeat (nigrahasthāna) and victory as constructed systematically by Dharmakīrti in the Vādanyāya. In Dharmakīr-ti’s theory, neither a proponent nor an opponent are to be defeated, even if they act solely within the guidelines of the nigrahasthāna. On the basis of Figure 1, which shows the flow chart of the conditions of victory or defeat defined in the Vādanyāya, the following situation serves as an example: in the beginning, a proponent intends to prove his statement using correct proof, i.e., the proof-action is not the case of nigrahasthāna. An opponent then tries to refute the proof of the proponent, but what the opponent points out is a pseudo-fault, not a real fault. If the proponent does not refute the pseudo-fault, neither proponent nor opponent will win or lose, in spite of the fact that the proponent’s proof is correct. The reason why Dharmakīrti regards the winner and the loser as undecided in this situation is that the victory of the proponent is defined to be the explanation of truth, but the proponent does not achieve this, since he fails to correct the opponent’s mistake. This reinterpreted idea of victory is consistently maintained throughout the entire text of the Vādanyāya.

6. Responses to Dharmakīrti’s ideas in the Nyāya school

It remains to be studied how different Naiyāyikas accepted or refuted the ideas on debate from the Vādanyāya. In this paper, we shall concentrate on Vācaspati Miśra’s Nyāyavārtti-katātparyaṭīkā (NVTṬ) and Bhāsarvajña’s Nyāyabhūṣaṇa (NBhū).

Figure 1: The conditions of victory or defeat defined in the Vādanyāya. (This figure has been presented in Sasaki 2013a)

6.1 Jalpa and vitaṇḍā in the Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā

Vācaspati Miśra explained wrangle and cavil as follows:

NVTṬ 1099,15–2000,11 (ad NS 4.2.51):

na kevalaṃ tadarthaṃ ghaṭamā-nānāṃ jalpavitaṇḍe, api tu vidyānirvedādibhiś ca pareṇāvajñāyamānasya; tābhyāṃ vigṛhyakathanam iti sūtram. yas tu svadarśanavilasitamithyājñā-nāvalepadurvidagdhatayā sadvidyāvairāgyād vā lābhapūjākhyātyarthitayā kuhetubhir īśvarāṇāṃ janādhārāṇāṃ purato vedabrāhmaṇaparalokādidūṣaṇa-pravṛttaḥ, taṃ prati vādī samīcīnadūṣaṇam apratibhayāpaśyan jalpavitaṇḍe avatārya vigṛhya28 jalpavitaṇḍābhyāṃ tattvakathanaṃ karoti vidyāparipāla-nāya…. idam api prayojanaṃ jalpavitaṇḍayoḥ. na tu lābhakhyātyādi dṛṣṭam. na hi parahitapravṛttaḥ paramakāruṇiko munir dṛṣṭārthaṃ paravañcanopā-yam upadiśatīti.

Wrangle (jalpa) and cavil (vitaṇḍā) [take place] not only between those who strive for it (i.e., protecting the ascertainment of truth)^[26] but also between those who are derogatorily considered to disregard expertise^[27] by others. [According to the Nyāya-]sūtra (i.e., NS 4.2.51),^[28] “by means of these two, [i.e., wrangle and cavil,] the hostile dispute [is undertaken].” However, the debater who doesn’t find an appropriate objection against the [following] person introduces (avatārya), namely, divides (vigṛhya) wrangle and cavil and then makes state-ments about truth through wrangle and cavil for the purpose of defending expertise. The [above-mentioned] person is engaged in objecting to Veda, Brahman, the future world and the rest in the presence of the Gods held firm by people through fallacious logical reasons because of a false conception, haughtiness, or unsophisticatedness that appears in his own view or [because of] a desire for profit, honor, or reputation on account of aversion to the true expertise…. This (i.e., defending expertise) is also the purpose of the wran-gling and the cavil. However, profit, reputation and the like are considered to be neither [the purpose of the wrangling nor the cavil] because the extremely compassionate sage who is engaged in the welfare of others (parahita) does not teach obvious methods for deceiving others.

