Brahma-Sūtra 2.1.7 (correct conclusion end)

English of translation of Brahmasutra 2.1.7 by Roma Bose:

“If it be objected that (in that case the effect must be) non-existent (we reply:) no, on account of there being a negation merely.”

Nimbārka’s commentary (Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha):

If it be objected: If the effect be different from its material cause, it must be “non-existent” prior to its origination,—(we reply:) No such objection can be raised, “on account of there being a negation merely”, in the previous aphorism, of the rule that there is a similarity between the material cause and its effect in every respect.

Śrīnivāsa’s commentary (Vedānta-kaustubha)

If it be objected: Having admitted an absolute similarity between the material cause and its effect in the aphorism: ‘(There is) no (having Brahman for its cause) on its part, on account of difference’ (Brahma-sūtra 2.1.4), it has been objected by the opponent that the world being different from Brahman, He is not its material cause with a view to disposing of that objection, it has been established in the aphorism: ‘But (it) is seen’ (Brahma-sūtra 2.1.6) that there can be a cause-effect relation even between two different objects. With regard to it, the question is whether prior to creation the universe was non-different from its cause, or different. What is your opinion? If you say: Non-different,—then, just as the origin of a different world is admitted, like the origin of hairs on the head and body hairs from a person from whom they are different, so why there may not be the origin of a similar world, like the origin of a gold-bracelet and the rest from gold?

If you say: Different,—then, the world must have a material cause different from Brahman, and hence pradhāna must be the cause of the world. If it be said that this cannot be admitted, as pradhāna has been already refuted,—(we point out) in the texts: ‘Brahman^[1] is one only, without second’ (Chāndogya-upaniṣad 6.2.1), ‘There was, verily, Nārāyaṇa, the one’ (Mahā-upaniṣad 1.2), ‘Then there was Viṣṇu, Hari alone, without parts’,—there is the mention of a single reality; and hence, it follows that there was the absence of anything else prior to creation. Therefore, the world must be non-existent prior to creation.

(Here ends the original prima facie view.)

(Author’s conclusion.)

(We reply:) ‘No’. Why? “On account of there being a negation merely.” The aphorism ‘But (it) is seen’ (Brahma-sūtra 2.1.6) negates merely,—by way of mentioning the difference between the material cause and its effect,—the rule, admitted by the opponent, viz. that there is similarity between a material cause and its effect in every respect; but it never establishes any difference between the two in every respect. Hence, because of having Brahman as its soul, the universe is existent even during its causal state.

Or an alternative explanation of the phrase: “On account of there being a negation merely”. The statement, viz. ‘The universe is non-existent’ is a negation merely, i.e. without any meaning, in accordance with the scriptural text: ‘“The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning”’ (Chāndogya-upaniṣad 6.2.1).

Comparative views of Śaṅkara:

Interpretation different, viz.: ‘If it be said that (the effect) is non-existent (prior to its actual creation), (we reply) No, since (it) is a mere negation (without an object to be negatived)’. That is, the negation by the opponent, viz.: ‘The world is non-existent’ has no object, for it certainly cannot have for its object the existence of the effect prior to its actual creation, as the effect always exists in its cause, whether before or after its actual creation.^[2]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

The word ‘Brahman’ is not included in the original text.

[2]:

Brahma-sūtras (Śaṅkara’s commentary) 2.1.7, ‘Pratiṣedhaṃ hīdaṃ nāsya pratiṣedhasya pratiṣedhyam asti’, p. 453.