Chapter 2b - Vācaspati Miśra on Gautama’s definition of Pratyakṣa

Vācaspati accepting Vātsyāyana’s interpretation of all the terms occurring in the definition of pratyakṣa differs regarding the intention of the sūtrakāra as regards to the terms ‘avyapadeśya’ and ‘vyavasāyātmaka’.

According to Vācaspati Miśra, the word ‘avyapadeśya’ in the sūtra means ‘mere acquaintance’ (ālocana). On the other hand, the word vyapadeśya signifies ‘a substantive as qualified by an attribute’ (viśeṣaṇa-viśiṣṭa-viśeṣya). So avyapadeśyam means the pratyakṣa without a substantive-attribute relation. Such an unqualified pratyakṣa is the bare awareness of an object. Such pratyakṣa is called well known as nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa in Nyāya epistemology.

In Nyāya epistemology nirvikalpaka is an earlier stage and the savikalpaka is a later stage of pratyakṣa. Vācaspati says, that at the first stage of pratyakṣa an object is revealed as bare something.^[1] He thinks that it is such a stage when the object is only seen but not associated with name or a subject-predicate relation. It happens not only in the case of infants or dumb persons those do not know the names of things, but also in the cases of all ordinary persons.^[2]

According to Vācaspati Miśra, the nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is that cognition which admits of no specification. It is the cognition of an object which is unrelated to its class, name, characters, attributes etc.; the pratyakṣa of an orange at this nirvikalpaka stage may give us indeed all its colour, form, and also the universal orangeness, but it does not reveal it in a subject-predicate relation.

Vācaspati Miśra differs from Vātsyāyana also with regard to the implication of the term ‘vyavasāyātmaka’ in the sūtra. The term is used, according to him, not to exclude pratyakṣa in the form of doubt. Doubtful perceptions being invalid are already excluded by the term ‘avyabhicārin’ (valid). The term vyavasāyātmaka is used to signify savikalpaka pratyakṣa.

This shows that Gautama recognizes savikalpaka pratyakṣa also as valid. According to Vācaspati Miśra’s interpretation of the sūtra, it contains not only the definition but also the classification of pratyakṣa. The term avyapadeśya and vyavasāyātmaka indicate the two forms of pratyakṣa, namely, nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka. The rest of the sūtra gives the definition of pratyakṣa.

Vācaspati Miśra, explaining Vātsyāyana’s opinion, refers to the view according to which the words standing for objects are identical with the objects themselves, because the words cow, horse, etc, are known as identical with the object as is evident from the expressions like ‘this is a cow’, ‘this is a horse’. That such expressions cannot be considered erroneous is clear from the fact that these form the basis of all usage. Words being identical with objects, the cognition of objects means the cognition of words. In short, according to this view there is no cognition which is not due to words.^[3]

As such, nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is impossible. How can there be a nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa when every cognition is qualified by a word that stands for its object?

Vācaspati quotes two verses from the Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari (600-650 A.D)^[4] and says that the word avyapadeśya in the present sūtra is intended to refute Bhartṛhari’s view.

This word here means ‘mere acquaintance’ (ālocana), which is known as nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. On the other hand, the word vyapadeśya signifies ‘a substantive as qualified by an attribute’ (viśeṣaṇa-viśiṣṭa-viśeṣya). The pratyakṣa without a substantive-attributive relation is avyapadeśyam. Such an unqualified pratyakṣa is but the bare awareness of an object and as such is nirvikalpaka. So, according to Vācaspati Miśra by the word ‘avyapadeśya’ Gautama refers to nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa.^[5]

We have seen that in refutation of the view that every cognition is due to word, Vātsyāyana says, cognition of those persons who are unaware of the relation between the word and its corresponding object is not referred to by the word naming the object. Vācaspati Miśra^[6] explains this as thus: word is alleged to be identical with the object. But what is meant by ‘word’ here? Does it mean the particular sound heard or does it mean sphoṭa (the significative counterpart of a word-sound)? It is not possible to accept either of these alternatives. By the word we cannot mean here sphoṭa, for nobody ever realizes any identity of the object with the eternal sphoṭa. Nor can ‘word’ be taken by the opponent to mean the particular sound heard, for the cognition of colour, etc. on the part of the infant and the dumb is not referred to by the corresponding words colour, etc. It is impossible to prove that the cognition of those persons who are unaware of such words or are unable to utter them is due to words. Besides, on the assumption of the identity of words and their corresponding objects it should be possible for the blind to perceive colour by his auditory sense when he hears the word for it or for the dumb to perceive the word when he has a visual perception of the object for it. Thus it must be admitted that the infant and the dumb have nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa unqualified by word. Even for those persons who are aware of the relation between a word and its object the cognition of the object is not due to the word standing for it. On the contrary, only after perceiving the object they come to know that such and such words denote such and such objects. In other words, on perceiving an object they recall the word naming it. But the pratyakṣa of the object, which precedes, is not due to that name. The pratyakṣa of the object comes first and it is the cause of the recollection of the word naming it. Therefore, it is necessary to admit a pratyakṣa of the object unrelated to the word naming it and this pratyakṣa is nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. This kind of pratyakṣa becomes eventually the cause of the savikalpaka pratyakṣa. But even this savikalpaka pratyakṣa is not the pratyakṣa due to the word standing for its object.

