Chapter 5d - Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa in Sāṃkhya-Yoga

The Sāṃkhya recognizes only three independent sources of valid cognition. These are pratyakṣa, anumāna and śabda. The other sources of cognition, like upamāna, arthāpatti and anupalabdhi, are included under these three, and not recognized as separate sources of cognition.

The Sāṃkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa (200 A.D) is the earliest classical source about the definition of pratyakṣa. Īśvarakṛṣṇa defines pratyakṣa (dṛṣṭa) as: “prativiṣayādhyavasāyo dṛṣṭaṃ”^[1] i.e. pratyakṣa is the determinate cognition of an object through its contact with some sense. For instance, when an object like a jar comes within the range of vision, there is contact between the jar and the eyes. The jar produces certain impressions or modifications in the sense organ, which are analyzed and synthesized by manas or the mind. Through the activity of the senses and the mind, buddhi becomes modified and transformed into the shape of the jar. The buddhi, however, being an unconscious material principle, cannot by itself know the object, although the form of the object is present in it. But as the buddhi has an excess of sattva, it reflects, like, transparent mirror, the consciousness of the self (puruṣa). With the reflection of the self’s consciousness in it, the unconscious modification of the buddhi into the form of the jar becomes illumined into a conscious state of perception. Just as a mirror reflects the light of a lamp and thereby manifests other things, so the material principle of buddhi, being transparent and bright (sāttvika), reflects the consciousness of the self (puruṣa) and illuminates or cognizes the objects of cognition.

It is to be noted that the author of the Sāṃkhyakārikā has been used the term ‘dṛṣṭa’ instead of pratyakṣa. None of the commentators of the Sāṃkhyakārikā explain why the author used the term dṛṣṭa instead of the term pratyakṣa.

Cognition of all kinds, according to Īśvarakṛṣṇa, is the function or attribute of buddhi.^[2] Buddhi is taken in the sense both—actual agent of knowing and means of cognition.^[3]

But Vācaspati (1000 A.D) states that pratyakṣa is a modification of the mind which gives definite cognition of objects affected by the sense-object contact. In his opinion, through buddhi, ahaṃkāra, manas and the senses, external object is apprehended by the subject.

When an object incites the senses the manas arranges the sense impression into a percept, the ahaṃkāra refers it to the self and the buddhi forms the concept. The author of Yuktidīpikā elucidates Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s definition and holds that the term viṣaya refers to the objects of cognition, the word prati in the definition stands for proximity and the word adhyavasāya implies the function of the intellect (buddhi). Vācaspati splits up prativiṣayādhyavasāya into two component parts—the first prativiṣayādhyavasāya covers the pratyakṣa of external objects and the second prativiṣayādhyavasāya covers the immediate experience of the inner phenomena. He holds that it is a case of ekaśeṣa, i.e. one component factor which is similar to the next one is dropped according to the rule of grammar.^[4] Though one word is dropped, its meaning is conveyed by the remaining component. It denotes its own meaning as well as that of the other (the dropped one). Regarding the number of the word, Vācaspati does not explain why singular number has been used instead of the dual one. He further shows that the significance of the word prativiṣaya in the definition. The word adhyavasāya excludes application of the definition to the cognition of absolutely non-existent objects like mirage, the circle of fireband and the city of the Gandharvas. If the definition would have been worded as adhyavasāyadṛṣṭaṃ it will include non-existent objects also because one will get determinate cognition of these objects. According to Vācaspati, the word viṣaya only can exclude the cognition of the above non-existent objects from the domain of pratyakṣa as these are mental concepts and not the objects in reality. The word prati in the definition excludes inferential cognition from pratyakṣa. The word prati means near and thus, denotes senseobject contact which is not found in anumāna. He further states that the word prati is used in the definition to exclude understanding of mutual intention by the cognitive organs.^[5]

On the other hand, Vijñānabhikṣu (1600 A.D) says that the cognition stands for buddhivṛtti. The buddhi goes to the object with the respective cognitive organ and gets the form of that object. This is pratyakṣa.^[6] The essence of the definition is that pratyakṣa is vṛtti of citta followed by its contact with the object and through the cognitive organ. This definition has two special features: (i) that the cognition called pratyakṣa is regarded more as an act than as a product, and (ii) that it is the form of object (tadākāra) which is cognized and not the object itself.^[7] Here it is noticed that cognition in Sāṃkhya is itself an act as well as a result in the form of a particular modification or state of buddhi. As to the second observation, buddhi which is a determining principle is a form which is not imaginary but real, and thus, what is cognized is the object only and the form created with mental imagination as supposed by the Buddhists.

