Vaisesika Doctrines (in the Nyaya Works)

by Diptasree Som | 2010 | 25,594 words

This essay studies the Vaisesika Doctrines in the Nyaya Works.—Both part of the system of Indian philosophy, Nyaya and Vaisesika are accepted to be friendly to each other. Many standpoints are advocated by both systems. For example, both Nyaya and Vaisesika strongly argue that all the three terms (viz., buddhi, upalabdhi and jnana) are synonymous, ...

Chapter 1 - Introduction

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As is well-known, the systems of Indian philosophy are divided into two groups, Nastika (denying the validity of the Veda) and Astika (admitting the validity of the Veda). The second group is generally represented by six systems, namely, Sankhya, Yoga, Vedanta, Mimamsa, Nyaya and Vaisesika. Again, among these six, there is supposed to be a sort of alliance between two. For example, Sankhya and Yoga are generally mentioned together as if they represent a single system. Similarly some interdependence is supposed to exist between Mimamsa or Purva-Mimamsa and Vedanta or Uttara-Mimamsa. Finally Nyaya and Vaisesika also are accepted to be friendly to each other and it is found that there is indeed a lot of collaboration between the two. Thus, even in their earliest phase, they were designated as samanatantra.

Before we enter into the detailed discussion of the nature of this collaboration between the two systems as found in the texts of both, we shall first try to have some basic ideas about the nature of the two and their literature. Of course, it is also a fact that there is much controversy among scholars regarding the date and nature of some of the works belonging to the two systems. The Nyayasutra, attributed to Gautama or Aksapada is generally accepted as the earliest extant work on the Nyaya system. An early attempt to determine the dates of the basic Sutra-works of the various Astika systems was made by the famous German scholar, H. Jacobi. In an article published in 1911, he makes a detailed examination of the question.^[1] As he himself declares at the outset, he would try to arrive at a conclusion on the basis of which particular Buddhist doctrine has been referred to in a particular work of a particular system. Actually, by the Buddhist doctrines he specially means Vijnanavada and Sunyavada. The former was established by Asanga and his younger brother Vasubandhu, (about the latter part of the fifth century A.D), and the latter by Nagarjuna (about the end of the second century A.D). Thus, he points out generally: “If they refer to the Vijnanavada, they must be later than the fifth century A.D; if however this is not the case, and we can assign to them an acquaintance with the Sunyavada only they must date somewhere between 200 and 500 A.D”.^[2]

Although from the comments of Sankara and Vacaspati it may first appear that the Vedantasutra and the Nyayasutra refer to Vijnanavada, a closer examination however reveals that actually the references are to Sunyavada.^[3] The commentators’ preference for the former view is most probably due to the fact that in their time the view had risen to great importance. Jacobi points out further that Vatsyayana’s views were criticized by the famous Buddhist logician Dinnaga, which implies that the former must be earlier than the latter at least by ten or twenty years. Moreover, Vatsyayana is not the immediate successor of Gautama and the two must have been separated by at least one generation. Hence Gautama may be assigned to the last quarter of the fifth century A.D. At the end of his commentary, in a verse, Vatsyayana refers to the author of the Nyayasutra as Rsi. It shows that he definitely considers him as an author of the remote past. In short, the Nyayasutra must belong to some period later to the second century A.D.^[4]

Some scholars think that the Sutras of Gautama and Kanada were composed quite later than the two Mimamsa Sutras which belonged roughly to the sixth century B.C. It appears that Gautama in many places refers to Vedanta doctrines and at least in one case Gautama borrows arguments and examples from the Vedantasutra. On the basis of such evidences it may be concluded that the Nyayasutra cannot be older than the fourth century B.C.^[5] Another scholar also discusses the question of dating the Nyayasutra elaborately. He refers to the views of Jacobi, but does not agree with him. He specially takes into account the reference to the different systems of philosophy in the Arthasastra. Finally, he concludes that the works of Kanada and Gautama were redacted between the middle of the fourth century and the second century B.C. perhaps towards the end of the fourth century B.C. and the work of Kanada might have been earlier.^[6]