Vācaspati seems to reinterpret the traditional definition of jalpa and vitaṇḍā by introducing a new concept in the Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā. The main points of his reinterpretation can be summarized as follows:

1) Vācaspati reinterpreted vigṛhya in NS 4.2.51 as avatārya, while Vātsyāyana inter-preted vigṛhya as vijigīṣayā. It is assumed that Vācaspati intended to change the traditional idea that debaters seek victory in jalpa and vitaṇḍā. This probably indi-cates his acceptance of Dharmakīrti’s criticism of the “debate of people with a desire to win” (vijigīṣūṇāṃ vādaḥ). However, according to Thakur’s edition, this interpreta-tion is problematic because he reads avatārya vijigīṣayā taṃ vigṛhya. Therefore, I would like to avoid drawing a definitive conclusion here.

2) The purpose is not “(self-)profit,” “honor” or “reputation.”

3) Vācaspati introduced the idea of “welfare of others” (parahita). He does not clearly describe this concept as the purpose or motivation of jalpa or vitaṇḍā. However, it is likely that Vācaspati integrated the Vādanyāya’s idea of “benefit of others” (parānugraha) into his own approach.

4) The purpose is “defense of expertise.”

5) The method is expressed using the metaphor of “thorns.”^[29]

Although there remain some uncertainties as to how Vācaspati Miśra responded to the ideas on debate presented in the Vādanyāya, it seems clear that he adopted some of these ideas to fit his own concept of debate.

6.2 Jalpa and vitaṇḍā in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa

In the case of the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, an influence from the Vādanyāya is more evident than in the case of the Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā.

NBhū 332,11–23: yatra tu vijigīṣuṇā saha lābhapūjākhyātikāmo jayārthaṃ pravartate, sā vijigīṣukathā. nanu ca mokṣamārgaviruddhatvāl lābhādiprāptes tatprayojanā kathā na yukteti, satyam; neyaṃ mumukṣuṇā kartavyā, kiṃ tu jñātvā varjanīyeti nirūpitā. yadā tu vītarāgo vijigīṣuṇākṣiptaḥ kathāṃ pari-hartuṃ paroparodhān na śaknoti, tadāsau vītarāgas tena vijigīṣuṇā saha parānugrahārthaṃ jñānāṅkurarakṣaṇārthaṃ ca tām eva caturaṅgāṃ kathāṃ kuryāt…. svātmani śiṣyādyātmani cotpannas tattvādhyavasāyāṅkuraḥ śākyā-dimṛgair bhakṣyetāpi yadi jalpavitaṇḍābhyāṃ kaṇṭakaśākhābhyām āvaraṇaṃ na kriyeta. ye cānutpannatattvajñānāḥ śiṣyādayaḥ, teṣāṃ prativādinaś cānu-grahārthaṃ vītarāgeṇāpi jalpādau pravartitavyam ity uktam. anugrahaś ca mokṣaśāstrācāryādiṣu śraddhotpattidvāreṇa bhavati.

However, when those who long for profit, honor, or reputation undertake a certain [debate] for the purpose of victory with those [disputants who are] desirous of victory, the [debate] is the “dispute of people with a desire to win” (vijigīṣukathā). (Objection:) Because the acquisition of profit and the rest is contrary to the path to liberation, the dispute that has it (i.e., victory) as its purpose is not appropriate. (Answer:) Yes, [you are correct]. It is determined that those who desire liberation ought not to do this (i.e., the disputation whose purpose is victory), but rather ought to avoid [such a disputation] after becoming aware of [such a disputation]. However, unless a person without passion who is provoked by a person with the desire to win can repel the dispute by troubling others, this passionless person will undertake the very dispute, which consists of four component parts^[30] with this person with a desire to win for the purpose of benefitting others (parānugrahārtham) and for protecting the sprout of knowledge…. The sprout of the ascertainment of truth that surfaces in [a debater] himself and in his disciples would be eaten by savage animals, such as Buddhists, if [the sprout] were not covered by thorny branches, i.e., the wrangling and the cavil. Furthermore, it is said that even the person without passion has to undertake the wrangling and so on for the purpose of benefitting (anugrahārtham) disciples and the rest who have no knowledge of truth and for [benefitting] an opponent. Additionally, the benefit [of others] occurs through having faith in the masters [who teach] the doctrine of liberation and the like.

As in Vācaspati’s text cited above, Bhāsarvajña also proposes a new interpretation of jalpa and vitaṇḍā. The main points are summarized as follows:

1) Bhāsarvajña considers that a person without passion (vītarāga) has to participate in the “dispute of people with a desire to win” (vijigīṣukathā) when he is provoked by a person with the desire to win (vijigīṣu). Even in that case, vītarāga, as its name suggests, is free from passion, such as the desire to win. Therefore, in the case of vijigīṣukathā carried out by vītarāga, it seems that Bhāsarvajña intends, like Dharmakīrti, to remove the idea of victory as the purpose of jalpa and vitaṇḍā. In other words, both vītarāga in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa and sat in the Vādanyāya have no desire to win (vijigīṣā). It seems quite probable that the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa’s view is influenced by the Vādanyāya.

