Nyaya-Vaisheshika categories (Study)

by Diptimani Goswami | 2014 | 61,072 words

This page relates ‘Vaisheshika theory of Universal and the Conflict with the Buddhists’ of the study on the Nyaya-Vaisheshika categories with special reference to the Tarkasangraha by Annambhatta. Both Nyaya and Vaisesika are schools of ancient Indian Philosophy, and accepted in their system various padarthas or objects of valid knowledge. This study investigates how the Tarkasamgraha reflects these categories in the combined Nyayavaisesika school.

The Vaiśeṣika theory of Universal and the Conflict with the Buddhists

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[Full title: The concept of Sāmānya (4): The Vaiśeṣika theory of Universal and the Conflict with the Buddhists]

The Buddhists do not accept the reality of universals. The Vaiśeṣikas establish that universal has an objective reality and it is directly perceived along with its substratum. The Buddhists uphold the theory of apoha and reject the theory of universal or generality. According to them, only the particulars, the kṣaṇas are real and the notion of generality is a thought–creation and not an objective reality. It is only a name.

Radhakrishnan summarizes the view of the Buddhists thus

“Different individuals do not possess any common features called sāmānya. If the specific individuality of a cow requires some common factor, then the latter requires another and so on and infinitum. Sāmānya is not perceived. We frame the notion of generality as the result of past experiences and erroneously extend it to outward objects.”^[1]

Dignāga accepts only two kinds of prameyas–

svalakṣaṇa (particular) and
sāmānyalakṣaṇa (universal).

Of these the first one is ultimate real while the second does not exist as external real, but only as thought form.^[2] This view of the Buddhists is strongly criticized by the Vaiśeṣikas. To refute the Buddhist view Śrīdhara argues that if universal is not accepted as abiding in many individuals, then there would be no unity among the individuals, their causes and effects, as they are different from one another. We all cognize something that exists in all individual cows which serves to distinguish them from all other animals like -horse etc. If no such common character is accepted to exist in all the different kinds of cows, then one individual cow will be cognized as different another individual cow just from an individual horse. As a matter of fact all individual cows are perceived to be alike. This certainly points to a common factor which is present in all the cows and absent in all others things.^[3]

Moreover, argues Śrīdhara, if there is no generality, what would be denoted by a word.

The concept of svalakṣaṇa (specific individuality) cannot serve the purpose, as it is momentary and exclusive of all other things.

“A word has a general meaning. It cannot denote a momentary specific individuality, which is distinct from the other individuals.”^[4]

Śrīdhara concludes that the denotation of words involves common character of an object. That which differs in each individual cannot be denoted by a word.^[5]

The conflict between the Buddhists and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas regarding the objective reality of sāmānya continued for a long time with arguments and counter arguments from both sides. However, Annaṃbhaṭṭa seems not to be at all concerned with the Buddhist view and has taken any notice of them. As such only a brief account of the Vaiśeṣika criticism of Buddhistst view is given here and an elaborate discussion is avoided.