We have already noted that the Nyayasutra of Gautama is the earliest extant work of the Nyaya system. There is controversy among scholars regarding the actual nature of this ancient text. Thus it has been suggested by many scholars that the Nyaya system has originated from the studies in the method and techniques of debate.^[7] Evidences for this view are found in the work itself. In the first sutra Gautama gives a list of sixteen categories and says that the right knowledge of these leads to liberation. In this list we find not only three distinct forms of debate, but also a number of topics which are specially connected with debates. The most useful instrument for engaging in a debate is inferential proof or argument. Thus, Gautama discusses in detail two topics, namely, avayava and hetvabhasa. Other important topics like chala, jati and nigrahasthana are also treated elaborately. Specially, the second ahnika of the first chapter and the whole of the fifth chapter discuss the nature of the different forms of debate and topics directly or indirectly connected with them.

Some scholars again go further and argue that the Nyaya is more a science of debate than a system of philosophy.

Thus, Bodas, after noting that the Nyaya and the Vaisesika occupy a unique position among the different systems of Indian philosophy, remarks:

“Nyaya, which is the more compact and perhaps also the more modern of the two, is much more a system of dialectics than one of philosophy. The aphorisms of Gotama and the works founded on them treat no doubt of metaphysical and theological questions occasionally but they come in rather as digressions than as inseparable parts of the system.”^[8]

Bodas also thinks that these sixteen topics may be divided into two groups. The first nine topics, starting with pramana and ending with nirnaya, come under the first and represent what may be called logic proper. The seven remaining topics which form the second group have a negative function in logic. By exposing errors they teach us how to avoid them.

Another noted scholar, H.P.Sastri, also critically examines the sutras of Gautama and thinks that, at least partially the Nyayasutra represents a work on logic.

Thus, he remarks:

“The study of the Sutras makes it apparent that works of two different sciences have been mixed up. One is a work on Logic, or rather the science of Reasoning…….and the other is a work on system of philosophy. The work on Logic is confined almost exclusively to the first and the fifth chapters. I say almost, because some sections of the second chapter also may belong to the Logic part. The rest of the work with about eight Sutras in the first chapter belongs to the philosophical part.”^[9]

S.C. Vidyabhusana points out that the Nyaya in its earlier phase was originally concerned with the art of debate, though it was designated by the term anviksiki. In fact, the term nyaya itself technically means an argument which has five members. The system is also called Hetusastra and Tarkavidya. All this points to its intimate connection with debate. However, in about 650 B.C, anviksiki bifurcated itself into philosophy (darsana) and logic.^[10]

The scholar also thinks that if we carefully consider the list of Gautama’s categories, it may be found that they represent stages in the course of a debate. The first category is pramana and it is the most essential means for debate. The second category prameya refers to the object of knowledge. In these two we have the basic materials for a debate, the subject of a thesis to be supported and the means by which it is to be established. The next category, samsaya is the precondition of a debate, because if there is no doubt regarding the nature of an object there cannot be a debate at all. Next is mentioned prayojana. It represents the purpose of a debate. Drstanta or illustration which is accepted by both the parties establishes a conclusion properly. Thus through these steps, one reaches siddhanta or a doctrine. That the conclusion is right is further shown with the help of avayava. The five logical steps help to show that the conclusion cannot be challenged. The category of tarka is necessary for removing any further counter-argument that may be justly or unjustly raised against one’s position. Finally, a conclusion is reached and it cannot be denied. So we come to nirnaya. That the categories of hetvabhasa, chala and jati are connected with debate is rather obvious. One should avoid them in one’s own arguments and must also expose them if any of them is employed by the opponent. Since one has to proceed through debates, some discussion on the nature and forms of debate is necessary. It is also necessary to make some rules for determining defeat or victory. That is why forms of debate and nigrahasthana are included in the list.^[11]

Another well-known scholar of Indian philosophy, S.N. Dasgupta thinks that originally Nyaya had connection with the interpretation of Vedic texts in the context of debate.

