Chapter 3 - Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa in Navya Nyāya

The notion of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa gives rise to a number of important philosophical issues. So far as the Nyāya system is concerned, the discussion on this subject begins with Vācaspati Miśra’s novel interpretation of Gautama’s Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.4. Vācaspati Miśra says, the words ‘avyapadeśyam’ and ‘vyavasāyātmakam’ in Gautama’s sūtra 1.1.4 respectively, means nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa and savikalpaka pratyakṣa. Before Vācaspati, Dignāga (400 A.D) and, following him, Kumārila (700 A.D) dealt with the subject in their own ways.

Vācaspati mainly followed Kumārila in his exposition of nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa.^[1] A shift in emphasis is first found in Gaṅgeśa’s (1200 A.D) Tattvacintāmaṇi, who is known as the founder of Navya Nyāya. To Vācaspati Miśra, nirviklpaka pratyakśa (ālocanajñāna) is mostly a preceding psychological phenomenon which, in fact, is the basis of a further perceptual cognition. But Gaṅgeśa in his novel book Tattvacintāmaṇi is least concerned with the psychological priority of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. Rather, he attributes to it logical as well as factual priority without which the subsequent developed perceptual cognition cannot occur. We shall discuss here the views of the father of Navya Nyāya, Gaṅgeśa along with the views of Annaṃbhaṭṭa (1623 A.D) and Viśvanātha (1634 A.D). We think by discussing the above views we will able to get a clear picture of Navya Nyāya theory of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa.

Let us start with Gaṅgeśa’s definition of pratyakṣa. Before providing his own definition of pratyakṣa, Gaṅgeśa raised an objection against the Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.4, and says^[2] pratyakṣa is not a cognition which produced from the sense-object contact that does not deviate from the cognized fact. That is to say, Gautama’s sense-object contact is found not only in pratyakṣa, but it is found even in memory and imagination. In memory, manas, which is sense, is in contact with the object remembered, and in imagination, manas is in contact with the object imagined. So Gautama’s definition of pratyakṣa is too wide. Furthermore, Gautama’s sense-object contact theory excludes God’s pratyakṣa. God has no senses and so there is no sense-object contact as the cause of His pratyakṣa. But in Nyāya system God is taken as the perceiver of all that is going on. So Gautama’s definition of pratyakṣa is too narrow.

Gaṅgeśa defines pratyakṣa as: “pratyakṣasya sākṣātkāritvaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ”^[3] i.e. pratyakṣa is direct apprehension or immediate cognition. He further says, “jñānākaraṇakaṃ jñānam iti tu vayam”^[4] i.e. it is such a cognition whose instrumental cause is not any previous cognition. That is to say, the instrumental cause of pratyakṣa is sense organ, which is not cognition. In other words, pratyakṣa is such cognition whose instrumental cause is not any other cognition. That means pratyakṣa is direct apprehension or immediate cognition.

Gaṅgeśa supports the definition of pratyakṣa, ‘jñānā-karaṇakaṃ jñānam’ i.e. cognition that does not have a cognition as its chief instrumental cause (karaṇa). An objection may be raised at this point. In Nyāya epistemology nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is supposed to be the cause of savikalpaka pratyakṣa. So savikalpaka pratyakṣa is a type of cognition which has a cognition as a causal factor. Gaṅgeśa’s point is that although nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is a causal factor for savikalpaka pratyakṣa. It is not an instrumental causal factor (karaṇa). Cognition of a qualifier is not the instrumental cause of savikalpaka pratyakṣa of an entity as qualified by that qualifier although a preceding cognition of the qualifier which is a state of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is a causal factor. All such conditions are not causally efficacious or have no vyāpāra. But an instrumental cause must have a vyāpāra. So all though nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is the cause of savikalpaka pratyakṣa, the latter is as much jñānākaraṇaka as the former is.