2) The purpose is not “(self-)profit,” “honor,” or “reputation” for those who desire liberation (mumukṣu).

3) hāsarvajña introduced the idea of parānugrahārtham “for the purpose of benefitting others” as the motivation behind vītarāga in the context of jalpa and vitaṇḍā. Being engaged in parānugraha “benefitting others” is common among vītarāga in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa and sat in the Vādanyāya. One may say that Bhāsarvajña covertly imported Dharmakīrti’s idea of parānugrahāya.

4) The purpose is the “protection of the sprout of knowledge [of the ascertainment of truth].”

5) The method is expressed using the metaphor of “thorns.”

Judging from the above, we can be fairly certain that Bhāsarvajña adopted the viewpoint and concept described in the Vādanyāya to his own notion of debate, presented in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa.

Figure 2: The comparison of conceptions of debate in Indian Logic

7. Concluding remarks

The comparison of “debate” concepts in the sources examined in this paper is presented in Figure 2. In addition, this comparison yields the following main points:

1) In the Carakasaṃhitā the term jalpa is employed to refer to a type of hostile debate conducted for the purpose of victory.

2) In the *Upāyahṛdaya the composition of a treatise (造論) is explained using the metaphor of thorns (荊棘). The same metaphor is used in the Nyāyasūtras. Ei-ther it was adapted from the *Upāyahṛdaya or from another text upon which both the Nyāyasūtras and the *Upāyahṛdaya draw. In the Nyāyasūtras the metaphor is used to explain jalpa and vitaṇḍā, technical terms that are also employed in the Carakasaṃhitā.

3) In the Nyāyabhāṣya both jalpa and vitaṇḍā are interpreted as forms of debate for the purpose of victory. As for jalpa, this interpretation is similar to that found in the Carakasaṃhitā.

4) In the Vādanyāya Dharmakīrti criticized the purpose of victory attributed to jalpa and vitaṇḍā in the Nyāyabhāṣya, presenting instead the idea of parānugraha “benefitting others,” as the purpose of debate. Dharmakīrti’s negation of the purpose of victory and the affirmation of the purpose of “benefit of others” is similar to the position found in the *Upāyahṛdaya.

5) From among the later Naiyāyikas, at least Bhāsarvajña, in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, ac-cepted implicitly Dharmakīrti’s construction of the debate concept in the Vādanyāya by adopting the idea of “benefitting others” and rejecting the idea of “victory.” It is possible that the same might be said of Vācaspati’s Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā as well, although the text is not explicit.

We may reasonably conclude that the Vādanyāya marked a turning point in the historical transition of the concept of debate. Dharmakīrti criticized the earlier concept of debate in the Nyāya school as “debate of people with a desire to win” (vijigīṣūṇāṃ vādaḥ) and created a new one, i.e., “debate of well-educated people” (satāṃ vādaḥ). His new understanding of the nature of the debate affected the later Nyāya school and led some Naiyāyikas to modify their approach. However, the extent to which the Vādanyāya influenced later works in the Nyāya school remains a matter for further research. An extended examination of the Vādanyāya’s commentaries, such as Śāntarakṣita’s Vipañcitārthā, as well as more comprehensive studies on later Nyāya literature, are needed to more fully understand these relationships.

References and abbreviations

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NBh Nyāyabhāṣya. See NV.

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NS Nyāyasūtras. See NV.

NV Nyāyavārttika. See NVTṬ.

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Footnotes and references:

[1]:

G. Tucci suggests Upāyahṛdaya as the original Sanskrit title of Fangbianxinlun, while E. Frauwallner suggested Prayogasāra. At the 17th Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (IABS) in 2014, Prof. Shōryū Katsura proposed a third possibility: Prayogahṛdaya.