He writes:

“It is very probable that the earliest beginning of Nyaya are to be found in the disputes and debates amongst scholars trying to find out the right meaning of the Vedic texts for use in sacrifices and also in those disputes which took place between the adherents of different schools of thought trying to defeat one another”.^[12]

It appears that Dasgupta is influenced by the view of Bodas. In his historical survey of Indian logic, he proceeds from the basic assumption that all sciences in India appear to have sprung out of sacrificial necessities.

He writes:

“It is probable, therefore, that the art of reasoning also originated in some requirement of the all-important sacrifices. Such requirements were mainly two, the correct interpretation of Vedic texts on which the due performance of the sacrifices depended, and victory in the philosophical and other discussion which were usually held in the intervals of sacrifices. It was a special function of the Brahman priest to give decision on any disputed points that might arise in the course of a sacrifice, and this he could not have done unless he was a master of ratiocination”.^[13]

S. Kuppuswami sastri, a noted scholar of Indian philosophy, agrees that the Nyaya-Vaisesika might have had close connection with argumentation, but he is not inclined to accept the view that the system was actually a product of Vedic influence.

The case might have been rather opposite. Thus he explains:

“Another section of rationalistic thinkers, who did not agree to play second fiddle to scriptural authorities, perhaps developed and expounded rationalistic doctrines on independent lines, without subjecting themselves to the thraldom of Vedic religion and philosophy. Some of these doctrines perhaps shaped themselves into the Sankhya thought of the pre-Buddhist stage, with a marked degree of hostility to Vedic ritualism. Some other doctrines of this kind gave rise to the pre-Buddhistic logic and metaphysics of the Vaisesika, with a special leaning in favour of the inductive method of reasoning based on observation and analysis ……”^[14]

Thus it follows that some scholars think that the Nyayasutra of Gautama should be looked upon more as a textbook on the science of debate than a work presenting a system of philosophy.It is true that Gautama lays special stress on debate and topics connected with it. Even then, there are some other important points that may be noted here.

While explaining the first sutra of Gautama, Vatsyayana, at the outset, makes a comment about the nature of Nyayavidya. Logically speaking, only the first two categories mentioned by Gautama are necessary and the other fourteen categories can actually be included in the first two. Then, why are they separately stated? Vatsyayana answers that the categories like samsaya and the rest constitute the unique subject-matter of Nyaya. If these categories were not separately stated Nyaya would have become a mere study of the self (adhyatmavidya), like the Upanisads.^[15]

The implication of Vatsyayana is as follows. Different vidyas have been prescribed for the welfare of mankind. Each vidya has its own special subject-matter. The nature of the self is discussed in the Upanisads as well as in Nyaya. Even then, the two are different. The Nyaya is not a study of the self only, but it also discusses many other topics like samsaya and other. That is why Vatsyayana adds the word matra. It shows that Vatsyayana considers Nyaya also as a study of the self and not simply as a system of Logic.

Moreover, in the Indian tradition the ends of human life are stated to be four, namely, dharma, artha, kama and moksa. For each of these four again a specific branch of study is prescribed. A system of philosophy or darsana is generally considered as the means for realizing moksa. Nyaya also is considered as a system of philosophy. In that case Nyaya cannot be only concerned with the methods of logic and debate, it should also discuss liberation ─ the means for attaining it and its nature. In fact, in the first sutra itself, Gautama states that the right knowledge of the sixteen categories leads to the attainment of the highest good. In the next sutra Gautama gives the causal sequence through which right knowledge ultimately leads to liberation.

Not only this, if we look into the contents of the Nyayasutra carefully, we find that Gautama has also discussed many important topics which constitute the subject-matter of philosophy proper. Thus he has discussed problems of metaphysics, final freedom and the like in the third chapter. For example, Gautama has discussed in detail the nature of the self spreading over a number of sections.^[16] There is also discussion about the nature of the body and sense-organs, the reality of the external object and similar other topics.^[17]

Although Gautama says that the right knowledge of the sixteen categories leads to liberation, Vatsyayana shows that in the context of liberation the self is the most primary, because false knowledge regarding the nature of the self actually subjects a person to worldly existence and sufferings.