Vācaspati Miśra denies also the possibility of any verbal cognition due to both senseobject contact and words. For instance, when an experienced person tells Devadatta that it is a cow, he perceives it as a cow. The words of the experienced person, though accessory to the resulting cognition, do not make the cognition a verbal one. Being produced by the senseobject contact the cognition is actually perceptual. Besides, the cognition here is clear and distinct, which are characteristics of only immediate cognition, verbal cognition being mediate is incapable of producing it.

For these reasons we conclude that the name is not operative at the time that the apprehension of the thing takes place; it becomes operative only at the time of its being spoken of, or communicated to other persons. The upshot of all this is that the apprehension of things, produced by the contact of the sense-organ with them is not verbal i.e., it is entirely free from all verbal representation.

In addition, some commentators explain that the term ‘avyapadeśya’ is used in the sūtra to exclude inferential cognition. Uddyotakara^[7] rejects these views. Because the definition already mentions the term ‘produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the object’; as a matter of fact, inferential cognition does not proceed from the contact of the cognized object with the sense-organ; hence (even without the term ‘avyapadeśya’) the definition could not apply to inferential cognition.

Vācaspati says^[8] savikalpaka pratyakṣa is that cognition which admits of specification; it is the cognition of an object as related to its class, name, characters, attributes etc. For example, when an object, say, a cow is present to our sense, its attributes are perceived as related to the cow and therefore the perceptual experience of the cow is expressed in form of a definite or savikalpaka judgment ‘This is a cow’. Let me clear to give an another example; when the sun’s rays are perceived in a desert and misapprehended as a stream, at the first nirvikalpaka stage the visual sense is in real contact with the rays and thus far there is no illusion so far as the contact with a real object is concerned, but at the second stage i.e. savikalpaka stage it is owing to the similarity of certain of its characteristics with those of a stream that it is misapprehended as a stream.^[9]

The Niruktakāras^[10] who flourished before Vācaspati used the term nirvikalpaka, but they explained it as the cognition of an object in which its general (sāmānya) and particular (viśeṣa) features were combined. But Vācaspati controverts the view of the Niruktakāras by saying that if, in the nirvikalpaka stage, an object were to combine in itself its general and particular attributes, how could, in the savikalpaka stage, the two, viz. the general and the particular, be separated, so that one might be predicated of the other in the form, “this (viśeṣa) is man (sāmānya)”.

Vācaspati thinks that doubtful pratyakṣa being invalid cognition are already excluded from the Gautama’s definition of pratyakṣa by the word ‘avyabhicārin’. So, Gautama does not include the word ‘vyavasāyātmaka’ in the definition to exclude doubtful cognition. According to Vācaspati Miśra, the word vyavasāyātmaka is used in the sūtra (1.1.4) to signify savikalpaka pratyakṣa and as such shows that Gautama recognizes savikalpaka pratyakṣa

also as valid. He says, the definition pratyakṣa contains not only the definition but also the classification of pratyakṣa. Both the above words indicate the two forms of pratyakṣa and the rest of the sūtra gives the complete definition of pratyakṣa. This classification of pratyakṣa accepted by all the later logician, such as Bhāsarvajñā (9^th century A.D), Keśava Miśra (12^th century A.D), Annaṃ Bhaṭṭa (1623 A.D), and the followers of the Sāṃkhya and the Vaiśeṣika and the Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (700 A.D) also. But the later Navya Nyāya thinker Gaṅgeśa (1200 A.D) gives the clear definition about this classification of pratyakṣa.

