

THE CRITICAL EXPOSITION
OF THE YUKTIMALLIKĀ

THE YUKTIMALLIKĀ

"Philosophy attempts to arrive at a conception of the reality as a whole. It seeks to have a world view. It investigates the nature of the reality including nature, soul, God. It tries to interpret the meaning and value of human life and its relation to the world in which we live. Philosophy in this sense is the criticism of life and experience."¹⁰³

Philosophy and culture are the two eyes of human life. If culture could be treated as light that exposes the worthy path or way of the life, philosophy would be the pioneer guide that ensues the thoughts as to how to lead the life on that path. Thoughts, flashed from philosophy, would be more meaningful and useful if they are referred to and related with real aspects of knowledge. The philosophy is the branch of knowledge or science that pursues an inquiry into Truth (Ultimate). It is defined: "Philosophy is the highest form of inquiry just because it alone involves no presuppositions."

Philosophy as the knowledge ultimates... Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines philosophy as "that department of knowledge which deals with ultimate reality, or with the most general causes and principles of things."¹⁰⁴ In course of inquiry, it also discusses and reviews the sources and means of

realizing the Ultimate Truth and also related aspects, that are also truthful (real).

There lie different opinions among Scholars regarding the existence of Ultimate Truth and also related aspects. If some negate verily the existence,¹⁰⁵ others, though admit, disregard the auspicious form¹⁰⁶ of that, and some others go to the extent of depriving it of being an object of knowledge.¹⁰⁷ And it is Madhva, who for the first time in the history of philosophy, has tackled this issue convincingly and also in a manner agreeable to thought and reason. The propriety lies in his argument and exposition that the Ultimate Truth must be real at all times.¹⁰⁸ When truth is real, the sources and means to realize that must also be real. Madhva is not silent at this point of argument but traces the valid sources and means thereof precisely.

The reason,¹⁰⁹ emerged from thought, must have the support of infallible means. The reason cannot work independently, since it may sometimes give scope to counter-arguments and the like.¹¹⁰ Therefore, Madhva stresses the valid support and in his opinion, the infallible testimony, the Veda is the valid support. Madhva shows the significance of this and of others in his works.¹¹¹

Vādirāja, closely following Madhva, upholds the view in his works.¹¹² He affords the important place for reason in his works, particularly in the Yuktimallikā. In his opinion, Yukti is not merely the bare reason but something more. Yukti in the Yuktimallikā, not only appears in the form of reason, but it is an activating element that enables the mind to have the knowledge of discrimination. Its scope is wider and broader. It is reason with series of arguments graced with befitting and apt analogies. It stands supported by valid proofs - Pratyakṣa, infallible testimony, the Vedas and the like.

I. GUNASAURABHA

Vādirāja begins his Yuktimallikā with benedictory verses.¹¹³ The verses abound in deep devotion and are graced with poetic charm. The very first verse begins with the word Bhakti. Vādirāja offers salutations in the first verse to his favourite deity Lord Hayagrīva. From the second verse, he pays homage to Lord Vedavyāsa and then Madhva and others.

In the sixth verse, he modestly declares that, it is only the devotional service at the feet of Lord Hayagrīva that prompted him to write this work.¹¹⁴

Then, he proceeds to state as to why he has selected

the Dvaita Siddhānta as a topic and theme of his work. He says that starting from Jainism and Buddhism to the Advaita, all have been the Pūrvapakṣa and it is the Dvaita Siddhānta which is claimed as the Uttarapakṣa.¹¹⁵ He assures and promises that it can be ascertained by a close examination of the tenets of different schools and also of the Dvaita Siddhānta. Vādirāja expresses that he has resorted to this Siddhānta, only after having examined the merits and demerits of other schools and thus being fond of Yukti has written this work.¹¹⁶

Vādirāja then shows the impracticability of the Advaita system in brief. He says that neither the Mithyātva nor the identity of the Advaita stands firmly and pleases the scholars. He also points out that Brahman would be degraded and be stained with blemish of reproach when identity and Mithyātva are referred to and related to. Further, he states that as Māyāvāda is unhelpful for developing the theistic sentiments, he has preferred Dvaita Siddhānta to others.¹¹⁷

Thereafter, Vādirāja praises the Yuktimallikā in about nine verses. He says that it is not an ordinary work, to be compared with others. It is rare and peculiar of its kind. He states that it is an opportunity for him to reveal his poetic talent, logical skill, devotional fervour and also to

propagate the right doctrine. He says that this work is useful to both the scholars and the layman, like a flower, rejoiced by both gods and bees. And this work does not owe any likes and dislikes for any particular view point, but it is solely guided and supported by the infallible reasons.¹¹⁸

THE VEDAS ARE APAURUSEYA

"As the oldest Indian, and at the same time, the oldest Indo-European literary monument, a prominent place in the history of world literature is due to the Veda... As the Veda, because of its antiquity, stands at the head of Indian literature, no one who has not gained an insight into the Vedic literature can understand the spiritual life and the culture of the Indians."¹¹⁹

Rādhākṛṣṇan writes: "The Vedas are the earliest documents of the human mind that we possess."¹²⁰

Man is living in this world of wonders. He is its part and parcel. The environment wherein he lives, the society wherein he interacts and the ideals with which he is infested, are variegated. As he grows up and attains maturity, he inclines towards making an inquiry in every step of his life. He is enthusiastic about the objects of the world. To know the objects of the world in their reality, it is but inevitable

that the knowledge of the means that produce the knowledge of the objects is to be gained and made use of properly.¹²¹

The means of knowledge or Pramāṇas such as Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Āgama, are widely accepted by one and all.¹²² Pratyakṣa,¹²³ the first and the foremost means, produces the knowledge by the contact of flawless sense organs with relevant objects. The Anumāna,¹²⁴ depending upon the valid data of the Pratyakṣa, in the form of Vyāpti¹²⁵ (invariable concomitance) produces the knowledge of objects. The Āgama¹²⁶ is the verbal testimony. It is the declaration of a reliable person that produces knowledge. The Vedas fall under the third category of Pramāṇas, namely Āgama.¹²⁷

The Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Āgama declaration of a reliable person, become valid means of knowledge in secular level, but they are not competent in case of super-sensuous level. Because, there are some super-sensuous and abstract objects of knowledge, the knowledge of which cannot be gained neither by Pratyakṣa nor by Anumāna nor by Āgama of ordinary kind or of secular type. These objects are Dharma, Adharma, Truth, Sin, God and the like. Hence, it is the Vedas that are competent to deal with these objects.¹²⁸

The Vedas are the sacred treasures and back-bones of

Indian culture and thought. They are the original and remote sacred texts. The Vedas are limitless in number.¹²⁹ The Vedas are divided into four. Regarding the division of the Vedas, it is said "One undivided mass of Vedas was made four-fold to facilitate the performance of sacrifices."¹³⁰ About the remoteness and the authorship of the Vedas, there is diversity of opinion among traditional and modern scholars. The tradition holds that, the Vedas are impersonal, beginningless and eternal; whereas the modern scholars opine that Vedas are the compiled texts of seers of ancient times.¹³¹

The four Vedas are Rg, Yajus, Sāma and Atharvana. Therein, again, are four divisions in each - Sāṃhitā, Brāhmaṇa, Āraṇyaka and Upaniṣad. In its derivative sense, the term Veda stands for knowledge. According to some, Veda stands for Mantras (Sāṃhitās) and Brāhmaṇas.¹³²

Vādirāja, in his Yuktimallikā, discusses Vedapauruṣeyatva first, since the Vedas are the valid means of knowledge of super-sensuous objects.¹³³

The main points of the topic, as summarised by K.T. Pandurāṅgi, are:¹³⁴

"1. Vedas are not the authority but respective founders

of the systems are the authorities.

2. Neither the Vedas nor the founders, but the reasons are the authority.

3. Vedas are authority, but they are not Apauruseya, they are produced by Īśvara at each Kalpa in the same manner.

4. Vedas are authority; they are Apauruseya; but there is no Īśvara. Īśvara has nothing to do with Vedas.

5. Vedas are authority; they are Apauruseya and Nitya; they are revealed by the God exactly in the same way at each Kalpa."

Vādirāja tackles all the first four issues and justifies the fifth one in a lucid and logical manner.

There is a view that the Vedas are not the authority, but the founders of the various systems of philosophy are the authority. This view is not tenable because the opinion of one founder is not accepted by others. His explanation of Dharma, Adharma and the like are rejected by others. He alone cannot justify and establish his doctrine since opponents are more in number and hence a single man cannot

contradict many.¹³⁵ And moreover, that particular founder cannot declare himself as omniscient. As he is not omniscient, the statements made by him become not valid. Hence his statements are not authority since, they do not decide as to what is Dharma and what is Adharma. And his omniscience is not recognised and accepted by other founders.¹³⁶ To explain, the supposed creator of this universe is not accepted as omniscient by one and all. The Naiyāyikas say that the creator of this universe is the Over-Lord and authority. But the Buddhists do not accept this view. To them, the Buddha is the authority. The statements of Buddha oppose the views of the Naiyāyikas in respect of the performance of sacrifices, worship of the Lord and the like. Thus, the views of the founders of such systems oppose each other. Whatever becomes Dharma to one, becomes Adharma to another. Performance of the sacrifice is opposed by the Buddha whereas it is upheld by others like Lord Īśvara.¹³⁷ Hence, nothing can be concluded and be declared as authority with the help of the views of such founders of the different systems.¹³⁸

The second view is also not advisable. The Yukti (reason), an outcome of human intellect,¹³⁹ cannot work properly and decide about super-human things.¹⁴⁰ Reason becomes valid only when it is supported by explicit data of other means. Otherwise it fails at every step, particularly in respect

of Dharma, Adharma and the like. If reason is unduly recommended and accepted, then it may lead to disharmony and accredit blemish in character and thus spoils the very purity in the society. To explain: Thinking, repetition to be useless duplication, one may give up repeating the mantras. One may kill others saying that one wants to free the soul suffering bondage in the body. In the same way, human logic or reason is apt to lead to so many ridiculous results. So every one should depend upon the sacred verbal testimony which is eternal and beginningless.¹⁴¹ Our (human) activities may lead to good results, sometimes to no results and sometimes to wrong results. Therefore, human logic, as it is not independently competent, sometimes even in case of secular things, cannot help to conclude anything about Dharma, Adharma and the like. Hence, the sacred verbal testimony, that has come down to us through tradition since time beginningless, should be accepted as valid means of knowledge since it is devoid of any personal faults or defects.¹⁴²

The third point is that the Vedas are the authority; but, they are not Apauruseya. Vādirāja discusses the view and justifies that the Vedas are Apauruseya.

The authorship of the Vedas cannot be assigned to any one of the founders of the schools of philosophy. Among the

founders of (1) Cārvāka, (2) Buddhism, (3) Jainism, (4) Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, (5) Sāṅkhya-Yoga, (6) Mīmāṃsā and (7) the Vedānta; the first three do not recognise the authority of the Vedas. The remaining four have nowhere declared that they are the authors of the Vedas. But, they agree so far as the authority of the Vedas is concerned.¹⁴³

The Sāṅkhyas, the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins contend that the Vedas were not written and produced by the Lord. But, the Naiyāyikas hold that the Vedas were written by the Lord.

But, the view of the Naiyā-Vaiśeṣikas is not tenable since their God¹⁴⁴ has nobody¹⁴⁵ and as such cannot produce the Vedas.¹⁴⁶ And this cannot be the origination or production like their atomic theory.¹⁴⁷ The sound of a word, a product of articulation needs the efforts of the constituents of the mouth. Thus, it is possible only when the being has a body of such kind. Even if it is granted that after creation, their god assumes the physical body, the authorship of the Vedas cannot be assigned to him, since even before that, the Vedas were existing which is evident from the statements like 'Sāmas originated from Rks.'¹⁴⁸ Without the Vedic hymns, the various sacrifices could not be performed. And even at the time of creation, the Lord

instructed the Vedas to His son and declared that He was not the author or producer of the Vedas. And during Pralaya (before creation) the goddess Durgā, recites the Vedic hymns to awaken the Lord.¹⁴⁹ So, it is clear that the Vedas were existing even before the world-creation.¹⁵⁰ The explicit personality of Lord Hayagrīva also justifies the same, since He is holding the sacred books of the Veda in His hand. He teaches the Vedas to God Brahmā in the same eternal order.¹⁵¹ The Lord, although Omniscient and Omnipotent, does not alter the order in the wording of the Vedas to disturb the eternal order.¹⁵² So the order, found in the Vedas, is unaltered and is eternally the same.¹⁵³

Vādirāja, in this context, as an allied topic, discusses the eternity of the Vedas in all respects. In general, order of words in a sentence are not the same everywhere and at all times. It may differ from man to man, place to place and time to time since they are the product of human intellect. But, in the case of the Veda, even the syllable, the word and the sentence, from eternity, are all put in the same order. The order is eternal since it is there in Īśvarabuddhi which is Nityopādhi. As Īśvara is eternal, His Buddhi, in the form of Upādhi (eternal source of manifestation) is also eternal; hence, the order of the sentence etc., in the Vedas, is eternal. So this order is due to the Nityopādhi of Īśvarabuddhi.¹⁵⁴

The Pancarātra texts and the Purāṇas are Pauruṣeya as they are the compositions of the Lord. Because there are no statements in the Purāṇas to say that, like the Vedas, the Purāṇas are also Apauruṣeya. Perhaps, there are valid statements to prove that they are Pauruṣeya. The god Brahmā and others learn and remember the Vedas articulated by the Lord. And the same is followed by all the teachers. So the Vedas are Apauruṣeya. Otherwise, the order etc., in the Vedas might be modified and reshaped by all and as such the authorship might be attributed to one and all. In the case of non-eternal and secular texts, dual-authorship may be accepted since everything is there in the Īśvarabuddhi and it is then produced through a particular human being of supra-natural calibre.

It should never be inferred that the name of the author of the Vedas is missing unknowingly. Normally, even sometimes the secret and unknown work attains popularity through the author's popularity. Here, the Veda is not secret and unknown and moreover, the eternity of this is held by tradition. But, the same tradition has never and nowhere referred to the author's name. And nobody can hide the author (name) of limitless Vedas of eternity. Therefore, the Vedas are authorless.¹⁵⁵

The fourth view, that of Mīmāṃsakas, is also not correct since that rules out the necessity of the presence of the Lord. They accept the Apauruṣeyatva of the Vedas but they have no faith in the existence of the Lord.

Vādirāja refutes this view very skillfully, saying that the Mīmāṃsakas are Anāthas or orphans whereas he and the like are Sanāthas having care-takers. The Vedas are Apauruṣeya according to them. If the existence of the Lord is not accepted then, how are the Vedas retained in Pralaya or annihilation and how are they reproduced and articulated at the time of creation. The reproduction and the articulation is possible only when there is a living being such as the Lord. So, the existence of the Lord should be recognised; otherwise, the Vedas might be known as Pauruṣeya - a view, not accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas themselves. Therefore, the existence of God should be recognised by all.

The fifth view which is upheld by the Dvaita system is that the Vedas are Apauruṣeya and Nitya. They are the sole authority in respect of Dharma, Adharma and the like. They are reproduced and revealed by the Lord exactly in the same way in each Kalpa.¹⁵⁶ Thus the Vedas should be recognised as primary and ultimate source of evidence. As irrespective of any Kalpa and Yuga they remain authority, one can understand

properly as to what is right (Dharma) and what is wrong (Adharma) by studying the eternal Vedas. And moreover, the effects or the results (fruits) of the Vedic hymns are also experienced by so many aspirants.¹⁵⁷ The Vedas are so called since they convey the sense of Dharma.¹⁵⁸

The Vedas are uncreated and as such they are not defective due to the inclination of personal attachment. Because, the inclination of personal attachment may be found where the works are written or composed by some persons of same sect. Or, sometimes it is found in case of close relatives on account of relative intimacy towards them. But the Vedas are neither written by any person nor are they defective due to the inclination of personal attachment. So this is the primary and ultimate source of truth and of knowledge of the Lord.¹⁵⁹

CRITICISM OF CĀRVĀKAVĀDA

In general outlook, materialism represents the tendency that seeks to reduce the higher to the lower or explain the higher phenomena in the light of the lower ones.¹⁶⁰

The Cārvāka of Indian Materialism seems to be an old system and is known as the atheistic or Materialistic School of Indian Philosophy. The reference about this system, are

found even in the Pre-Buddhistic and the Buddhistic literature.^{160A} The founder of this system is known as Bṛhaspati. The references to this system, are also seen in the Upaniṣadic literature.

The main tenets of this system are described thus:

1. Earth, water, fire and air are the four elements.
2. Bodies, senses, and objects are the results of the different combinations of the elements.
3. Consciousness arises from matter like the intoxicating quality of wine arising from fermented yeast.
4. Soul is nothing but conscious body.
5. Enjoyment is the only end of human life.
6. Death itself is the liberation.¹⁶¹

Vādirāja refutes the views of the Cārvāka system logically.

The epistemology of the Cārvāka system is that the perception alone is the valid means (Pramāṇa) of knowledge. But this belief is not sound. Because, if perception alone is admitted as the Pramāṇa, then this statement itself becomes invalid. The perception is the contact between the sense-organs and their objects. Everywhere and at all times this type of contact is impossible. In that case one has to advocate some reliable statements causing the same

sense. If one does not make any statements, then one cannot make others know the things or gain the knowledge.¹⁶² Because, the very statement is verbal testimony which is not accepted as a valid means of knowledge by the Cārvāka. Thus, he cannot open his mouth to convince others or to teach others. When a statement is made as "Perception alone is Pramāṇa" and if this statement is accepted as valid, then the very statement becomes invalid. If it is not considered as valid, then also it is useless. Thus, by both, there is futility in advocating and accepting perception as the only means of valid knowledge. The invalidity accrues with the means when they fail to convey the sense and do not denote the objects to be denoted.¹⁶³ So the theory of Pramāṇa, advanced by the Cārvākas is not acceptable since it does not fulfill the required conditions. Thus, the verbal testimony becomes valid as it has not faced adversity in any way. The single Pramāṇa i.e., perception cannot protect the Cārvākas, as it causes injury to themselves.¹⁶⁴

As Anumāṇa (inference) is not considered as a valid means, the Cārvāka has to shut his mouth in scholarly debates. Because, there he cannot participate since he cannot advance any arguments. Advancing arguments is the core of inference. When the inference is not accepted, there is no scope for arguments. The knowledge of perceptive observance cannot

clear the doubts of opponents and satisfy them. Thus, he becomes ineligible and incompetent to participate in the debates.¹⁶⁵ If something is said about the thing perceived, it does not convey any sense, since that expression itself is invalid. If he argues for validity to that, then it is but inevitable that he has to accept both Anumāna and Śabda as valid. Then only he can advance arguments. Even when he does not argue, his silence cannot disregard and debar the possibility of the validity of inference.¹⁶⁶

The rejection of inference and verbal testimony narrows down the scope to express our thoughts and ideas which cannot be perceived.¹⁶⁷ So, those who incline to think and to discuss, should necessarily and involuntarily or voluntarily resort to the inference and verbal testimony.

Accepting perception as the only valid means of knowledge and at the same time rejecting the validity to inference and testimony is not helpful to gain knowledge. Therefore, one has to accept the validity of all the three means of knowledge, namely perception, inference and testimony.¹⁶⁸

C.D.Sharma has rightly observed- "The Cārvāka view that perception is valid and inference is invalid is itself a result of inference... Thoughts and ideas, not being material objects, cannot be perceived, they can only be inferred...

Pure perception, in the sense of mere sensation, cannot be regarded as a means of knowledge unless conception of thought has arranged into order and has given meaning and significance to the loose threads of sense-data."¹⁶⁹

Vādirāja discusses the invisible destiny before coming to the description of the Jīva or embodied soul connected with this. It is said that Cārvākas have not accepted the theological truths such as Adr̥ṣṭa,¹⁷⁰ Karma and the like. We cannot deny the possibility of invisible destiny for it is this that has caused difference among the individual souls. The perceptible body, organs etc., cannot be held as the cause of this difference. Because, both the poor and rich may have similarity in their physic and desire. But even then such a notable difference is seen in the society. Thus, when the effect is clearly seen there must be a cause. When the cause is not seen, it cannot be said that effect resulted without the cause. The cause and the effect relation is a universal principle and it cannot be disregarded by any one. So, here an invisible cause Adr̥ṣṭa is to be accepted inevitably.¹⁷¹ And this Adr̥ṣṭa differs from person to person and is also under the control of the Lord.¹⁷²

The view of the Cārvākas that there is no Jīva as such,

apart from the body, is critically examined at length and refuted by Vādirāja. Just being dependent or being controlled by this Adṛṣṭa, the Jīva performs the activities causing different results. If Caitanya or consciousness is accepted as the very body then what is the difference between a living body and a dead body? - asks Vādirāja.

If the existence of the Jīva is not accepted on account of the presence of the sense-organs, one cannot differentiate a living body from a dead one. It cannot also be said that the breathing is the standard since we cannot perceive the breathing in the case of minute bodies like insects etc. So one has to accept the existence of soul in the body.¹⁷³ The Cārvāka's contention of this kind is the result of their epistemological point of view. As perception cannot behold the Jīva and prove its existence they took it for granted that there is no Jīva besides the body.

The Cārvāka says that the consciousness in the body, originates by the proportionate combination of the material elements - earth, water, wind, and fire¹⁷⁴ like the red colour that originates by the combination of pan-leaf, arecanut and lime. If it is accepted, then, why should the consciousness not be present in a dead-body wherein there are all the four elements. According to the Cārvāka, consciousness should also exist in a dead body.¹⁷⁵

But this view is not correct. Because, the reddish colour that results from the combination of leaf, arecanut and lime, is also material unlike non-material consciousness. So whatever is not there in any constituents of a cause, cannot get resulted in the product. Consciousness is not an attribute of any of these constituents. So their combination cannot produce consciousness. On account of the proximity of red flower, marble appears red and that redness cannot be brought in formless air by any means. In the same way, if there would have been consciousness in any one of the constituents of the cause then the theory of Cārvākas would have been correct. But consciousness, an attribute of non-matter Jīva cannot be considered as a product of material elements.¹⁷⁶ The gathering of hundred blind persons cannot give rise to visual power, but only with the help of a visioned person there can be visual power. In the same way, a body also can live only when it is associated with Jīva an embodiment of consciousness. And moreover, with artificial means, a body cannot be made active or to live. Because, a well-painted eye in a picture can behold nothing. So one has to accept the existence of the Jīva voluntarily which is entirely distinct from the material body. Thus, one is called Dehī.¹⁷⁷ The term Dehī can thus be explained as one having a material body. Thus the derivative explanation also proves the existence of Jīva who is entirely different from the material body.¹⁷⁸

The Jīva as different from the material body, can be established with reasoning. The just born infant voluntarily inclines towards breast-feeding. That infant is in no way taught regarding breast-feeding by anybody. It is the impact of past life (experience) that it inherits the experience and feels happy in breast-feeding. Here, there is not the same body to retain the experience. And it is seen clearly that the consciousness of an experience is not an attribute of the body. So, on this ground, one can infer the presence of Jīva apart from the body. It is something other than the body that constitutes the attributes such as consciousness, knowledge and the like and that is the Jīva.¹⁷⁹ Thus, the body may change whereas Jīva is the same since he is carrying the experience of past-lives, like food may change but experience of food-taken can be retained. In the same way, the body is different and the Jīva is different. If this is not accepted then breaking, splitting, cutting etc., would have to be attributed to the consciousness element which is not desirable.¹⁸⁰ Hence the Jīva is different and eternal.

When the existence of the Jīva is accepted, it cannot be said that he is formless. The nature (form) of the Jīva is of Jñāna and Ānanda. The nature of Jñāna and Ānanda is to be accepted since it is asserted in the Vedas¹⁸¹ (Śruti) that the Jīva is the Pratibimba of Īśvara and it is described

in the Śrutis that the liberated souls experience all sorts of blissful enjoyments. As God is an embodiment of (nature of) unlimited and eternal Jñāna, Ānanda and other auspicious qualities, the Jīvas being Pratīmba of God, are also embodiments of eternal Jñāna, Ānanda and the like, butⁿ a limited scope. The reason also does not come in the way of proving the nature of Jñāna and Ānanda to Jīva. As atomic form and nature is recognised and accepted in the case of atoms, likewise nature of Jñāna and Ānanda can be accepted in the Jīvas.¹⁸² As the minute atomic form and nature is invisible, in the same way the nature of Jñāna and Ānanda of Jīvas is also invisible to our material eyes. As the atomic form (Parimaṇḍalya etc.) can be recognised with the help of the advanced and scientific instruments; in the same way, the nature and form of the Jīva can also be recognised and realised by the divine power of sight. Thus, as atoms have the eternal atomic nature in the same way the Jīvas also have the nature of Jñāna and Ānanda. They are lusture-natured or formed.¹⁸³

It may also be sometimes questioned "why not the Jīvas be formless like ether?". But Vādirāja says that even the ether has its own form and nature. The natural form, giving scope to space for all, is the form of the ether. And moreover, it looks blue from a distance. In the same way

everything has its own nature and form. At this juncture, Vādirāja ridicules the Nirākāravāda of the Advaitins.¹⁸⁴ He states that everything is (including the Lord) having the form of Jñāna and Ānanda.¹⁸⁵ The acceptable view is that the Jīva is lustrous and all his minute parts such as face, hands, feet etc. are also lustrous. Moreover, it is but practical experience to everyone that material should be different from non-material.¹⁸⁶ In this body made of material elements, fire has its own form; in the same way, let there be form to that also (Jīva) made of pure lusture. We do find the references regarding the lustrous and other formed Jīvas in their respective worlds.¹⁸⁷ So all the Jīvas are of the nature of bliss and knowledge and possess the limbs of Jñāna-ānanda which are eternally real.¹⁸⁸ Otherwise, they cannot be treated as Pratibimbās of the Lord. The Pratibimba, although being entirely different, carries the same nature and form of Bimba as seen everywhere. Bimba Lord is of the nature of Jñāna and Ānanda, so Pratibimbajīvas are also of the nature of Jñāna and Ānanda. The Śruti also supports this view.¹⁸⁹ Hence, the form with hands, feet etc., is natural to the Jīvas, as being closely attached to this; the Liṅga-deha has also the form (of the same kind). And these Liṅga-dehas are made of Prakṛti contents. These contents of Prakṛti have atomic form. So, they themselves cannot take the form of hands, feet etc. So, it is by the close association with the

Svarūpa-body of Jīva (having the form of hands, feet etc.)
Līṅga-dehas have the form of feet, hand, etc. Līṅga-dehas
 are the garments, made of Prakṛti of Svarūpa body of Jīva.
 The Līṅga-deha gets the form of Svarūpa body of Jīva.¹⁹⁰
 So the form of hands, feet etc., is there in the Jīvas
 naturally and eternally and Līṅga-Śarīra (form) is like the
 garment of that.¹⁹¹ Otherwise let all the material products
 (forms) have the hands, feet etc., of their own like human
 beings, which is impossible and impracticable. Therefore,
 a natural and of its own-kind form must be accepted in the
 case of the Jīva.¹⁹²

Vādirāja then attacks the ethics of the Cārvākas. He
 says that the Cārvākas' ethics is not at all the ethics on
 account of the absence of any morals in the system. The
 doctrines of any philosophical system should have the base of
 morals or ethics. The system becomes sound and firm if it
 is supported by ethics.