Thus it appears that, after all, Gautama also intends Nyaya to be a system of philosophy or Moksasastra. It is also difficult to trace the origin of Nyaya in the interpretation of Vedic texts. That task is specially taken up by the Mimamsa system. As an astika system the Nyaya also defends the validity of the Veda. Gautama also has a section in which he refutes the position of the opponent and shows that the Veda has validity. But the whole discussion is of a very general nature. Moreover, according to Nyaya, there is no difference between a Vedic statement and an ordinary statement—the validity of both is proved on the same ground.

We have specially discussed about the Nyayasutra, because it is the earliest extant work of the system and have tried to understand the nature of the system. We shall now try to have a brief idea about the literature of the system. There is no doubt that the work of Gautama suffered much from interpolations at different periods. In fact, Vacaspati Misra later takes up the composition of a work called the Nyayasucinibandha, which tries to give the sutras in genuine forms. According to it, the Nyayasutra has a total of 528 sutras and is divided into five adhyayas, each of which is subdivided into two ahnikas. In every ahnika there are sections, each dealing with some particular topic.

Since then, a vast literature in the form of commentaries and sub-commentaries has grown up on this work of Gautama and the Nyaya system has developed considerably through the ages through all these works. We have already referred to the commentary of Vatsyayana, who probably lived sometime in the beginning of the fourth century A.D.

Uddyotakara (about 635A.D.) wrote the Nyayavarttika, which not only explains the comments of Vatsyayana but also criticizes his views on many occasions. His main purpose was to refute the criticisms of the Buddhist and to establish the Nyaya views logically. There is no doubt that he had a good knowledge of the Vaisesika views.

He is followed by Vacaspati Misra who himself states that the Nyayasucinibandha was composed in 841 A.D. He was a great scholar and was the author of many important and authoritative treatises mainly in the nature of critical commentaries on almost all the systems of Indian philosophy. In Nyaya his monumental work is the Tatparyatika, an elaborate commentary on the work of Uddyotakara, written in order to bring out the right implications of Uddyotakara which were misinterpreted. Vacaspati not only explains the difficult portions of the Varttika but also discusses many obscure portions of the Bhasya and sometimes of the sutra. He made a lot of original contributions.

The Nyayamanjari of Jayantabhatta is an outstanding contribution to the field of Nyaya-Vaisesika in particular and Indian philosophy in general. He might have flourished between 850 A.D and 910 A.D. The work is supposed to be a commentary on the Nyayasutra, although it is rather of the nature of an independent work. Jayanta has discussed in great details all the important problems of logic and philosophy, representing the position of the opponent faithfully and criticizing them from the Nyaya standpoint with great logical acumen.

Udayana (10^thcent.A.D.) also was a stalwart in the whole range of Indian philosophy. He wrote a commentary on Vacaspati Misra’s Tatparyatika, called Parisuddhi. He also wrote a number of works, both commentaries and independent ones, both on the Nyaya and the Vaisesika. In fact, he is supposed to be the pioneer of the syncretism between Nyaya and Vaisesika.

We may also mention Bhasarvajna who belonged probably to the beginning of the 10^th century A.D. He is the author of an important Nyaya work called the Nyayasara and also a commentary on it. In certain respects it deviates from the established Nyaya tradition.

The Navyanyaya school began with Gangesa Upadhyaya of Mithila (about 1200 A.D.). His Tattvacintamani is an epoch-making work, serving as the basic text for the exponents of the new school of Nyaya. He wrote mainly on the four pramanas admitted in the Nyaya system. From the latter half of the 12^th century to the third quarter of the 16^th century, Navyanyaya flourished in Mithila. But from the 15^th to the 17^th century Bengal became the most important, almost the exclusive, centre for Navyanyaya studies.

