2.1. Perception according to Gautama

[Full title: 2. The Prācina-Naiyāyika Theory of Perception—Perception according to Gautama]

Gautama, the founder of Prācina-Nyāya system defines perception as the non-erroneous cognition produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects, not associated with any name and well-defined (Indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam Jñānam avyapadeshyam avyabhichāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam).^[1]

There are some important factors in this definition which need to be considered:

1. Perception is a kind of cognition (jñāna).
2. It produces from the sense object contact which is the particular defining character according to Gautama.
3. It is invariable connected with/to the object that is, it is non-erroneous (avyabhicāri).
4. It is not expressible in words (avyapadeśyam).
5. It is well defined (vyavasāyātmaka).

In the first part of Gautama’s definition, the expression, “perception is a kind of cognition” signifies the knowledge of an object. The object here includes substance (dravya), like a chair, a pot, a lamp etc. It also means quality (guna) like colour (rūpa), touch (sparśa), taste (rasa), smell (sukha) as well as pain (dukha). Thus the statement, “perception is a kind of cognition”, also means the knowledge of pleasure or pain. The knowledge of substance like a chair and of quality like red colour is a kind of external perception while the knowledge of pleasure and pain is a kind of internal or mental perception.^[2]

The second part of Gautama’s definition indicates the etymological meaning of the term pratyakṣa which means the functioning of the sense-organs, with regard to each specific object.^[3] Perception is a kind of knowledge which is produced by the association of the soul with the mind, the association of the mind with the senses and the intercourse of the senses with their particular object. In Gautama’s definition of perception it is not mentioned that there is contact of the soul with the mind and the contact of the mind with the senses because he believes it is common to cognition generated by all the means of knowledge. The definition talks only about the distinctive cause of perceptual knowledge. The unique feature of Gautama’s definition is the contact of senses with the object, which is admitted by other philosophical systems too.

In the third part of Gautama’s definition, the term “avyabhicāri”, which means nonerroneous cognition, describes the logical conditions of valid perception i.e., it should uncontradicted with the real nature of the object. For instance, it is seen that in summers, the beams of the sun combines with the heat-beams radiating from the surface of the earth and hence the two jointly emerging at same distance come in contact with the sight of spectator who seems to have a direct perception of water producing from the sense-organ and the object-contact. In order to ignore such mistakes the term avyabhicāri has been included to the definition.^[4]

The fourth and fifth parts of Gautama’s definition mentions about two stages of perception: (i) avyapadeśyam, i.e. which is not associated with a name and (ii) vyavasāyātmakam, i.e. which is well-defined. It is also known as indeterminate perception (nirvikalpa) and the other as determinate (savikalpaka).

In Gautama’s definition of perception, the word artha is rendered as “object” which means “a real thing”, but it does not include anything of which one may know without the contact of senses. So, the term artha is taken in the sense of merely perceptible thing. No perception is possible without a contact between such an object and the senses. In the Nyāyasūtra, the word artha signifies the five qualities that belongs to the five elements i.e. earth (pṛthivī), fire (tejas), water (ap), air (vāyu) and space (ākāśa) from which the senses originate.^[5]

For Naiyāyikas, Perception is relying upon the contact of the senses (indriya) with the object (artha). This connection is called sannikarṣa which is the “operative relation”. Gautama used the word sannikarṣa which includes both the entities (i.e. object and sense-organ).^[6]

Some would argue that the Gautama’s definition of perception is defective. Because in the process of perception, there is a contact between object and sense-organ which is associated with mind which is again associated with ātman or self. So, the soul and mind are essential causes of perception which cannot be refused, but the role of soul and mind is not given in Gautama’s definition.^[7]

The Naiyāyikas reply to the argument that in the definition of perception, the specific cause of it has been given. Karaṇa is defined as vyāpāravad asādhāraṇakāraṇaṃ karaṇaṃ (i.e. the uncommon cause along with intermediary is called a karaṇaṃ).^[8] But soul, mind etc. are not the specific causes but the common causes of perception. Also they are common in other pramāṇas i.e. inference, comparison and testimony. Thus, it is important to state the features of perceptual knowledge which are distinct from other means of valid knowledge. It is not at all important to state the role played by the ātman and mind in the definition. Gautama’s definition was further discussed by his successors like Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in detail.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Nyāyasūtra , 1.1.4.

[2]:

G.N. Jha, Indian Thought, vol.I, p.39.

[3]:

akṣasyākṣasya prativiṣayaṃ vṛttiḥ pratyakṣam. Nyāyabhāṣya , 1.1.3.

[4]:

Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya , 1.1.4.

[5]:

Pṛthivyāpastejo vāyurākāśamiti bhūtāni. Nyāyasūtra , 1.1.13.

[6]:

C.D. Bijalwan, op.cit., P.70.

[7]:

na tarhīdānīmidaṃ bhavati, ātmā manasā saṃyujyate, mana indriyeṇa”ndryamarthene” iti. Nyāyabhāṣya , 1.1.4.

[8]:

S. Chatterjee, op.cit., p.156.