Gaṅgeśa in nirvikalpaka-vāda of his ‘Tattvacintāmaṇi’ has discussed in details the definition and nature of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. Gaṅgeśa divides two stages of pratyakṣa; nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa and savikalpaka pratyakṣa. Of these two stages of pratyakṣa, the nirvikalpaka is the first one. He defines nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa as: “tatra nāmajātyādiyojanārahitaṃ vaiśiṣṭyān-avagāhi niṣprakārakaṃ nirvikalpakam”^[5] i.e. nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is that pratyakṣa which has no names, universals etc., and which is not of a qualificative relation, and which does not have any mode. In other words, nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is not a cognition of an entity as qualified, where a qualificandum is cognized as qualified by a qualifier. It has no predicative content or any mode. On the other hand Gaṅgeśa defines savikalpaka pratyakṣa as: “savikalpakaṃ ca viśiṣṭa-jñānaṃ yathā gaur ayam iti. tac ca sāmānyādīnāṃ paramārtha-sattvena arthajatvād indriyajatvāc ca pratyakṣam. kvacit saṃskāra-sahakāri-vaśena tattā-viśiṣṭasya idantā-viśiṣṭā-bhedôllekhī aindriyako vikalpaḥ”.^[6] That is to say, savikalpaka pratyakṣa is cognition of an entity as qualified, for instance, ‘This is a cow’. And this would be a pratyakṣa in as much as it is produced by sense organ. The object of such a pratyakṣa is a complex object consisting a relation between the universal etc. which is a real existent and the individual which is also real existent object. In some cases (viz., recognition, e.g., ‘This is that Devadatta’), the savikalpaka cognition is sensory with an identity manifested by that which is qualified by thisness and that which is qualified by thatness, in as much as a memory-impression serves as an auxiliary cause. In other words, savikalpaka pratyakṣa is a cognition of a qualificandum qualified by a qualifier, where the qualifier is provided by a prior cognition. After the definition of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa Gaṅgeśa offers a number of arguments to prove the actual occurrence of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa.

Gaṅgeśa starts with “nanu gauritipratyakṣaṃ viśeṣaṇajñānajanyam, viśiṣṭajñānatvāt anumitivaditi”.^[7]

Gaṅgeśa’s argument for nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is presented in the form of an inference for the sake of others which consists of five sentences as its parts (avayava) thus:^[8]

(i) Proposition: the (savikalpaka) pratyakṣa of the form ‘(the) cow’ is produced by a cognition of the qualifier.

(ii) Reason: Because this is a qualificative cognition.

(iii) Pervasion with example: Every qualificative cognition is produced by a (prior) cognition of the qualifier, for example, inference.

(iv) Application: The pratyakṣa of the form ‘(the) cow’ is a qualificative cognition.

(v) Conclusion: Hence, it is produced by a cognition of the qualifier. (The fourth and fifth members are not clearly stated but can be supplied very easily).

The cognition of the qualifier cannot itself be a savikalpaka pratyakṣa which, in its turn, will need a cognition of its qualifier and so on ad infinitum. So to stop this infinite regress Gaṅgeśa holds that a savikalpaka pratyakṣa which is a qualificative cognition having a qualificand, a qualifier, and a relation between them as its complex object can be produced only if there is a prior cognition of the qualifier. The point is that if I perceive what is objectively a cow as a cow, i.e., as cowness-possessing, then the cognition of cowness existing at the moment preceding the pratyakṣa is necessary. I might have perceived what is objectively a cow not as a cow but simply as an animal, or as a white object and so on.

Pratyakṣa is regarded as selective, because the object perceived always possesses almost an infinite richness of properties which cannot be perceived all at once. So every particular act of pratyakṣa is selective in the sense that a particular property of the object is perceived. The Nyāya theory is that this selection of the property perceived in the object is not arbitrary. It is epistemologically determined by the cognition of the particular property which happens to be present in the self when one perceives the object. But how is the cognition of the particular property to be explained? The property must itself be perceptible and with veridical cognition be present in a perceptible object; the object is perceived through the property, but the property itself is perceived not again through a property, but directly. This pratyakṣa which precedes the pratyakṣa of the object through a mode, i.e., through a qualifier, is not a pratyakṣa through a mode, i.e., it is a nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. This is the Gaṅgeśa’s argument for nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa.

A qualificative cognition with a singular viśeṣaṇa must be preceded by an unqualified qualifier. ‘This cow’ (gau) and ‘a man with a stick’ (daṇḍipuruṣa [daṇḍipuruṣaḥ]) are the instances of such complexly related objects of qualificative cognition. When one cognizes ‘this cow’ or ‘a man with a stick’ the cognition is causally determined by one’s prior cognition of ‘cowness’ or of ‘stick’ which serves as the qualifier in the particular cognition in question. In this way, through inference we do, and have to, arrive at some cognition by acquaintance of a bare qualifier unqualified by any further qualifier. And such an acquaintance of the bare qualifier is called nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa.