We shall now try to have some idea about the nature of the Vaisesika. This system is generally considered earlier than the Nyaya. Some scholars, following the general notion that all intellectual activities of the Indians begin with the Vedas, argue that the beginnings of the Vaisesika also may be traced to the Upanisads. The four well-known stages in the realization of the self are darsana, sravana, manana and nididhyasana. Here we find that investigation and discussion with the help of reason are given some importance. This shows that there was some scope for logic even in the case of the knowledge of the self. Of course, in some Upanisads there is found some opposition to logic. It has been declared that the best knowledge cannot be attained through tarka or argumentation. Even then, we find in Upanisadic literature reference to philosophical debates on many occasions. Thus it may be concluded that during the period of the Upanisad “some logical doctrines should have not only begun to appear, but also progressed beyond the nebulous stage.”

It is true that philosophical speculation on Indian soil begin in the Upanisads. In that age questions were raised and sought to be answered. All these can not be done unless some sort of elementary logic is there. But although it may easily explain the origin of the Nyaya, it may not be easy to decide about the origin of the Vaisesika on this ground. The Vaisesika, unlike the Nyaya, is not so much interested in the theory of pramanas. The emphasis of the system is more on prameyas. The system is definitely more concerned with the theories of physics and metaphysics.

It has also been suggested that in the pre-Buddhistic period there developed in certain sections an antagonism to Vedic tradition. The two major doctrines that represented this trend were the Sankhya and the Vaisesika. The Vaisesika was not inclined to follow the general tendency of submitting to the authority of Vedic religion and philosophy. In the Vaisesikasutra of Kanada, which is accepted to be the earliest and basic text of the system, there is very little reference to the Vedas. There is no clear defense of the validity of the Vedas, though the system is considered to be astika. Also, only two kinds of pramanas, namely, perception and inference, are admitted. According to Prasastapada, the Vedas are not any extraordinary works, they were actually composed by the seers who were after all human beings. In fact, some scholars go to the extent of claiming that this contributed much to the development of the anti-Vedic tradition of the Buddhists. All this may be true of the earlier phase of the system, but in the later period the system could not overcome the influence of the Vedic tradition.^[18]

While discussing the nature of the system we may draw attention to a remark of Kautilya in the beginning of the Arthasastra,^[19] while giving the classification of the vidyas. Of the four vidyas, the most important one is Anviksiki, which represents logic. It is again divided into three, namely, Sankhya, Yoga and Lokayata. What is meant by Yoga here? Obviously it cannot mean the system of Yoga as expounded by Patanjali, because the essential characteristic of Anviksiki is that it must give much prominence to logic. However, in a number of works belonging to the different systems of Indian philosophy, Vaisesika views are found to be referred to as views accepted by Yoga. Secondly, the word yoga may mean samyoga or conjunction. According to the Vaisesika, the origin of the world begins with the conjunction of atoms. Thus yoga or samyoga plays a very important role in the Vaisesika system which is distinct from other systems in advocating the atomic theory. Thus it may be that by Yoga Kautilya was referring to none other than the Vaisesika. In that case, the Vaisesika also becomes a system prominently based on logic.^[20]

The Vaisesikasutra of Kanada is the earliest and the basic text of the system. It has ten chapters, each of which is divided into two sections. It chiefly aims at the explanation of the various categories recognized in the system. But it also refers to several problems of general philosophical interest. According to it, all the things of the world are to be included in only six categories (padartha), namely, substance (dravya), quality (guna), action (karman), universal (samanya), particularity (visesa) and inherence (samavaya). Some of these are again divided into different classes. The nature of the categories is described in different chapters. We have also references to forms of inference with examples. Logical fallacies are also mentioned and illustrated. The qualities, the objects of the senses, perception and its nature are also discussed. The properties of matter are also elaborately given. The self as a distinct entity is also established by a number of inferences and indirect arguments. Some remarks about the atomic theory are also found. However, so far as this work of Kanada is concerned one point should be clearly remembered. Unlike the work of Gautama, it is not a very systematic work. The topics are not logically arranged and the discussion also is not always coherent.