The ethics of Cārvākas is a path unrestricted and
 unrestrained. Every one is given freedom of all kinds and
 of all sorts. It preaches the enjoyment of worldly pleasures.
 When the core of life is spoiled, when the society is polluted;
 the Cārvākas cannot control or overcome the misfortunes since
 there is no steps in his system to control all that.¹⁹³

The freedom sanctioned by Cārvāka system may lead to excess indulgence of worldly enjoyments, and that in course, indeed, causes bad results. Excess eating leads to indigestion and the like. So taking into consideration all these, one has to conclude that, everything has got its own limitations. Identifying and realising the limitations, one should try his best to gain the pleasure not mixed with mispleasure.¹⁹⁴

The scholars do not like the path of Cārvākas as it leads to troubles and then displeasure. And the illiterate do not require the help of Cārvāka system. Thus neither the wise nor the layman prefer this system. So, on account of its uselessness the Cārvāka system has become non-effective like the impotent weapons having no power.¹⁹⁵ There is no topic (good) to be studied and there is no proper relation among these as there is no utility. So the whole Cārvāka system lacks in having essential qualifications of a system (Viśaya, Adhikārī, Prayojana and Sambandha). K.T.Pandurangi has rightly observed the defective ethics of the Cārvākas: "... This will certainly make his life and the life of his fellow-beings miserable because of excessive indulgence. No civics or ethics is possible for a selfless society."¹⁹⁶ C.D.Sharma remarks, "The ethics of the Cārvāka is a crude individual hedonism; pleasure of the senses in this life and that too of the individual is the soul end."¹⁹⁷

CRITICISM OF JAINISM AND BUDDHISM

After bringing out the futility of the Cārvākavāda, Vādirāja takes up the Jainism and the Buddhism for critical consideration. Both these systems are being referred to simultaneously on account of similarities in so many aspects between them.

According to Vādirāja, the attack of the Buddhism and the Jainism on the Vedic religion is surprising. Their argument is, when killing of beasts is a sin in ordinary cases, then it must also be a sin in sacrifices. They question as to why alone killing of animals, in ordinary cases, is a sinful act? But they must know that Dharma and Adharma are super-sensuous elements and cannot be ascertained by inference. The inference cannot act independently since it is always dependent either upon perception or on testimony.¹⁹⁸ The baseless argument may even prove right what is actually wrong, like drinking of liquor may be admissible as it is also a liquid like milk. Hence, baseless inference is of no use. If baseless reason is resorted to, then, cutting the head of a person, just to relieve him from the bondage of Samsāra may also become a worthy act. So reason, unsupported, cannot be a Pramāṇa in ascertaining the Dharma and Adharma or what is sin and what is not. Vādirāja says that only on the basis of reason, eating of meat cannot be

prohibited which is done by the Jainas.¹⁹⁹ Because, as rice is the produce of five elements, meat also is a produce of five elements. On this reason, eating of meat cannot be prohibited and for that one can kill animals. Thus the Jainas have to accept killing of animals and eating their meat.²⁰⁰

The total non-violence²⁰¹ is impossible and impracticable. Even the Jainas directly or indirectly engage in violence. While constructing the Jaina temples, during roaming about of the Jaina monks, lakhs of creatures are mercilessly slain. Holding the peacock feather and eating the salt etc. are also the acts of violence.²⁰²

The Jainas accept only two types of Jīvas, the liberated and bound. Vādirāja urges for the acceptance of the third, supreme Cetana (God) who is the doer of all the deeds in this world.²⁰³

Vādirāja takes up then the Svabhāvavāda²⁰⁴ of the Buddhists.²⁰⁵ According to this Vāda, matter acts on its own accord with the help of its intrinsic nature.²⁰⁶ But, this is not sound because the Svabhāva accepted by the Buddhists is also Jada (insentient) like a pot. As pot cannot move by itself, in the same way, the Svabhāva, being Jada, cannot move and make the object move and act.²⁰⁷ If Svabhāva is

regarded as Ajaḍa (sentient) and Asvatantra (dependent) then also Svabhāva is to be initiated by some Svatantra (independent) being. Because an Asvatantra being cannot do anything independently. It does require the help of a Svatantra being. And it cannot be said that let there be an individual Cetana (activating element) to each Svabhāva. Because, then there may be limitless Svatantra beings acting in their own way creating chaos and confusion. So it is not tenable to admit limitless individual Svatantra beings. If an Independent Cetana is accepted, then, it would prove that the Buddhists differ only in terminology. Because, the Lord is the Independent Cetana who initiates and activates the whole world.²⁰⁸ As a Cetana potter is required to produce and shape the pot, a supreme Cetana must also be there to create this wonderful world.²⁰⁹ If Svabhāva is the cause of everything then it should bestow upon the Buddhist the liberation. His engagement in the practice of rigid vows would be useless. So Svabhāva of a Jāḍa should be initiated by an Ajaḍa or Cetana.

Even the unseen things like sin and merit cannot make the man act and attain the cherished goal. Because, they are also Jāḍas. To make them active, the help of a Cetana is required. It is only the God who makes them active. The power of activating the Jāḍa, being present in That, is seen

clearly. Narasiṃha, who came out of a pillar and protected Prahlāda. So, He alone is Omnipresent and He alone dwells in the hearts of all to control and activate.²¹⁰ Thus even the Svabhāva of Jada is under the control of the Lord. Vādirāja, in this respect, cites some other examples and shows that Jada cannot act without the initiation of the Lord. Even the destiny cannot play its role without the help of the Lord. Adṛṣṭa or destiny becomes active only when the Lord minds it to be active. Thus Adṛṣṭa is also under the control of the Lord.²¹¹ The logic also corroborates this view as all the effects (products) pre-suppose the presence of the doer. So, there cannot be found even a single instance where this law is violated.²¹² So, Jada acts when motivated by Ajāda. So the Lord is the controller and regulator of all. The Svabhāvavādin cannot reply, when questioned, as to why gem alone has lustre and not in case of other stones, since gem is also a type of stone. It is the will of the Supreme-Controller that the gem should be lustrous. It does not mean that, the importance of the Svabhāva of objects is totally ignored. The Svabhāva of objects is accepted to the extents of the intrinsic capacity in the form of the eligibility as such. The raw-material mud has its own Svabhāva of becoming pot which is not seen in other things. Thus Svabhāva is not ignored and to make it active, the initiation of the Lord is necessary. Thus originally,

all the Jādas such as Svabhāva, Karma, Adṛṣṭa etc.,²¹³ are inactive and they become active by the favour of the Cetana Lord.²¹⁴ Thus Svabhāva establishes the existence of the Lord. The Svabhāva cannot be said to be one uniformly present in all objects. It differs from object to object and place to place. It is the eternal will of God, that wills that with gradation the Svabhāva should be different in all objects. And this difference of Svabhāva is practically seen when one is blind and another is deaf. If it (Svabhāva) were one and alone, blindness and deafness would have been there in all and there should not be difference between the two. But it is not so. Therefore, the Svabhāva is different and unique in all objects.²¹⁵

Likewise, Karma cannot be treated as an independent cause of all effects. It is also dependent and controlled by the Lord.²¹⁶ If it is held that Karma is the sole cause of birth and death etc., then, in practical life, killer-killed relation would become meaningless. And there cannot be any sin when one is slain, saying that he is slain due to his Karma. So it is not the cause of any effect. Like the Svabhāva it also acts when being initiated by the Lord. The importance of Karma is accepted in this context as that of the Svabhāva. Thus, Karma also seeks the help of a Cetana Lord. So, it is inevitable that one has to accept the

existence of the Supreme Lord who controls and activates all (the whole world) such as Svabhāva, Karma and the like.²¹⁷

Thus, in this context, a few views of the Jainism and Buddhism are tackled, combindly. The excess indulgence in Ahiṃsā, the concept of Jīva, the Svabhāvavāda etc., are criticised; and with reason of practical value and authority, the existence of the Lord as the Sovereign and Supreme activating Agent is established.

THE RĀMĀYANA SVATASTVA (Self-validity of Knowledge)

M.Hiriyāna writes: 'Indian theories of knowledge are divisible broadly into two classes- one maintaining the self-validity (svataḥ-prāmānya) of knowledge; and the other contending that it needs to be validated by an extraneous means (parataḥ-prāmānya). In the former view, whenever knowledge arises, the presumption is that it is right; and verification becomes necessary only when there is some circumstance throwing doubt upon it. In the latter case, knowledge by itself guarantees nothing in this respect; and its truth or falsity is to be ascertained through some appropriate test.'²¹⁸

In the system of Madhva the doctrine of self-validity of knowledge is the consideration of any knowledge as valid

by the intuitive agent (Sākṣin)²¹⁹ which experiences that knowledge without being hindered by any defects or any other obstruction.²²⁰

It is a well discussed topic in Indian philosophy. Whether the validity of the knowledge has its origin through the same conditions that produce the knowledge or by any other external conditions, and whether the ascertainment of the validity of knowledge is through the same conditions that make us to ascertain the knowledge or by any other external conditions. Vādirāja examines the question whether the validity of the knowledge needs external verification or not.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas opine that validity of experience or knowledge requires external verification. According to them, both validity and invalidity are originated and ascertained by the external conditions that are instrumental to the rise of knowledge.²²¹ It is called Prāmānya-Paratastva.²²² They argue that if validity and invalidity were to be intrinsic then knowledge of any kind should not be false. But there arises falsity of knowledge. And hence we have to depend upon some external conditions for the validity. This school holds that knowledge is apprehended by mental perception whereas its validity is inferred by correspondence or texts. Hence, Prāmānya is Paratastva.²²³

The Mīmāṃsakas²²⁴ and the Advaitins²²⁵ contend that validity is intrinsic and invalidity is extrinsic.^{225A}

The Bhāṭṭa view, referring to the Jñātātā, (cognizedness) states that validity is inferred through this Jñātātā.²²⁶ Therefore, here validity is intrinsic, only in name and not in reality.

The Prābhākaras say that validity results from the knowledge itself and there is no invalidity at all.²²⁷

The Sāṅkhyas hold the view that both validity and invalidity are innate.²²⁸ Both are organic to knowledge.

The Dvaita view is that validity is intrinsic with reference to its origin and ascertainment.²²⁹ Both the knowledge and its validity are cognized by the Sākṣin,²³⁰ whereas invalidity originates by the defects associated with the instruments of the knowledge.²³¹ In the Siddhānta, it is the nature of Sākṣin, that, gaining the knowledge of objects grasps its validity also without any external aid or verification.^{231A} In common practice it is seen that when we acquire the knowledge of an object, we proceed to deal with that. It means, here validity of that knowledge is also gained. If at all, there is any need to verify the validity, then

there would not have been any hasty dealing with the object known.

The acceptance of the Sākṣin is necessary because of of the limitations of other means of knowledge such as mind and the senses.²³² It is evident that, knowledge derived through the sense-organs, sometimes, if not always, needs correction by the subsequent evidences. It may be better Pratyakṣa, inference or other means. And these means and tests, sometimes, would need further tests, and then as a result, that may lead to endless regression.²³³ And moreover, different persons require different degrees of verification for validity of their knowledge. What satisfies one may not satisfy another. Thus there is no end. The problem at this stage stands unsolved in the hands of all the philosophers. But it is Madhva who has pointed out the principle of Sākṣin, which is termed as Svarūpendriya of the knowing self and which is capable to reveal itself and its contents. Both knowledge and its validity are grasped by the Sākṣin in the ultimate analysis. So far as invalid knowledge is concerned, the Sākṣin cognizes the cognitive aspect of invalid cognition that is the bare content of cognition.²³⁴ And its invalidity is ascertained by the Sākṣin indirectly through Viśaṁvāda and other tests.²³⁵

In the case of erroneous experience such as mistaking a rope for a serpent or Sukti for Rajata, the Sākṣin is obstructed and it does not grasp the validity. It is the Manas that hastens to grasp the experience as valid and also initiates the action.²³⁶ And when the error is realized later, that validity of experience is given up. And where there is no obstruction by any Dosa, the Sākṣin obtains valid experience and also the validity of the knowledge without waiting for the need of any verification.²³⁷ The insistence of verification in all cases, is unnecessary and impracticable. Because in that case, as already mentioned, there would arise the defect of Anavasthā - a chain of never ending experiences.²³⁸ E.g. if the experience of water is to be verified by the experience of quenching the thirst, then the latter will also need further verification by another experience to prove that as not false. And then that experience may also require another experience to prove it real. Thus, there could be no end in this direction.²³⁹ So, to avoid this never ending verifications, one has to accept the self-validity of the experience which is the very nature of the Sākṣin. And this is capable of having knowledge and ascertaining its validity by itself. C.D.Sharma writes "The fallacy of infinite regress cannot be avoided since the knowledge of the external condition which is said to validate any knowledge, being itself knowledge, would require another external condition to validate it.

Hence, all knowledge must be regarded as self-valid."²⁴⁰ There may be instances, where the error arises. But they are exceptions and not a rule.

In fact the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas do not insist on any verification in the case of the inferential knowledge on the basis of Vyāpti (invariable concomitance). They opine that when Vyāpti and other ingredients of an inference are faultless, there is no need for further verification. Vādirāja, defends and argues that if that would be the case, then why the Sākṣin should not be given such a privilege when there are no Doṣas in the gained experience.²⁴¹ And moreover, the inference is also not an independent Pramāṇa as it needs the data of either Pratyakṣa or of verbal testimony. So the Sākṣin should be admitted without any hesitation. The Sākṣin is the name of the spiritual sense-organ of the self through which it intuits its experiences.²⁴² But this instrument of intuition is not something different from the self (Pramātā). And this Sākṣin is competent to know its own flawless nature and the validity of the tests applied without resorting to further tests. The Sākṣi-Pratyakṣa is self-luminous, self-explicable, self-certifying and uncontradictable.²⁴³ Thus, the Sākṣin is capable of ascertaining the validity of the knowledge obtained by it. The verification is needed only to remove obstructions that cause erroneous experience.

When once these obstructions are removed, the validity of even those experiences will be ascertained by the Sākṣin itself.²⁴⁴

Thus, it is evident that the validity of knowledge arises from the same conditions that give rise to that knowledge, and the validity of knowledge is ascertained from the same factors through which knowledge arises or as soon as knowledge arises. That means, ascertainment of validity of knowledge does not wait for further verification. And so far as the invalidity of knowledge is concerned, it is governed by external conditions.^{224A}

The theory of self-validity of knowledge, in the hands of Mīmāṃsakas and others does not conform itself to be purely subjective though they define and claim to be so, as they have not accepted the concept like Sākṣin, which is inner-intuitive organ. Their advocating this theory is only to overcome objective difficulties. (Anavastha- endless regression etc.).^{244B}

The credit goes to Madhva as he, admitting the Sākṣin, which is none other than the inner sentience; has justified the theory as purely subjective and self-authentic. And, hence, criterion of truth need not be conformed and determined by

the criterion of falsity as a model, as misunderstood by some scholars who have not realized the significance of Sākṣin.^{244C}

By the by, Vādirāja refutes the doctrine of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, that the Pratibandhakābhāva^{244D} or absence of obstructions is also a cause of effect. It means the Doṣābhāva is also the cause of Pramā. But this view is not tenable and acceptable. Because, an obstruction or Pratibandhaka may prevent the result of the effect.²⁴⁵ And that does not mean that its absence is the cause of effect. Causes are distinct and different. Effect will not take place when these causes are prevented by an obstructing factor for their emergence. When that obstruction is removed, the same causes lead to the effect. Thus, the absence of the obstructing factor cannot be a cause,²⁴⁶ it may only be a preventive factor that disables the causes to be effective. So the Doṣābhāva cannot be the cause of Pramā.²⁴⁷

CONSIDERATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION OF ŚRUTI PASSAGES AS TATTVĀVEDAKA AND ATATTVĀVEDAKA

After discussing the problem of self-validity, Vādirāja refutes the contention of the Advaitins that the Śruti passages are both Tattvāvedaka and Atattvāvedaka. The Tattvāvedaka means those passages conveying Truth and the Atattvāvedaka passages are those that give some tentative knowledge, being not true ultimately.²⁴⁸

This view of the Advaitins is not tenable since it cuts at the very root of the validity of the Śruti passages admitted by all. The very classification as Tattvāvedaka and Atattvāvedaka is invalid and as such unacceptable.²⁴⁹ The Vedas are valid by themselves. The validity of the Vedas is established since they are free from human defects of faults. So they are self-valid. Hence treating some passages as Atattvāvedaka is most objectionable.²⁵⁰

By the by Vādirāja criticises the Mīmāṃsaka view of Kāryatāvāda.²⁵¹ S. Dasagupta writes: "This doctrine holds that each word yields its meaning only as being generally related other factors or only as a part of an injunctive sentence."²⁵² According to the Mīmāṃsakas, the Śruti passages become valid only when they become causes and produce effects. To explain, one desirous of heaven, after performing the sacrifice of Jyotiṣṭoma attains heaven. The Śruti passage viz., Jyotiṣṭomena Svargakāmo Yajeta becomes valid as there is Vedic injunction in it. The verb Yajeta is Vedic injunction that points to perform their duties and thus leads to successful activity. Hence, the statement is valid.²⁵³ This is called Kāryatāvāda. They say that the Śruti passages do not convey the sense of accomplished objects (entities) such as the Lord. Therefore, the existence of the Lord is not admitted by the Mīmāṃsakas.

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The Kāryatāvāda of the Mīmāṃsakas involves the factor that the desired objects (Iṣṭaphala) must be an already established entity (Siddhārtha). The statements, that are related to the desired objects, means thereof, and also to the factors of injunction; are authoritative. The heaven, for attaining which they perform the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, should be a Siddhārtha - an already accomplished or established entity desired by the sacrificer. The Śruti passages that convey the sense of such an entity and means thereof, become valid according to the Mīmāṃsakas. Consequently, the Lord, who is also an established entity (Siddhārtha) and who is glorified by all the Śruti passages as limitless in their primary and ultimate implications should also be admitted. Thus, by Mīmāṃsakas theory of the Kāryatāvāda also, existence of the Lord is established and all the Śruti passages are self-valid. The validity of the Vedas is thus proved by their theory of the Kāryatāvāda. So Siddhārthabodhakatva does not come in the way of the eternity and validity of the Vedas.²⁵⁴ Otherwise Asti Āyuh (Life-span is there) and such other statements may become invalid or meaningless since they also convey the sense of an established aspect viz., life-span. Therefore, the view upheld by Madhva, is defectless and right. According to him, all the Vedas are Tattvāvedaka and as such they convey the valid knowledge of the Truth. Treating some Śruti passages as Atattvāvedaka is, therefore, wrong.²⁵⁵

There may be some passages that appear to contradict the import of other passages. This apparent contradiction should be removed by changing the word-meaning with the help of implications of purport. Thus we cannot disregard those passages just because they apparently contradict others. Vadiraja contends that if two cows fight mutually, to stop the fight one should not kill either of them; on the other hand, one has to try his best to divert one cow by attracting it by grass and the like and thus stop the combat. To stop the combat, as killing a cow is unwanted, in the same way, to remove apparent contradiction, some Śruti passages need not be considered as Atattvāvedaka and be rejected. The apparent contradiction among the Śruti passages should be removed by just altering the word-meaning with implication.²⁵⁶ Thus all the Śruti passages convey the knowledge of Truth. And there are no Śruti passages as Atattvāvedaka as believed by the Advaitins.

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AIKYAŚRUTIS ARE SĀVAKĀŚA

There are some Śruti passages called Aikyaśrutis by the Advaitins. That means, those passages that convey the sense of identity expressively such as Tattvamasi, Ātmaivedam, Ekamevādvitīyam and others. The Advaitins contend that these Aikyaśrutis convey the sense of identity between the Lord and Jīvātman or embodied soul. But the Aikya mentioned in these

passages does not convey the sense of identity asserts Vādirāja. The term Aikya in the Aikyaśrutis should be understood in different senses such as (1) Similarity, (2) Unity of place, (3) Unity of thought, (4) Unity of scope, (5) Uniqueness of qualities and (6) Uniqueness of independence. The Śruti passages do not give up the intrinsic or inherent sense of their own.²⁵⁹ The Aikya is Sāvakaśa and hence does not give up the sense of the Advaitic identity. The Sāvakaśatva means restrained with some limitations. Here also the term Aikya is restrained with some limitations. Because everywhere and at all the times, it does not give the sense of identity. Hence, it is Sāvakaśa. The six types of meanings, stated above, should be taken into consideration as per the context.

If the sense of Aikya is pre-eminent, foremost and ultimate, then it would become Niravakaśa or unrestrained with limitations. But everywhere and at all times the Aikya (identity) is not the ultimate sense. It gets sublated on some contexts. Hence, the Aikyaśrutis are not Niravakaśa. Moreover, the meaning of the Aikya mentioned above in six types does not prove the identity by any means. The unity of space means coming together at one place, as Kauravas gathered at one place. In the same way, the term Aikya or unity, never gives the sense of identity.²⁶⁰

The term Aikya, according to the Amarakoṣa, denotes (1) Pradhānatva or pre-eminence, Kevalatva or alone (the state of standing by itself), (3) Anyatva or separateness and (4) First act.²⁶¹ So it refers to the Lord who is Pre-eminent. The character of Pre-eminence thus proves the Omniscience of the Lord and also difference from the Jīva and Jada which are not pre-eminent and omniscient. Thus the term Aikya in the Śruti passages conveys the sense of Pre-eminence of the Lord and His difference from all else.²⁶²

In the Advaita, as Brahman is not an object of knowledge, as it is not the primary import of any Śāstra (Veda), the very classification of Śruti passages as Tattvavedaka and Atattvavedaka becomes most untenable. In the same way, considering some passage as Niravakāśa and others Sāvakāśa is also not befitting as entire Śāstra is the product of Ajnāna.^{262A}

PRĀKRTAGUNANIRAŚANA

As Aikya in the Śruti passages should mean pre-eminence etc., in the same way the term Nirguṇa also means that the Lord is free from inauspicious qualities. The term Guṇa means quality of any kind, auspicious and inauspicious. Here, Nirguṇa²⁶³ does not convey total absence of all qualities. But it conveys the absence of ordinary or common or inauspicious qualities. Material qualities are Sattva, Rajas and Tamas.²⁶⁴

All these qualities bind the soul and become the cause of his Samsāra and the qualities such as delusion, jealousy and the like cause grief. The Lord is free from all these inauspicious and common qualities. So Nirguna means absence of such material and inauspicious qualities, and does not mean total absence of qualities. Thus, the Nirguna Śruti^{264A} should be interpreted properly. So it should be understood as absence of inauspicious qualities.²⁶⁵

There are some passages such as Eṣaḥ Sarveśvaraḥ²⁶⁶ which declare primarily the ultimate supremacy of the Lord. Here, since the meaning is not restrained, this is Niravakāśa statement. Thus, the unrestrained passages never give up the primary sense.²⁶⁷

When the sense of the term is restrained, it should be understood in a different fashion and sense. This change or alteration, on implication, is introduced elsewhere also. For example, the statement Na hiṁsyāt²⁶⁸ has its scope restrained outside the sacrifices. The statement is not valid everywhere.

Here Nirguna etc., are Sāvakaśāśas and Eṣaḥ Sarveśaḥ etc., are Niravakāśas. Sāvakaśāśa passages are to be understood in favour of Niravakāśa statements.

Vādirāja in defence of this quotes the statement of God Śiva given in the Padmapurāṇa. The Lord Śiva critically examines and explains the term Nirguṇa as devoid of all unworthy and ordinary qualities. So this is the true and real meaning of Nirguṇa passages.²⁶⁹

Vādirāja might be asked as to why Abhedaśrutis alone are Sāvakāśa and Bhedaśrutis are Niravakāśa. The reply is that the reason is obvious. Passages like Dvā suparṇā convey the sense of two different objects. So when the primary meaning as well as the meaning by implication denote two objects of different nature clearly, there is no scope to get the meaning changed. So in such statements, simultaneously, mind gets acquainted with two different entities of two different intrinsic natures. There is no need to imply any other sense. Thus, the unrestrained (Niravakāśa) statements are ever valid and their sense is not contradicted. They always convey the reliable and proper sense.

So all these Śruti passages glorify the ultimate supremacy of the Lord and declare the difference between the Lord and the Jīva.²⁷⁰ The word Nirguṇa refers to the Lord, who is also called Nārāyaṇa. So this Nārāyaṇa is the Supreme Brahman and Eternal as He was there even before the creation. Like a pot, He is not created and not affected by any material

and ordinary qualities that throw one into the cycle of birth and death. On the other hand, He is endowed with unlimited auspicious qualities such as bliss, knowledge and the like. The derivative explanation of the word Brahman is an embodiment of unlimited auspicious qualities. And the word Nārāyaṇa also signifies the same sense when explained etymologically. Arah means demerits, Nārah means auspicious qualities (merits), Ayanam means chief or primary source and substratum. Thus Nārāyaṇa, who is Nirguṇa, is Brahman²⁷¹ an embodiment of numberless auspicious qualities and devoid of any material qualities. He is the primary object of glorification of all the Vedas as described in the Brahma-sūtras.²⁷²

After explaining the meaning of the Nirguṇa-śrutis, to substantiate his explanation, Vādirāja quotes the passages from the Nārāyaṇopaniṣad, the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa and others and explains their import. He also points out that passages like Neha nānāsti declare that there is no difference between the Lord and His qualities. Vādirāja also points out that there is no such restriction as a rule to split the śruti passage: Kevalo Nirguṇasca as Advaitins contend, but it can also be split as Kevalo anirguṇasca. Then, it explicitly states that the Lord alone is Supreme and an embodiment of auspicious qualities.

A CRITICAL APPRECIATION OF THE NĀRĀYANOPANISAD : SUPREMACY
OF LORD VIṢṆU

Vādirāja, in this chapter, quotes the Nārāyanopaniṣad and critically examining it, justifies that Nārāyaṇa is the Lord Brahman. He alone can be called Lord Brahman and none else.

All the attributes of Brahman are referred to Lord Nārāyaṇa, glorified in the Purusasūkta^{272A} and in well known other Śruti passages. Hence Ultimate Truth or prime gist of all the statements is that Nārāyaṇa, indeed, is the Lord Brahman (an embodiment of everlasting auspicious qualities). At the commencement of the Śruti as Upakrama and at the end as Upasamhāra, Lord Nārāyaṇa is referred to and glorified as Brahman.²⁷³

So in the opinion of learned Vedic scholars, who pursue an impartial inquiry about the Ultimate Truth (primary sense) of the Śruti passages, Lord Nārāyaṇa is the Supreme God and He is the Brahman being endowed with unlimited auspicious qualities.²⁷⁴

The word Nirguṇa can be read as Anirguṇa, since there is no prescription for dissolving the conjunction of the words of Upaniṣads.²⁷⁵ Then Anirguṇa wherein the two negative

prefixes, gives the positive sense. Thus Śruti can be read as Kevala and Anirguna, that means Lord alone is Supreme and is endowed with qualities. So the term Anirguna throws away the sense of Nirguna as absence of Guna. And these attributes or qualities of the Lord are not momentary but they are eternal and always real.²⁷⁶ Thus, all the words, in the Vedas describe the glorious majesty of the Lord (one or other auspicious attributes of the Lord). So the word negating the attributes of Brahman is totally unseen in the Veda.