According to Sāṃkhya thinkers the above definition cannot apply to perceptive knowledge of yogins as also to the pratyakṣa of Īśvara. In their opinion pratyakṣa defined here is the external pratyakṣa while the perceptive knowledge of yogins does not come under the purview of it. Again to avoid the defects of the definition they try to explain that yogins due to their exaltation can come in contact with the objects lying in their cause in the past and future states also. As to the defect of its non-applicability to Īśvara’s pratyakṣa the Sāṃkhya philosophy states that existence of Īśvara is not proved.

On the other hand, Yoga is defined as the cessation of the modification of citta. The modification of the citta are of five kinds, viz., right cognition (pramāṇa), wrong cognition (viparyaya), imagination (vikalpa), sleep (nidrā) and memory (smṛti). Right cognition (pramāṇa), according to Yoga-Sūtra, is of three kinds, viz., pratyakṣa, anumāna and āgama (śabda). When the citta is affected by some external object, through the sense-organs, we have a case of pratyakṣa. The mental modification is directly related to the object. Though the latter has in it both generic and specific features, we are concerned more with the latter in pratyakṣa.^[8] In other words, pratyakṣa, when the citta, through the sense-organs, comes into the contact with the external object and assumes its form, or comes into contact with the internal mental state.

In the Yoga-sūtra of Patañjali (150 B.C), there is no definition of pratyakṣa. The sūtra mentions only pratyakṣa as one of the three valid forms of cognition (pramāṇa). Vyāsadeva (400 A.D) says, “indriyapraṇālikayā cittasya vāhyavastuparāgāt tadviṣayaḥ sāmānya viśeṣātmano arthasya viśeṣāvadhāraṇapradhāna vṛttiḥ pratyakṣom pramāṇam”.^[9] It means that the mode of the buddhi goes out through the channel of sense-organs and becomes united with the object by means of its mode. The mode is the part and parcel of the buddhi itself. It is like the rays of the sun that go out and catch the form of the object with which they are united.

In pratyakṣa, the particular is emphasized though the universal element in the object used is not overlooked. Vācaspati brings out the following implications of the definition: since pratyakṣa is cognition of a real object, it is free from all unreal mental imagination imposed upon it. The statement that citta is coloured by the form of an object implies that cognition existing in citta comes in contact with external object. Though there is no direct contact of citta with the object known yet the cognitive organ serves as the medium. Pratyakṣa apprehends chiefly the specific nature of an object. It implies that although generic nature also is apprehended in pratyakṣa yet it is subordinate to specific nature.^[10] But Vijñānabhikṣu observes that the expression after its being coloured with the form of external object through cognitive organs should not be considered a part of the definition. It speaks of merely the cause of pratyakṣa.^[11] Otherwise the definition will not be applicable to perceptive cognition of soul, etc. as also pratyakṣa of Īśvara for the former does not stand in need of colouring of citta by external object and Īśvara has no cognitive organ.

Actually, in the system of Yoga we perceive that a different account of process in pratyakṣa. Vyāsa states that citta goes to the external objet through the senses and gets the form of that object. According to Vijñānabhikṣu, citta goes to the external object along with the senses.^[12] The statement ‘through the senses’ does not mean that citta alone travels to the objects cognized. The fact that the defect of eye like, jaundice affects perceptual cognition and the citta is modified into the form of object along with the sense-organ.^[13] He further states that this citta or buddhi again reflects its modification into the puruṣa after getting the reflection of puruṣa earlier. There arises the apparent cognition in puruṣa through this reflection.