[2]:

See VN 1,4–5: asādhanāṅgavacanam adoṣodbhāvanaṃ dvayoḥ / nigrahasthānam, anyat tu na yuktam iti neṣyate //1// “Asādhanāṅgavacana and adoṣodbhāvana are the conditions of defeat for the two (debaters, i.e. a proponent and an opponent, respectively). However, other [conditions of defeat that the Nyāya school and the like explain] are not correct, hence [they are] not accepted.” Here Dharmakīrti presents his original idea of dividing “the condition of defeat” into asādhanāṅgavacana (the condition of defeat for a proponent) and adoṣodbhāvana (the condition of defeat for an opponent). This compels us then to conclude that a proponent is judged to be defeated when his behavior corresponds to asādhanāṅgavacana and an opponent is judged to be defeated when his behavior corresponds to adoṣodbhāvana, according to the terms of debate set up in the VN. However, based on the descriptions supplied in the VN, this conclusion must in fact be wrong. See section 5 for details.

[3]:

As for nigrahasthāna as presented in the Nyāyasūtras, see Vidyabhusana 1921: 84–90. With regard to nigrahasthāna as defined in the Vādanyāya, see Much 1986 and 1991; Chinchore 1988; Gokhale 1993; Sasaki 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 2014a, and 2014b.

[4]:

See Preisendanz 2009: 266–268.

[5]:

For jalpa or √jalp, cf. CaS 8.8.15, CaS 8.8.18, CaS 8.8.20, CaS 8.8. 21. As Preisendanz 2009: 268 pointed out, the word vāda is also already introduced in the saṃbhāṣā section.

[6]:

Matilal 1998: 38–41 also points out that Caraka divides the “hostile debate” (vigṛhyasaṃbhāṣā) into two main types, jalpa and vitaṇḍā. Matilal calls the first the “j-type” hostile debate and the second the “v-type” hostile debate.

[7]:

Kajiyama 1984 assumes that the author of the *Upāyahṛdaya is Nāgārjuna.

[8]:

The same basic point is argued by Candrakīrti in the Madhyamakāvatāra as follows, MA 6.118 (p. 231): bstan bcos las dpyad rtsod la chags pa’i phyir // ma mdzad rnam grol phyir ni de nyid bstan // gal te de nyid rnam par bshad pa na // gzhan gzhung’jig par’gyur na nyes pa med // Cf. Uryuzu and Nakazawa 2012: 214. I am indebted to Dr. Shenghai Li for having provided this useful information.

[9]:

Ishitobi 2006: 42–44 and Eltschinger 2012: 471–472 translate this passage and analyze the motives and aims of treatise or debate presented in the *Upāyahṛdaya.

[10]:

Preisendanz 2000 considered this problem in detail.

[11]:

Cf. NBh 1099,4: anutpannatattvajñānānām aprahīṇadoṣāṇāṃ tadarthaṃ ghaṭamānānām etad iti; NV 1099,8: anutpannatattvajñānenaitat kartavyam iti sūtrārthaḥ.

[12]:

Cf. NV 1099,10–2000,4: tābhyāṃ jalpavitaṇḍābhyāṃ vigṛhyeti vijigīṣayā, na tattvabubhutsayeti. vi-dyāpālanārthaṃ caitat, na lābhapūjākhyātyartham iti.

[13]:

See VA 70,19–21: durjanānāṃ vipratipattir aśobhano vyavahāraḥ tasmān na yogavihito nyāyyaḥ kaścid vijigīṣuvādo(1) nāma, yac chalādibhiḥ kriyata ity adhyāhāraḥ. ((1) vijigīṣu° em.: vijagīṣu°.)

[14]:

McClintock 2010: 70, n. 169 has pointed out that Much uses the inappropriate translation “regellos” for the yogavihita in Much 1991: 51,2.

[15]:

Vitaṇḍā is criticized in VN 61,1–2: etenaiva vitaṇḍā pratyuktābhyupagamābhāve vivādābhāvāt.

[16]:

See NS 1.2.2: yathoktopapannaś chalajātinigrahasthānasādhanopālambho jalpaḥ //

[17]:

vipratipadyeta° em. [D337a6/P377b8: mi rtogs pa; VA 70,24: vipratipadyeta]: pratipadyeta° VN.

[18]:

See VA 70,21–22: ukte sati nyāye tattvārthī cet prativādī pratipadyeta tam arthaṃ nyāyopetam.

[19]:

See VA 70,22–24: atha svapakṣarāgasya balīyastvād ukte’pi nyāye na pratipadyeta. tadā tena prati-vādinā tasya nyāyasyārthasyāpratipattāv anyaḥ(1) samīpavartyātmajño janakāyo na vipratipadyeteti kṛtvā nyāyānusāraṇam eva satāṃ vāda iti vartate. ((1) anyaḥ VAMS em.: anya° VA.)