REFUTATION OF THE CONCEPT JĀTI OR SĀMĀNYA OF TĀRKIKAS

S. Dasagupta writes "Sāmānya is the fourth category. It means the genus or aspect of generality or sameness that we notice in things. Thus, in spite of the difference of colour between one cow and another, both of them are found to have such a sameness that we call them cows. In spite of all diversity in all objects around us, they are all perceived as Sat or existing. The Sat or existence is thus a sameness, which is found to exist in all the three things, Dravya, Guna and Karma. The sameness is called Sāmānya or Jāti, and it is regarded as a separate thing which rests on Dravya, Guna and Karma."²⁷⁷

The Jāti²⁷⁸ according to the Tārkikas, is the property

which is peculiar to a class and distinguishes it from all others. It is an essential characteristic of species as Gotva of cows, Aśvatva of horses and the like.²⁷⁹ It is a common and equally applicable property of the entities. And it is being referred to by similar terms. According to them Jāti is that which helps to recognise the entities as similar.²⁸⁰

In connection with the exact meaning of the Jāti, Vādirāja poses following questions: Is it a single means of dealing? Or is it endowed with one property? Or is it of single formed and is it an object of expression with synonymous words?²⁸¹ He opines that the first option is not acceptable to both since, it is well experienced fact that even the entities of similar type are dealt with and referred to separately as "It is a pot, this is a pot, that is a pot" and the like. So, on the basis of dealings, the Jāti cannot be proved. And the second view is not sound since the expressive dealing in terms will not lead to any identity. As it does not prove the identity, even the third view stands baseless. Because the different and variegated dealings ascertain the fact that there are different and variegated properties. Thus, this discards the claim that the common property of similar kind and of the same magnitude must be there in all the entities of that class. So oneness of common property as Jāti cannot be entertained. The difference is distinct

in all respects; e.g. the offering of Bali for devils and others differs from one to another of the same class. Since it depends upon the individual capability, it is not governed by a common property of any kind.²⁸²

If it is argued that the Jāti of one class is single and the parts of it are manifested individually in each entity of that class, then it appears that the each entity is the part of that and this proves the absence of an entity of complete Jāti. Then all the pots become only potsherds (Ghaṭa-aṁśas) and there cannot be a complete pot.²⁸³

This also causes impropriety so far as the usage and dealing are concerned.

So the view that the Jāti is one in the entities of the same class, is not tenable. The Ghaṭatva of one Ghaṭa is peculiar and is related with that Ghaṭa only. Hence, Jātis are to be admitted as innumerable even in one single class of entities. Each entity is governed by its own Jāti. And if it is referred to with one word for the sake of usage and dealing, there is nothing wrong. Because, this does not prove the common property of the entities of one class. The usage with single word is for the convenience of easy dealing and it does not help to prove any Jāti. The property, (Dharma) though appears as if present in all the entities

of that same class, is distinct on account of the difference in entities as shown above.

It may also be held that the similar objects, subject to the similar and common usages and dealings, would be the Vyanjakas and that common and innate property, lying there and which is suggested by the objects, is Vyangya and that is termed Jāti. In the expressions, 'This is Ghata (pot)', 'That is Ghata;' Ghatas (pots) are similar and they are Vyanjakas and these Vyanjakas denote the common and innate property - Ghatatva which is Vyangya.

But, Vādirāja says that this view is not correct. He advocates counter argument questioning that if on account of similar, common dealings and usages, a common innate property (Jāti) is traced and admitted then, what is unsound if distinct and manifold properties are traced and admitted for similar and common dealings.²⁸⁴ Moreover, according to the Tārkikas, expressions are not Nitya and they differ from time to time and place to place even with respect to similar objects. And hence these distinct expressions cannot prove a single common innate property related to all entities of that class.

According to the Tārkikas, even the entities of same

class are different each other. And these entities cannot be held as causes for the apprehension of single, common innate property. Because, as entities (here, marked with the fact of being cause), that are held causes, are manifold and distinct each other; the differentiating characteristic attribute (Kāranatāvacchedakadharmā) is also manifold and distinct. If Ghaṭas, as Kāraṇa, are manifold and distinct, then the fact of their being causes, Kāranatā is also manifold. When Kāranatā is manifold, it is evident that the differentiating characteristic attribute (innate property-Kāranatāvacchedakadharmā - Ghaṭatva) is also manifold and distinct.²⁸⁵

Further, if the Jāti is taken to be one, then what happens to that Jāti, when an entity of that class gets affected. When a Ghaṭa is broken, then what happens to that Ghaṭatva? Either the part, manifested, or the complete Jāti, should get affected. But it never happens. Thus, the acceptance of the Jāti in this sense, leads to such manifold absurdities.

ABSENCE OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE LORD AND HIS ATTRIBUTES

There is no difference between the attributed (Dharmin) and eternal attributes (Dharmas). Brahman is Dharmin and His attributes are Dharmas. The attributes of Brahman are eternal

and real. So there is no difference between Brahman and His attributes.²⁸⁶

It may be mentioned that in the Advaita there is difference between the Lord and His attributes.²⁸⁷ The Advaitin may be questioned as to what is the reason or ground for him to behold difference between the Lord and His attributes, since he is the rigid and close follower of unreality of difference everywhere. It is wonder to know that he denies difference everywhere but claims difference between the Lord and His attributes. Thus it looks partial and contradictory in the case of the Advaitins. So all the attributes of Brahman are Brahman-natured (attributed-natured).²⁸⁸ Even 'difference-cum-identity' (Bhedābheda).²⁸⁹ cannot be referred to Brahman and His attributes, since neither the few attributes (Dharmas) are destroyed nor the attributed Lord Himself. So the Bhedābheda view is also not tenable. Thus neither Bheda nor Bhedābheda is found reasonable in case of the Lord and His attributes.

GUNAMITHYĀTVA^{289A} IS NOT POSSIBLE EVEN WITH AIKYA ŚRUTIS

Advaita holds that Brahman is qualityless. The reference of qualities in the Upaniṣads is not absolutely real. It is not tentative. The Advaitins, in this regard, claim the authority of Aikyāśrutis.

Even the Aikyaśrūtis like Tattvamasi as such cannot prove the unreality of the attributes of the Lord. Because, identity is established if all the qualities are given up. And the attributes are given up when the identity is established. Thus, there would result the defect of mutual dependence.²⁹⁰ It means when the identity is proved then the absence of attributes is proved. When the absence of attributes is proved then the identity is proved. The eternal and intrinsic attributes cannot be given up on account of the supposed identity-texts. Because, the statement Tattvamasi is Sāvakāśa and can be understood as not complete identity but as similarity. On the basis of Caitanya lying in the Jīva and Paramātmā similarity can be traced and not identity in essence. (Svarūpāikya). Whereas there are passages (Niravakāśa śrūtis) such as Satyam Jñānāmanantaṁ Brahma which cannot be interpreted and understood in different way.²⁹¹ If the Aikyaśrūtis are understood as is done by the Advaitins (if the expressive meaning is taken as invalid) then one has to give up the very concept of Brahman.²⁹² Because, in respect of attributes, if Sattā is Vyāvahārika,²⁹³ and Nityatva means remaining for a longer period, then let it be so even in the case of the very existence of Brahman which is not acceptable even to the Advaitins. Nowhere in the śrūtis the attributes of the Lord are described as Vyāvahārika but they are stated to be eternal, intrinsic

and real. If the attributes are sublated, then Vyāvahārikatva may be attributed to them. If they are not sublated, they are eternally real. When stand sublated, then the statements, denoting the auspicious attributes, would become invalid. So with a view to safeguard the validity of the statements such as Kevalo nirgunasca and the like they are to be interpreted as absence of material attributes. In case of the passages like Tattvamasi etc., identity is to be understood as similarity with regard to Caitanya element.²⁹⁴

REALITY AND ETERNITY OF ATTRIBUTES OF THE LORD

The attributes of the Lord are never affected and never get changed. When the nature of Brahman does not get affected, how can the attributes get affected? - asks Vādirāja. So the attributes are real and eternal. And the Śruti also substantiates the view that knowledge, strength and action of the Lord are natural to Him for ever.²⁹⁵

The attributes of the Lord are neither of the nature of destruction nor of the nature of change as is the case in Pīlupāka and Piṭharapāka of the Vaiśeṣikas.²⁹⁶ In the Pīlupāka atoms get changed. It means when wet pot is heated then all its atoms are destroyed and they produce a new pot. So in the Pīlupāka, Dharmin or the object gets completely affected. In the Piṭharapāka, the object does not get

destroyed or changed, but only its attributes like colour, form and the like get changed. The object remains the same; so in one case, the object is changed and in another attributes are changed.²⁹⁷

The attributes of Brahman are not of the nature of getting in either of the manners said above. The Lord does not undergo any type of Pāka i.e., He does not get affected by the fire. So the Form, Beauty, Valour, Adventure, Supreme independence and Omnipotence and other attributes of the Lord, are all real and eternally present in Him.²⁹⁸ And these characteristics of the Lord are not conditional and are not procured by others' favour. So when the Lord is not subjected to destruction, the intrinsic attributes are also not subjected to destruction. The attributes of the Lord such as knowledge and the like, are not created like the knowledge of an ordinary being. They are uncreated and Aprākṛta. When the object is present, absence of its intrinsic attributes, is nowhere found.²⁹⁹ The attributes of the Lord are Śrutisiddha and are not sublated. Everywhere in general, it is known that, existence of the attributes is regulated by the existence of the object. E.g., as long as there exists the pot (object) so long potness (Ghaṭatva-attribute) also exists. So undoubtedly, all the attributes of Brahman are eternally real.³⁰⁰ The natural attributes may

come to an end only when the concerned created entity perishes.³⁰¹ As Brahman is eternally Undestroyable, Imperishable, His attributes will never come to an end or never be destroyed. The attributes of the Lord are described in the Śrutis and the Smṛtis as natural, real and eternal and hence are not the nature of Māyā³⁰² as understood by the Advaitins.³⁰³

The Vidyā and the Avidyā are mutually opposite and produce different effects. By the Avidyā³⁰⁴ one cannot gain the Vidyā, strength, lusture etc. Because all these are not the products of the Māyā. In the same way, like Brahman, His attributes are also not the products of and not related to the Māyā. Corroborating with this, one can state logically that all the Dharmas of Brahman are Amāyika because they are real, natural and eternal like Brahman.³⁰⁵ The Māyā cannot be said to be an Upādhi (extraneous limiting factor) to Brahman. Because, the Māyā is Jada and it cannot have the Lord's qualities like Vyāpyatva, Nityaśuddhatva, Muktatva etc. So the Māyā cannot superimpose all these on Brahman. Therefore, the attributes of Brahman cannot be considered as Māyika or products of Māyā.³⁰⁶ Moreover, as this Māyā of the Advaita cannot trace and exert its influence on the Jīva directly, how can then it superimpose the extra-ordinary features such as Omniscience, Omnipresence on Brahman who is the Lord and is Omnipotent. In the Bhāgavata, fifth canto,³⁰⁷ it is clearly

stated that the knowledge of Brahman never gets related with Māyā. So as Brahman is Real, Natural and Eternal likewise His attributes are also real, natural and eternal. The absence of them (non-existence) cannot be thought of.³⁰⁸

So far it is proved that Māyā as Upādhi or limiting adjunct cannot be related with the Lord and His attributes. Further it is said that in Bimba and Pratibimba, Bimba or reflection is Upādhi or Pratibimba or reflected. The qualities of the Bimba are seen in the Pratibimba. As the redness of the flower is seen in the nearby crystal. Here, the flower is Upādhi or Bimba and crystal is Pratibimba. Hence, the quality of redness is seen in the Pratibimba crystal. But the relation of Bimba and Pratibimba cannot be referred to Māyā since the Lord is Amāvika. The Māyā cannot be an Upādhi in case of Brahman as is the flower in case of crystal but, it is only an apparent cause or a pretext, a secondary cause.

Now Brahman is the Bimba and the Jīva is the Pratibimba. Brahman is Upādhi and hence on account of that, the attributes such as knowledge and the like of Brahman are seen in the Pratibimba Jīva. To all these attributes, the Lord Brahman, who is Bimba and of the Upādhi state, is the primary cause. So all the attributes, seen the Jīva, are under the control of the Upādhi, i.e. Brahman, whereas the attributes of Brahman

are natural. We cannot ascribe the Upādhikatva to the attributes of the Lord since they are like red colour of a flower. So the qualities of Brahman are seen in the Jīva as reflections.³⁰⁹ Therefore, the attributes of Brahman are all natural and eternal. This proves that the attributes of Pratibimba that are knowledge and bliss (Jīvasvarūpa) are natural. Brahman is Bimba to all starting from Goddess Lakṣmī to minute beings such as ants and others. Hence, Brahman is real, eternal and is never Nirguṇa³¹⁰ as the Advaitins contend. The relation of Bimba-Pratibimbabhāva between the Lord and the Jīva, is not taken in respect of nature and content but with regard to the control and regulation of the Lord over the Jīva in all respects. The Śruti referred to above, describes the natural qualities of Brahman as Jñāna, Bala, Kriyā and the like. Vādirāja says that Lord Viṣṇu, Saguṇa Brahman is none other than the Śuddha Brahman. We cannot classify Brahman as Śuddha and Śābala. Śruti does not permit for this Classification. So one has to give up the very concept of Nirguṇatva (attributelessness) and should accept Guṇapūrṇatva (perfection).

Now even if Māyā is taken for granted as Upādhi, Vādirāja says that Māyikatva cannot be attributed to the qualities of Brahman. In general, a Māyin (magician) creates wonderful things out of Māyā. But the very next moment, everything

stands disappeared from our sight. So the created wonderful things may be treated as non-permanent (non-natural) and Māyā-generated. But the existence of the magician, his power, efforts, desire and the like do not disappear and hence they are permanent (natural) and real. In the same way, Brahman, His Knowledge, Desire, Action and the like are real and natural. But the world, created by Him though real unlike the created things of a magician, may change now and then.³¹¹ Thus, the Knowledge, Richness etc. of the Lord are natural and they are ever imperishable also, since Brahman is Imperishable. As the attributes of Brahman such as Omniscience and Omnipresence are eternal and natural it cannot be imagined that they would disappear, since the Lord never disappears. Thus, the attributes of the Lord do not get sublated by any means whereas the concept of identity of Brahman and the Jīva stands sublated. Because, so as to have the identity of that kind, according to the Advaita, Brahman should be proved as attributeless (Nirdharmika), which is impossible. Therefore, identity cannot be proved. Hence Brahman cannot be described as Nirguna or attributeless. There are innumerable Śruti passages that extol the majestic glory of Lord Brahman.³¹² The glory of the Lord is real. He is the sole supporter of the whole universe. He is the supreme Brahman. And there is no Brahman as Nirguna.³¹³ The Nirguna Brahman fabricated by the Advaitins

is of no use. Because, It cannot bestow the liberation. And moreover, Vādirāja says that, both the Śrutis and the Smṛtis do not claim the Mokṣadātṛtva to the Nirguṇa Brahman. It is only Lord Viṣṇu, who bestows liberation (Mokṣa). Thus, in all respects the Nirguṇa Brahman should be rejected. Even if two Brahmanas are imagined and accepted, identity cannot be proved. And this imagination is contrary to the Śruti passage Ekamevādvitīyam.³¹⁴ So Brahman is alone and He is all-pervasive and is called Viṣṇu.³¹⁵ Due to the reasons cited above, it is highly impossible to ascribe the Nirguṇatva to Brahman. If, with strong attachment or persistence, Nirguṇa Brahman is accepted then there will be two Brahmanas which would go against the Advaita.³¹⁶ Thus, the acceptance of Nirguṇa Brahman, serves no purpose. It cannot be proved by any valid evidence. Further, it leads to rejection of the concept of Advaita. So there is no supreme Brahman other than Viṣṇu-declares Vādirāja.³¹⁷

LORD VIṢṆU IS THE SUPREME BRAHMAN

Vādirāja promises that Lord Viṣṇu is Supreme. To substantiate this he quotes the statements of the Mahābhārata and the Bhāgavata.

The statements ascribe Parabrahmatva to Nārāyaṇa and at the same time negate the existence of another Brahman.³¹⁸

All the statements of the Mahābhārata, clearly glorify the supremacy of Lord Viṣṇu. With reference to the conventional marks of the purport of proposition (Tātparyaliṅgas) such as Upakrama, Upasamhāra, in these verses, the supremacy of the Lord is referred to and is praised at the beginning, in the middle and at the end. So the aim of the statements of the Mahābhārata is to establish the supremacy of Lord Viṣṇu.³¹⁹

In the Bhāgavata also it is declared that Lord Viṣṇu is the sole creator, sustainer and destroyer of this universe. It is the Brahmā, appointed by Lord Viṣṇu who creates this world. That means the Lord, gracing his Brahmā-form in Brahmā, creates this world. And in God Śiva, retaining His Śiva-form destroys the world. Thus, Lord Viṣṇu alone possesses all the three powers of creation, protection and destruction. Under His control, both Brahmā and Rudra fulfil their functions.³²⁰

The attributes of the Lord are innumerable and each one of them is complete in itself, the scope of each is limitless. Even the forms or incarnations of the Lord are also limitless. They cannot be counted. Thus the concept Nirguṇa-Brahman has no place at all and it is excommunicated in respect of all spaces and times.³²¹

REFUTATION OF NIRGUNA³²² BRAHMAN BY INFERENCE

So far it has been shown that the attributelessness (Nirgunatva) is not the import of Śruti and other works. Vādī-rāja contends that even inference is also not competent to prove attributelessness. Because if it is accepted that there is a Brahman who is devoid of all characteristics, then an aspirant who realises It, would have to become devoid of characteristics. If, with the help of inference etc., Nirguna Brahman is accepted for the attainment of Mokṣa then, Brahman would be possessed of many Guṇas or attributes such as Māna-meyatā (the fact of being an object of Pramāṇa) and Jñāna-drśyatā (the fact of being an object of knowledge or realisation). And by this, there comes the Vācya (the fact of being an object of expression) and with this Padārthatā (the fact of being an object) is also attributed.³²³ So, this Vastutva wards off the Nirgunatva-view of the Advaitins and proves the Sagunatva-view which the very word Brahman conveys that It being an embodiment of innumerable auspicious qualities. So the phrase Nirguna Brahman is self-contradictory. The terms Nirguna and Brahman give entirely different and opposite senses.³²⁴

Now, the Vyāvahārikasatyatva³²⁵ cannot be attributed to Nirguna-Brahman, since it is worse than Pratibhāsikasatyatva which is there in the Śuktirajata. In Pratibhāsika level,

at the end (when the superimposed knowledge of Rajata vanishes) there remains Śukti, in time and space. But when the Vyāvahārikasatyatva of Brahman is sublated, there remains nothing. So the Vyāvahārikasatyatva of Nirguṇa Brahman is more harmful than the Prātibhāsikasatyatva. Because, in the Advaita by the knowledge of Brahman everything stands sublated (becomes unreal). So there is no use of the knowledge Brahman of Vyāvahārikasatya because it gets sublated (proved unreal) at realisation and it does not exist at all the times. So it is not proper to treat an unreal entity (Nirguṇa-Brahman) as Vyāvahārikasatya. If the Bādhyatva is there in the Bādha (unreality in sublation), then the Abādhyatva, reality is thus proved, (the attributes of Brahman become real). If the Abādhyatva is attributed to the Bādha, then also the very statement proves reality. Thus there would be two real entities that lead to the loss of Advaita once again. And if that Bādha is a Brahman-form then it becomes an attribute of Brahman. The Bādha is the knowledge of non-existence (Abhāva). And if this Abhāva is the form of Brahman, It becomes Jada and then It also, like Bhāva, becomes an object of knowledge. Jadatva, Vastutva and the like then, become the features of Brahman. Thus, by this also, no Nirguṇa-Brahman can be proved. And if it is held that these attributes are not there in Brahman then there could be no Abhāva also. Thus, there is no Abhāva of negation, which

means absence of Bādhya in attributes. Thus they become real. If Nirgunatva is to be known through the Pramāṇas, then Nirgunatva is given up. If it is not to be known through the Pramāṇas, then also it is given up.³²⁶

So, Hari, an embodiment of innumerable auspicious qualities, is the Lord (controller-regulator) of all and there is none, who is equal and superior to Him.

MADHVA'S APPROACH IS THE RIGHT APPROACH

That path alone is declared as right wherein Lord Hari is worshipped as Guṇapūrṇa. And that is not the right path wherein the Lord is not given the state of Supremacy and is not worshipped with supreme devotion. The statement of the Mahābhārata,^{326A} clearly states that, that path does not help us to attain the upliftment where Lord Nārāyaṇa is not declared as Guṇapūrṇa.³²⁷ So the doctrines that do not declare Nārāyaṇa as Guṇapūrṇa, the Purāṇas that do not proclaim the Guṇapūrṇata of Lord Nārāyaṇa and the Śruti passages that do not state Nārāyaṇa as Guṇapūrṇa are all lead to treated as unworthy and/a wrong path.³²⁸ So the approach of Madhva, based on such statements of the Mahābhārata and the like, and wherein the Lord is declared as entirely distinct from this world, as Supreme Being to be worshipped by all and as sole Controller and Regulator, is right.³²⁹

The Mahābhārata verse in this way gives a clear exposition of the doctrines of Madhva school of philosophy in a nut-shell.

NIRGUNATVA CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED ON THE EVIDENCES OF PURĀNAS
AND THE LIKE

There are eighteen Purāṇas³³⁰ which are classified and called Śaiva, Brāhma and Vaiṣṇava³³¹ (extolling respectively Śiva, Brāhmā and Viṣṇu). In none of these Purāṇas there is any reference to Nirguṇa-Brahman of the Advaitins. So just as their Nirguṇa-Brahman is placed out of the Śruti texts, he is also excluded from the Purāṇas. And it is but proper as both the Śrutis and the Purāṇas have the same purport.³³² Ultimately, all these Purāṇas do not refer to any attributeless Brahman besides describing Śiva, Brāhmā and Viṣṇu.

The purport of the Śrutis can be understood with the help of Itihāsa³³³ and Purāṇa. Accordingly, one has to try his best in understanding the Śruti passages with the help of one's study of the Itihāsa and the Purāṇa. So the understanding of the Śruti should be in accordance with the purport of the Sātvikapurāṇas and the Mahābhārata.³³⁴ In this way when the Śruti passages are understood evidently, Viṣṇu will be proved as the Lord Brahman. Vādirāja quotes profusely from the accepted texts to prove the Supremacy of Viṣṇu.

The Advaitins contend that the primary sense of the Śruti passages should be given up and then it is to be said that the Śruti aims at attributeless Brahman. The words Satyaṁ, Jñānaṁ and Ānandaṁ³³⁵ are the terms denoting the attributes of Brahman. So to avoid this, the Advaitins suggest to give up the primary sense of these terms. If this would be the case, then Vādirāja asks that according to the same principle why can't the sense of the term Nirguṇa (sense of attributelessness) be given up and be understood as devoid of materials attributes? If this is not accepted then neither Nirguṇatva nor identity could be proved.³³⁶

Vādirāja opines that the Advaitin's way of understanding the Śruti is like starving it to death. That is depriving the Śruti of its proper meaning. So Vādirāja pleads that the Śruti be protected by offering at least limited food (instead of giving up totally the primary purport on implication, it is to be understood in different way, that means not killing but protecting by offering the food). Therefore, instead of giving up completely the primary sense, it is better to have a limited or restricted sense. So, the restricted meaning of the term Nirguṇa, then, is absence of material qualities.³³⁷

BRAHMAN IS SAGUNA

So far Sagunatva of Brahman is established by means of scriptural authority and now Vādirāja shows that Sagunatva can be proved by means of reason also. Brahman is endowed with innumerable Bhāvadharmas, since He is eternally liberated. This statement proves the Sagunatva of Lord Viṣṇu and denies the Nirguṇa concept of the Advaita.³³⁸ Here Muktatva or state of liberation means the state of absence of Bandha or bondage (Samsāra). And this bondage is not there in Acetana or non-sentient. This is also not there in liberated souls.³³⁹ So this bondage is in sentient beings who are not liberated. As there are Bhāvadharmas in objects like pots, likewise, there are also Bhāvadharmas in Brahman. Even if the presence of the Abhāvadharmas in Brahman, is taken into account (the Advaitins claim the presence of the Abhāvadharmas^{339A} in Brahman and mode of cognition of these is as Brahman is not an object of Jñāna. Brahman is not Creator and so on), the absence of Samsāra, as one of the Abhāvadharmas, is to be accepted. If Muktatva is not accepted in Mukta Brahman then Baddhatva as in the Jīva, is to be accepted. Even then Bhāvadharmas cannot be negated in Brahman. Here there are two self-contradictions (Vyāhatis). One is, accepting Brahman as Mukta and then attributing Muktatvabhāva to Him and secondly accepting Baddhatva in Him. Because a liberated one can have neither Muktatvabhāva nor Baddhatva.³⁴⁰ In this

context it must be noted that Vādirāja is not of the view of agreeing Baddhatva to Brahman but states the said view only to refute the views of others. (The Advaitins claim Brahman as Māyābaddha).^{340A} According to Vādirāja Baddhatva of Brahman means not the Advaitins' Māyābaddhatva but Baddhatva means bound in the hearts of devotees.

Now both Baddhatva and Muktatva are not at all found in Nirguṇa Brahman. Therefore, He is to be Saguṇa. Here Muktatva means absence of Bandha. But this type of Muktatva is not there in Brahman, since He is Nityamukta. Muktatva, in the form of destruction of Bandha, may be seen in the liberated souls, who, for sometime, have been Baddha (in Samsāra) and then by the grace of the Lord, have attained the liberation. So, Brahman being Nityamukta, there is no question of Baddhatva and Muktatva. If this Muktatva is admitted in Brahman then once again, it is a self-contradiction.³⁴¹

Now Vādirāja proves Sagunatva with some other arguments. The Advaitins contend that Brahman is Nirguṇa, being an object of negative cognition.³⁴² It means He is Abhāvāśraya. Vādirāja says that even this Hetu, viz., Abhāvāśrayatva does not come in the way of proving Sagunatva of the Lord. Brahman is Saguṇa on account of being the Abhāvāśraya like a Kapāla

or potsherd. In the potsherd, which is Abhāvāśraya of jar, there may not be the characteristics of Ghaṭatva and others but there are other characteristics such as form, colour and the like. Thus, the Kapāla (an absence of jar) helps us to understand some other characteristics. In the same way Nirguṇa Brahman may be Abhāvāśraya or object of negative cognition but as a real entity, which is a Pratilyogin or counter-part of Abhāva, or negation becomes Saguna. Even if all the characteristics are negated, the characteristic namely Abhāvāśrayatva or the fact of being an object of negative cognition is there and it proves Brahman to be Saguna. So making use of Abhāvāśrayatva characteristic (Hetu) in proving Sagunatva is not a defect. Thus, this Hetu, Abhāvāśrayatva is not seen where there is no Sagunatva.³⁴³ Otherwise, doubt or question may arise as to the Abhāva of what? So wherever, this Abhāvāśrayatva is seen, there is an entity with some Gunas. So Sagunatva is inevitable. There may be Abhāvāśrayatva or not, but there is no harm to Sagunatva. Muktatva is a Bhāvadharma and thus Brahman is Bhāvadharmin.³⁴⁴ Here Bhāvadharma means an experience of eternal nature of eternal intrinsic bliss. The Bhavadharmas of Brahman, that are characteristics, are unlimited.