Pratyakṣa in this way depends upon the contact of sense-organs with the object on the one hand and with the internal organs on the other. When the object is clearly visible or when one feels fear or the like, the contact of external sense with the object and among internal senses is simultaneous. There is difference of opinion amongst the Sāṃkhyas in this respect. The Yuktidīpikā maintains that the theory of simultaneous action is not the view of Sāṃkhya. Īśvarakṛṣṇa treats it as a prima facie view and rejects it for establishing his theory of successive action of senses. On the basis of the nature of objects perceived, pratyakṣa comes to be of two kinds: external and internal. The former depends upon the intercourse of external senses with objects, while the latter requires the intercourse of organs with the objects which are also situated internally and are beyond the reach of the senses which are extrovert in nature. It comprehends the qualities of buddhi like pleasure, pain, desire etc. In this there is no need of postulating nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa because being found at the stage of senses it does not have any scope there.^[14]

In Tattvakaumudī, a commentary on Sāṃkhyakārikā, Vācaspati Miśra first divided pratyakṣa (dṛṣța) into nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka in Sāṃkhya tradition. So in Sāṃkhya philosophy, Vācaspati Miśra is the pioneer to division of pratyakṣa (dṛṣța).^[15] Vācaspati Miśra follows the footsteps of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (700 A.D) in this respect. He quotes verses from

Ślokavārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa to define nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka pratyakṣa.^[16] In Sāṃkhyakārikā, Īśvarakṛṣṇa defines ālocanajñāna as: “śabdādiṣu pañcānāmālocanamātramiṣyate vṛttiḥ”.^[17] It means that ālocanajñāna is that cognition which is produced from the contact of the five sense-organs with their object of sound, touch etc. Ālocana is a bare awareness or simple cognition of an object without its special identity, i.e. without its name, class, quality etc. Vācaspati Miśra interprets ālocanajñānam which has been used in the Sāṃkhyakārikā, as that cognition (nirvikalpaka) which does not discriminate the two elements of an object namely the particular from the universal. In the very definition of dṛṣṭa, the term adhyavasāya has been used. Adhyavasāya is defined by Vācaspati Miśra himself as the form of savikalpaka jñāna. According to him, the savikalpaka pratyakṣa is due to the operation of manas, as Vācaspati Miśra interprets. Manas alleviate the doubt regarding the definiteness of the object cognized. At this stage genus and particular qualities of an object are decided. Ahaṃkāra then determines the relation of an object with the cognizer. Finally, buddhi decides whether to accept or to reject the object. This is the final state called adhyavasāya. At this stage cognition is turned into savikalpaka.^[18] Savikalpaka pratyakṣa is the definite cognition of an object related to its properties and qualified by its generic and specific characteristics. On the other hand, Vācaspati Miśra admits that ālocana is nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is the immediate, pure and simple cognition of an object. It presents a vague idea of the object.

According to Vācaspati, buddhi comes into touch with external objects through the senses. At the first moment of this touch there is an indeterminate consciousness in which the particular features of the object cannot be noticed. This is called nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. At the second moment by the function of the saṃkalpa (synthesis) and vikalpa (abstraction or imagination) of manas, the object is perceived in all its determinate character; the manas differentiates, integrates, and associates the sense-data received through the senses, and thus generates the savikalpaka pratyakṣa, which when intelligized by the puruṣa and associated with it becomes interpreted as the experience of the person. The action of the senses, ahaṃkāra, and buddhi, may take place sometimes successively and at other times as in cases of sudden fear simultaneously.^[19] While Vācaspati thinks that the activity of manas is necessary for pratyakṣa, Vijñānabhikṣu denies it, and holds that buddhi directly comes into touch with the objects through the senses. At the first moment of touch the pratyakṣa is nirvikalpaka, but at the second moment it becomes clear and savikalpaka pratyakṣa. Vācaspati assigns to manas the function of arranging the sense-data and ordering them into savikalpaka perceptions, while Vijñānabhikṣu thinks that the determinate character of things is directly perceived by the senses and that manas is only the faculty of desire, doubt and imagination.^[20]

In short, nirvikalpaka perceptions are sort of pure sensations or crude impressions. They reveal no cognition of the form or the name of the object. There is vague awareness about an object. There is cognition, but no recognition. An infant’s initial experiences are full of confusion. There is a lot of sense-data, but there are improper or inadequate means to process them. Savikalpaka perceptions are the mature state of perceptions which have been processed and differentiated appropriately. Once the sensations have been processed, categorized and interpreted properly, they become savikalpaka perceptions. They can lead to identifications and also generate cognition.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Sāṃkhyakārikā, 5.

