Chapter 30 - The five divisions of sense-object relationship

263. The pratyakṣa (cognition) is divided into two, namely, laukika (ordinary) and alaukika (extraordinary). In pratyakṣa, the indriyas seek the sense-object contact. This is called as pratyāsatti or the relationship between the objects and the senses.

264. This relation is five fold. The first one, namely, laukika pratyakṣa, the two relations saṃyoga and saṃyukta sambandha are present.

265. The relationship between the senses and the substances is called as saṃyoga and the relation between the senses and the qualities of the substances is saṃyukta sambandha.

266. The sāmanya, jñāna and dharma are the alaukika sannikarṣas (i.e.) the extra-ordinary relationships. Through the sāmānya the knowledge of relation between dhūma and vahni arises.

267. On seeing the smoke there arise the knowledge of the invariable concomitance of dhūma and agni which is termed as sāmānya. In the same way, when the fire is noticed through its genus (jāti) it becomes the sāmānya for all the fires (vahnitva sāmānya).

268. Therefore, through the vyāpti jñāna wherever smoke is seen there fire is to be inferred. The jñāna pratyāsatti (the relation through knowledge) is caused by the saṃskāra (latent impression), which is gained by the previous experience.

269-270. This saṃskāra leads to pratyabhijñā (recollection of knowledge). The knowledge of an object which is attained with the aid of saṃskāra and indriyas as in the instance “this too is a cow (iyamapi gauḥ)” is known as Savikalpaka (determinate perception).

The knowledge of an object that is comprehended for the first time with sense organs as in the instance “this is a cow (iyam gauḥ)” is termed as Nirvikalpaka (indeterminate perception). In this there is the absence of the aiding factor namely, saṃskāra.

271-272. The difference between the Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka pratyakṣa is that in Nirvikalpaka though there is the knowledge of gotva in gauḥ, yet there is the absence of retrospective knowledge (anuvṛtti) of gotva as present in other cows. Hence, it is termed as indeterminate.^[1] Whereas, in the statement “iyam ca gauḥ” there is the retrospection of the knowledge of gotva as present in other cows. Hence it is termed as determinate.

273. Though the relation between the viśeṣaṇa and the viśeṣya (Noun and Adjective) is perceived in the statement “iyam gauḥ” and the relation of this namely, anuvṛtti is not understood in that. So it is stated as Nirvikalpaka and not because of the absence of viśeṣaṇas or the adjectival quality in it. According to our system, the Nirvikalpaka jñāna or Niṣprakāraka jñāna is not different from pratyakṣa.

274. In fact any viśiṣṭa jñāna (knowledge associated with attributes) are not really requiring the knowledge of the adjectival features. The Savikalpaka jñāna or viśiṣṭa jñāna is not preceeded by viśeṣaṇa jñāna. It originates along with the indriyas which are supported by the saṃskāras (latent impressions).

275-276. But, when the indriyas are not supporting the viśiṣṭa jñāna, the viśeṣaṇa jñāna pūrvikā itself is the quality to it. This is the accepted principle. According to the statement of Vālmīki it is accepted that there is the knowledge of an extra-ordinary perception that arises out of virtue or dharma. The extra-ordinary perception arising out of dharma is two fold, namely, external and internal.

277. The knowledge of the past happenings (atīta) and the future happenings (anāgata) are due to the power of dharma (dharma vīrya) is known as bāhya or external. There will be certain method in understanding the past and future happenings.

278. Even the yogīs are not able to grasp the smell (gandha) by the śrotrendriya (ear). It is possible to know the past and future happenings only with the respective sense organs. But the mind can comprehend all the seen and unseen objects without any differences. This is known as jñāna sāmānya sannikarṣa.

279. According to the practical usages of the world, the indriyas comprehend the objects with their respective quality. Therefore, the fragrance of sandal is the perceptive knowledge of ghrānendriya.

280-281. The fragrance of sandal is not achieved by cakṣurindriya. If it is doubted that how the knowledge namely, ‘surabhi candana’ is grasped than either the knowledge of sandal is cākṣuṣa (grahaṇa) and the fragrance of sandal is smaraṇa (remembrance) or it is the knowledge of the indriyas namely, mind as ekapratyakṣa because the mind does the function of all the other sense organs. The practical applicability of all the indriyas except mind is to be accepted.

282. This theory has been clearly stated in the texts Sarvārthasiddhi etc.^[2] Due to the divine grace of God, Arjuna and others got the divine vision without yogic practice which is the result of some extraordinary merit.

283. If it is said that in the instance of ‘divyam dadāmi te cakṣuḥ’, there is the bestowment of non-material eye, it is not so.

284. It is because there can be no mix-up of material and non-material in the case of the bound individual soul. Hence, the word ‘divya’ in ‘divyam dadāmi’ is to be understood in the sense of the enhancement of the power of vision and not as non-material eye.

285-286. (According to some, there is the direct knowledge through verbal testimony). Though the sense organs originate from pure sattva and as such they are non-material, on the authority of scriptural statement yet, they don't become the instrument of knowledge for the liberated souls and the Lord. It is because for them, there is always the uncontracted knowledge of everything in that state.