However, the above two cognitive instances viz., the cognitions of ‘this cow’ and ‘a man with a stick’, though both are qualificative (both of them may be cited to prove the existence of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa), are not obviously of the same type. The first instance, i.e. ‘this cow’ is, no doubt, a complex type of cognition technically known as ‘viśiṣṭajñāna’.

The qualifier of this cognition (i.e., cowness) does not involve any further qualifier. But the second instance is a more complex type of cognition technically known as viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyajñāna.^[9] The qualifier of this more complex cognition (i.e., stick) involves a further qualifier (i.e., stickness). The cognition of ‘stick’, like that of ‘a man with a stick’, is thus saprakāraka or qualificative . Gaṅgeśa’s point here is that a qualificative cognition, irrespective of its degree of complexity, is necessarily preceded by the cognition of its qualifier (excepting a few cases like samavāya, abhāva etc. of which nirvikalpakajñāna is not possible). Now if that cognition is relatively less complex (viśiṣṭajñāna) then the preceding cognition of its qualifier cannot but be non-qualificative perceptual cognition. But if that cognition is relatively more complex then, as the qualifier of that cognition has a further qualifier, it cannot be non-qualificative. To stop the vicious infinite regress, we are forced to admit in this process a first or bare qualifier (prāthamika viśeṣaṇa) which does not involve any further qualifier (bhāne vānavasthā nirvikalpakāsiddhiśca).^[10]

As we have already seen that the cognition of the first qualifier of a viśiṣṭajñāna cannot but be nirvikalpaka. But can we claim with equal force that it is perceptual?

Throughout his discourse on ‘nirvikalpakavāda’ Gaṅgeśa has used the term ‘nirvikalpakajñāna’ and not ‘nirvikalpakapratyakṣa’ to indicate such unqualified cognition.^[11] The real intention lying behind this usage is not very clear. One may wonder if Gaṅgeśa really admits the possibility of non-perceptual nirvikalpaka.^[12] It is true that Gaṅgeśa has used the term ‘nirvikalpakajñāna’, but he has certainly used it in the context of perceptual cognition.

So, it appears that, by the use of this term he has tacitly indicated nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa which is, obviously, a nirvikalpaka jñāna, too. Although the first simple unqualified cognition is commonly said to be perceptual, its perceptuality is known through an inference alone and not through any anuvyavasāya, the immediate means of knowing a prior cognitive state. In other words, it is only through an inference that we can apprehend a type of perceptual cognition to be nirvikalpaka.

Gaṅgeśa’s interpretation of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa interestingly accommodates both nirvikalpakatva and savikalpakatva (as co-characters) in the same state of qualificative cognition. For instance, in the qualificative perceptual cognition of the form ‘this is a cow’, an individual cow is apprehended as qualified by the universal cowness, but even then the apprehension of cowness itself remains unqualified. Similarly, in the negative qualificative perceptual cognition of the form ‘There is no pot on this spot’, the negation of the pot is apprehended as qualified by the spot. That spot is also apprehended as qualified by the universal spotness, but the apprehension of spotness itself remains unqualified. Thus the same perceptual state of cognition is a qualificative (savikalpaka) one from the point of view of the individual cow and a non-qualificative (nirvikalpaka) one from the point of view of cowness (gauriti savikalpakamapigotvāṃśe nirvikalpakameva tatra prakārābhānāt).^[13] As a result the qualificativeness (savikalpakatva) and non-qualificativeness (nirvikalpakatva) cannot be regarded as generic attributes (jāti) like cowness, horseness, etc. which as generic attributes are mutually exclusive (ata eva nirvikalpakatva savikalpakatve na jāti cākṣuṣatvādinā saṃkarāpatteḥ).^[14] In the Nyāya epistemology, excepting a few ontologically indivisible elements like samavāya, abhāva, etc., all other reals, when they become the objects of qualificative perceptual cognition, may also be partly considered as the objects of nonqualificative perceptual cognition though, in pursuance of the Nyāya maxim of the trikṣaṇavarttitva of jñāna, we can also admit that they might be apprehended at the preceding moment.