[2]:

“adhyavasāyo buddhidharmo jñānaṃ virāga aiśvaryam. sāttvikametadrūpaṃ tāmasamasmāt viparyastam”.—-Sāṃkhyakārikā, 23.

[3]:

“sohadhyavasāyaḥ buddherasādhāraṇo vyāpāraḥ, tadbhedā buddhiḥ.”—-Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī, Kārikā 23.

[4]:

“evam tarhi prativiṣayādhyavasāyascā prativiṣayādhyavas sāyaśca prativiṣayādhyavasāyat iti sārūpāṇāmekaśeṣakarisyate.”—-Yuktidīpikā on Sāṃkhyakārikā, 5.

[5]:

Yuktidīpikā, 5.

[6]:

“sambaddhavasttvakāradhāri bhavati yadvatijñānaṃ buddhivṛttiḥ tatpratyakṣam pramāṇamityarthaḥ.”—-SPB, 1.7.

[7]:

Quoted from Jwala Prasad’s ‘History of Indian Epistemology’, p. 195.

[8]:

Indian Philosophy, Vol-II, by S. Radhakishnan, p. 321.

[9]:

Yogabhāṣya, 1.7. Quoted from Mukta Biswas’s ‘Sāṃkhya-Yoga Epistemology’ p. 122.

[10]:

“yadyapi sāmānyamapi pratyakṣe pratibhāsate tathāpi viśeṣam pratyupasarjanibhūtamityarthaḥ.”——Tattvavaiśāradī, 1.7. Quoted from Mukta Biswas’s ‘Sāṃkhya-Yoga Epistemology’ p. 123.

[11]:

“ātmādipratyakṣavyāpanādiśvarapratyakṣa vyāpanācca tasyajanattvāt”.—-Yogavārttika 1.7. Quoted from Mukta Biswas’s ‘Sāṃkhya-Yoga Epistemology’ p. 123.

[12]:

“cittasyendriya sāhityenaivārthākāraḥ pariṇāmo bhaveti”.—-Yogavārttika 1.7. Quoted from Mukta Biswas’s ‘Sāṃkhya-Yoga Epistemology’ p. 135.

[13]:

“nayanādigatapittādyanaya vyetirābhyām”–Yogavārttika 1.7. Quoted from Mukta Biswas’s ‘Sāṃkhya-Yoga Epistemology’ p. 136.

[14]:

Collected from Mukta Biswas’s ‘Sāṃkhya-Yoga Epistemology’, p. 136.

[15]:

Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī under Sāṃkhyakārikā, Kārikā 27.

[16]:

“asti hyālocanajñānaṃ prathamaṃ nirvikalpakam. bālamūkādi vijñānasadṛśaṃ mugdhavastujam’iti. tataḥ paraṃ punarvastu dharmairjātyādibhiryathā. buddhyāhavasīyate sāhapi pratyakṣatvena sammatā”.—-Ślokavārttika as quoted in Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī, 27.

[17]:

Sāṃkhyakārikā, 28.

[18]:

“saṃkalpena rūpeṇa manolakṣyate. ālocitamindriyeṇa vastu ‘idam’ iti sammugdham idamevaṃ, naivam’iti samyak kalpayati viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvena vivecayatīti yāvat”.—Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī under Sāṃkhyakārikā, Kārikā 27.

[19]:

A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol-I, by Surendranath Dasgupta, p. 262.

[20]:

Indian Philosophy, Vol-II, by S. Radhakishnan, p. 274.