Now, if Vyāvahārika-satyatva³⁴⁵ or empirical reality is stated for Muktas and to their Muktatva, then also the statement

is self-contradictory in two ways. If Vyāvahārikatva is attributed to liberation, then it is as good as opposing the very Muktatva. Accepting Mukti and rejecting its Dharma viz., Muktatva, is one defect; secondly let one be Mukta but not have Muktatva. It is as good as saying that Brahman is eternal but there is not eternity in Him. So Vyāvahārika-satyatva cannot be attributed to the Lord to prove Him as Nirguṇa, because He is eternally liberated and hence the question of Vyāvahārikatva does not arise.³⁴⁶ So rejecting Muktatva in the Mukta, is as good as saying, let there be a Vipra having no Vipratva, "Let one be rich without possessing any money."³⁴⁷

Vādirāja asserts that the text Kevalo nirguṇasca should be understood as Brahman is Nirguṇa or devoid of material qualities. The Śruti also declares that Brahman is Blissful as He possesses eternal and unlimited bliss. The Śruti does not discard the blissful nature of Brahman. Because of His Blissful nature, He is called Blissful. When the sense of the term Sukharūpa is evident and not incompatible, there is no reason to give it up and to understand a different sense. Because, Lakṣaṇā functions only when there is a primary sense and the same becomes incompatible.^{347A} When the Śruti passages convey compatible sense, there is no need to give up the primary (expressive) sense and understand some other sense

by implication. The Śruti states Brahman as Sukharūpa, since His very nature is really and absolutely Sukhamaya.³⁴⁸ If Brahman were not to be a Sukharūpi then the Śruti would not have praised Him, like that. In the same way, if Mukti is not understood as Sukharūpa, then it becomes the Mukti of logicians.³⁴⁹ Sukhasvarūpa and Sukharūpatva go together always. If Bhāvarūpadharmas are denied in the Muktas, then Sukharūpatvadharmas will also cease to be there. Then the Hetu Muktatva would become removed and absent and this would lead to the absence of Muktasvarūpa in Brahman. So the state of Mukti³⁵⁰ intended by the Advaitins, cannot be found on account of the absence of the Hetu-Muktatva. And if Brahman is stated as Nirguṇa (attributeless) then, that Nirguṇa-Brahman will not become the topic of the Śruti.³⁵¹

In the Śrutis, both in the beginning and at the end Brahman is glorified as an embodiment of unlimited auspicious qualities; so how can the term Nirguṇa, coming in the middle, establish the attributelessness of Brahman? Therefore, it should mean that the term Nirguṇa denies the possibility of the Prākṛta-guṇas (Sattva, Rajas and Tamas).³⁵²

APPARENT MEANING OF NIRGUṆA ŚRUTI IS NOT CORRECT

The Nirguṇatva indicates the absence of Prākṛta-guṇas. If one more negative particle is added as Nairguṇyam na, then

it gives the sense of affirmation. It affirms that the Lord is Saguna (He is not Nirguna).³⁵³

According to the Advaita, it cannot be said that Nirguna-śruti negates the Bhāvadharma. Because the Śruti: Neha nānāsti kincana^{353A} denies all the Bhāvadharma in Brahman according to the Advaita. If this is so then Nirgunatva-dharma is also to be denied on the same ground. If Nirgunatva-dharma alone is regarded or accepted then 'Neha nānā...' Śruti becomes invalid. Therefore, it is better to accept the meaning of the Nirgunaśruti as absence of three Prākṛta-guṇas, or material qualities, by which validity of all the Śruti-passages remains unharmed.³⁵⁴

Now, if it is stated that the Lord is Nirguna, then on account of Nirgunatva-rūpadharma and Vācyatvarūpadharma (guṇa), He becomes Saguna. If He is known by Lakṣyārtha, then on account of Lakṣyatvarūpadharma, He becomes Saguna. If both these Vācyatva and Lakṣyatva are given up, then He becomes Abodhya and this Abodhyatva-dharma is attributed to by which He becomes Saguna.³⁵⁵

If Nirgunatva is Mithyā, then Sagunatva is thus proved easily. The Nirgunaśruti cannot affect or cause any sublation to Saguna-śruti, because Nirgunaśruti is Mithyā. If Bhāva-

rūpadharmas are alone negated or denied, then Abhāvadharmas could be traced and mentioned as real without any difficulty. So the Anyonyābhāva, one of the Abhāvadharmas, becomes real and it proves and establishes the absolute difference (Bheda) between the Lord and the Jīva and the Jada. Here Anyonyābhāva may be known in respect of Sarvajñatva of the Lord and Alpaññatva of the Jīva. The two are distinct to each other. This difference is not the Prthaktva of the logicians^{355A} which disregards any relation. Vādirāja states that though the Lord and the Jīva are absolutely different, they have the relation of Bimbapratibimbabhāva. Pratibimba cannot have the existence without Bimba. So Prthaktva of the logicians is not the Bheda of Tattvavāda.³⁵⁶

So, Nirgunatva may be real or unreal, or it may convey the sense of Abhāvadharmas; Sagunatva is unharmed. Hence, Bhāvadharmas are to be admitted inevitably by Nirgunaśruti as admitting Abhāvadharmas. Bhāvadharmas, such as Jñātattva, Viśayatva, Abhāvadharmaśrayatva and others are to be accepted.

Vādirāja promises that the text Tattvamasi also indicates the Bheda of Anyonyābhāvarūpa. Bheda or difference between Tat and Tvam is Bhāvarūpaviśeṣa. The Advaita cannot deny this difference for having not admitted Bhāvarūpaviśeṣas.³⁵⁷

REFUTATION OF VYĀVAHĀRIKAPARATVA TO ŚRUTIS AND GUṆAS

The Nirguna Śruti cannot attribute Vyāvahārikatva to other Śrutis or to Guṇas. This Śruti with its primary power may deny the presence of Guṇas in Brahman. But on implication, it cannot give up the Bhāvagūṇas such as Śabdatva and the like that are Āśraya to its Svarūpa at the same time. But really speaking, like Bhāvagūṇas such as Śabdatva and others, it cannot deny Bhāvagūṇas of Brahman such as Sarvajñatva and others. Therefore, here the primary Vṛtti or power is more important since it conveys the acceptable sense.³⁵⁸

The Nirgunatva of Brahman, proclaimed in the Nirguna Śruti will not cause any harm to its Upajīvyas^{358A} that are Śabdatva and the like which are real. On the same ground, the unlimited Bhāvadharma such as Sarvajñatva, Sarveśvaratva and so on, cannot be denied by this Nirguna-Śruti. But this Nirguna-Śruti definitely denies Durgūṇas or demerits, and also material Guṇas such as Satva, Rajas and Tamas.³⁵⁹

The Sarvajñatva and the like which are the Bhāvadharma are also Upajīvyas like the Śabdatva of the Nirguna-Śruti. So this Śruti should be meant that it affords protection to similar Upajīvyadharmas. And the Bhāvadharma such as Sarvajñatva^{and} others, are self-Upajīvyas and are absolutely found in the Lord. Thus, having resorted to Bhāvadharma such as Śabdatva and others, how can the Nirguna-Śruti deny

or discard other Bhāvadharma. It is not possible. Like, where there is a pot it is not proper to deny its presence.³⁶⁰ Thus, all other Śruti-passages that declare the Bhāvadharma of the Lord such as Sarvajñatva and others become Upajīvyā to Nirguṇa-śruti. Therefore, this Nirguṇa-śruti cannot deny them. The Prākṛtaguṇas are those, that are with changes, seen in the Jīvas and not in Brahman. So this Śruti proclaims that Prākṛtaguṇas are not there in Brahman. It does not deny Bhāvadharma of Brahman such as Sarvajñatva and others, that are Aprākṛta. So as other Śrutis would become Upajīvyas³⁶¹ real, they also declare the auspicious attributes of Brahman. And hence, Vyāvahārikatva cannot be attributed to both Śrutis and Guṇas of Brahman.

BHĀVA OR POSITIVITY IS PREFERRED TO ABHĀVA OR NEGITIVITY

The Nirguṇaśruti is supposed to be a Śruti that gives the sense of Abhāva or negation, absence and hence it is called Abhāvaśruti. And the other Śrutis that convey the sense of Bhāva, existence, presence are known to be Bhāva-śrutis.

The Nirguṇaśruti is a denoter of Abhāvadharmas and others are of Bhāvadharmas. Among these two types of Dharmas, it is better to get retained Bhāvadharmas of the Lord. Moreover, scholars say that there is difficulty in respect of

Abhāva. It means, it is a difficult task to prove the Abhāva-dharmas in Brahman, whereas it is easy to prove the Bhāva-dharmas in Brahman.³⁶²

In the text Neha nānāsti kincana, the term Kincana conveys the sense of Bhāva, Vācya and Bodhyatva of some kind. So really speaking, there is no scope and possibility to accept only Abhāva-dharmas in Brahman. So admitting Abhāvatva to that Śruti, becomes self-contradictory. As Bodhyatva is real, the Bodhakaśruti is also real (unsublated). As the Śruti is beginningless and eternal, its meaning is also eternal and beginningless. So Bhāva is to be admitted as real.³⁶³ The Śruti Neha nānāsti kincana denies only difference in Brahman and not the presence of Bhāva-dharmas in Brahman.

The Bodhaka sentence would not exist if there had not been the Bhāva-dharma viz., Vakṛtva in Lord Hari, who, disclosing the Vedas, taught them to others. Then the Śrutis such as 'Neha nānā...' and others, being absent, would not have conveyed any meaning. Further, the absence of that would be a severe defect in the form of Svarūpahāni (self-destruction)³⁶⁴ Therefore, Dharmin must be taken for granted, otherwise Brahman would cease to be there. The term Iha, in that Śruti establishes Satyatva of Brahman.

If the Bodhaka sentence is regarded as Vyāvahārika-satya or empirically real, then Bodhya-Brahman will have to become Vyāvahārika-satya. According to the Advaita, Vyāvahārika-satya means, ultimately total negation (absence). Thus, Brahman Himself becomes totally negated.³⁶⁵

And if the Śruti does not impart real knowledge, it becomes Atattvavedaka. Then how can it be the destroyer of Avidyā? Therefore, if Brahman is accepted and declared as real, then, the Śruti, which gives the knowledge of Brahman, should also be taken as real.³⁶⁶ A Śruti of superimposed reality cannot convey or describe real Brahman just as a barren woman (a woman of superimposed womanness) cannot beget any children. So, it is to be admitted that Nirguna-śruti denies only Prākṛta-guṇas in Brahman. Therefore, Vādirāja asserts that Nirguna-śruti, being attracted by the auspicious, supreme and extra-ordinary personality of the Lord, does not deny the Bhāvarūpadharmas, whereas by discarding the Prākṛta-guṇas, it glorifies the Lord.³⁶⁷ In this way Bhāva is preferred to Abhāva.

EXPOSITION OF THE NIRGUṆA-ŚRUTI³⁶⁸

On accepting the Advaita view, there appears contradiction among the Śruti texts. E.g., the Śrutis Ekamevādvitīyam Tattvamasī^{368A} and the like, and the Nirguna Śruti, since

conveying the sense of Bhāva and Abhāva respectively become contradictory to each other. The text Ekamevādvitīyaṁ indicates Ekatva-dharma, whereas the Nirguna-śruti debars all the Dharmas in Brahman. If the Nirguna-śruti is regarded as Pramāṇa or valid then the Ekamevādvitīyaṁ Śruti becomes Apramāṇa or invalid. Then the intended oneness of identity would not result.³⁶⁹ If the Ekamevādvitīyaṁ Śruti is regarded as valid, then the Nirguna-śruti becomes invalid. And that will prove supremacy, Guṇapūrṇatva and the like of Brahman. And again the intended oneness or identity would not be there. So on account of mutual contradiction, the Śruti passages of both the types seem to be invalid (sublated).

The connotation of the words depends upon the usage of the learned. Therefore, the usage of the learned is to be taken into account. If it is not taken as authority, then the literal meaning of the words may differ and become incorrect. The word Paṅkaja is not taken to mean a frog, but the usage of the learned reveals that the term denotes 'lotus'. In the same way, the word Suvarṇa cannot mean 'fire' on account of Yaugikārtha-possessing dazzling brilliance.' So ignoring the understanding of the usage of the learned it is not proper to accept the Yaugikārtha viz., devoid of Guṇas to the term Nirguna. According to the Advaita, there can be no usage that aims at Brahman

since Brahman is not Vācya by any words.³⁷⁰ The term Nirguna is primarily used in Brahman. And for this, there is support of the usages in Śrutis and Smṛtis.³⁷¹

Therefore, the meaning of the words when employed to convey a certain object, is to be taken without prejudice or harm to the basic characteristics of the object, like the word Guru. The term Guru could be used in a teacher on account of teaching quality, etc., in case of a weighty object (stone etc.) and also in respect of variegated. So the basic features are to be taken into account when a word is to be employed to convey certain objects. In the same way, the term Nirguna, when employed to Brahman, with restriction, denies the three Prākṛta-guṇas and not the other innumerable auspicious Guṇas as in Kanyakānūdarā. Here, Anūdarā does not mean that the girl has no waist but it conveys that she has a very slender waist.³⁷²

So depending on the context, the meaning of the term differs. The term Nirguna when employed to describe an ordinary man, it may give the sense of absence of Sadguṇa in that man, and if the same word, when applied to Lord Brahman - an embodiment of auspicious qualities it gives the sense of the absence of Prākṛta-guṇas and not Aprākṛta-guṇas.³⁷³

NIRGUNA MEANS DEVOID OF THREE GUNAS ACCORDING TO THE BHĀGAVATA

Lord Hari is totally disassociated from Prakṛti and Prākṛta-tattva. Hence, He alone can be called Nirguna. He, who worships the Lord Nirguna, will also become Nirguna, that means by Lord's grace, he, being released of the Prakṛti-bandha, will attain Mukti. Thus, Lord Hari is glorified as Nirguna in the Bhāgavata. Hence, on account of the absence of three material qualities and being embodied with all the auspicious Guṇas, He (denoted by the Nirguna-Śruti) is Brahman; who is absolutely śuddha.³⁷⁴ When the devotee with His grace gets released from the bondage (Prakṛti constituting three Guṇas- Sattva, Rajas and Tamas) and attains Mukti, (state of the absence of the effect of three Guṇas) how can then the Lord be a Sabala (impure due to the association of three Guṇas)? When River Gaṅgā, since touching the holy feet of the Lord, has become holy and pure to all, how then the Lord be impure?³⁷⁵ - asks Vādirāja.

And moreover, the description of Mukti is Nirguna has to mean beyond trinity (free from three Guṇas). If it is interpreted as devoid of any Guṇa, then no body would long for and try for such Mukti.³⁷⁶

The Bhāgavata, undoubtedly states that Lord Hari is Nirguna on account of the absence of three Guṇas. And the

same term is also applied to Muktas secondarily, since they too, for attaining Mukti, are freed from three Gunas.³⁷⁷

Further, Vādirāja discusses the topic in most appealing and different manner. Śiva has Prākṛta form and his worship will become the cause material wealth (progress). Lord Hari has Aprākṛta or extra-ordinary form and His worship would become the cause Aprākṛta fortune (Mokṣa). This also proves that the Lord Hari is Aprākṛta means Triguṇa-śunya. The Aprākṛta form of the Lord is of the nature of Cit only. And this form is Satya and Nitya. Hence, Aprākṛta qualities such as Sarvajñatva (Omniscience), Sarvaśaktitva (Omnipotence) of the Lord are eternal. They will never get sublated.³⁷⁸ So the Nirguṇa should be understood as devoid of three Prākṛta Gunas.

THE SENSE OF ABSENCE OF QUALITIES' LEADS TO MUTUAL CONTRADICTION

In the same context,³⁷⁹ (6th Chapter Śve.Up.) the term Sarvavid denotes Omniscience.³⁸⁰ Likewise Ekah, Devah, and Sākṣi etc. are the words found in the same passage, that declare Lord Brahman as Saguṇa (having Sadguṇas or auspicious qualities). When all the words give the sense of Saguṇatva, it is improper to deny the Gunas in Brahman by a single word Nirguṇa of the same sentence. Otherwise, there arises mutual

contradiction among the words of the same sentence.³⁸¹ If Eko devah of that sentence is to be supposed as Anuvāda^{381A} (secondary) then on the same ground, the Nirguna-word should also be considered as Anuvāda. Therefore, in the same sentence, this is not correct to have such discrimination. Moreover, a single word of a sentence cannot deny the purport of other words of the same sentence.

So, if the term Nirguna is taken to mean as devoid of all qualities, then, Ekatva, too, being a quality, is to be denied. Thus, Nirguna, if understood as absence of qualities, leads to mutual contradiction. Ekatva, Devatva etc., are the qualities denoted by that verse. Among all these qualities, preferring the only one quality, that is Ekatva; if other qualities are denied account of the term Nirguna therein; then it becomes as good as saying that there is difference in the homogeneous delicious food of the same vessel. So, if other Guṇas are to be denied, then the Ekatva should also be denied. All the qualities conveyed by the terms, from Eka to Kevala, are to be taken into account. As the term Nirguna cannot deny the Ekatva, it also cannot deny other Guṇas conveyed by the intervening terms of that sentence.

The Lord incarnated Vedavyāsa does not admit the

negation of even a single Guna. In the Brahmasūtra, He states- "Sarvadharmopapatteśca," which clearly declares that the Lord is an embodiment of unlimited qualities and is devoid of all demerits. The Śrutis are to be interpreted in accordance with the Sūtras. And these Sūtras, composed by Vedavyāsa, admit auspicious qualities of the Lord and never deny them.³⁸²

THE ŚRUTI WORDS, SINCE CONVEY DHARMA-VIDHĀYAKA SENSE, ARE MORE POWERFUL

All the words of this Śruti state one or the other meritorious qualities of Brahman. Therefore, they are more powerful. If the ni prefix, conveying the sense of negation in the term Nirguna, is separated and added to all the words of that Śruti-text independently then Ekatva would be no more. And if it is not dissolved and not added to others, then there is no (meaning) sense in saying that it protects the Ekatvadharmas and denies all other Dharmas.³⁸³

THE ŚRUTIS ARE NOT ANUVĀDAKAS³⁸⁴

The Advaitins hold that certain passages of the Śruti are Anuvādākas, mere repetitions and hence fit to be rejected. If this is so, then there must be some indicative terms such as 'Yat', 'Tat' and the like. But such indicative terms are not there in this Nirguna Śruti. So the words of this

Śruti or the whole passage cannot be considered as Anuvāḍaka. The presence of indicative terms may be found where there are both Anuvāḍa and Niṣedha in only one sentence or passage. Otherwise Na is used separately in difference sentence.³⁸⁵

To declare certain data as Anuvāḍita, it must have been already conveyed by some other Pramāṇas. There, the question of negation does not arise. If Niṣedhakatva is understood by the word Nirguṇa, then all the Dharmas of that sentence, including Ekatva become invalid. When the Dharmas are Anuvāḍita (invalid) then those need not be negated by the Nirguṇa word. Thus, on either grounds, the Niṣedhakatva is not the intended and suitable meaning of the Nirguṇa word in this context. In this way, there arises the defect of mutual dependence.³⁸⁶ And even if the term Nirguṇa is understood as rejecting the Guṇa, it cannot deny the Dharmas such as Ekatva and others. It is to be questioned whether the Anuvāḍita Dharmas (Sagunatva etc., according to the Advaita) are conveyed by the Pramāṇas other than the Vedas or by the Advaita or by Veda-Pramāṇas? Let the Dharmas be conveyed by any means, the Anuvāḍakatva cannot be conveyed and attributed to that. Because, the qualities of the Lord such as Sarvajñatva and the like, are eternally conveyed by the Vedas.^{386A} So they need not be conveyed by any other Pramāṇas. Therefore they cannot be called the Anuvāḍita Dharmas. If these Dharmas stand conveyed by the Śruti, then also these cannot be rejected by the Nirguṇa Śruti. Whatever

is conveyed by one section of the Śruti, cannot be rejected by another section of the same Śruti. Otherwise, the very validity of the Śruti gets affected. So the Anuvādatva cannot be established in respect of the Saguna passages.³⁸⁷

Further, the Ekatva and the like, are unaffected even when they are accrued with Anuvādatva. In such case, they convey the object of knowledge as it is. Hence, it will not become invalid. Agnirhimasya bheṣajam conveys that fire destroys snow. This fact becomes well-known and firm by this statement. So the Anuvādatva will not cause any harm to the purport.³⁸⁸ Because, it has conveyed what is confirmed by direct observation. So the Anuvādatva has nothing to do with negation. Thus, the Nirguna Śruti will not deny or reject the Bhāvagūṇas such as Sarvajñatva and the like of Brahman conveyed by other Śrutis.³⁸⁹ So the Śruti opines that all the Guṇas of the Lord are Svābhāvika and hence the question of denying them does not arise.³⁹⁰ The Guṇas of the Lord cannot be considered as Vyāvahārika, since, even before creation, all these Guṇas were there as they are even today. The eternal Veda proclaims them as eternal.^{390A} So Vyāvahārikatva cannot be ascribed to these Guṇas that are unsublated for ever. The Śruti Yāvad Brahman viśtīṭaṁ tāvatī vāk,^{390B} clarifies that both Brahman and Śruti are beginningless and eternal. The Śrutis are Nitya, that means they get

manifested from the Lord at the time of creation. So the creation is manifestation in respect of the Vedas. Therefore, all the Śrutis are Satya and Nitya. The Nirguṇa Śruti, hence, denies the Prākṛta-dharma that are different from the Nitya-dharma of the Lord such as Kartṛtva, Bhokṛtva and Phala-dāṭṛtva etc. Hence, it is to be admitted that the term Nirguṇa does not belittle or reject other Śruti passages.

Here Vādirāja quotes some Śrutis and the statements of the Bhāgavata in defence of Guṇa-declaration. These statements clearly state that Lord Brahman is Sarvagūṇaparipūrṇa, possessing all the good qualities. There is no limit so far as His ocean of qualities is concerned. Even thousand faced Śeṣa cannot count His auspicious qualities. Thus, all these statements establish the Anantatva (infinity) of the auspicious qualities of the Lord.³⁹¹

Further, if the Śruti words are dissolved as Kevalaḥ and Anirguṇaśca then the purpose will serve very easily. The expressive meaning will remain unharmed. It conveys uncontradictory and unsublated sense as Brahman is not devoid of qualities. This explanation also removes the mutual contradiction and proves the Ekavākyatā.³⁹²

THE ADVAITA INTERPRETATION³⁹³ IS SELF-CONTRADICTORY

Now, if it is argued that the passage Kevalo nirgunaśca (Śve.Up.) denies all the Guṇas, then it will lead to the rejection of Jñāna, Ānanda and the like of Brahman. If Brahman is understood as of the nature of Jñāna, Ānanda and the like the Nirguṇa Śruti, if understood according to the Advaita, will also reject these Dharmas when interpreted as above.³⁹⁴ If the Dharmas - Jñāna, Ānanda and the like are said to be identical with Brahman, then on the same ground Guṇas (Dharmas) such as Sarvajñatva and the like, are also to be understood as identical with Brahman. The Śruti Neha nānāsti kiñcana^{394A} denies the difference between Brahman and His qualities. So let there be Abheda between the Lord and His qualities.³⁹⁵ There is no impropriety in this. The Nirguṇa Śruti rejects the qualities that are not identical with Brahman. So the Guṇatva and Ekatva can be present in Brahman.³⁹⁶ As the above Śruti - Neha nānā... directly rejects the Bheda, there is no possibility to think of the Bhedābheda in Brahman. The Guṇatva and Ekatva may be present in Brahman at the same time and it is possible with the help of the Viśeṣa.^{396A}

Further, if something is not possible to a person, the very possibility cannot be ruled out completely. Because it may be possible to another man. In the same way, everything

is possible in Brahman. In the Bhāgavata, the Lord declares Himself as Ananta. He clarifies that each Guna is complete in itself and unlimited and it is cognized as Ananta by Him. Thus, the Guṇānantya of the Lord refers to each quality.³⁹⁷ All this is possible with the help of the Viśeṣa, which is also called Bhedapratinidhi since it assists for Bheda-vyavahāra where, really speaking, there is no Bheda at all.³⁹⁸ The Brahmasūtra-Ātmani caivam vicitraśca hi (II-i-29) states that the Brahman is endowed with this Viśeṣa-power that ascertains the Guṇānantya of Brahman without any contradiction.^{398A}

THE SARVAJNATVA AND THE LIKE ARE ALSO BRAHMASVARŪPA

The Advaitins contend that Sarvajñatva of Brahman is Sopādhika (conditional). And whatever is Sopādhika is not absolutely real.^{398A} Because, to gain Sarvajñatva, the knowledge of the whole world is necessary. When the world is caused by Mithyopādhī, the knowledge of that should also be caused by Mithopādhī. So the Sarvajñatva (an attribute of having the knowledge of Mithyā-world) being Sopādhika and limited, it cannot become identical with the nature of Brahman which is Nirupādhika (unconditional - unlimited).

But Vādirāja argues that the world cannot be Mithyā, or Sopādhika. It is not caused by any Upādhī. The world is

real, Its reality is conveyed by the Śrutis.³⁹⁹ So the Sarvajñatva is not Sopādhika. And both, the Sarvajñatva and the nature of Brahman could be stated as one and the same.⁴⁰⁰ The Mithyātva of the Advaitins is self-imagined and superimposed. If there is any doubt regarding the reality of the world, then why not the same case regarding the unreality of the world. Thus, this view of mutual contradiction about the reality of the world (personal views of different sects) will not affect and harm the Sarvajñatva of Brahman, which is conveyed and proved by the Śrutis.⁴⁰¹

Further, the identity of the world with Brahman cannot be stated on the basis of the identity of Brahman and Sopādhika Sarvajñatva, since both Sarvajñatva and the world are Sopādhika.

Moreover, their view is also unsound. Because, the knowledge of a pot is of Manorūpa, but the pot itself is not of Manorūpa. The pot is outside and mind is inside.^{401A} In the same way, the knowledge of the whole world (Sarvajñatva) is of the nature of Brahman and not of the world. Further, the knowledge of the world (may be Mithyā according to the Advaita) is real as the knowledge of the silver in the conch-shell and of the serpent in the rope is real, since it is cognized by the Sākṣin. In the same way, though the

world is held to be Mithyā, the knowledge of that need not be so. Therefore, there is nothing wrong in considering Sarvajñatva as identical with the Brahmasvarūpa.⁴⁰² If it is argued that on account of the Mithyātva of the world, the knowledge of that also is to be taken to mean Mithyā, then why can't the object of real knowledge be considered as real. As the knowledge of Brahman is real, the objects (world etc.) of His knowledge, should also be treated as real.⁴⁰³ The knowledge of Brahman is real and Yathārtha, so the objects related to that knowledge are also real.⁴⁰⁴

Further, Vādirāja questions regarding the Sopādhika-Sarvajñatva itself. Is it mixed with the world caused by the Upādhi or is it only termed or indicated by the Upādhi? If it is admitted that the Sarvajñatva is mixed with the world caused by the Upādhi, then it is as good as saying that there is no Sarvajñatva, since the very Upādhi in the Advaita, is Mithyā.

Secondly, the Sarvajñatva cannot be termed as it is indicated by the Upādhi. As light of the sun, which is identical with the sun, in the same way, the knowledge present or abiding inside though having connected with the outside world, is identical with that person. So the Sarvajñatva of Brahman is identical with Brahman. Further,

if the knowledge related to the Mithyā object is taken to mean Mithyā, then the knowledge of Brahman too, is to be regarded as Mithyā since having as its object, the Mithyā world. Then it amounts to saying that Brahman too is Mithyā. According to the Advaita, the knowledge of Brahman has delusion. But in the Siddhānta, this defect is not there. Because, Lord Brahman has the knowledge of the real world. So He is of the nature of real Jñāna.⁴⁰⁵ Thus, the Sarvajñatva of Brahman becomes unsublated and this in turn suggests that all the Dharmas of the Lord are of His very nature. With the help of the Viśeṣa, Guṇagunitva, Ekatva, anekatva etc., are possible in the Brahman.⁴⁰⁶ Therefore, like Sukha, all the qualities are identical with Him.⁴⁰⁷

The Advaitins declare that the Brahman is of the nature of Jñānānanda. They do not contend that the Brahman alone is there and not the Jñāna and Ānanda. So also there is nothing wrong in declaring that the Brahman is of the nature of unlimited qualities. And all these qualities are identical with the Brahman. There is no charm and reason to lessen and limit the number of qualities in the Brahman. So Guṇatā, Gunitā, Sukhitā and Sukhatā are all possible in the Brahman. They are not contradictory. The Śruti-Viññānamānandam Brahma^{407A} states that the Lord is of the nature of Jñāna and Ānanda. And the Śruti-Ānandaḥ brahmano

vidvān^{407B} specifies that the Brahman is possessing Ānanda. Thus, the first statement proves Sukhitā in the Brahman and the second the Sukhatā in Him. On the same ground, Gunatā and Gunitā are also established.⁴⁰⁸ Thus, Viññāna, Ānanda etc., convey the presence of innumerable qualities in the Brahman and not merely the Svarūpa of Brahman. Though they are identical with the Brahman, with the help of the concept of Viśeṣa, they are liable also for Bhedavyavahāra.⁴⁰⁹ In this way, the Nirguna-Śruti will also not cause any harm to other Saguna-Śrutis, but negates only the vicious qualities- Prākṛta qualities in Brahman.