We do not have any early commentary on the work of Kanada. Some references to an early commentary called the Ravanabhasya are found, but it is not extant and no further information except the name is found. The next most important work of the system is the Prasastapadabhasya, which probably belongs to the fifth century A.D. It is almost as authoritative as the work of Kanada. It is a very systematic work and the Vaisesika doctrines are discussed clearly, logically and elaborately. As the name suggests, it is supposed to be a commentary on the sutras of Kanada. However it is not at all like a standard commentary in which every sutra is separately taken up and explained. Moreover, the work considerably develops the theories of the school and also introduces many new ideas and concepts. It is therefore better to consider it as an independent work. In any case, for a study of the Vaisesika system, this work is indispensable and invaluable.

Further development of the Vaisesika doctrine is effected through a number of commentaries written on the work of Prasastapada. We have at least four well-known commentaries which are all very learned and detailed. They are the Vyomavati by Vyomasivacarya (seventh century A.D), the Nyayakandali by Sridhara (last part of the tenth century A.D), the Kiranavali by Udayana (last part of the tenth century A.D) and the Nyayalilavati by Vallabha (end of the tenth or beginning of the eleventh century A.D.). The work was also explained later adopting Navyanyaya terminology by Jagadisa (about seventeenth century A.D.) and Padmanabha Misra (about the end of the fourteenth century A.D.).

We have already noted that no early commentary directly on the Vaisesikasutra is available. However, mention may be made of two commentaries, one early and the other late. The first is a Vrtti by Candrananda (about seventh century A.D), which is actually of the nature of brief explanatory notes of sutras. Some scholars think that the readings of the sutras as given by this author are more authentic. The second work is called Upaskara and it is written by Sankara Misra (fifteenth century A.D.). It freely adopts Navyanyaya terminology and also introduces later concepts and ideas. It is indeed doubtful how far his explanation is true to the spirit of the original.

We have already remarked that the Nyaya and the Vaisesika were closely allied systems. Although they started as separate systems, ultimately they combined themselves into one system. In fact, whenever scholars try to trace the development of the systems they often attach much importance to the tendency to syncretism in these two schools.

S. Kuppuswami Sastri^[21] has discussed about the nature and scope of this syncretism. According to him, syncretism means the tendency to reconcile and blend two opposing and irreconcilable systems, by minimizing differences. If we accept this meaning then it may be said generally that such a tendency was present only with reference to their condition before the doctrines were presented in the form of Sutras.

Sastri also thinks that in the pre-Buddhistic age, rationalistic thinking developed through two separate approaches. One tradition linked itself with the Vedic tradition and the other was antagonistic to the same. As a result of a rapprochement between these two trends, the Vaisesika and the Nyaya arose in the form of two closely allied schools. In respect of most of the important metaphysical and logical doctrines they were in agreement, though some comparatively minor differences were there. As such, the two systems were never considered as rivals. Even when separate works of the school are written the authors of one system is always respectful to the other system also.

Although it is not generally accepted, Sastri claims that the spirit of synthesis may be traced as early as the Nyayasutra of Gautama itself.

He writes:

“It should be remembered here that Aksapada-Gautama, effected the momentous synthesis between the inductive (Vaisesika) and deductive (Nyaya) types of rationalistic thinking, in his doctrine of five-membered syllogistic expression (nyayaprayoga) hinging upon the example (udaharana) as the central member.”^[22]

Moreover, as it is well-known, the Nyaya lays special stress upon pramana, epistemology and logic, but the Vaisesika is much more concerned with metaphysics and ontology. Thus, in a sense, the two could easily become complementary to each other. The Nyaya could develop itself into a complete system by accepting and defending the Vaisesika theory of prameyas. On the other hand, the Vaisesika could take the help of powerful Nyaya logic to explain and defend its metaphysics more clearly and logically. Perhaps that is why they ultimately become a combined system. In Indian philosophy, we have also instances of other allied pairs, for example, Sankhya and Yoga, and Mimamsa and Vedanta. But they develop as separate systems and do not lose their identity in the others. But the case with the Nyaya and the Vaisesika is different.