[20]:

The Tibetan translation of the Vādanyāya gives the lines a different reading. Cf. D337a6–7/ P377b8–378a1: gal te de kho na nyid bsrung ba’i don du dam pa rnams kyang rgyal bar’dod pa sgyu(1) la sogs pa dag gis tshar gcad (D; bcad P) par bya ba yin no zhe na / ma yin te khu tshur dang / thal lcag dang / mtshon chas bsnun (D; bsnan P) pa dang / me la sogs pa dag gis kyang zhes brjod par bya na / ((1) sgyu em.: rgyu D337a7/P377b8.)

[21]:

The word ādi seems to imply jāti or nigrahasthāna. Cf. NS 1.2.2: yathoktopapannaś chalajātinigraha-sthānasādhanopālambho jalpaḥ //

[22]:

See VA 70,27–28: tadabhāva iti sādhanaprakhyāpanasādhanābhāsadūṣaṇayor abhāve.

[23]:

See VA 70,28: anyathāpīti mithyāpralāpādyabhāve’pi.

[24]:

Steinkellner 1988: 1441–1442 pointed out that [satāṃ-]vādaḥ has to serve the investigation of truth (tattvacintā VN 21,22) and the explanation of truth (tattvakhyāpana VN 23,5). In the discussion at the conference, Prof. Steinkellner made the important remark that tattva in the case of tattvacintā should mean “true reality.”

[25]:

As for the difference between Dharmakīrti’s satāṃ vādaḥ and the notions of vāda, jalpa or vitaṇḍā as defined in the Nyāyasūtras, see Much 1991: Einleitung 2.2 and Gokhale 1993: Introduction, pp. xv–xvii.

[26]:

See NS 4.2.50: tattvādhyavasāyasaṃrakṣaṇārthaṃ jalpavitaṇḍe… // “The wrangling (jalpa) and the cavil (vitaṇḍā) [are undertaken] for the purpose of protecting the ascertainment of truth.” See section 4 for details.

[27]:

See NVTP 558,2–3: vidyānirveda ity asya vivaraṇaṃ sadvidyāvairāgyād iti. ādigrahaṇavivaraṇaṃ lābhapūjeti.

[28]:

See section 4 for details.

[29]:

Cf. NVTṬ 1099,13–14 (ad NS 4.2.50): tattvādhyavasāyasaṃrakṣaṇārthaṃ jalpavitaṇḍe bījapraro-hasaṃrakṣaṇārthaṃ kaṇṭakaśākhāvaraṇavat iti sūtram. tad vyācaṣṭe–anutpannatattvajñānānām iti.

[30]:

Basically, in the Nyāya school vītarāgakathā corresponds to vāda, and vijigīṣukathā corresponds to jalpa or vitaṇḍā. Bhāsarvajña, however, shows another interpretative possibility–that vītarāgakathā and viji-gīṣukathā are divided into four sub-types: (i) sapratipakṣā vītarāgakathā, (ii) apratipakṣā vītarāgakathā, (iii) sapratipakṣā vijigīṣukathā, and (iv) apratipakṣā vijigīṣukathā. See NBhū 332.7–11: vītarāgakathāpi dvividhā bhavati–sapratipakṣā vāpratipakṣā(1) ca…. evaṃ cāvāntarabhedavivakṣāyāṃ catasraḥ kathā bhavanti, na tisra iti. vyavahāras tu viśeṣasaṃjñātrayeṇaivāstīti tisra eva viśeṣasaṃjñā uddiṣṭāḥ. atha vā tisra eva bhavantu, vādo’pi hi pratipakṣahīno vitaṇḍaiveti vakṣyāmaḥ. ((1) vāpratipakṣā em.: vā pratipakṣā.) “The dispute of people without passion (vītarāgakathā) also has two types: [the dispute that] has an opposing view and [the dispute that] has no opposing views…. Furthermore, when one wishes to express the division [of the disputes] in this way (i.e., based on the existence or nonexistence of opposing views) respectively, there are four types of disputes, not three. On the other hand, it is [already] taught that there are only three particular names (i.e., vāda, jalpa, and vitaṇḍā) because there is conventional usage only by the three particular names. We, however, will state as follows: if only the three [particular names] exist, the debate (vāda) that has no opposing views is also a cavil (vitaṇḍā).”