THE REFUTATION OF AKHAṆDĀRTHAVĀDA^{409A}

The Advaitins opine that the Śruti passage- Satyam jñānam...^{409B} is Svarūpamātrapara. It may be an answer to the question- Kim Brahma. Therefore the above Śruti passage gives the Akhaṇḍārtha. But this is not correct. Because in an example- Kāścandraḥ (who is moon?), the question is asked to know the special features of the moon. One may be knowing already the moon as an illuminating object of the galaxy. But to know more about the moon i.e., its special features, he asks that question. Therefore, it is not an ordinary question but it is a particular question (Dharmavācaka) i.e., the question is- 'What are the special features of the moon? Who is possessing the Candratva? and so on.'⁴¹⁰ If the

question is meant to refer to Svarūpa only, it may be taken to mean as Candra only by nature, but that is not wanted. It is something more that is enquired into, i.e., the special features of the moon.

In the same way Kim Brahma is not an ordinary question related to Svarūpamātra. Here also, to know the special features of the Brahman, the question is asked. So the Śruti- Satyam jñanam.. is a reply which is the relevant Lakṣanavākya. And this Lakṣanavākya states the special features of the Brahman such as Satyatva, Jñānatva that are not found elsewhere. It declares that all these Dharmas are complete.⁴¹¹ If it is taken to mean Svarūpamātrapara, then there would have been only one term and not more terms. In that case, other terms would become useless.⁴¹² By way of Lakṣanā it is not befitting to say that Satya is 'other than Asatya,' Jñāna stands for 'other than Ajñāna' and Ānanda stands for 'other than Duhkha.' In such case, in the oft-quoted passage 'Gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ, the term Gaṅgā will have to mean 'not Agāṅgā' instead of the bank (Tīra) as understood by one and all. Then both Gaṅgā and Lakṣya-bank appear to be conveyed by Lakṣanā which is absurd. In fact, the terms Satya and the like convey the Dharmas of Satyatva and the like of the Brahman. The term Satya itself negates the possibility of Asatya. These terms directly convey the Dharmas of

Satyatva and the like which is the primary meaning of those terms. The Lakṣyārtha (secondary meaning) is taken into account only when Mukhyārtha (primary meaning) gets sublated.⁴¹³ The basic fact is, without Mukhyārtha, there cannot be Lakṣyārtha.⁴¹⁴ The Advaitins may say that the Brahman, though not having Satyatva, is not Mithyā being of Sadrūpa. But this is not correct because, without Satyatva there cannot be Sadrūpatva.^{414A} Otherwise horns of the rabbit, though not having Satyatva, should also be taken to mean Sadrūpa. The Satyatva and the Sadrūpatva go together always. And wherever there is no Satyatva, there is no Sadrūpatva. Therefore, to admit Sadrūpatva in the Brahman, the Satyatva must be accepted. Otherwise, the Brahman cannot be of the Sadrūpa as a head, when shaved, is deprived of hair.⁴¹⁵

If it is said that the term Satya conveys the Brahman by Lakṣaṇā, then there must be something else to be Vācya and real (by which the Brahman is implied and suggested). And that real could be the world. So if the Brahman becomes Lakṣya - secondary meaning, then the world becomes Vācya (primary meaning). Thus, the Lakṣaṇā of the Advaitins promises to guarantee two real things - world and Brahman. And this Lakṣita Brahman, becoming real, will not give up the Satyatva of its own. So conveying of Satyatva and the like is inevitable.

Likewise, if the Śruti- Tattvamasī⁴¹⁶ is treated as Svarūpamātrapara, then the Aikya cannot be termed in Brahman since according to the Advaita as the Brahman is devoid of all the Dharmas, this Aikyadharmā too, cannot be traced there. When the Aikyadharmā is not there, identity of Brahman and Jīva is not possible. Thus, this Śruti conveys the primary sense Bheda.⁴¹⁷

So here the Lakṣaṇa is not meant as conveying the secondary meaning, but the term Lakṣaṇa refers to special or extra-ordinary features of Brahman. That means it conveys the Dharma such as Satyatā, Jñānatā and Anantatā.

Even if the Advaitins deny the Dharmas such as Satyatva, Jñānatva etc., their intended Akhaṇḍārtha is not proved and established and Sakhaṇḍatva is not dropped. Because, the Advaitins may negate the Dharmas viz., Satyatva and the like, but cannot deny Lakṣyatva, Amukhyārthaviśayatva and the like. These Dharmas are unaffected even at the negation of Satyatva etc.⁴¹⁸ In fact, Akhaṇḍatva is also a Dharma. If this too is negated, with a view to declare Brahman as Nirdharmika, then Sakhaṇḍatva occurs automatically. Because, Abhāva (negation) of Akhaṇḍatva means Sakhaṇḍatva.⁴¹⁹

EXPOSITION OF THE CONCEPT VIŚEṢA

"The relation between substance and attributes is one of the intriguing problems of philosophy. It has well-high taxed the ingenuity and resources of philosophers in the East and in the West. Madhva's contribution to the solution of this problem is both original and significant. He has actually contributed a new idea, the concept of Viśeṣas - to the treatment of this philosophical problem. It is an outstanding discovery of his. Madhva accepts a relation of 'colourful identity' (Saviśeṣabheda) in respect of coessential attributes and difference-cum-identity (Bhedābheda) in the case of transient attributes.

Khandite bheda aikyaṁ ca; syādvastu na bhedavat(TV)

He has thus made a striking efforts to rise above the 'dualism' of substance and attributes and combine them into a homogeneous whole that admits, however, of logical conceptual and linguistic distinction, wherever necessary, thro' the self-differentiating capacity of substances themselves, to be known as "Viśeṣas."⁴²⁰

It is peculiar characteristic of things which makes the talk of difference possible where, really speaking, there exists only identity.^{420A}

The concept Viśeṣa is an unlimited power of Lord Brahman

which is His very nature, that plays the role of conveying the identity of the attributes of Brahman that appear mutually distinct for common understanding and also that helps for Bhedavyavahāra. This Viśeṣa conjoins and distinguishes the attributes for Bhedavyavahāra and it does not spoil the^{420B} very nature and identity of the attributes of the Brahman. And it does not refer to and conjoin the attributes that are of opposite nature such as Baddhatva, Muktatva since they spoil the very nature and greatness of Brahman. This Viśeṣa, though it is one of the Guṇas (or is included in Guṇas), its function goes on without any obstacle.⁴²¹ With the help of this Viśeṣa, presence of the attributes of mutual contradiction is possible in the Brahman such as Anutva (atomic form), Mahattva (universal form) and the like.⁴²² Such wonderful attributes such as Anīmā-mahimā, Garimā-laghimā are present in the Brahman as a mark of His unlimited treasure of auspicious qualities. This Viśeṣa also establishes the identity of the Brahman with His each unlimited Guṇa. This conveys the Nityatva to the Lord's Bala, Jñāna, Kriyā and the like. The concept Viśeṣa may be defined as- "that extra-ordinary power of Brahman as His nature that fulfills the need of Bheda-vyavahāra where there is no Bheda at all; and also infinity of the attributes individually." Here the function of Bheda by Viśeṣa is restricted to that which is conveyed by the Śruti. Therefore, it is to be understood that it

does not serve the purpose of identitying Duḥkha, Jīva and the like in the Brahman.⁴²³ To prove Abheda of this Viśeṣa with the Brahman, we do not require any other Viśeṣa, lest that may lead to endless regression, it proves of its identity with the Brahman itself and not with the help of another Viśeṣa. So it is Svanirvāhaka like a lamp, that reveals other objects and does not require another lamp to get itself revealed.⁴²⁴ It is Svanirvāhaka, means self-competent, self-explicable and self-related for dealing. It is nothing but an intrinsic power, peculiar, and particular of respective objects.^{424A} The qualities of Brahman are not different from Him. But these are referred to as distinguished through this Viśeṣa. This is the real purpose of Viśeṣa.

The Guṇas are the very nature of Guṇin. So the Viśeṣa, being a Guṇa, is the very nature of the Brahman and hence establishes the identity of them and distinguishes the same for the sake of usage. For the sake of usage as Guṇa of the Brahman, the Viśeṣa is accepted that playing the role of the representative of Bheda, assists for usage on one hand and establishes the identity of Brahman and His Guṇas on the other.^{424B} The incarnations of the Lord such as Rāma, Kṛṣṇa and the like are not different from Him. All are identical in nature.^{424C} In the same way, the unlimited auspicious qualities of the Lord Nārāyaṇa such as Sarvajñatva etc., are identical with

each other and are present even in incarnations. The unlimited forms and innumerable qualities are identical. There is no mutual Bheda among the forms and qualities of the Lord.⁴²⁵

It can be stated that, the Viśeṣa too is conveyed by the Śruti. Because, the Śruti states that the Brahman is Guṇapūrṇa, Guṇaviśiṣṭa and there is no difference between Guṇa and Guṇin. Explicitly it appears contradictory and illogical. But for conveying the real import of the Veda, all these three are grouped together in sense (Viśeṣa, Guṇa and Guṇin). And for that, the Viśeṣa is to be admitted which successfully accomplishes this function. With the help of this Viśeṣa, difference-in-identity and identity-in-difference could be conveyed. Identity can be established with reference to Guṇatva and Guṇitva in the Lord like Sukha and the like. It means Sukha, Jñāna etc., are the very nature of Brahman. The Vācya varūpa guṇa of these is conveyed and Guṇaguṇibhāva is thus possible with the strength of Viśeṣa.⁴²⁶ The Śruti-Yathodakam,...^{426A} stating the Brahman as possessing unlimited attributes, negates the difference thereof. So this very Śruti conveys the Viśeṣa, described above in detail.⁴²⁷ So to prove the validity of this Śruti, the Viśeṣa should be admitted in the Brahman as His Svarūpaśakti that indeed dispels the contradiction being seen in the explicit appearance of Guṇaguṇibhāva, identity of the Guṇas and the like.


Thus, it is not possible to state the relation of attributed and attribute without the help of such concept which is termed Bhedapratidinidhi (playing the role of the representative of difference). This is also required to relate the plurality with regard to the attributes of same object.⁴²⁸ Jayatīrtha says that these Viśeṣas are innumerable subject to manifold and innumerable dealings and usages.⁴²⁹

II. ŚUDDHISĀURABHA

NIRDOSATVA OF THE LORD IN HIS MŪLARŪPA AND IN AVATĀRARŪPAS

In the Guṇasaurabha the Guṇapūrṇatva of the Lord Nārāyaṇa was established. In this Śuddhisaurabha, the Nirdoṣatva of the Lord is established. The theme of this Saurabha is "Lord Nārāyaṇa is absolutely free from all demerits and drawbacks."

Vādirāja asserts that even the act of searching for a demerit in great persons, is wrong. So, it becomes an unworthy act to refer to blemishes or flaws of Lord Hari, who is Ever-free from all demerits. He is Nirdoṣa being endowed with innumerable auspicious qualities.⁴³⁰ And whatever seems to be a defect in ordinary persons need not be a defect in the great. The Lord destroying the whole created universe at its end, stands unaffected. E.g. giving up of daily religious duties is sinful in respect of those, who are in

Samprajñatāsamādhi but it seems not sinful in case of those who are in deep meditation or Asamprajñatāsamādhi. So the Lord is defectless even when He gets engaged in some destructive deed and such a destruction appears sinful from the point of view of only ordinary persons. Thus even killing Rāvaṇa is not a sinful act. The Lord is Acyuta having no demerits.⁴³¹ It is said, Lord Nārāyaṇa, during Pralaya, sleeps on a leaf. But that leaf exists without any tree. When there is such greatness  in the case of the leaf at Pralaya then what to say about the greatness of the Lord who sleeps on that.⁴³² The Lord has no birth and death. He is eternal. Because, birth and death are also a type of Doṣas as they exist in the bound souls. But Lord Hari is an Eternally Liberated Supreme Soul. The absence of pre-existence may be the cause of effect in case of others. But the Lord is an exception to this as He is Eternally Existent. Even during Pralaya He is not destroyed. So there is no absence of pre-existence in the Lord. Thus, He is not born like others.⁴³³ There is no cause as such for Lord's birth, since He is not born. The four-faced Brahmā is born out of Lord's navel and god Śiva is born of His wrath, but the Lord is not at all born from any source. It means, there is nothing that could be thought of as the cause of His birth.⁴³⁴ When there is no cause, no effect (birth) as such can result. The presence of the

Lord, during the Pralaya, justifies that even when everything in the universe is destroyed, He is not destroyed and He is present even before everything is created. So this fact proves that He has no birth and death.

Now one may say that the Lord is Apūrṇa since He, in the beginning, tends towards the creation of this universe. But this argument is not tenable since this inclination towards creation is for the sake of others and not for His sake like the overflowing of the water from a tank is to irrigate the adjacent lands and not for its own benefit. In the same way, the Lord engages in the creation etc., with a view to give different states to different souls,⁴³⁵ (Mokṣa, Svarga and Naraka). Lord Nārāyaṇa has no displeasure and delusion. He is an embodiment of bliss and knowledge. Therefore, neither is He sorrowful nor deluded.⁴³⁶ The displeasure and the like happen as a result of the misdeeds and the like in one's past life.⁴³⁷ But as the Lord is never born, there is no question of His past life and performance of misdeeds and the like. He neither gets prospered nor degraded by any action, since His engagement in activity, is not for His own sake,⁴³⁸ but with a view to bless the devotees, He gets engaged in multifarious activities. We learn that the Lord, in His incarnation of Kṛṣṇa, has eaten butter, drunk milk and so on. But by this, we cannot conclude

that He also has the feeling of hunger, thirst and the like. Because, generally, the feeling of hunger, thirst and the others, are not seen even in the liberated souls. Those feelings are there only upto liberation. The Lord, being eternally liberated, cannot have either hunger or thirst. And likewise the Lord is independent. Although He sits on Garuda and moves, He is not dependent. Because, when the whole earth was drowning into water, the Lord lifted it up and at that time, there was neither Garuda nor others to support Him. So His sitting on Garuda etc., is only to favour them by receiving devotional service from them. In His several incarnations, some activities of the Lord may appear as if defective. And, one may ascribe Him pain, sorrow and the like as it happened in the case of Rāma who lamented for Sītā. But there, it does not mean that Rāma was incapable of regaining Sītā and hence suffered a lot. Because, the same Rāma, in His Kṛṣṇa form went to Anantāsana to bring back the child of a brahmin. For Him, getting back Sītā was not a great and impossible task. The fact is, as the Lord is all-pervasive, He was there all the time with Sītā, even in Laṅkā. Even then Lord's variegated deeds are to impart instruction regarding the behaviour to the human beings as it is remarked in the Bhāgavata.⁴³⁹ Although, He killed Rāvaṇa who was a brahmin, He did not gain any sin by that. Because, at the end of the Yuga or age, He even

swallows the creator Brahmā, but He was not stained with any sin. Therefore, there is no Brahmahatyādoṣa as such. And His installing the Śivaliṅga at Rāmeśvara, is to offer a chance to god Śiva to look at Setu and to get rid of the sin of Brahmahatyā,⁴⁴⁰ caused by the cutting the fifth head of God Brahmā. So at the request of Śiva, Lord Rāma installed the Śivaliṅga there. And keeping friendship with Sugrīva is also not defectful. King although capable, goes as if led by the servant; Lord Rāma, who is capable to take with Him the creatures to the Brahmaloḥa,⁴⁴¹ has no need to depend upon others.

Then Vādirāja deals with the Kṛṣṇāvatāra and its Nir-doṣatva. Lord Kṛṣṇa is also free from birth and death. Because, in His belly, all the worlds exist and they were seen by His mother Yaśodā as such. His showing the Brahmaṇḍa in His mouth proves that He is beyond birth and death.⁴⁴² The holy mark of Śrīvatsa, which is there on the chest of Lord Nārāyaṇa, was seen on the body of Kṛṣṇa.⁴⁴³ So Kṛṣṇa is none other than Lord Viṣṇu.⁴⁴⁴

The Lord is not subject to Cheda, Bheda and the like.⁴⁴⁵ When Kṛṣṇa showed His Viśvarūpa to Arjuna, the latter saw all the warriors of his enemy side, being clutched between the teeth of Kṛṣṇa. So how can such a Lord be killed and

cut off by the same warriors on the ground.⁴⁴⁶ Therefore, He is Acchhedya and Abhedya. When Kṛṣṇa came to Duryodhana for the talks of compromise, Duryodhana intended to bind him, but could not. So, Lord Hari is beyond and not subject to destruction like Cheda, Bheda, Bandhana etc. Thus, Lord Hari, in His incarnations, appears to be weak and defectful. But He is not so in reality. So, his appearance is like a male actor, who takes a female role on the stage; but by this very acting, he cannot be said to be a woman.⁴⁴⁷

Here after, Vādirāja quotes from the scriptures to substantiate what is proved above.

By this, it is clear that the Lord is free from all demerits. He, who credits demerits to the Lord, will become sinful. The Lord, therefore, in his original form or in the incarnated forms, is defectless. He is Blissful and Guṇa-pūrṇa. It means, He always enshrines with His intrinsic pure and blissful nature.⁴⁴⁸

REFUTATION OF ADVAITA CONCEPT OF AJÑĀNA

After clearing out the doubts regarding the Nirdoṣatva of the Lord, Vādirāja takes up for criticism the Advaita concept of Ajñāna.⁴⁴⁹ The Advaitins attribute Ajñāna or nescience to Brahman. They say that Brahman is the Āśraya

(locus) and Viṣaya (object) of Ajñāna.⁴⁵⁰ And it is said that He, because of this, undergoes Saṁsāra (transmigration). If all this is admitted, then Nirdoṣatva or defectlessness of the Lord would become baseless.

Vādirāja states that Brahman can be neither the Āśraya nor the Viṣaya of nescience. By superimposition of Ajñāna, only erroneous experience will result and that will lead to attaining states like Jīva bhāva. But the superimposition of nescience on Brahman is impossible. Because, according to the Advaita, superimposition is of two types: (1) Tādātmyā-rūpa - mistaking one entity for another and (2) Dharmārōpa - mistaking the attributes of one entity as the attributes of another entity, mistaking the attributes of body such as Sthūlatva, etc., as the attributes of the self.⁴⁵¹ But Brahman has no such erroneous experience of two kinds. It cannot be said "Ajñānam Brahma" - which means Ajñāna cannot be attributed to or transferred to Brahman saying "Brahma Ajñānam." Thus Ajñānarōpa is not possible in Brahman.⁴⁵² And the experience as Ajñoham - "I am ignorant" involves no superimposition. It is only the experience of Siddhā-jñāna.⁴⁵³ It may be superimposition only when association of nescience in that, is regarded as superimposed. For this, presence of nescience must be there somewhere before and same is to be wrongly associated with Brahman by superimposing

the attributes of that. But in the Advaita, there is no another entity⁴⁵⁴ other than Brahman, which can be the locus and object. Presence of nescience cannot be regarded as superimposed. And in the Advaita, nescience is not a different and independent entity. According to them, it is Brahmāśrita or associated with Brahman and not Anyāśrita.⁴⁵⁵

To have erroneous experience in Brahman, there should be nescience before, then it is to be superimposed. The expression "I am ignorant" may be erroneous in him, who has no nescience. And it is not erroneous in him, who has nescience. So, in the Advaita, Ajñānasamsargarōpa is not possible since, nescience is already associated with Brahman. So, there is no question of superimposition as such. And this association cannot be treated as superimposition. So, the expression- "I am ignorant" is not erroneous one. The superimposition of nescience might be possible, if Brahman is considered an Ādhāra or substratum of nescience and the attributes of Ādharatva (state of being substratum) of Ajñāna are seen.

But, the Advaita Brahman feels Itself as 'It is ignorant.' So the experience of ignorance is not all erroneous. Moreover, unless the superimposition of nescience is proved, the superimposition of its association cannot be proved and vice versa. The superimposition of nescience in Brahman is not possible since, nescience is not an independent and different entity. So, in the form of cognition "I am ignorant," there is no

Āropa of Tādātmya, and Samsarga as shown above.⁴⁵⁶ In the statement "I am ignorant," if Ajñānāropa is accepted, then there would be Apasiddhānta i.e., the very concept of their Siddhānta will collapse. For, according to the Advaita, nescience is associated with the very nature of Brahman and it is the root cause of the experienced such as "I am ignorant" etc., So how can either the nescience or its association be superimposed? The association of pot and earth is not at all superimposed (not imagined). It is real. So nescience being present with Brahman, is not erroneous, but it is to be accepted as real and non-erroneous.⁴⁵⁷ And Brahman is declared as Nirdoṣa or defectless in the Advaita.⁴⁵⁸ If association of nescience is referred to Brahman then the very Nirdoṣatva will be no more. And nescience cannot become erroneous to itself. It may cause erroneous experience such as pride etc., which are seen in the embodied soul. So it is evident that Ajnāna is Jīvāśrita and not Brahmāśrita. Thus, (superimposition of nescience in Brahman is not tenable. The nescience is eternal and hence there is no first and second nescience as such. Even if it is taken for granted, the latter does not become the cause of the defect of erroneous experience to the former. But, it may become the cause of the ascertainment of nescience as in darkness.⁴⁵⁹ Bhramā is possible, only when something is understood in its absence. In the same way, erroneous

experience (Bhramā) may get originated, only when superimposition of nescience or its association is possible. As shown above, the superimposition of Ajñāna is impossible. All this has been said and thus proved that the Advaita concept of Ajñāna remains unproved. Really speaking, in the eternity of Ajñāna, it cannot become the cause of superimposition of latter Ajñāna.⁴⁶⁰ Moreover, at the time of the ascertainment or apprehension (in the case of experience as "I am ignorant"), nescience cannot become the cause of Bhramā (its superimposition). Because, cause should precede the effect. Ajñāna being a Doṣa or defect, should give rise to Bhramā (erroneous experience).⁴⁶¹ But here, both nescience and erroneous experience become mutually cause and effect.⁴⁶² It means whenever there is nescience, there is apprehension of erroneous experience and whenever there is erroneous experience, there is nescience (defect). Thus, the view is affected by Anyonyāśraya-doṣa or the fallacy of mutual dependence.⁴⁶³ Now the erroneousness cannot be said as born of nescience because according to the Advaita, even this erroneous experience of nescience is cognized by Sākṣin.⁴⁶⁴ And this Sākṣin is eternal and unborn. So in "I am ignorant," the knowledge of it, is cognized by eternal Sākṣin. And this experience is unborn and not erroneous. Whatever is not born of defect (nescience) is not erroneous experience.⁴⁶⁵ So, the expression "I am ignorant" does not accept Ajñāna as

Brahmāśrita, since there is no any valid proof. But it is clear that it is Jīvāśrita or associated with soul, where its effects such as pride, arrogance etc., are clearly perceptible. So, the association of nescience in Brahman is just imagined and baseless. Thus, in Brahman, as there is no nescience, there is no erroneous experience. In the Advaita, the self is Nirviśeṣa⁴⁶⁶ (devoid of all characteristics). So, how can there be defect of nescience and the erroneous experience from that in It? The Nirviśeṣatva view of the self (Brahman) does not permit nescience to be the cause of erroneous experience. So nescience concept of the Advaita is not tenable.

Now, if nescience is not superimposed, then it must be real. When it is real there is the loss of the Advaita. Not only this, the world created by this should also be declared as real. Because, when the cause is regarded as real then the effect must also be real. The real cause does not give rise to an unreal effect. By this, the Bheda or difference is also established and because of real nescience it remains unsublated so far as cognition is concerned. And according to the Advaita, whatever is real, like Brahman, never disappears.⁴⁶⁷ So, the real nescience remains as it is and because of this there is no Mokṣa or liberation. Mokṣa is cessation of nescience. When nescience

is real like Brahman there is no cessation and hence there is no liberation.⁴⁶⁸ Thus, the doctrines in the form of branches of the tree of the Advaita, such as identity, liberation fall one by one, since the very root Ajñāna of the Advaita-tree is not firm.

According to the Advaita, Pratikarmavyavasthiti means when the nescience which is Bandhaka or binder and the veil of an object, is removed by the preception of direct cognition (Aparokṣajñāna), then that entity becomes an object of knowledge Cetana. This is Pratikarmavyavasthitiḥ. As shown above, when the cessation of real nescience is impossible, then Pratikarmavyavasthitiḥ is baseless. Thus, nescience as contended by the Advaitins, is nowhere found as proved so far. So, Brahman does not get associated or affected by this nescience and for It there is no necessity to attain state of soul and see the world. Thus, there is no nescience as such; even if it is real (in the Jīva) its products such as world etc., are also real. So, acceptance of the concept of nescience by the Advaita leads to baseless and impossible conclusions. Thus, the whole tree of the Advaita with nescience as its root, when uprooted, collapses completely.⁴⁶⁹ And there remains nothing as a topic for the Advaita Śāstra.⁴⁷⁰ Now "I am ignorant" and other statements give the sense that nescience is present in soul since he

has such experience. How can it be then Brahmāśrita? For Pramāṇa (valid means) is somewhere and Prameya or an object of knowledge is elsewhere. Pramāṇa is the experience of soul and how can Brahman be an object of knowledge of this? And even by the fact of Aikya (identity) in Brahman and Jīva, nescience cannot be attributed to Brahman. If attributed, then there will be the defect of Anyonyāśraya (mutual dependence). When identity is proved, nescience as Brahmāśrita is proved and when nescience as Brahmāśrita is proved then the identity is proved. Thus, there is Anyonyāśraya-doṣa.⁴⁷¹ So nescience is impossible in Brahman. The Bhagavadgītā⁴⁷² clearly shows that the Lord is Sarvajña or Omniscient and Arjuna is Alpaज्ञा or knowing little. And these two qualities are mutually contradictory. And by this statement, it is evident that the Lord has the perception of His Sarvajnatva omniscience for ever. So, nescience seen in the soul cannot be associated with Brahman. Thus, nescience is also not approved of by Śruti, Smṛti etc.

Now, even the Jīva does not become the locus of nescience. If it is to be the locus of nescience, then it would be earlier to nescience. And if nescience is proved, then the Jīva is proved, and if Jīva is proved then only it can be a locus of nescience. If it is contended that Brahman, owing to Ajñāna, attains Jīvabhāva, then the Jīva has to be admitted as distinct

since beginningless^{472A} and by this Bheda-difference becomes evident. So to avoid this, the Advaitins have to declare that Jīva is Ajñānakalpita. So, when it is Ajñānakalpita, then also there is the defect of mutual dependence.⁴⁷³ And, this defect of mutual dependence is more severe, than the defect of endless regression (Anavasthā). Because, in Anavasthā (as in seed and sprout), the relation of mutual cause cannot be decided and it is not deformed and moreover, it does not create any Ayathārtahajñāna (the tree is not born of the seed of the same tree). Whereas in mutual dependence, the state of cause and effect is defective. So nescience is not a Viśaya or object at all. Brahman is not Āśraya or locus of this nescience (of superimposed nature). If it is admitted that nescience present in soul is also there in Brahman, then Brahman Itself owing to Ajñāna should attain Jīvabhāva. By this knowledge of identity, experience of a Jīva should also be seen in all, i.e., nescience of one soul should be in all and experience of one soul must be there in all. To avoid this crisis, if Vyāvahārikabheda (empirical difference) is allowed to flourish, then the experience as "I am ignorant" does not prove nescience in Brahman.