The above view of Gaṅgeśa about nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa, however, is quite different from the traditional views. Traditionally, nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa has been thought of as a type of cognition the objects of which are some undifferentiated whole or some unrelated simples (unrelated, i.e., the viśeṣya, viśeṣaṇa and saṃsarga as just the entities over there).^[15] But when the question arises as to whether such non-qualificative apprehension of samavāya is possible, most of the Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that where the saṃsarga in question happens to be samavāya, the unqualified viśeṣya and the unqualified viśeṣaṇa (the bare substantive and the bare qualifier) alone, and not that samavāya, that are to be considered as objects of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. Gaṅgeśa, it appears, has advanced a step further. His argument proves that it is only the cognition of the bare viśeṣaṇa which necessarily precedes the subsequent savikalpaka pratyakṣa. For Gaṅgeśa, a prior cognition of the bare viśeṣya is not essential for the corresponding qualificative cognition (viśeṣyajñānaṃ ca na kāraṇam).^[16] This is evident from his argument which seeks to justify the impossibility of non-qualificative cognition of abhāva (ata evābhāve na nirvikalpakam). ^[17] The cognition of ‘the absence of pot on the spot’ is a qualificative cognition. In the case of this qualificative cognition ‘the absence of the pot’ is the viśeṣya and ‘the spot’ is the viśeṣaṇa or the qualifier.^[18] The prior non-qualificative cognition of ‘the spot’ is essential for this qualificative cognition, but not so of ‘the absence of the pot’. The cognition of ‘the absence of the pot’ is always qualificative. But the absence of the non-qualificative cognition of ‘the absence of the pot’ (i.e., viśeṣya) does not stand on the way of the subsequent qualificative cognition of ‘the absence of the pot on the spot’. So the prior non-qualificative cognition of the viśeṣya is not a must for the subsequent qualificative cognition (viśiṣṭajñāna) of the viśeṣya as qualified by the viśeṣaṇa. But the case of viśeṣaṇa is different altogether. Although the qualificative cognition of a viśeṣaṇa in the case of a relatively more complex cognition (viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭajñāna) is beyond question, the cognition of the first viśeṣaṇa cannot but be non-qualificative. This non-qualificative cognition of the first viśeṣaṇa or bare viśeṣaṇa, is a pre-condition for qualificative cognition (viśiṣṭajñāna) of objects (except, of course, the cases of those unanalysable elements admitted in the Nyāya).

This, however, does not mean that the non-qualificative cognition of the viśeṣya is not possible. The viśeṣya (not even in such verbalized form), when known as bare something or unqualified something is no doubt the object of a non-qualificative cognition, but the occurrence of such a non-qualificative cognition of the bare viśeṣya is not essential for the occurrence of the subsequent qualificative cognition (vyabhicāra being the case of abhāva etc.). Therefore, it is the bare viśeṣaṇa is to be regarded as the sure object of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa.

In recognition of the form ‘This is that Devadatta’ the thatness is the qualifier of Devadatta, and the recognition is caused by the cognition of this qualifier. Anyone who had not known Devadatta previously would not be able to re-identify him as that person. So the recognition is caused by the cognition of the qualifier (thatness), yet recognition is not an indirect cognition but is a kind of pratyakṣa which is direct cognition. So it is not true that whatever cognition is caused by the cognition of the qualifier is indirect cognition.

It should be noted here that according to Gaṅgeśa the cognition of the qualifier (thatness) in recognition is memory and is hence indirect cognition. But this does not mean that the recognition is memory; it is a direct cognition. This follows from Gaṅgeśa’s second definition of pratyakṣa as given earlier: pratyakṣa is that cognition which does not have another cognition as its instrumental cause. This definition of pratyakṣa does not preclude the possibility that some other cognition (often memory which is an indirect cognition) is a cause of pratyakṣa; only that cause must not be the instrumental cause. So in recognition memory plays a causal role, but it is not the role of the instrumental cause.^[19]

Let us now to the views of Annaṃbhaṭṭa (1623 A.D) and Viśvanātha (1634 A.D) in this regard.