However, there is a fundamental difference in the views of the two systems so far as pramana is concerned. The Vaisesika recognizes perception and inference only as pramana, while Nyaya admits two more, comparison and verbal testimony. It is also remarkable that, though differences are there, the Vaisesika theory of inference has much similarity with that of the Buddhists. It is more or less accepted that Prasastapada and Dinnaga were not far removed from each other. Thus it is possible that both were representing to a great extent a common tradition of inferential theory. Of course, differences were there due to the difference in the basic philosophical tenets of the two. Sastri thinks that the Vaisesika was thus sort of anti-Vedic. The Nyaya which admitted four pramanas and showed much more interest in defending the validity of the Veda was definitely pro-Vedic. As a result, the Vaisesika gradually lost its hold and influence.

This spirit of synthesis is very much reflected in the manuals of Indian logic from about the ninth century A.D. onwards. Thus, S.C. Vidyabhusana^[23] says that these manuals can be mainly divided into four classes, namely, Nyaya works dealing with only the category of pramana, all the other categories being described under only this one, Nyaya works which embody in them the categories of the Vaisesika system, works which deal with the Vaisesika categories assimilating in them the Nyaya categories and lastly, works which discuss certain topics of the Nyaya and certain topics of the Vaisesika.

The most notable example of a work belonging to the first class is the Nyayasara of Bhasarvajna (about 10^th century A.D.). He attempts to reduce the sixteen categories of the Nyaya to one, namely, pramana. Though he definitely belongs to the Nyaya school, still, he sometimes differs from the generally accepted Nyaya views. For example, he does not accept comparison as a separate pramana. His attitude to the Vaisesika also is somewhat different. For example, vibhaga is accepted as a separate quality by the Vaisesika, but according to Bhasarvajna, it is only absence of samyoga. We shall discuss all these in detail in the third chapter.

As instances of works which claim to discuss the sixteen Nyaya categories of Gautama, but also discusses the Vaisesika categories absorbing them into the Nyaya ones, we may refer to at least two important works, namely, Varadaraja’s (12^th century A.D.) Tarkikaraksa and Kesava Misra’s Tarkabhasa (13^thcentury A.D.). Varadaraja deals with all the sixteen categories of Nyaya. The second category prameya is generally taken in a technical sense to mean only twelve specific objects. But Varadaraja includes the six categories of the Vaisesika also into it. Kesava Misra also begins his work by quoting the first sutra of

Gautama. But he also discusses in detail the Vaisesika categories. According to Gautama, one of the twelve prameyas is artha, which stands for the five qualities as known by the five sense-organs. But Kesava Misra includes Vaisesika categories into this prameya.

The opposite tendency is observed, for example, in the Tarkasamgraha of Annambhatta (17^th century A.D.). In a verse at the end of the work he says that he has written this work for explaining the view of Nyaya-Vaisesika. He treats of four pramanas but of seven padarthas. In the concluding remark he claims that all padarthas can be included into the seven, and in the Dipika, he quotes the first sutra of Gautama and briefly shows how the sixteen can be reduced to the seven.

Another well-known work of this nature is Visvanatha’s Bhasapariccheda (17^th century A.D). He does not refer to the sixteen categories at all, but starts with the seven categories of the Vaisesika. In the commentary he says that these categories are well-known as the Vaisesika ones, but still, they are not opposed to the view of the Naiyayika. In fact, this is actually shown by the author of the Nyayabhasya. His commentators discuss how the sixteen can be reduced to the seven.^[24]

The Navyanyaya works, as is well-known, do not systematically discuss the categories of either the Nyaya or the Vaisesika. They are mainly concerned with the four pramanas as accepted by the Nyaya and they try to develop the concept and ideas which they themselves innovate. However, if the contexts demand, they take up the discussion of a Vaisesika category in their own terminology and thereby make contributions to its development. For example, Gangesa discusses samavaya after the discussion of ordinary sense-object contacts producing perception. Samavaya is accepted to be the contact for the perception of the quality of sound (sabda).

In the following chapters we shall try to show in some details how some of the important texts of the Nyaya treat of the various Vaisesika views.