So Jīva is ignorant, he is not the Lord and creator of the world. He, who is the Lord and creator, has no ignorance. The association of Bhrama (illusion) of nescience is impossible

in Brahman.⁴⁷⁴ In Śrutis also, it is clearly stated that, soul is associated with Ajñāna since eternity and this Ajñāna is of Abhāvarūpa (negative) and Bhāvarūpa⁴⁷⁵ (positive) /as it veils the understanding of the nature of knowledge, bliss etc. There is no Ajñāna in the sense of 'self,' but only in respect of the content of knowledge, bliss etc., of 'self.' So in "I am ignorant" Ajñāna is of Abhāvarūpa. Otherwise, the Samsāra (with Bhāvarūpājñāna) would have to be declared as Mokṣa. If there is realisation of the pleasure of self, then that state is called Mukti.⁴⁷⁶ And there is no rule as such, that without the knowledge of the Svarūpasukha (Bhāva), there cannot be knowledge of its Abhāva as there is no knowledge of the objects without the light. Because as, for the cognition (perception) of darkness, light is not required. So also for knowledge of Abhāva, knowledge of Svarūpasukha (Bhāva) is not necessarily required. So just giving up of the rigidity of the rule as knowledge is ever dependent on an object, it is to be accepted that Svarūpa knowledge is common and general and knowledge of its qualities such as bliss etc., are particular and peculiar. So "I am ignorant" means, the sense of I (self) is general and common and ignorant means Abhāvarūpājñāna of the qualities of self (Avacchedaka).⁴⁷⁷ Thus, in this context, the problem is whether an object of which Ajñāna is talked of, is known or not. For this the Advaitins have no solution. But in the Dvaita, the solution

is shown as above (with the help of the Sāmānya and Viśeṣa).

Without the distinction of Sāmānya and Viśeṣa if Jñānābhāva (absence of knowledge) is meant as Atyantābhāva (total non-existence) then the Atyantābhāva is Śūnya and its knowledge would become absolutely real as Brahman. (It is as good as saying the Śūnya is also real). Because knowledge of Pratiyogin of Atyantābhāva is real as Brahman. So, the Śūnya (a Pratiyogin of Atyantābhāva) should also be real.⁴⁷⁸

Then, if Jñāna of Jñānābhāva is not accepted, it is as good as negating the Jñāna itself, which is impossible as a blind by birth cannot negate the presence of variegated and colourful earth. There is nothing which is absolutely unknown since there is no evidence. (It means, everything including Jñānābhāva, is cognized in the form of knowledge). So, Jñāna of Jñānābhāva is to be accepted.⁴⁷⁹ As nescience is accepted, likewise let absence of knowledge also be accepted in the form of knowledge. Thus, there are two aspects (Ajñāna and Jñānābhāva) to be put on. May be Bhāva-rūpājñāna or Abhāvarūpājñāna, there is no so much distinction since Ajñātatva is common to both. If Bhāvarūpājñāna is accepted, as it is a partial view that causes the loss of the Advaita. According to the Dvaita view, there is no

Abhāva of Jñānāsāmānya⁴⁸⁰ since Sākṣijñāna is eternal one. And so far as Abhāva is concerned, it is there in the Viśeṣajñāna of the Jīvas. But it is not there in Brahman, since He is Sarvajña. So in the experience of Jīva as "I am ignorant" the Ajñāna is of Abhāvarūpa of Viśeṣajñāna. So as to say it does not mean that Jīva has no Sāmānyajñāna of Brahman, but he lacks Viśeṣajñāna which is Abhāvarūpa.

If some one says that he does not understand Brahman, it means he has no direct cognition of Brahman through eye: (He lacks Viśeṣajñāna of Brahman or lacks Śāstrajñāna pertaining to Brahman) but he may be having Sāmānyajñāna.^{480A} The Ajñāna does not mean total negation of Jñāna but only absence of Viśeṣajñāna. So the statement "I am ignorant" does not negate Parokṣajñāna gained by the study of Śāstras, but it negates only the Aparokṣajñāna (direct cognition) of Brahman. Here the same is applied to the Advaitins, because the Bhāvarūpajñāna although conceals the nature of Brahman (Brahmaparokṣa) it does not negate the Jñāna gained by the Śāstras. The Advaitins contend that they do not understand It (Brahman) even after gaining Its knowledge by the Śāstras.^{480B}

In the Dvaita, there is no impossibility of cognition (Jñāna) of Ajñāna (Jñānābhāva).⁴⁸¹ According to the Advaita, Brahmajñāna is not competent to remove Ajñāna but it is the

Manovṛttijnāna, that removes the Ajnāna. But this view is not tenable since it is as good as saying that a king, impossible to be killed by the sharp weapons of his enemies, is slain by the sword of his own at home. The Vṛttijnāna is originated from Avidyā (Ajnāna). How can this Vṛttijnāna remove the Ajnāna which cannot be removed by Brahmajñāna? (knowledge of Brahman or absolute knowledge)? So the view of the Advaitins is contradictory to the Śruti and reason as well. And Brahmajñāna is Ajāda (sentient) and Vṛttijnāna is Jāda (insentient). So how can this Vṛttijnāna which is insentient, remove the nescience? One Jāda cannot kill another Jāda as it is originated from that. It is impossible.⁴⁸² Really speaking, the very contention as Vṛttijnāna originates from insentient Ajnāna (nescience) is unsound. The mind (Vṛttijnāna) only when having association of the Svarūpajñāna, becomes capable to cognize the objects. So how then does the mind (Vṛttijnāna) become competent to remove nescience without Svarūpajñāna? For the removal of nescience, connection of Svarūpajñāna is necessary. Otherwise, neither can it (Manovṛttijnāna) cognize the objects nor can it remove the nescience since it is insentient. Only with the help of Cetanaśakti of Svarūpajñāna, the two above mentioned capacities are seen in Vṛttijnāna.⁴⁸³ So the nescience stands undestroyed.

Thus, having disregarded the nescience, Vādirāja takes up

the Bhrama (illusion) of the Advaitins for refutation. This illusion is also a product of nescience. If it is said that Brahman cognizes the Siddhajagat, then it is not the Bhramā. And if at all it (Jagat) becomes the product (Kalpita) of illusion to which nescience is the cause, then it (Jagat) would be eternal (Sarvakālikanītya) being Brahmakalpita. As long as the world is there, nescience is also there and eternal Brahman is also there. And as Brahman and nescience are eternal, Brahman would have the cognition of the world for ever. Because as long as nescience is there, illusion is also there, and Jagat a product (Kalpita) of that nescience is cognized without destruction (Pralaya) since the power of cognition of Brahman is eternal and indestructible. Thus, illusion is also Nītya. The Adṛṣṭa, Kāla etc., cannot be treated as the cause of Pralaya, since they are also products of Bhrama.⁴⁸⁴ The Advaitins quoting the Śruti passage- "Māyīnantu mahēśvaram" contend that Māyā is in Brahman. But here the term Māyā means Prākṛti (primal matter). So Māyīn does not give the sense of Brahman having Māyā. The term Māyīn does not attribute Māyā to Brahman. Brahman does not get bound by Māyā like the term Cakṛin, referring to a potter, does not make him get bound by the wheel. As a potter makes use of the wheel in manufacturing the pots and the like, Brahman also makes use of Māyā in creating this world. As the wheel is under the control of the potter, the

Māyā is also under the control of Brahman. So Māyin means He, with Māyā under His control.⁴⁸⁵ Brahman, although Māyin is Māyādūra like a king, although in forest is called Dhanin. How can Brahman get affected by Māyā (Ajñāna) when He is declared as Sarvajña? He, who is Omniscient has no Ajñāna. Brahman is Sarvajña in the sense, He is an embodiment of eternal power of cognition and cognizes Himself and the whole world. So attributing nescience to Omniscient is as good as saying that a mother is a barren woman, which is self-contradictory.⁴⁸⁶ The Śruti proclaims that Brahman is Asaṅga (having no association of Ajñāna as such).^{486A} And it cannot be argued that, it is only by means of Ajñāna, that Brahman gains the knowledge of the world (contact of the world) and without Ajñāna His Sarvajñatva is no more. Because, Ajñāna need not play the role of conductor since Brahmanetana is all pervasive and need not be helped by any means. And very naturally Brahman has the contact with all the objects. The Advaitins explain the term Asaṅga as Brahman, in its nature, is devoid of any contact.^{486B} In the Dvaita view, Asaṅga means Brahman, not affected by the association of the world. Really speaking, the Advaitins cannot explain the term since, in their view, Brahman is associated with nescience always. But in the Dvaita, Brahman is Asaṅga in the sense that He is all pervasive which means although having associated with the world, He is disassociated in the sense He does not get affected by that association.⁴⁸⁷ So the very

Śruti passage Asaṅga wards off even the association of Ajñāna in Brahman. But it does not rule out the association or the contact of other things other than the Ajñāna. Because, Asaṅga-Śruti not merely discard the defect of Ajñāna but discards other defects (demerits) also. Otherwise, this Śruti would oppose other Śruti passages such as Niranisto niravadhyah.^{487A} So the Asaṅga-Śruti negates the association of defective things such as Ajñāna and the like, and it does not negate the association of meritorious and auspicious qualities. The Asaṅga-Śruti, admitting meritorious and auspicious qualities in Brahman such as Sarveśvaratva, Sarvavyāpitva, Sarvakartṛtva etc., does not admit creation of defective world. It means, because, Lord Brahman is Sarvakartā. He does not create any illusory world, but creates a real world. And by this very creation, He is not affected by any Dosa. Thus, the term Asaṅga gives the sense of the absence of the contact of demerits or defects. The creation of the world does not make Him to be defective, whereas it proves His Sarvajñatva, Sarvakartṛtva, Sarvavyāpitva etc. So, this Śruti describes that Brahman has the association of the Prakṛti (primal-matter) and at the same time it negates the association of the defects such as Karman, Ajñāna, Duhkha etc. And the Śruti-Niranisto niravadhyah does not negate the association of meritorious qualities, but negates the association of demerits. The Asaṅgaśruti also suggests that Brahman

nescience are two different, separate, distinct, opposite and contradictory aspects. Therefore, Madhva has stated in his Upādhikhaṇḍana, that Ajñāna can never be attributed to Brahman who is Omniscient (Akḥilasamvetr).⁴⁹¹ Now it cannot be said that let there be Ajñāna in the presence of Jñāna. Because, then the prefix a (giving the sense of negation) becomes futile, or else, Ajñāna should mean the knowledge of Brahman since a denotes Lord Viṣṇu. So His knowledge is Ajñāna.^{491A} And Brahman has no Vṛttiñāna (since He has no mind which is Prākṛta). So there is no question of getting affected His Svarūpañāna as shown above and also Mānasikañāna since there is no material mind. Thus there is no nescience in Brahman.⁴⁹² The world, including mind is the product of nescience. Before creation there was no nescience since there was no world as such. How can then the forming or fashioning of these be possible? So there is neither nescience nor illusion in Brahman. When it is proved that Brahman has no Mānasikañāna (Vṛttiñāna) how then its nescience (if taken for granted) be removed? Because, in the Advaita, Ajñāna is to be removed by Vṛttiñāna. And it is foolish to say that nescience of Brahman would be removed by Vṛttiñāna of the Jīvas forming in future. Because, nescience of one cannot be removed by the Vṛttiñāna of another. And if the Advaitins say that this is possible because of the identity of Brahman and embodied soul, then as shown earlier, there would be

Anyonyāśraya (if there is nescience in Brahman there is identity and if there is identity there can be nescience in Brahman). It also cannot be said that it is possible as Brahman attains the Jīva bhāva through Its nescience because it amounts to saying that nescience is there along with Jñāna (true knowledge) which is a self-contradiction. Now it is proved that Vṛttijñāna of soul cannot remove the nescience of Brahman. As Brahman is veiled (or concealed) by nescience, there is no chance for soul to gain true knowledge since he is identical with Brahman in the Advaita.⁴⁹³ Let the Vṛttijñāna, a product of nescience, destroy not only the nescience (even if taken for granted) but also true knowledge since it is understood that it is present always with Ajñāna in Brahman and both of them are not contradictory, as Ajñāna is not going to be destroyed by Jñāna. This view becomes opposed to the Śruti passage- Dr̥ṣṭvaiva taṁ mucyate^{493A} (Realising It one gets liberated), because, according to this view neither Samsāra nor Ajñāna can be destroyed. Further, it is to be accepted that nescience has only resisting power towards the origin of true knowledge. Otherwise, the Śruti-passages relating to the destruction of Ajñāna by Jñāna become futile.

Now this nescience cannot be destroyed by Mānasa jñāna. Because, Mānasa jñāna related to Brahman, is insentient according

to the Advaita. The Acit element of this Jñāna is not capable to destroy the Ajñāna. And if the Cit element is regarded as competent as it is the very nature of Brahman, then there is no scope for Ajñāna to be there in Brahman. So the Bhāvarūpajñāna which is Nitya as contended by the Advaitins, is not at all there in the Lord.

AJÑĀNA IS NOT VISAYĀŚRITA

Some of the Advaitins contend that Ajñāna is Viśayāśrita.⁴⁹⁴ According to this view, Viśaya becomes the locus of Ajñāna. It is because of the concealment by the Ajñāna, the Śukti cannot be comprehended as it is. It is because of Ajñāna only, the Śukti is mistaken for Rajata. Therefore, it is said that the Ajñāna is Viśayāśrita. But this view does not stand any test; since, when the Ajñāna of that object (Śukti) is removed by the Vṛttijñāna of one beholder, then the object, as it is, should become exposed to one and all. Because the Vṛttijñāna has already removed the Ajñāna covering that object. But practically, it never happens.⁴⁹⁵ When some light is taken into a room, it removes the darkness therein and makes all the objects therein visible to one and all. But in the case of Ajñāna, which is believed to be Viśayāśrita, it does not happen. Even by the Vṛttijñāna of one, when the Ajñāna, which is the Āvaraka of the object is removed, it does not become visible as it is to one and all. So it is clear that the Ajñāna

is not Viṣayāśrita. If another concealment is to be accepted (Ajñānāntarāvarana), then that object becomes invisible to one and all including him, who, at first attempt, had seen the object.⁴⁹⁶ If separate Ajñānas, concealing the same object, according to a number of Jīvas, are to be regarded, then that leads to the concept of infinite number of different Ajñānas. So the view, that the Ajñāna is Viṣayāśrita, is not tenable.⁴⁹⁷

Thus, it is clear from this, that neither Brahman nor individual soul and nor even Viṣaya can be the Āśraya of Ajñāna.

AJÑĀNA^{497A} IS JĪVĀŚRITA

According to the Dvaita view, the embodied soul is the locus of Ajñāna. The Ajñāna (wrong knowledge), coming in the way of true knowledge is found in the soul. And the souls alone, and not insentient things, are called Tāmasas (possessing Ajñāna).⁴⁹⁸ He, whose Ajñāna (wrong knowledge) gets removed, is capable to have the knowledge of objects. And like the variegated defects of sight in different persons, the veil of Ajñāna (wrong knowledge) is also distinctly different from man to man. Generally, the light and darkness appear to be resorted to objects. Really speaking, objects resort to light and darkness. One becomes the Nāśaka (destroyer) and another Nāśya (destroyed) as light enters in the place

of darkness and removes it; in the same way, Jñāna and Ajñāna are Nāśaka and Nāśya (relation of Nāśyānāśaka). By this very fact, it can be known that both Jñānaajñāna are there in the soul. As true knowledge is there in Puruṣa, in the same way, the nescience to be destroyed by that true knowledge, must also be there in the same Puruṣa. Then only the destruction of his nescience (wrong knowledge) is possible. But in Brahman, there cannot be any nescience (wrong knowledge). Since He is an embodiment of unlimited pure knowledge.⁴⁹⁹ Thus, Jñānaajñāna being present in the Jīva the Jñāna becomes the cause of Vastujñāna and wrong knowledge of that like an eye-disease, causing veil to objects, becomes the cause of wrong knowledge. The role of wrong knowledge in Puruṣa is also the same. As the Jñāna is there in the knowing Jīva, the Ajñāna is also there in the Jīva.⁵⁰⁰

The Advaitins' stand is that to gain the knowledge of objects, our mind moves out of the body through eyes (senses) towards objects (Āśraya of Ajñāna).^{500A} But this view is wrong. Because the experience of the knowledge of objects etc., is like the experience of pleasure and displeasure. As the experience takes inside,⁵⁰¹ knowledge of objects cannot take place outside. Otherwise, there cannot be experience of that. The sense-organs such as the eye, ear, although tracing outward, originate knowledge inside; whereas mind, not tracing

outward, need not move out of the body towards objects. The moving of the mind from the body is seen when the soul departs from the body. The mind is called Antahkarana - inner sense - organ. So it should always be there inside and accomplish its work.⁵⁰² As Jñāna is Antahkaranagata, Ajñāna is also Antahkaranagata. So the destroyer and destroyed should be at the same place. And moreover the true knowledge of one man does not destroy the wrong knowledge of another. By this very fact also, it is clear that Jñāna and Ajñāna are of Ekāśraya (having one and the same as substratum). The experience of Sāksin is also the same. The experience as - 'I know' and the experience - 'I know not' are also cognized by the Sāksin.⁵⁰³ The Jñāna as 'I am ignorant' proves the Ajñāna of the Jīva. The Vedic statement corroborates the same point as Mayā (Avidyā-Ajñāna) is there in the Jīva since eternity.⁵⁰⁴ But, it cannot be said that by the fact of identity (Aikya) of Jīva and Brahman, Ajñāna can get transferred to Brahman. Because, Pramāṛtva (knowability) is there in the Jīva and Pramatā (Jñātr) (knower) is soul only. So the Pramāṛtva of Jīva cannot be attributed to Brahman as there is difference in Kartr, Karma and Bhava according to the Advaita.^{504A} When Aikya itself is untenable and illogical as shown earlier, it is foolish to attribute Pramāṛtva of Jīva to Brahman.⁵⁰⁵ The inference also favours the view that wrong knowledge is in the soul since the Āśraya

(locus) of this is same as that of Jñāna (true knowledge) like the pleasure and displeasure found in the same person.⁵⁰⁶

The Advaitins hold that Ajñāna is the Upādānakāraṇa (material cause) for the creation of this world.^{506A} So Ajñāna is there in Brahman. But this view is wrong. The primal matter (Mūlaprakṛti) at creation and the mud and the like in subsequent creations is the material cause (Upādānakāraṇa). So the nescience is not required for creation of this world. Even if it is taken for granted that nescience is there in Brahman, Brahman is the Lord, the controller of that like a cowherd who is called the lord of cows (Gomān). It means, He being the Lord of that, never gets affected.⁵⁰⁷ The Jīva, since sleeping with Māyā (Ajñāna-affected), cannot have the experience of his own bliss. When this Māyā (Ajñāna-wrong knowledge) is removed, he will experience his own bliss. Hence Ajñāna is Jīvaśrita.⁵⁰⁸ This Māyā, which is real, conceals only the blissful nature of soul and not the element of the cognition 'I'. The wrong knowledge does not affect the 'I' element. The Māyā (Ajñāna) of this kind is real, an element of Prakṛti, and seen in Jīvas.⁵⁰⁹ The wrong knowledge which is Anādi in souls is of two kinds. One Jīvacchāḍaka that veils the very nature of the soul like the cataract of an eye and another is Paramācchāḍaka, like a curtain, that makes the very nature of Brahman unknown

to the soul. Thus two-folded Ajñāna (Māyā) is there in the Jīva. The Lord, not having any of these, removes away the same. (He is the destroyer of these two).⁵¹⁰ If He is not away from or free from two types of wrong knowledge, how can He then dispel the wrong knowledge of others like a king being himself confined or arrested cannot help others to get released.⁵¹¹ Those, who attribute Māyā to the Lord, should be questioned as to whether Māyā causes delusion to the Lord or not? If it does not create delusion then let it be in the Lord as a special power. Then it proves that the Lord, being unaffected and undeluded, makes the Jīvas deluded. The Bhāgavata⁵¹² passage discards the possibility of the presence of Ajñāna in Brahman. It is only a fool or ignorant, who, with a view to hide his demerits, attributes the same to the others. In the same way, he attributes Ajñāna, possibly present in the Jīva, to the Lord with a view to ward off the inferiority complex.⁵¹³ Thus, Ajñāna, may be in any form, can never be attributed to the Lord; whereas it can be attributed to the Jīva since the Jīva is the locus of the Ajñāna.

ONE AND THE SAME CAN BE THE SUBJECT AND THE OBJECT

The Advaitins contend that one and the same cannot be the subject and the object for one and the same action, viz., knowing. Regarding this, they say that Lord cannot realise

himself or know Himself. But the statements such as "I know not myself", "I know myself" clearly show that one and the same can be the subject and the object for the same action of knowing. This cannot be rejected since it is universally accepted.⁵¹⁴ The contention of the Advaitins seems to be based upon the definition of Karma Mīmāṃsakas.^{514A} According to them, Karma or the object is that where the fruit of the action such as movement (knowing) is seen. According to this, one and the same cannot be the subject and the object for the same action. But, this definition has no universal applicability. It may not be true in the case of experiences. So some other definition has to be stated.⁵¹⁵

By quoting the definition of Karma of Mīmāṃsakas the Advaitins slip into self-contradiction.^{515A} Because, disregarding the same definition, the Advaita superimposes the world on Brahman - with the view that the subject-object relation (Jñāna-Jñeyarūpa-relation) cannot be applied and attributed to Brahman. If it is attributed, like Brahman, the world will also become real. Hence, the Advaita does not admit this relation in the case of Brahman. But here, to reject the identity (sameness) in the subject, the object and the action, the Advaita has relied upon the same definition of Karma given by the Bhāṭṭas. Thus, there is self-

contradiction in this approach. Moreover, the definition itself of the Bhāṭṭas is defective. Because, the fruit or aim or result of action can never be the object whereas it is something pertaining to the subject only. E.g. he, who wants to go to a village, walks a certain distance. The mere stepping into that village is not the fruit or the aim, but it is something more that pertains to the subject who walks. Otherwise Karmatva is to be attributed to the entire portion of the land touched by his feet on the way. But, this is not the case. Just Karmatva cannot be attributed to the entire portion of the land, in the same way, Karmatva cannot be attributed to the last portion or last stepped or touched land. Thus the application of definition is affected, with two demerits, too wide and too narrow (two logical defects).⁵¹⁶ Therefore, the relation of the subject and the object must be subjective - a type of subjective or intrinsic relation. Since it is evident that when one knows an object (pot), the fruit of that knowledge is to describe it in terms or words. And this is seen in the knower and not in the known (pot). Hence, the fruit of the action is related to the subject and not to the object. So the definition of the Bhāṭṭas is defective. According to this definition, one and the same cannot be the subject and the object. Whereas self-objectivity of knowledge (Svarūpa) is thus evident. So there is identity in the subject, the object and the action.⁵¹⁷

The characteristic of the object of the knowledge is not found in the object (pot) but seen in the knower, since the fruit of the knowing action is a peculiar subjective relation which is in the form of usage or articulation. The Jñātr̥tva is not there in the object but in the knowledge of the knower. If it is in the object, then Jñātr̥tva cannot be seen pertaining to the realisation of past and future things. So Jñātr̥tva is there in the knowledge⁵¹⁸ of the knower. Therefore, there is sameness in these.

The Svarūpañāna of the Lord realises the nature of the Lord. The Bhagavadgītā corroborates this view. The Gītā^{518A} declares, the Kart̥r̥tva, Karmatva and Kriyātva to the Lord. The difference is seen between Jñāna (which is intrinsic) and Jñeya (the object of knowledge - extrinsic) in respect of the knowledge of the Jadā. But when Jñānat̥va and Jñeyatva are attributed to the same Jñānarūpa Ātman there is no difference and there the same becomes the subject, the means and also the object. Hence, there is no universal rule that there is difference between Jñāna and Jñeya. So there is no any invalidity in saying that Ātman realises himself.⁵¹⁹ Jñānat̥va and Jñeyatva are possible to be seen in respect of an object of Jñānarūpa such as Ātman.

Explicitly, there appears difference among Brahman, His knowledge and His action so far as usage is concerned. But, they are not different. Identity among them is possible with the help of the concept Viśeṣa.^{519A} The Viśeṣa is the philosophical concept expounded by Madhva that proves ultimate identity between the Lord, His knowledge, His action and the like and at the same time plays the role of representative of difference so as to help the usage such as 'Lord's knowledge,' 'Lord's action' and so on. So, there is no impropriety in saying that one and the same can be the subject and the object for the same action of knowing. To the same Ātman (the Lord) Kartṛtva is attributed in the process of knowing and Karmatva too as He being the object of knowing.⁵²⁰ The statements 'Māmaham na vijānāmi', 'Māmaham jānāmi' etc., clearly show the sameness in the subject, the object and the action of knowing.

Now, Vādirāja point out the demerits of the definition of Svapraśaṣatva of the Advaitins.^{520A} First of all, the sense, conveyed by the definition, is contradictory to common understanding. Because, the Advaitins simply say that Brahman is Svapraśaṣa but declare that It has no Svarūpajñāna and attribute Asarvajñatva to It. So Svapraśaṣatva becomes meaningless. According to the Advaita, Brahman is not merely Asarvajña. But it also attributes Jadatva, a defect also.

The state of Brahman of the Advaitins, is worse than that of a blind man. Because, a blind man, though not knowing others, knows at least himself. Whereas, the Advaita-Brahman knows not even Itself.⁵²¹ If Svarūpasukha is not experienced, then it is useless. According to the above definition, Brahman has no experience of bliss, although having Sukhasvarūpa. If, like Svarūpasukha, it is contended that Svarūpajñāna is also not an object of Itself then what is the use of the Jñāna that cannot be made use of. The knowledge, that cognises an object, is useful for Vyavahāra. But the knowledge of Brahman, as it does not cognise Itself, is useless. When this is the state of Brahman, then nobody will aspire to attain and realise such Brahman.⁵²² If it is said that Brahman is Sukharūpa, but It has no experience of that Sukha then how can It be declared as eternally liberated one, since in the state of liberation, one has to experience the bliss bereft of sorrow of any kind. So a liberated one, although having Jñānarūpa and Sukharūpa cannot gain any fruit experience of Jñāna and Sukha. If bliss is not experienced in the liberated state, the liberation will cease to be a Puruṣārtha. The liberation is nothing but a state of realization of intrinsic bliss and knowledge.^{522A} If there is no experience of bliss and knowledge in liberation, then it will not be coveted by any one and also it cannot be called as the final goal to be

achieved by an embodied soul.⁵²³ Therefore, to prove Puru-
ṣārthatva to liberation, Brahman should be described as
Svaprakāśa as one who realizes Svarūpañāna and Svarūpasukha
of Himself. That means that these are the subjective
objects of His realization. The derivative meaning of that
term also corroborates this view, as Svaprakāśa is one who
knows his nature (himself).⁵²⁴ The Gītā statement also
states the same that the Lord knows Himself through His
knowledge.^{524A}

Therefore, even if one and the same becomes the
subject and the object or even if Kartṛtva, Karmatva and
Kriyātva are seen in one, there is no harm. But, the
Advaitins' idea of Svaprakāśa as one that does not know
himself (itself) is untenable.