Annaṃbhaṭṭa in his Tarkasaṃgraha says that “tatra pratyakṣajñānakaraṇam pratyakṣam”.^[20] The author gives the definition of pratyakṣa as one of the four pramāṇas’, i.e. pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, and śabda. The word ‘tatra’ here indicates so. Pratyakṣa pramāṇa is the cause of pratyakṣa jñāna. The question is now what is pratyakṣa jñāna? In reply Annaṃbhaṭṭa says that “indriyārthasannikarṣajanyam jñānam pratyakṣam. tat dvividham—-nirvikalpakam savikalpakam ca iti”^[21] i.e. pratyakṣa is that cognition which is produced from the sannikarṣa between the sense-organs and their objects. It is of two kinds(i) nirvikalpaka, & (ii) savikalpaka pratyakṣa.

Here, sense-organ (indriya) is eye etc., object (artha) is pot etc., their relation (sannikarṣa) is constituted by conjunction (saṃyoga) etc., and the cognition that results from such relation is pratyakṣajñāna. Further, the author subdivides pratyakṣa into two kinds, viz., nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa and savikalpaka pratyakṣa.

The author of Tarkasaṃgraha here gives the standard definition of perceptual cognition as that which is due to the relation of a sense-organ with the object. As the context is that of pramā or veridical anubhava, the definition is to be taken as of veridical pratyakṣa and not of pratyakṣa is general. The Sanskrit term ‘indriya’, here does not stand for ‘senseorgan’ in the physiological sense of the term, as a visible portion of the body. It means a nonperceptible entity, the power of perceiving objects. The term ‘artha’, here stands for ‘a real thing’ and not for any and everything that one is aware of. The term ‘sannikarṣa’ means here that relation between a sense-organ and an object, which serves to produce a perceptual cognition. It is to be noted that Annaṃbhaṭṭa’s definition of pratyakṣa as a pramāṇa is not quite accurate as it stands. He defines this pramāṇa as the karaṇa of pratyakṣa-jñāna. But jñāna may be veridical (yathārtha) or non-veridical (a-yathārtha) and may, again, be of the nature of an anubhava or not or of smṛti. It is only the karaṇa for a yathārtha-anubhava or pramā that can properly be called pramāṇa. The karaṇa for a cognition which is neither veridical, nor of the nature of an anubhava, cannot surely be designated as pramāṇa; the karaṇa of smṛti or of viparyaya or of tarka,—-this three varieties of non-veridical cognition recognized by the author—-cannot properly be called pramāṇa. Yet if the author’s definition of pratyakṣa-pramāṇa as pratyakṣa-jñāna-karaṇa were taken at its face value, then the karaṇa of an erroneous pratyakṣa or of a perceptual doubt would have to be called pratyakṣapramāṇa. But that would make the definition too wide. The above definition, we believe, is not to be taken as it stands and it may be imagined with reason that the author intends by the term pratyakṣa-jñāna-karaṇa nothing but pratyakṣa-pramā-karaṇa.^[22]

After the definition of pratyakṣa Annaṃbhaṭṭa gives the definition of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa and savikalpaka pratyakṣa. He defines nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa as: “(tatra) niṣprakārakam jñānam nirvikalpakam. (yathā ‘kiñcit īdam’iti)”^[23] i.e. the cognition which is niṣprakāraka or devoid of modes (prakāra) is called nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. And savikalpaka pratyakṣa as: “saprakārakam jñānam savikalpakam. yatha—‘Ḍitthaḥ ayam,’ ‘Brāhmaṇaḥ ayam’, ‘Śyāmaḥ ayam itī”^[24] i.e. the cognition which has modes (saprakāraka) is called savikalpaka pratyakṣa; e.g., that is ‘ḍittha’, that is Brāhmaṇa, that is a black etc.

The author gives the definition of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa as niṣprakārakam jñānam, i.e., to say, it is the cognition that does not have for its object or cognitum a determinandum (viśeṣya), a determinans (viśeṣaṇa), or a relation (saṃsarga). If it be claimed that what is the evidence for the postulation of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa, the answer is, no, this type of objection cannot arise. The nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is evident from the inference (anumāna) of the following form.