Vācaspati’s^[11] explanations on ‘avyapadeśyam’ and ‘vyavasāyātmakaṃ’ terms are very important. According to him, the term ‘avyapadeśyam’ in the Nyāya-sūtra (1.1.4) means ‘that which cannot be expressed by words’, which, infect refers to the nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa, for it is not specified by a nāma, jāti, etc. and is, therefore indefinite, while the word ‘vyavasāyātmakaṃ’ denotes the savikalpaka pratyakṣa which means ‘that which is definite or certain’, pointing to something specified by its genus and name (nāma, jāti, etc.). By these two terms Vācaspati claims that Gautama intends to divide pratyakṣa into nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa and savikalpaka pratyakṣa. The term ‘avyapadeśya’ implies nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa and the term ‘vyavasāyātmaka’ implies savikalpaka pratyakṣa. According to him, Gautama in his Nyāya-sūtra (1.1.4) uses the words avyapadeśya and vyavasāyātmaka to mean respectively nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka pratyakṣa. None of the commentators in old Nyāya philosophy clearly divided pratyakṣa into nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka. Vācaspati was the first old Nyāya thinker who divided pratyakṣa into nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka. He observes that the authors of the ‘Nyāyabhāṣya’ and the ‘Nyāyavārttika’ did not mention it and explain this distinction because they considered it to be too evident. There is no reason, however, to believe that this assertion of Vācaspati Miśra is correct. He further declares that he has introduced the distinction of the two kinds of pratyakṣa in his commentary following his own preceptor named Trilocana (9^th century A.D).^[12]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

“prathamamālocito’rthaḥ sāmānyaviśeṣavān”.—Tātparyaṭīkā, p. 91. Quoted from Surendranath Dasgupta’s ‘A History of Indian Philosophy’,Vol-I, p. 338.

[2]:

“tasmādvyutpannasyāpi nāmadheyasmaraṇāya pūrvameṣitavyo vinaiva nāmadheya marthapratyayaḥ.”—-Ibid. p. 84. Quoted from Surendranath Dasgupta’s ‘A History of Indian Philosophy’,Vol-I, p. 338.

[3]:

Nyāya Philosophy, Part-I, by Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya & Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, p. 53.

[4]:

“na sohasti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte. anuviddhamiva jñānaṃ sarvvaṃ śabdena bhāsate.”—-123, Vākyapadīya: Bramahakāṇḍha. Quoted from Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkabāgīśa’s ‘Nyāyadarśana’, Prathama khaṇḍa, p. 120.

[5]:

“tadasya nirākaraṇaṃ lakṣaṇagatena ālocanajñānāvarodhārthenāvyapadeśya padena sucitamiti.”—-Tātparyaṭīkā. Quoted from Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkabāgīśa’s ‘Nyāyadarśana’, Prathama khaṇḍa, p. 120.

[6]:

Nyāyadarśana, Prathama khaṇḍa, by Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkabāgīśa, p. 121-122.

[7]:

The Nyāya-sūtras of Gautama, Vol-I, by Gaṅgānāṭha Jhā, p. 135-136.

[8]:

A History of Indian Logic, by Satisa Chandra Vidyābhūṣaṇa, p.137.

[9]:

“indriyeṇālocya marīcīn uccāvacamuccalato nirvikalpena gṛhītvā paścāttatropa ghātadoṣāt viparyyeti, savikalpako’sya pratyayo bhrānto jāyate tasmādvijñānasya vyabhicāro nārthasya.”—-Tātparyaṭīkā, p. 87. Quoted from Surendranath Dasgupta’s ‘A History of Indian philosophy’, Vol-I, p. 337.

[10]:

“yathāgya niruktakārāḥ. nirvikalpakavodhena jyātmakasyāpi vastuno grahanam. tathā—tataḥ paraṃ pūnarvastu dharmaujātyādhibhīryoyā. vujyāvasīyate sāpi pratyakṣatvena saṃmatā.”—-Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā, p. 89. Quoted from Satisa Chandra Vidhyābhūṣaṇa’s ‘A History of Indian Logic’, p. 138.

[11]:

“vyavasāyātmakapadaṃ sākṣāt savikalpakasya vācakaṃ. tathāhi, vyavasāyo viniścayo vikalpa ityanarthāmbharaṃ, sa evātmā rūpaṃ yasya savikalpakaṃ pratyakṣaṃ. tadetadatisphoṭatvācchiṣyaigamyate eveti bhāṣyavārttikakārābhyām vyākhyātaṃ.”—-Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā p. 87. Quoted from Satisa Chandra Vidyābhūṣaṇa’s ‘A History of Indian Logic’, p. 137.

[12]:

“ammābhiḥ—trilocanagurūnnītamārgānugamanonmukhaiḥ. yathāmānaṃ yathāvastu vyākhyātamidamīdaśaṃ.”—-Ibid. p. 87. Quoted from Satisa Chandra Vidyābhūṣaṇa’s ‘A History of Indian Logic’, p. 137.