REFUTATION OF ŚABALATVA ATTRIBUTED TO VIṢṆU BY OTHERS

The Advaitins attribute Śabalatva to Brahman.^{524B} The
Brahman when affected or qualified by Avidyā becomes Śabala
and thus is called Īśvara. And this Śabala-Brahman plays
the role of the world-creator and the like. But this view
is wrong. There cannot be such classification as 'Para-
Brahman' and 'Apara Brahman.' Therefore, Vādirāja says that
He, who is eternally Śuddha cannot become Śabala. Since
the Lord is eternally liberated one, He cannot be confined

to any bondage or He cannot get affected by any Dōṣa such as Avidyā and the like. Brahman is the Supreme Lord. He is eternally Śuddha and Mukta. Nityamuktatva and Nitya-śuddhatva are not present in Samsāra. Nityaśuddhatva means absence of any Dōṣa such as Ajñāna, Bhrama for ever. In the state of liberation, one is free from such Dōṣas.⁵²⁵

According to the Advaita, Brahman gets affected with Avidyādoṣa and since beginningless it has been assuming the Jīva-state or form.^{525A} If this is the position, how can there be Śuddhatva in Brahman who is stained with the dirt of transmigration. In the Advaita, there is no possibility of a Śuddha-Brahman. Further, it cannot be argued that part of it gets stained with Ajñānadoṣa. It is to be stated that the whole gets affected like an injury in the part of the body that causes pain to that man as a whole.⁵²⁶ Now it can also not be argued that Bandha is not real and hence let Brahman be both Baddha and Śuddha. Because, the Śruti-passage does not admit this.⁵²⁷ In the Śruti, both the Jīva and the Lord are described as two birds. They are present in the same tree in the form of body always.⁵²⁸ The Lord, although present with the Jīva, does not undergo any changes or does not get affected like the Jīva. The terms 'Anaśnan' and 'Abhicākaśīti' do not admit any Dōṣas in Brahman. So He is eternally Śuddha. So it cannot be

stated that let Brahman be both Baddha and Mukta as Bandha is unreal. And moreover, unreal Bandha cannot attribute Baddhatva to Brahman. So it is inevitable on the part of the Advaitins either to give up Śuddhatva (Muktatva) or Baddhatva (Śabalatva) of Brahman. The Śruti-passage, cited above, does not permit both together in Brahman. Both are contradictory to each other. So it is evident that Brahman, being eternally Śuddha and Mukta, never gets affected by Avidyā and the like and never becomes Śabala as the Advaitins contend. 529

Now it may be argued that let the Bandha, though unreal but on account of it being Vyāvahārika, be attributed to Brahman. But this view is untenable because whatever is Vyāvahārika, is not there in reality. As Śukti remains as it is (unchangeable), Brahman also is of same type (unchangeable) for ever. And moreover, the Baddhatva and the Muktatva cannot be present jointly in one. The Baddha is different and the Mukta (Nityamukta) is different.⁵³⁰ The Sūtra-Sthityadanābhyām ca, accepted by both also states difference between the Jīva and Brahman. The term Sthiti in the Sūtra suggests the presence of Brahman with the Jīva. The Jīva enjoys or eats the fruit of his deeds. The term Adana suggests the presence of the Jīva enjoying the Karmaphala. Thus, neither Śabalatva can be proved in Brahman nor identity of Jīva with Brahman is possible.

CLARIFICATION OF THE MEANING OF THE BHĀGAVATA VERSE -
"BADDHO MUKTA ITI HYĀKHYĀ GUNATO ME NA VASTUTAH"^{530B}

The Bhāgavata verse, Baddho mukta iti hyākhyā gunato me na vastutah at first reading appears to convey the sense that "I (God) am called bound and released through Guṇas but really speaking I am neither bound nor released." But this is not the intended meaning. Because in the previous verse Lord Kṛṣṇa has said that there are Guṇas, namely, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. These Guṇas bind the Jīva and not the Lord. By this it is promised that the God is free from these three Guṇas. Bandha is to the Jīva on account of the Guṇas that are under God's control. When the Guṇas are under the control of the Lord, how can they bind Him?⁵³¹ And moreover, latter part of the verse^{531A} also suggests that since Guṇas arise out of Māyā or Prakṛti, God has no Bandha nor Mokṣa. Because, Māyā or Prakṛti is also under the control of the Lord. Therefore, the real meaning of the verse is "The Jīva has Bandha and Mokṣa through the Guṇas - Sattva, Rajas and Tamas that are under My control but not as a part of his very nature; since, Guṇas arise out of Māyā or Prakṛti. I have neither Bandha nor Mokṣa." Because, The very Māyā is under God's control, as in the statement- 'he lives with my amount.' Here 'my amount' means amount under my control. And for livelihood, it is taken by some one else. In the same way, 'Me gunatah' means through Guṇas

that are under my (God's) control. So the Jīva, thus gets bound through these Guṇas and hence is called Baddha. When the same Jīva gets released of these, he is called Mukta.⁵³²

The Advaitins interpret this verse that on account of the association of the Guṇas, Sattva and the like, the God is called Baddha, Mukta and the like and not in reality.^{532A} But this interpretation is not correct since there arises contradiction when compared with previous and latter verses. And moreover, according to the Advaita, Bandha may be supposed to be Mithyā but Mokṣa can never be said to be Mithyā. Therefore, Vādirāja's interpretation wherein both these Baddhatva and Muktatva are attributed to the Jīva, is correct and appropriate. Further, as long as there is Bandha, there is no Mokṣa, when once Mokṣa is attained there cannot be any Bandha.⁵³³

In the latter part of the verse, Lord Kṛṣṇa negates the Bandha to Himself since He is devoid of or is not influenced by the Guṇas such as Sattva, Rajas and Tamas that originate from Māyā. The God is Aprākṛta and hence, there is no possibility of the effect of Prākṛtaguṇas that cause Bandha. Māyā cannot be there in the Lord because He is the destroyer of that. Therefore, the Guṇas, arising from Māyā, cannot affect the Lord. So, when the Guṇas are not there, there is

no Bandha. When there is no Bandha, the question of attainment of the Mokṣa does not arise. Hence, the Lord is Nitya-mukta whereas the Jīva is Baddha and also subsequently Mukta.⁵³⁴

The Jīva is of different nature from that of the God. Therefore, he is called Bhinnātmā. In the statement Sayujau sakhāyau,^{534A} among the two birds of the Jīva and the God, Guṇabandha is there to the Jīva and release of the Bandha is also there to the Jīva. The beginningless Ajñāna is the cause of Guṇabandha. When the Ajñāna is destroyed, the Guṇabandha is released. Then the Jīva attains the state of liberation. Thus, the Bandha and the Mokṣa pertain to the Jīva and not to the God.⁵³⁵

ANOTHER INTERPRETATION OF THE VERSE 'BADDHO MUKTA...'

Vādirāja interprets the same verse Baddho mukta... in a different manner.

Baddhatva, Muktatva and the like are attributed by the scholars to the God since He controls them. Really speaking, He is completely free from Bandha and Mokṣa. The Brahmasūtra^{535A} also justifies the same; that, which is regulated or controlled by a person, is normally attributed to him as in the slogan- 'King is victorious.' Actually, it is the soldiers who are responsible for the victory, but since they and their efforts

are under the control of that sovereign, victory is applied to him.⁵³⁶ The term Baddha is real in the case of the Jīva who is dependent. He is Baddha due to having real Bandha. This clearly states the difference between Baddhajīva, Muktajīva and Nityamukta God.⁵³⁷ As the Lord controls the Māyā, how can there be either Guṇabandha originated from Māyā or destruction of that, in Him.

If the Bandha is imagined as delusion, then the cause to that effect should also be stated. But the Guṇa cannot be treated as its cause. Because, it is the real Guṇa that causes Bandha and not the delusion. Moreover, cognition of Guṇa is not unreal. Therefore, Mithyātva cannot be attributed to Bandha. The Śruti also proves the same.

Moreover, the knowledge originated from the Sattva-guṇa, is taken for granted as real. The gods, sages, full of Sattvaguna, admit that Saṁsāra-bandha is real. It is an object of their direct cognition. So the Bandha cannot be called as unreal.⁵³⁸ In His preaching to Uddhava, God Kṛṣṇa has said that Bandha is due to Avidyā, but it cannot be called Mithyā.⁵³⁹

Vādirāja refers to other verses of the Bhāgavata⁵⁴⁰ and states that even the four-faced Brahmā, who heads the

Jīvas, gets bound by Guna. And he cannot know the Lord completely who is totally free from Gunabandha, who is Supreme and is the Lord of all. All the Jīvas - from the four-faced Brahṁā to Sthāvara Jāṅgama (ordinary beings) all are bound by these Guṇas with gradation in content. Being caught hold by the wrong knowledge, (except Rjus)^{540A} they are always engaged in the performance of various Karmas and as a result of that they undergo or attain different births. At the end, even after the attainment of liberation, all the Jīvas remain in the state of dependence. There also, they are bound by Asvātantrya, Apūrnatā and the like.^{540B} And hence they are called Baddhas both in Saṁsāra state and also in Mukti state.

PURPORT OF DIFFERENT ŚRUTIS AND SMRTIS SHOWN IN THE PADYĀRTHA

Here Vādirāja establishes Lord's Nitya-muktatva asserted by some Śruti passages and Smṛti statements. In the Bhagavad-gītā, it is stated that Karmas do not affect the God since He is completely beyond that. Three Guṇas, namely, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas originate from Prakṛti and they bind the embodied souls in different bodies. So it is clear that the Guṇabaddhatva is to the embodied souls and not to the Lord.⁵⁴¹ Likewise, the Śruti-passages Utamṛtasya^{541A} and the like declare the Nityamuktatva of the Lord. It is also suggested that the Muktas are not Nityamuktas because these Jīvas attain the liberation by the grace of the Lord

and hence even in the Mukti state, they remain dependents on and devotees of the Lord. So the Nityamukta God is the Lord of Muktas. As the Lord is the controller of the embodied souls, He is also the Lord of liberated souls.⁵⁴²

It is accepted that when a Jīva attains the liberation, his Gunabandha is removed. But there is bondage in the form of Asvātantrya. So the Jīva has either Gunabandha or Bhakti bandha.⁵⁴³ There is a class of Jīvas who are called Nitya-saṁsārins, since they have the mixed experience of pleasure and pain according to their inner nature. There is difficulty to treat them as Nityabaddhas.⁵⁴⁴ Thus Baddhatva and Muktatva are eternal and real. So, Mithyatva cannot be attributed to these. The two are eternal like Brahman and Mukti.⁵⁴⁵ The bondage of the Jīvas is on account of Gūṇas and not as a part of nature. This bondage, although beginningless, is not eternal.

Attributing bondage to the Lord is contradictory to the common understanding also. A fool, if unhappy, attributes unhappiness to others. In the same way, an embodied being attributes his bondage to the Lord.

It cannot be said that the Lord is also bound. If He too becomes subject to bondage, then who would be there to

release the souls from bondage like a man, fallen in the ditch, cannot protect others. Therefore, the God should be declared as Nityamukta; then only He can remove the bondage of bound-souls.⁵⁴⁶ When the Bandha of the soul is removed, the soul will not become similar to the Lord. The identity cannot be established between the God and the Jīva. Because, the God is eternally released and pure where as the soul is then released and purified like a dirty cloth made clean. A released soul may not have birth and death but on this ground he cannot be identified with the God. The Sāyujyamukti, a kind of release^{546A} does not indicate any identity, but it states that the soul without any pain lives with God.

The Advaitins classify Brahman as Parabrahman and Śabalabrahman and attribute Śabalatva to the Brahman. Vādirāja asks: "What is this Śabalatva? Is it Māyā Śabalatva in the form of a Doṣa? Or is it Māyā Śabalatva in the form of Adoṣa? Or is it Śabalatva in the form of meritorious qualities such as Jñāna, Ānanda?" In these options, Vādirāja, discarding the first one, accepts the second and third ones since the two do not superimpose or attribute any demerits (Doṣas) to the Lord.⁵⁴⁷ And it is ascertained that Ajñāna (Māyā) is Jīvāśrita and not Brahmāśrita. Because, Ajñāna is experienced by the Jīva as Ahaṁ ajñāh. So Ajñāna is

found in the Jīva and not in Brahman.⁵⁴⁸

ESTABLISHING MĀYĀDŪRATVA BY THE BHĀGAVATA STATEMENT

In this context, Vādirāja gathering the data from the Bhāgavata,⁵⁴⁹ states that the praise of the Lord (God Kṛṣṇa) recited by the four-faced Brahmā. The praise declares that the Ajñāna, that causes delusion to the embodied souls, is not found in the Lord. He is the Supreme Ātman. He is a treasure of qualities and is the Ādipurusa. He keeps aside the Māyā by the power of His knowledge. He is the Lord of Prakṛti. He is the controller of the entire world. He is Anāśrita (not having resorted to any one). He is glorified as bestower of Dharma, Kāma and Mokṣa to the Jīvas who are deluded by Māyā. Thus the praise establishes Māyādūratva of the Lord.

Vādirāja adduces one more argument that the Vaikunṭha-loka is Aprākṛta. It means Māyā (either Prakṛti or Ajñāna) is not there in the abode of the Lord viz., Vaikunṭha. When the abode of the Lord is Amāyika, then how can its Lord be Māyā-formed? Thus, it is evident that the Lord is Amāyika (absence of Prakṛti, or Māyā).⁵⁵⁰

ESTABLISHING MĀYĀDÜRATVA BY A DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION OF
THE TERM MĀYĀ

The term Māyā occurs in the Śruti and Smṛti passages in the following meanings: (1) God's Desire, (2) God's Power, (3) Goddess Lakṣmī, (4) Jadaprakṛti and (5) Ignorance of the souls.^{550A} The Māyā, referred to in these meanings, is not Mithyā. So Māyā is inexplicable according to the Advaitins, is nowhere found. The Māyā, although being declared as Anirvacanīya- inexplicable by the Advaitins, it is not Anirvacanīya. It is Anirvacanīya only in terms and not in sense. It is not totally Asat. The Advaitins' interpretation and explanation of Māyā and its product Śabalatva look baseless and are totally disregarded by scholars. If the Lord, an embodiment of infinite auspicious qualities is declared as Śabala, Aśuddha and so on, it is a defect or bad remark as in the case of pure cloth when stained with dirt. When He is declared as Śuddha Brahman, an embodiment of unlimited power, beauty, knowledge and the like, then that shows that demerits such as ignorance etc., are not there in the Brahman. Thus, He becomes Pure and not associated with any defects.⁵⁵¹

Now in attributing Śabalatva to the Lord, Ajñāna or nescience is the main cause. This nescience is an aspect whose presence is known temporarily at the time of appearance and not prior to that. And this nescience, it is stated,

becomes the cause of delusion. It is also said that this nescience is removed by the Vṛttijñāna born of the nescience and not by Svarūpajñāna. If Svarūpajñāna is not the destroyer of Ajñāna then the Ajñāna, although destroyed by the Vṛttijñāna, may reappear and cause the delusion as in the case of delusion of the silverness in the conch shell. So it is to be stated that the nescience cannot be destroyed totally since its appearance now and then like the delusion of silverness in the conch shell which proves the absence of liberation or presence of the nescience even after liberation. Both these views suggest that the nescience cannot be destroyed completely.

So it is right and logically reasonable also to state that Ajñāna is destroyed by the everlasting and dazzling Svarūpajñāna. By its association only, one's mind gains the cognitive power.⁵⁵² The Svarūpajñāna of the Lord is eternally pure and illuminious and unlimited. Therefore, there is no possibility of the presence of Ajñāna in Him. When Ajñāna is not there, then śabalatva connected to Ajñāna cannot be attributed to Him. Māyām vyudasya citśaktya^{552A} and other Smṛti passages proclaim the eternal śuddhatva and Muktatva of the Lord. So how can there be any defect in Him?⁵⁵³

EXPOSITION OF THE ŚRUTI-PASSAGES 'NISKALAM NISKRIYAM ŚĀNTAM' ETC.

The Advaitins deny Kartṛtva in the Śuddha Brahman^{553A} on the ground that, if Kartṛtva is accepted in Brahman then that would be a defect in the form of a means to possible action of agreeable efforts. It means Kartṛtva is also a cause of Śabalatva. But this view of the Advaitins is untenable. Because, if Kartṛtva is said to be the cause of Śabalatva, then why not Jñāṭṛtva? And moreover, as Kṛtṛtva is denied in Śuddha Brahman, on the same ground Jñāṭṛtva should also be denied, which is undesirable. If Kartṛtva denotes the action of movement etc., Jñāṭṛtva also indicates the action of cognizing the objects. In both, one or other type of action is involved. Further, in general, all the roots give the sense of action one or other. So if Kartṛtva is denied then Jñāṭṛtva be denied.⁵⁵⁴ Śruti passage has no partiality in denying Kartṛtva and in attributing Jñāṭṛtva. Therefore, either both have to be denied or to be admitted.

But really speaking, the Śruti passage, cited above,^{554A} never denies Kartṛtva and the like in Brahman. The Śruti⁵⁵⁵ Parāśya śaktiḥ^{555A} clearly states that Jñāna, Bala and Kriyā of the Lord are all inherent and eternal. If the previous Śruti is understood as denying the Kartṛtva then there would be contradiction between the Śruti-passages of one and the same section. Therefore, it should be known that Niskriyam

Śruti negates the merit and demerit of action in the Lord. It means, the Lord, though engages in the action of creating the world and the like is neither graced with merit nor stained with demerit. In the same way, other Śruti passages are also to be understood. The Śruti- Aśabdamasparsāmarūpan^{555B} does not deny the śabda, sparsa and the like completely, but denies Duṣṭaśabda, Duṣṭaśparsa etc. If this is not admitted, then the Niskalam Śruti is to be understood that it does deny Jñātata in Brahman. Therefore, all these are to be understood as the Lord is free from evil-sound, evil-touch, evil-form and the like. If Aśabda Śruti speaks of Him then also He becomes śabdaviṣaya, the object of expression. If the Śruti does not speak of Him, then also His śabdaviṣayatva is not disregarded. So, in either case, He is not Aśabda not being an object of śabda.⁵⁵⁶ Similarly, if Asparsa is meant as absence of touch, then Avidyā of the Advaitins cannot touch or affect the Brahman.⁵⁵⁷ If the option is given in the case of Avidyā (means Avidyā alone touches Brahman and not the other), then also expressive and primary meaning of the term Asparsam is supposed to be given up. So with implication, agreeable meaning is to be understood. In that case, the term Asparsa could be meant as not having Prākṛtasparsa - effect of influence of Prākṛtasparsa. The Śruti- Aśarīrin suggests that the Lord has no Prākṛta or material body since He has Aprākṛtaśarīta.^{557A} Further,

the Śruti describes God as Rukmavarṇa. This shows that He has Rūpa or form. It means He has no Prākṛtarūpa, but Aprākṛta one.⁵⁵⁸ Moreover, touch and form go together. Therefore, neither of them can be denied. So the Śrutis 'Aśabdam...' etc., deny evil word, evil touch, evil form and the like, and not the meritorious or auspicious words such as Nārāyaṇa, the graceful touch of Goddess Lakṣmī.

ESTABLISHING THE DIVYĀKARA (DIVINE FORM) TO THE LORD BY
ŚRUTI, SMṚTI AND YUKTI

The Śruti- Āditya Varnam tamasaḥ parastat^{558A} declares that the Lord is free from nescience and He is brilliant or illuminating with extra-ordinary unlimited prowess.⁵⁵⁹ Here is the argument wherever there is colour, there is touch and both these are in form. This rule is not merely applicable to the material world of things, but applies also to the non-material domain. The Śruti-Rukmavarṇam tamasaḥ parastāt states that colour, touch, form and the like exist also there in the Aprākṛta place. This can also be proved by the reason Tamasaḥ parastāt which means away from ignorance i.e., Prākṛti.⁵⁶⁰ Therefore, on the basis of the Śruti and Yukti stated therein, the Ākāra of the Lord is described as He has unlimited eyes, arms, legs, faces and the like. It means He is Viśvarūpin. So the Lord's presence in the Prākṛta things, does not become

Prākṛta and also does not get affected. He is eternally Aprākṛta bliss-natured. He has the forms of Sukha, Jñāna and the like and not the forms of Pancabhūtas.⁵⁶¹ Though He shows the single world of things in manifold forms at the same time in different places, He is unaffected with Prākṛta contents. As the Māyā, the causes of material creation, is not heard as related to Him, His form is of knowledge and bliss and is free from Māyā. The form of the Lord is all-pervasive in the same way.⁵⁶²

And the term Kāya, when derivatively explained, conveys the following sense: 'Ka' means Sukharūpa and Aya means Jñānarūpa. So Kāya denotes Sukharūpa and Jñānarūpa of the Lord.^{562A} In the same way, even when the term Śarīra is referred to the Lord, His Sukharūpa remains unharmed. The term Śarīra, when etymologically explained, conveys the following meaning: 'Śa' means happiness, 'Ra' means enjoyment and 'īra' means knowledge.^{562B} Thus, Śarīra means He who experiences and enjoys His own happiness and knowledge. The form of the Lord abounds in happiness from top to bottom. All the limbs are of bliss-natured and are of extra-ordinary prowess.⁵⁶³

Another Śruti ascribes Aśariratva to the Lord. But it does not mean that the very concept of form is negated. It

only denies the presence of the material body, as is in the case of aerial speech, where body is not denied totally but unseen body is accepted and taken into account. Because, without the organ there cannot be the articulation of any speech. In the same way, Aśarīratā with regard to the Lord, stands for Alaukikatā.⁵⁶⁴ If there is Śarīra, there is no need to accept the presence of Duhkha and the like as a rule. Because, the Śarīra of the Lord is entirely different and not a product of matter. For Duhkha and the like, Śarīra is not responsible but the type of food. The Lord has been declared as Niranna in Dvāsuparna Śruti.^{564A} So He has no defects that could originate from the food (of ordinary kind). So whatever may be the objective term, that would never attribute any defects to Brahman. All the terms declare one or the other meritorious and auspicious quality of the Lord.

Now, Vādirāja refutes the view of the Advaitins that there is no Kartṛtva to Cetana of Cit-content.^{564B} If Cetana is declared as not Kartā, then there arises the difficulty. If Kartṛtva is ascribed to the Dehagatacetana, then it appears as if it refers to the both Deha and Cetana. Because, when Kartṛtva is referred to the Viśiṣṭa (Dehin), then Deha and Indriyas are also understood to have Kartṛtva. But really speaking, it does not behave proper to attribute Kartṛtva to the Jada. The Jada by nature itself, is devoid of any

Kartṛtva.⁵⁶⁵ And scholars say that Svatantraḥ kartā^{565A} that means Cetana alone is Kartā since he does different activities with means that are under his control, like the potter who is acclaimed as Kartā or doer.⁵⁶⁶ The potter uses the mud, stick, wheel and the like that are under his control. These are the external instruments for accomplishing the effect viz., pot. The mind, body etc., of the potter are the internal means. So neither the mind nor the body is the Kartā whereas Cetana or soul alone is the Kartā and all others are just related to that. The Māyā of the Advaitins also cannot contribute Kartṛtva because it is also Jada. Moreover, scholars do not agree with the idea that the Kartṛtva is specified or qualified in ordinary case. So Jada is accessory and Cetana alone is Kartā.⁵⁶⁷ Vādirāja says that, the Kartṛtva of the Lord is noticed as qualified. Viśiṣṭa. Because the Lord creates this world with accessories time, Prakṛti, Karma, that are under his control.⁵⁶⁸ And Viśiṣṭa Kartṛtva is possible in the case of the Lord, as this is the very form and not different from Him.

So far as the Lord is concerned, He is Nityamukta. or eternally free. His form (body) is eternally embodied with unlimited auspicious qualities such as power, brilliance of knowledge, bliss beauty etc.⁵⁶⁹ The embodied souls becoming favoured by His grace, get released from the bondage.

In release they always look at the blissful form of Lord Nārāyaṇa. The Śruti Yamaiveṣa...^{569A} conveys two things that the Lord removes the obstacle of the Jīvas (Jīvāccādikā) and setting aside the curtain of Paramāccādikā,^{569B} unveils His form to souls who fulfilling the prescribed course of Sādhana, become qualified for liberation. The Śruti also states that both eternally free Lord and the released souls have forms. The term Tanu in Śruti signifies this. The adjective Svām suggests that it is the Svarūpadeha and no else.⁵⁷⁰ If the body of the released souls is considered to be material then the grace of the Lord (would have to be treated as futile. The terms Svām Tanūm and Vivṛṇute indicate the nature of beginninglessness and eternality of Svarūpadeha respectively. This also proves that body in release state is other than material; it is non-material. Therefore, scholars, knowing the purport of the scriptures admit and proclaim the body of the released and of the Lord as an embodiment of Cit or spirit, Jñāna and Ānanda (bliss) and not material. The non-material body as described above⁵⁷¹ will not cause rebirth, oldage, disease and the like. So how can there be dirt of any kind to both Mukta and Nityamukta. All the released are devoid of defects. They are pure natured and enjoy desired enjoyments of various kind. So there is no śābalatva in them, both in the released souls and in the Lord.⁵⁷²

Vādirāja, at this point, emphatically denies the possibility of Śabalatva in the Lord. The inherent nature of the Lord is not Śabala but it is Śambala, that means the Lord is the bestower of extra-ordinary treasures to released souls. The Lord of the Advaitins is Śabala and of the Dvaitins is Śambala. Only an Anusvāra is added by which He becomes more powerful and destroys the Śabala Lord. Hence, no Śabalatva can be attributed to Brahman or else. He may also be understood as Śabala since He is bright and lustrous with variegated complexions.⁵⁷³

The form of the Lord is Amāyika and eternal. In this regard Vādirāja quotes the Bhagavadgītā statements.⁵⁷⁴ The Lord is described by Arjuna: He is beginningless. He has no beginning, middle and end. His universal form is so bigger that everything could be visualised. He has unlimited arms, faces, eyes and the like. Arjuna could see this Viśvarūpa, only when he was graced with the divine sight by the Lord. Thus, the form of the Lord is extra-ordinary. Therefore how can it be treated as Māyika^{574A} and material. The Lord has His own unlimited power to assume minute form as well as bigger form.⁵⁷⁵ The form, directly cognised by Arjuna, is unlimited and all-pervasive. So then how can it be formless and associated with Māyā. It cannot be.⁵⁷⁶ Moreover, the devotees who seek refuge in the Lord, get released of Māyā

by Lord's grace, how can there be Māyā in Him? He is eternally free from Māyā.⁵⁷⁷ Further, when qualified soul realizes the God in the cavity of his heart, Māyā gets burnt to ashes like a cloth. Thus, when the very sight or realization of the Lord destroys the Māyā how could God become Māyāmāyā? It can never be. His blissful form is eternally of same nature, and unaffected.⁵⁷⁸

CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF THE PURUṢASŪKTA

The exposition of Puruṣasūkta, given by Vādirāja, tackles the views of the Advaitins. The Advaitins hold that the Lord described in the Puruṣasūkta is Māyāmāyā. He is formless. The world is not different from Him. There is identity of the Lord with the embodied soul and the like. But in this hymn, the Lord Brahman is extolled as having wonderful form with unlimited heads, hands and the like. Thus, the whole hymn describes Brahman as possessing a form. The Puruṣa in this hymn is the same Nārāyaṇa or Viṣṇu and not any ordinary being. It is stated in this hymn that, he, who realizes the God as described in this hymn, attains the liberation.^{578A} If this is the fact, then how can He be the being of any ordinary type?⁵⁷⁹

So the Being described in this hymn, is Lord Viṣṇu who is spiritual, non-material, free from nescience and bestower

of the release which is non-material. If this Being would be of ordinary type, then He cannot grant the spiritual release. So there is no doubt that the Lord of this hymn is Aprākṛta or spiritual.