The cognition of a determinate-entity (viśiṣṭa-jñāna) which is expressed as cow is due to the cognition of a determinans (viśeṣaṇa); for it is of a viśiṣṭa-jñāna type like the cognition of a person with a stick. If the cognition of the determinans (viśeṣaṇa) were again to be savikalpaka, there would be the difficulty of infinite regress, and for this reason i.e., to avoid this difficulty, the reality of nirvikalpaka is to be taken as established. Lastly, the author defines savikalpaka pratyakṣa as saprakārakam jñānam, i.e., to say, it is the cognition that has for its cognitum or viśeṣya, a name, a universal etc., as its determinans (viśeṣaṇa), and a relation (saṃsarga).^[25]

Viśvanātha defines pratyakṣa as: “indriyajanyaṃ jñānaṃ pratyakṣam”^[26] i.e. pratyakṣa is a kind of cognition which is produced by the sense organ. In this definition the word ‘sannikarṣa’ is not included. This is because Viśvanātha thinks that the karaṇa of pratyakṣa is sense organ, and not the sense-object contact (sannikarṣa). Sannikarṣa, however, is necessary for pratyakṣa, but it is not the instrumental cause of pratyakṣa. It is only an operatory cause (vyāpāra) of pratyakṣa. As Viśvanātha defines pratyakṣa by its instrumental cause (karaṇaghaṭatalakṣaṇa), so he has not mentioned the word ‘sannikarṣa’ in the definition of pratyakṣa.

Viśvanātha defines nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa as: “jñānaṃ yat nirvikalpākhyaṃ tadatīndriyamiṣyate”^[27] i.e. the cognition that is called nirvikalpaka is considered to be beyond the senses. The definition mentions only one characteristic of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. This characteristic is atīndriya. Here ‘atīndriya’ means that nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa cannot be perceived. There are so many things that are atīndriya. So that definition mention above cannot be treated as logical definition. It is only a statement about a nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa.

In Muktāvalī Viśvanātha expain nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa in details and offers a reason for admitting nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa.^[28] He says that immediately after the conjunction of the eye etc. with the object, it is impossible to have a cognition like, ‘It is a jar’, about something qualified by jarhood etc. because the cognition of the qualification ‘jarhood’ etc. is absent before it; and with regard to a qualified cognition the cognition of the qualification is a cause.

So at first there arises a cognition which does not comprehend the relation between a jar and jarhood. That is nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. Viśvanātha here explains the process of origination of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa along with the reason in favour of its existence. The reason stated is more or less the same as stated by Gaṅgeśa and Annaṃbhaṭṭa. Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is to be admitted to make possible savikalpaka pratyakṣa. In other words, without nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa savikalpaka pratyakṣa cannot take place. But there are so many instances of savikalpaka pratyakṣa that we find in our everyday life. So the existence of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa cannot be denied.

Viśvanātha says that nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is atīndriya. That means it is not perceptible. The pratyakṣa of a cognition is called anuvyavasāya. By anuvyavasāya we can know the cognition that occurred before hand along with the object cognized. The pratyakṣa of cognition is never without a comprehension of the relation between a thing and its qualification. For example, the cognition, ‘I know the jar.’ Here cognition is presented in the soul as a feature (prakāra), as is the jar in respect of the cognition, and jarhood in respect of the jar. The feature itself is designated as a qualification (viśeṣaṇa). That which specifies a qualification is called the determinant (avacchedaka) of the qualificationhood. The cognition which is cognizant of this determinant of the qualificationhood as a feature is the cause of the cognition that a qualified thing is related to another. In nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa jarhood etc. are not cognised as features; hence it is not possible for the relation of a jar or the like, which is qualified by jarhood etc. to be cognized in nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. Nor can there be qualified cognition of a jar or the like, in which jarhood etc. are not cognized as features; for it is the rule that the cognition of all categories other than the generic attribute and the unanalysable characteristic (akhaṇḍopādhi) must have some attribute as its features.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

“asti hyālocanaṃ jñānaṃ prathamaṃ nirvikalpakam. bālamūkādi-vijñāna-sadṛśaṃ śuddhavastujam. na viśeṣo na sāmānyaṃ tadānīm anubhūyate. tayor ādhārabhūta tu vyaktirevāvasīyate”.—-Ślokavārttika, iv. 112, 113.

[2]:

“nanu na pratyakṣaṃ tāvad indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannaṃ jñānam avyabhicāri. ātmānumiti-smṛtyor jñāna-mātre ca ativyāpteḥ. ātmāno’rthasya manasā indriyeṇa saṃyogād utpatteḥ. īśvara-pratyakṣā-vyāpteś ca. sannikarṣasya ca saṃyogādi-rūpatvena an-anugamāc ca. saṃyogādy-anyatamasya ca a-nirdhārita-eka-paratve bhāgā-siddhir itara-bheda-sādhane, vyartha-viśeṣaṇatvaṃ ca. indriyārthayor eka-janyatvasya lakṣaṇatve vyartha-viśeṣaṇatvam. na ca tayor eka-eka-janyatvam eva lakṣaṇaṃ, ātmamano-janyatvena jñāna-mātre gatatvāt. indriyasya pratyakṣa-nirūpyatvāc ca”.—-Tattvacintāmaṇi, p. 327.