287. It may be said that because the self comprehends its own self - the self luminous entity and as such the śabda jñāna may be said to be direct or aparokṣa. It may be replied that, in that case, the statement that ‘aham anuminomi’ would also become an instance of aparokṣa jñāna.

288. But this will not be admitted either. Even the view that by the meditation on the Supreme there arise a perceptual knowledge is not admitted.

289. It is only a clarity or clear knowledge (vaiśadya) because of the repeated practice and not perceptual knowledge of God in the state of meditation. The power or clarity achieved by the repeated practice provides some vivid and clear knowledge on remembrance or recollection.

290. Thus it is defined; vaiśadya is that which provides more knowledge of the objects “adhikākāra vijñānam vaiśadyamiti śikṣitam”. It is an accepted fact that the mind is the instrument in all recollections.

291. Therefore, through the mind there arise a clear knowledge (vaiśadya jñāna). The wisemen do not accept that there arise perceptual knowledge through the mind in ‘laukika sannikarṣa’.

292. Similarly, it is also wrong to say that the mind is ‘anuvyavasāya’ to knowledge, because the knowledge is self-luminous. In verbal testimony too the knowledge arising through the aiding factors, the ātman or the self too gets illuminated along with knowledge.

293. This is the view of those who know the import of the Vedas. According to our system the different states of dharmabhūtajñāna, namely, icchā (desire) dveṣa (hatred) sukha (happiness) duḥkha (sorrow) prayatna (effort) etc., are also self-luminous.

294-295. It is accepted that the self is self-luminous in the deep sleep state. This is because of the reason that a person who gets up after sleep has the experience ‘sukhamaham asvāpsam’. In this blissful state of sleep, the ātman is self-luminous.

296-297. Though the experience of the self (ātmānubhava) is present, an awakened person recollects the blissful experience as ‘sukhamaham asvāpsam’. Here the question arises that when a person experiences both the self as well as the blissful experience (sukhānubhava), the ātman is treated as savikāra (that which changes). But this is not accepted because the ātman is nirvikara. Otherwise there will not arise the blissful experience in the deep sleep state (śuṣupti). Therefore, it cannot be said that the experience of the self is arising out of ātman.

298. According to some, in dharmabhūtajñāna there is the expansion or manifestation for the blissful experience and it is followed by a saṃskāra and the recollection of that experience. But this view is not accepted by the sūtra and its commentary, namely, “puṃstvādivat tu asya sataḥ abhivyakti yogāt”^[3], which denies the manifestation for the dharmabhūtajñāna in deep sleep state. This has been accepted by great ācāryas.

299. If it is doubted that how it could be possible to have the blissful experience during the sleeping state, then in the statement ‘sukhamaham asvāpsam’ only the bliss that is innate and implicit, which is essential nature of soul is experienced and which is self-luminous.

300. In the practical experience, the ‘I’ ness alone is the cause and there is no need of any adventious cause for saṃskāra.

301. In the experience ‘sukhamaham asvāpsam’ the absence of knowledge namely, svāpa, svāpakāla, the ātma or ahamartha are understood through inference and it is not recollection (smaraṇa). This inference has been quoted in śrutaprakāśikā.^[4]

302. The saṃskāra achieved through inference gives rise about the knowledge about the deep sleep state and its experience. Therefore, the knowledge about the experience is only achieved through inference after waking up from the sleep and hence, there is no difficulty in explaining that.

303. Here, the author criticizes the view of Śrī Raṅgarāmānujācārya, the commentator of Nyāya Siddāñjana, that the saṃskāra which arises out of inference is related to the ‘svāpa’ and the ‘svāpakāla’, in which the remembrance has been taken place.

The inferential knowledge in an awakened state (suptotthita parāmarśa) is not criticized by any pramāṇā. As such there is no need to inquire into the saṃskāra in the ātmasvarūpa. This may lead an unnecessary misunderstanding.

304. The above statement of the commentator of Nyāya Siddāñjana is due to fatigue and should not be taken in real sense.^[5] The various objects witnessed by a person in dream state are due to the free will of the Supreme Lord in accordance with the individual soul’s puṇya and pāpa to be experienced by that soul at that particular time.

305-306. Thus, the creation of the objects (padārtha sṛṣṭi) is explained. Therefore the perception is possible by the external senses, that is provided to him alone for that purpose only, the recollection by the mind as in the awakening state. The objects of the dream and the external senses are created by the Supreme Lord.

307-308. Through the scriptural statement ‘āśu tadā nāḍīṣu supto bhavati’ the individual soul reaches the nāḍi called ‘purītat’ and during that state there is no relation with the mind for the ātman. As the mind is the cause for all the knowledge, the comprehension of knowledge is not there during dream state. The individual soul cannot comprehend anything in deep sleep state. Thus, the narration of dream (svāpna vṛttam) and the perception with its classifications are explained.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Śrī Bhāṣya, I-(i)-l Vol-I, p.118.

[2]:

See Tattva Muktā Kalāpa, IV-37 and the commentary Sarvārtha Siddhi thereof.

[3]:

See Śrī Bhāṣya II-(iii)-4 Vol-II, p.365.

[4]:

Ibid. Śrutaprakāśika, pp.367-370.

[5]:

See Nyāya Siddhāñjana. Comm, pp.271-272