[3]:

Ibid. p. 330.

[4]:

Ibid. p. 334.

[5]:

Quoted from Sibajiban Bhattacharyya’s ‘Gaṅgeśa’s Theory of Indeterminate Perception’, Part-Two, p. 4.

[6]:

Tattvacintāmaṇi, p. 334.

[7]:

Quoted from Sibajiban Bhattacharyya’s ‘Gaṅgeśa’s Theory of Indeterminate Perception’, Part-Two, p. 9.

[8]:

The formulation of this argument is taken from the ‘Gaṅgeśa’s Theory of Indeterminate Perception’, Part–two, by Sibajiban Bhattacharyya, p. 10.

[9]:

‘viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭyajñāna’ and ‘viśiṣṭa-jñāna’ means ‘viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭya viṣayakajñāna’ and ‘viśiṣṭa-viṣayakajñāna’. These are types of cognition the objects of which are relational complexes. In Nyāya epistemology a piece of cognition is often described after its object.—So ‘viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭyajñāna’ here is nothing but the ‘viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭyāvagāhijñāna’.

[10]:

Tattvacintāmaṇi, p. 638.

[11]:

“As far as Gaṅgeśa is concerned, there is no harm in calling this cognition a nonqualificative cognition of cowness”.—Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis, by B. Kārikā Matilal, p. 85.

[12]:

“Gaṅgeśa apparently concedes this point and says that not all our perceptual judgments are preceded by a non-qualificative, perceptual state”. Ibid. p. 85.

[13]:

Tattvacintāmaṇi, p. 638.

[14]:

Ibid. p. 638.

[15]:

“jātyādi svarūpāvagāhi————gāhi”.—-NVT, p. 108. “tasmādya eva vastvātmā—————-śabdollekhavivarjjitaḥ”.—-N M, p. 144.

[16]:

Tattvacintāmaṇi, p. 636.

[17]:

Ibid. p. 636.

[18]:

“prathamaṃ bhūtale ghaṭo na asti iti buddhiḥ. tatra bhūtalaṃ viśeṣaṇam, abhāvo viśeṣyaḥ”. Ibid. p. 636.

[19]:

Collected from Sibajiban Bhattacharyya’s ‘Gaṅgeśa’s Theory of Indeterminate Perception’, Part–two, p. 31.

[20]:

Tarkasaṃgraha-Dīpikā on Tarkasaṃgraha, Annaṃbhaṭṭa, Translated and Elucidated by Gopinath Bhattacharya, p. XXII.

[21]:

Ibid. p. XXII.

[22]:

Collected from: Ibid. p. 169.

[23]:

Ibid. p. XXII.

[24]:

Ibid. p. XXII.

[25]:

“nirvikalpakasya lakṣaṇam āha—‘niṣprakārakam’ iti. viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyasaṃbandhā navagāhijñānam ityarthaḥ. ‘nanu nirvikalpake kim pramānam’iti cet na; ‘gauḥ’iti viśiṣṭajñānam viśeṣaṇajñānajanyam viśiṣṭajñānatvāt daṇḍī iti jñānavat’ityanumānasya pramāṇatvāt. viśeṣaṇajñānasya api savikalpakatve anavasthāprasaṅgāt nirvikalpaka siddhiḥ. savikalpakam lakṣayati—-‘saprakārakam’ iti. nāmajātyādiviśeṣaṇaviśeṣya saṃbandhāvagāhi jñānam ityarthaḥ. savikalpakam udāharati, ‘yathā’ iti”. Ibid. p. XXIII.

[26]:

Viśvanātha, Siddhānta-Muktāvalī, Bhāṣā-Paricceda, kārikā -52.

[27]:

Ibid. kārikā -58.

[28]:

“jātya khaṇḍopādhyatirikta padārtha jñānasya kiñciddharmaprakārakatvaniyamāt”.—Ibid. kārikā -58.