The Advaitins contend^{579A} that the statements Puruṣa eva idaṁ sarvaṁ etc., in the hymn, give the sense of oneness and claim that there is identity between Brahman and the embodied soul. And the Lord is not different from this world. But this view is not correct. Because, the terms in the hymn are adjectives, that qualify and denote the extraordinary nature of the Lord, and hence they cannot be referred to the embodied souls in any manner. Neither explicitly, nor implicitly, the embodied soul is described here. And moreover the Lord cannot be identical with this world, since He is Ajāda or non-material⁵⁸⁰ and the world is material. And if oneness is traced forcibly then as the world is false in the Advaita Brahman should also have to be declared as false or unreal. The Puruṣasūkta does not convey either the falsity of the world or identity of Brahman and soul. But it establishes the absolute supremacy of the Being (Lord Nārāyaṇa), reality of the world, and distinction of Brahman and soul. It also states that the entire world is under the control of the Lord. And as Lord Puruṣa (Brahman) is eternally real, the world, controlled by Him is also eternally real.

Thus, it can be said that, the Puruṣasūkta is a critical exposition of the second Brahmasūtra- Janmādyasya yataḥ. Hence, the Being of this hymn is the Brahman.⁵⁸¹ And the end of the Puruṣasūkta of the Yajurveda, Śrī and Lakṣmī are described as Lord's wives.^{581A} This also indicates that Puruṣa is Lord Nārāyaṇa.⁵⁸² (He, who knows and realizes the greatness of the Lord Puruṣa, will be favoured by the grace of the Lord, and as a result of that he attains liberation. Hence He is essentially knowable by the seekers of release. Therefore, there is no other Brahman Śabala as such. The term Brahman primarily and absolutely refers to Lord Nārāyaṇa.⁵⁸³ And devoted service of this Lord Nārāyaṇa, who is an embodiment of innumerable auspicious qualities, who has spiritual form is the only means of attaining final release. The service of other gods will not lead to that release.⁵⁸⁴

III. BHEDASOURABHA

INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM ANANTAM IN THE ŚRUTI SATYAM-

JÑĀNAMANANTAM BRAHMA^{584A}

This Bhedasourabha, after a close examination of all aspects, establishes the five-fold difference. The five-fold difference is distinction between God and the embodied, soul, distinction between God and matter, distinction among souls, distinction among matters and distinction between matter and soul.

"Difference is not merely a component part of reality, but constitutes its very essence. So much so, that to a thing is to know it as distinct from all others, in a general way and from some in a particular way...

Difference being thus Dharmisvarūpa, the so called perception of the object is nothing but the perception of its difference!"^{584B}

At the beginning, the expression Anantam in Satyam-jñānamanantam brahma of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, is examined. The Advaitins interpret the term Anantam as limitlessness in respect of time, place and entities. They contend that the limitlessness in respect of entities means Brahman is comprised of all entities and hence there is nothing other than Brahman. It means Brahman is Sarvavasturūpa or of the

form of all entities. This view is not correct.⁵⁸⁵ Because, the very exposition of the nature of Brahman, according to the Advaita is Brahman is not Jada or insentient matter. He is not unreal. If it is admitted that Brahman is Sarva-vastvātmaka or identical with all entities then it would be contrary to their contention. As matter is also one of the entities, accordingly, Brahman would have to be of the form of matter. But the statement acclaims that Brahman is Jñānasvarūpa or of the form of knowledge. So the interpretation as the form of matter is not agreeable. Further, in the Advaita, world is unreal and this passage declares Brahman as real. So how can it be of the form or nature of unreal matter? There lies eternal difference between real and unreal. So the term Ananta conveys that Brahman is limitless in respect of place as It is present everywhere. (all-pervasive). It is also limitless in respect of time since It is present in all the three times, viz., past, present and future. Thus the expression does not convey the sense of Brahman as of the nature of all entities. That which is all-pervasive cannot be an Anurūpa or of the atomic form and that which is eternal, cannot be claimed to be non-eternal like pot, cloth and the like that are also atomic. Because in the first two cases pervasiveness and eternity of Brahman are declared. So how can the word Anantam convey the sense of identity with atomic and non-eternal

entities like pot, cloth and the like.⁵⁸⁶ Brahman is described as different due to Its limitlessness nature in respect of time and place. But how is that It is identified in respect of entities. If identity, with entities, is intended, then It must also be identified with time and place since these two also fall under the category of entities. This leads to the absurdity of expressing Brahman as Deśakālasvarūpa,⁵⁸⁷ or of the form or nature of time and place. But the attribute of pervasiveness, in respect of place and time, makes it clear that Brahman is distinct from Deśa and Kāla. Because, difference between pervasive and pervaded is ever established. Thus, the expression of identity with entities leads to two defects: identity with insentient matter world and identity with place and time.

As Anantatva or limitlessness in respect of place and time is understood as Brahman is present in all places and times, in respect of entities also it should be known that Brahman is present in all (limitless) entities. The limitlessness is to be understood in all the three cases with the same application.⁵⁸⁸ Vādirāja gives one more agreeable meaning.^{588A} The term Anantam means being the substratum or support to all entities. As Brahman is the sole substratum of limitless auspicious qualities He is also support of all limitless entities. Here it is to be noted that though

Brahman is the substratum or support to place, time and entities, He is different from them. But in the case of auspicious qualities, He is not Guṇābhinna or not different from the qualities. He is very embodiment of those qualities. In this sense, He is Guṇāśraya or the locus of auspicious qualities, Guṇābhinna or identical with them and Guṇavyāpta or pervaded by them. It is also meant that there is no limit of Brahman in being the support of limitless entities and there is no limit of entities having the support of Brahman.⁵⁸⁹ 'Ananta' is that which has no limit. Anta means limited association in respect of place and time with some entities; and that which has the association of all the times, places and all entities, is called Ananta. Thus, Guṇānantya means Brahman having the association of all auspicious attributes. In this sense, there is no difference or difficulty in realizing the significance of limitlessness.⁵⁹⁰ The relation in respect of place and time is of the Ādhārā-dheya-type or the support and the supported — since Brahman is the Ādhāra and place and time are Adheyas. In the case of the qualities the relation is Ādhārādheya and also Guṇa-guṇibhāva.^{590A} Brahman is Ādhāra and the qualities are Ādheya.

RELEVANCE OF THE GIVEN INTERPRETATION

The expression Anantam is to be understood accordingly, so that it should not lead to any confusion or contradiction. Otherwise, that may show the ignorance of understanding of the reality in respect of entities and also of Brahman being identified with all entities. And moreover, the sense of identity degrades or lessens the greatness of Brahman. Therefore it is not agreeable to regard identity. Further, the sense of identity stands opposed with other scriptural passages like Sa ca Brahavidāpnotiparam^{590B} and the like wherein the term Param glorifies Brahman as distinct and supreme.⁵⁹¹

In fact, there is no difference of opinion with regard to limitlessness in respect of time and place. The difference of opinion lies only in the third aspect that is whether in respect of entities and in respect of qualities. Therefore, Vyāsa has specifically clarified and explained as Mahadgunatavat yamanantamahuh^{591A} stating the Lord is Ananta, being endowed with limitless auspicious qualities. Really speaking, it is because of the attributes of Vyāptatva or pervasion, and limitlessness in respect of qualities, Nityatva or eternity, Guṇānantya/is the primary meaning of the expression Anantam.⁵⁹² Vadiraja critically examines all the terms of the passage in their fitness with the context.

Brahman is extolled as Satya or real since He affords the very Sattva or existence or sustenance to this entire world. This conveys the sense of creation, sustenance and destruction. As Sattva stands for three functions of the Lord He is called Satya.⁵⁹³ The Advaitins interpret the term Satya as Abadhya.^{593A} According to this It is a subject of sublation. But this is not the meaning intended here. Because, in continuation of that passage, we find other passages that deliberately deal with the sustenance and destruction of the world by the Lord.^{593B} Therefore, here 'Satya' means the sole and independent creator, of the world, which is also real and stands distinct from Him.⁵⁹⁴

As it is said that Brahman is the creator of this world, He is also the destroyer. It is clear from the statements - Advatettica,^{594A} Annam Brahmeti vyajānāt^{594B} and the like. Thus the very fact of destroying the creation is the Annatva. So here Satya means destroyer of the creation.⁵⁹⁵ (Annamaya Kośa)^{595A}

Now the term Satya means also He, who affords the very life or sustenance to this world. This is denoted by the term Prāṇa. The Lord is described as Prāṇamaya that means the protector of the world. Both Satya and Prāṇa give the same sense.⁵⁹⁶

The second term Jñānam in the passage is explained with reference to Manomaya and Vijñānamaya Kośas. Brahman is described as Jñānam or knowledge due to His possessing the knowledge of all the entities in general and particular. The general knowledge of the Lord is complete and limitless in all respects. He knows limitless entities in this created world. Brahman has also specified (particular) knowledge of all entities. This is indicated by the prefix Vi in term Vijñāna of the Vijñānamayakośa. This is the knowledge of limitless entities with regard to special characteristics. Hence He is also called Sarvajña⁵⁹⁷ or Omniscient. This Sarvajñatva is explained in two Prakaraṇas - Manomaya or sheath of mind and Vijñānamaya⁵⁹⁸ or sheath of intellect.

Now the last term Anantam of the passage is explained in the Ānandamaya Prakaraṇa. Anantam means Pūrṇa, complete in all respects. Brahman is Pūrṇa or perfect with attributes Ānanda or bliss and the like. So the limitlessness is in respect of attributes and not in respect of entities. If Anantatva is meant as identity with the entities, then the very Ānandamaya-prakaraṇa becomes not only irrelevant but also opposed to the other passages. If the world becomes identical with the nature of Brahman, then the passages Tatsr̥tvātadevānuprāviśat^{598A} and others become meaningless. The intended entrance is possible only when created world

is real and distinct from the creator. So Anantatva is the Pūrnatva or completeness of Ānandādigūṇas of the qualities like bliss and the like and not the identity ś is contended by the Advaitins.⁵⁹⁹ Thus, like Sarvajñatva, or Omniscience Ānandapūrnatva or perfection in respect of bliss is also a characteristic attribute which is explained in the Ānandamaya Prakaraṇa. And it is denoted by the term Anantam. It may be questioned as to why the term Ānanda is not used in passage instead of Anantam? The term Anantam serves double purpose. The term not only denotes Ānanda as shown above, but also the limitless nature of other attributes such as all-pervasiveness, omnipotence necessary for the creation and the like. The mention of Anantam in the passage is to state that all the attributes are complete also individually.⁶⁰⁰

The attributes are limitless in number. Each attribute is also all-pervasive and of the nature of limitless attributes. So the description of the six Prakaraṇas is the critical exposition of the Mantra Satyam Jñānamanantam brahma. In this way, the absolute distinction between the Lord and the world of souls and matter is established.

JUSTIFICATION OF THE ABOVE ORDER AND INTERPRETATION

The above order and interpretation is agreeable in all respects. Relevancy in two ways, is noted here. The statement Satyamjñānāmanantam brahma suggests the order in terms one by one. By the term Satyam, the sole doership (Sarvakartṛtva) of the Lord is explained. And this Sarvakartṛtva necessarily requires Sarvajñatva or omniscience. And this is described by the word Jñānam. At last as an essence, Guṇānantya or limitlessness in respect of qualities is explained. This Guṇānantya relates to all attributes of the Lord headed by Ānanda and declares that each attribute is limitless also. Secondly, this order is indicated and upheld by the Brahmasūtras also. The second Sūtra mentions the creation etc., of this world.^{600A} This creation is placed first and others next in the order. So the order of the inquiry of this passage has thus the support in two ways.⁶⁰¹ These two ways do not clash each other. Moreover we find another passage as Satyamjñānamānandam brahma.^{601A} It is called Samākhya Śruti. Here the word Ānandam is in the place of Anantam. It evidently states that the term Anantam is to be understood in respect of attributes, Ānanda and the like. In this way it is substantiated by the Samākhya Śruti.⁶⁰² The presence of Ānanda in the Samākhya Śruti does not negate the possibility of other qualities. It implies and stands for other qualities also. Thus Ānantya or limitlessness is proved in respect of qualities Ānanda and the like.⁶⁰³

The passage Nālpe sukham^{603A} states that, the Pūrṇatva or perfection is the cause of bliss, and this also promises the Pūrṇatva or perfection of each attribute of the Lord. The Lord is eternally contended, He is complete in respect of beauty, prowess, knowledge and the like. There is no occasion to have defects of sorrow and the like. Hence, He is eternally blissful. The limitlessness becomes the cause to prove Pūrṇatva or perfectness.⁶⁰⁴

Even if the Vastvānantya or limitlessness in respect of entities is taken, it is nothing but the Lord's eternal relation as the primary support of all the limitless entities.⁶⁰⁵ The relation of the Lord with the Guna, Kriyā and the like of all the entities is also evident. Here the Vastu is nothing but an attribute of the Lord. Just as one who has abundant wealth, is called Dhanapūrṇa, so also Brahman is called Gunapūrṇa since He is endowed with limitless qualities.⁶⁰⁶ In defence of this, Vādirāja quotes some Bhāgavata statements.^{606A} As there being no limit in respect of qualities, the Lord is glorified as Anantam.⁶⁰⁷

If the term Pūrṇatva in respect of qualities such as Sarvajñatva etc. of the Lord is not admitted then, it would be as good as treating the Lord as Alpañña, Aññāni in some places. But nowhere and by no means the Lord is described

as either Alpañā or Aññāni. As the Lord is all-pervasive (Dharmin), His auspicious qualities (Dharmas) are also all-pervasive like the form, taste etc. of the objects. The Dharmas, other than Samyoga, are all-pervasive in Dharmin like Dharmin itself.⁶⁰⁸ Therefore the state of limitedness cannot be ascribed to the attributes of the Lord. Neither the Lord nor His attributes are the products of Māyā. As He is eternally real, His limitless qualities are also eternally real.

Thus, the passage Satyam Jñānāmanantam brahma disproves the two contentions of the Advaitins, identity of Brahman and soul and qualitylessness of the Lord. It proves Gūṇa-pūrṇatva or perfectness in respect of qualities of the Lord and also the absolute distinction between the Lord and the souls.⁶⁰⁹

ESTABLISHING JĪVEŚVARABHEDA BY SHOWING IRRELEVANCY AND CONTRADICTION IN OTHER BHĀṢYAS

Lord Vedavyāsa has composed the Brahmasūtras to determine the support of the scriptural passages. These Sūtras show the way of interpretation and hence are called Sūtras.⁶¹⁰ They are Nirṇāyakas or determining^{and} the scripture is Nirṇeya or the determined. The purport or import of the scriptures should be understood in the light of the Brahma-

sūtras.⁶¹¹ Therefore, any interpretation, that is not in accordance with the Brahmasūtras, is not correct. Vādirāja declares that the Bhāṣya^{611A} or the commentary written by Madhva, alone is relevant since it is written in accordance with the Brahmasūtras.

The Advaitins interpret that the Puccha in the passage of the Taittīriya Śruti viz., Brahma Puccham Pratiṣṭhā^{611B} is Brahman. They also say that the Ānandamaya is a Kośa. But in the forthcoming passages of that context, Asanneva sa bhavati, Asadbrahmeti veda cet, Asti brahmeti cedveda and^{611C} the like the word Brahman is used twice and Ānandamaya is described as Brahman only. The Sūtra Ānandamayo'bhyaśat also lays down that Ānandamaya is Brahman.^{611D} So treating Ānandamaya as Kośa and describing Puccha as Brahman is irrelevant to the context and also against the Brahmasūtra.⁶¹²

The term Ānandamaya is to be understood as Brahman and not as Puccha. Because, in the four Prakaraṇas of Ānandamaya and so on, the object of praise is Aṅgin and not the Aṅga (limb). Likewise in the fifth Prakarana of the Ānandamaya, the Aṅgin (Puruṣa) alone is to be taken to be the object of praise and not any limb such as Puccha. The word Brahma in Brahma Puccham Pratiṣṭhā^{612A} does not suggest that the Puccha is Brahman but it implies that the Puccha (foot) of

Brahman is also Ānandapūrṇa or blissful. So the word Brahman is to be taken to mean Ānandamaya (Āṅgin) and not as Puccha (Aṅga).

The Advaita-interpretation states that Ānandayama is a Kośa.^{612B} But it is irrelevant; because as the Kośa is insentient the Puccha, its part, must also be insentient. So Brahmatva cannot be attributed to that insentient Puccha. In the Dvaita view, as all the limbs are of the blissful form of Brahman, they are also blissful and are of the very nature of Brahman and as such, ^{there is} no such irrelevancy.⁶¹³

If Brahmatva is attributed to Aṅga (Puccha) alone, then how can there be Brahmatva in the Āṅgin and if Abrahmatva is ascribed to the Āṅgin then how can there be Brahmatva to the part (Puccha) of that Āṅgin. Thus both the arguments show the defects in the Advaita-interpretation. In Brahman, who is Jñānarūpa or the very form of knowledge, there are delight, bliss and the like. These are also the very nature of Brahman. When Brahman is Sukharūpa or blissful, Brahmatā is there in that bliss. In the passage Brahman is described as Ānandaṁ brahma kaṁ brahmā^{613A} and the like. This states that Ānanda or bliss is Brahman, blissful is Brahman. So Brahmatā is there to that Ānandamaya in complete and not only in a part viz., Puccha.⁶¹⁴ It is strange to know as to

how the Advaitins, who are very much particular about the identity of soul and Brahman, are not ready to admit the identity of Aṅga and Aṅgin that constitutes or comprises of one and the same object.⁶¹⁵ When Puccha can be Brahman then why can't the middle portion of that body? If an Ox is made of clay, the tail should also necessarily be of clay.⁶¹⁶

Moreover, Brahmatva is evident in both Aṁśin and Aṁśas and it is complete in all respects. The passage Pādam brahma karau brahma^{616A} clearly mentions that Brahmatā is seen in all the parts. It glorifies the limbs of Brahman as having Brahmatā being complete in all respects.⁶¹⁷ The Pūrṇatva or perfection described in passage of Brahman, has been realized by the knowers like Brahman and others. Yaśodā is the witness in this regard who saw the entire world in the graceful mouth of Lord Kṛṣṇa.^{617A} So all the limbs of Brahman are all-pervasive and hence are of the nature of Brahman.

In the Bhṛguvalli of Taittirīyopaniṣad, while delineating the definition of Brahman, it is described that creation and the like of this world take place from Ānanda and the same Ānanda as Brahman is praised at the Ānandamaya-prakarṇa of the Brahmavalli.^{617B} So the Ānandamaya is Brahman.⁶¹⁸ By the passage Brahma Pucchaṁ pratiṣṭha,^{618A} if Brahmatva is restricted to Puccha only then, according to the passage

Ānanda ātma,^{618B} Ānandatva is to be restricted to the soul of Brahman. Then it implies that there is no Ānanda in Brahman denoted by Puccha. So if Brahmatva is negated in the Ānandamaya, then the Ānandatva is to be negated in Brahman. Thus, the entire exposition of the Advaitins becomes absurd and contradictory.⁶¹⁹

If the Ānandamaya is the material sheath, then how can there be Brahmatva in its Puccha? And by referring to Puccha, form is to be admitted. But in the Advaita, Brahman is formless (Nirākāra).^{619A} By admitting Brahmatva in the Puccha of material sheath which is deprived of Brahmatva it appears as if the organ is cut off from the Ānandamaya. It is as good as saying that the passage is Atatvavedaka or not imparting the right knowledge.⁶²⁰ And if for attributing Brahmatva, Puccha is taken to be Adhiṣṭhāna or substratum, then Brahmatva becomes Āropita or superimposed. And whatever is superimposed is unreal. So Brahmatva would become unreal. And how is that this Brahmatva is attributed to Puccha alone which is a limb and why not to other limbs of that Ānandamaya.

Therefore, Brahmatva should not be restricted to the Puccha. It should also to be referred to the Ānandamaya as a whole. Then only there would be concordance among scriptural passages Ānandam brahmeti vyajñāt, Brahma puccham pratisthā and the like.^{620A}

If the Advaitins have high regard to scripture, let them admit Brahmatva to Puccha but they cannot have the privilege of discarding Brahmatva to Ānandamaya (sheath). Abrahmatva of Ānandamaya is nowhere heard in scriptures.⁶²¹ The reason given by the Advaitins as Brahmatva, since specified in terms with Puccha, is not there in Ānandamaya; gives chance to fabricate counter reason as Brahmatva, since not referred to Ānandamaya cannot be there in Puccha as it being the part of Ānandamaya or sheath. Thus mere reason leads to misinterpretation. Sometimes it also spoils the contextual purport. Therefore, that reason alone which has the support of either perception or right scriptures is valid. The reason, given by the Dvaitins,^{has} the support of both scriptures and Brahmasūtras. Hence, Ānandamaya is not a sheath. Brahmatva is to be referred to both Ānandamaya and Puccha.⁶²² However, the reason advanced by the Advaitins may be appealing, if it is against the Sūtra, then it will be futile.

The Advaitins contend that the Kartṛtva, in respect of creation etc., of the world though a characteristic is a contingent in pure Brahman.^{622A} It is a contingent characteristic and not a constituent characteristic. The above definition may be seen in the Śabala Brahman who is Avidyāśrita. And it is this Śabala Brahman who is the Kartā of the creation etc., of the world.

While interpreting the second Sūtra Janmādyasya yataḥ, the Advaitins hold that this lakṣaṇa or definition is a contingent characteristic of Brahman. They say that Śabala Brahman, a product of Māyā, is the creator etc., of this world.^{622B} Hence, the above definition of the Sūtra applies to this Śabala Brahman. It is as good as attributing Jagatkāraṇatva or world-creatorship to Māyā. But the contention of the Sūtrakāra is different. The second Sūtra expresses the fact of Brahman being the efficient cause (Nimittakāraṇa) like a potter in making a pot. And this Sūtra does not state the Tatastha lakṣaṇa as the Advaitins believe. Because, after mentioning Brahman in the first Sūtra, the Sūtrakāra is giving the definition of Brahman in the second Sūtra. There is no necessity to define Avidyā or Śabalabrahman in the second Sūtra which is out of context.⁶²³

According to innumerable usages and also other aphorisms, a word having the suffix 'Tasi' conveys the sense of all cases.^{623A} In view of this Yataḥ in the Sūtra is to be meant as 'Yena' (instrumental case). Then the Śruti conveys that the Lord is the creator of this world. He is the efficient cause. He need not get modified Himself and need not appear in the form of the world as the Advaitins contend.

If the definition of Kartṛtva is attributed to Māyā,

then the entire creation and the like of the world, would become without a Kartā.⁶²⁴ It is not sound and tenable to hold that without a Kartā, effects get originated. And if, along with Māyā, Brahman is taken to be a cause of creation, then the purpose of ascribing Tātsasthya to Brahmalaksana stands unserved. And further, neither the Śruti nor the Sūtra promises two types of origination of an effect with Kartā and without Kartā.

In the first Sūtra, Brahman is described as an object of inquiry and in the second Sūtra as a reason to have inquiry. His constituent characteristic of creation etc., is explained. In the same way, the Śruti passages Tadvijī-
ñāsasva tadbrahmeti^{624A} and the like, state Brahman as an object of inquiry. And other passages Yato vā imāni bhūtāni
jāyante^{624B} and so on, deal with constituent characteristics of Brahman, as the cause of inquiry. If the definition of Kartṛtva is not referred to aim at Brahman then why the mention of Brahman, as an object of inquiry in the first Sūtra, is made? And if it is held that the definition aims at Māyā, then one has to pursue the inquiry of Māyā to attain the same. By this, the very concept of Brahman and the inquiry of Him stand dismissed.⁶²⁵ Hence, taking into account Brahman as the primary object of inquiry, definitions are to be explained.

The Advaitins' contention of attributing Tatasthatva to the definition of Brahman does serve the purpose of overcoming the contradiction with other passages like Niṣkriyaṃ niṣkalaṃ śāntaṃ, is baseless. Really speaking there is no contradiction. The passage Niṣkriyaṃ niṣkalaṃ śāntaṃ^{625A} does not negate the Kartṛtva of Brahman but negates secular effects such as birth, death and the like. So there is no contradiction among scriptural passages and hence there is no scope to attribute Tatasthatva to the definition of Brahman. Like Time, Brahman is also an efficient cause. But He is the primary efficient cause unlike Time and the like. So there is no possibility to describe Brahman as the material cause by any means.⁶²⁶

The Dharma or the characteristic feature that is present only in all the defined objects and not in others, is called Lakṣaṇa or definition. That is the Asādhāraṇadharmā or the unique feature of that entity. When this is what is meant by Lakṣaṇa, then how can the Lakṣaṇa of Jagatkāraṇatva, aiming at Māyā, the Upādānakāraṇa of the world, be the Lakṣaṇa of Brahman? And if its application or presence is admitted in both Brahman and the Māyā, then Lakṣaṇa becomes Ativyāpta (too-wide).^{626A} Further, Lakṣaṇa of Jagatkāraṇatva, aiming at Māyā as said above, cannot be the Lakṣaṇa of Brahman. Thus, the attributing Tātasthya to the definition of

Jagatkāraṇatva makes the very definition as the definition of Māyā and not of Brahman. Thus, Tatasthalakṣaṇa spoils the very proposition of the context-inquiry of Brahman.^{626B}

By disregarding the Tatasthalakṣaṇa, it is proved that Brahman cannot get associated with Māyā and hence Upādāna-kāraṇatva or the fact being the material cause cannot be attributed to Brahman. Further, Tatasthalakṣaṇa can also not be understood as Brahman is the substratum (Adhiṣṭhāna) for the superimposition (Āropa) of Māyā, the Upādāna according to the Advaitins of Jagat. Because, neither in the Brahmasūtra nor in the Śruti, Āropa is described as an object of inquiry. Otherwise, the Sūtrakāra could have composed the second Sūtra as Āropasya Yataḥ instead of Janmādyasya yataḥ and the Śruti would also have explained the Āropa deliberately. Therefore the term Yataḥ in the Sūtra and the Śruti, is to be meant as Brahman and to be construed with Tad that literally denotes Brahman. Thus, there is no reference to Māyā by any means.⁶²⁷

The contention of the Advaita that Lakṣaṇa is Tatastha, since Brahman is Nirguṇa^{627A} is also untenable.^{627B} The Lakṣaṇa conveys the attributes of Brahman one or another. And if on the basis of Nirguṇa-Śruti, Tatasthatva is attributed to the Lakṣaṇa, then that leads to the defect of mutual

dependence. If Nirgunatva or attributelessness would be the primary import of the Śruti then Lakṣaṇa can be proved as Tatastha and if the Tatasthatva of Lakṣaṇa is proved, Nirgunatva can be proved. Thus there is Anyonyāśraya or defect of mutual dependence. So the Lakṣaṇa cannot become Tatastha with regard to Brahman.⁶²⁸

Now Brahman cannot be the Upādānakāraṇa or material cause of the world. Because, He is Nirvikāri (not subject to modification). Hence He is described as the creator and so on in the Sūtra as well as in the Śruti. Brahman not being subject to modification, is acclaimed as Niskriyā in the Śruti. It also means that though He gets engaged in the creation and the like, He is not affected by the results such as Punya, or merit, ^{and} Pāpa or demerit. In this sense, He is called Akartā or non-doer.

There is no proper direction in the approach of the Advaitins since they, sometimes neglecting the Śruti, resort to the Sūtra and sometimes disregarding the Sūtra, resort to the Śruti. E.g. while explaining the Śruti Asya Lokasya...^{629A} the term Ākāśa is understood as Brahman with the help of the Sūtra Ākāśastallīṅgāt;^{629B} but while explaining Ānandamaya, the determining Sūtra Ānandamayobhyāsāt is given up, and it is explained as Kośa.^{629C} Thus there is irrelevancy in the Advaita-interpretation.

The Śruti Sa idam sarvamsrjata^{629D} clearly states that Brahman is the creator of this world and not the material cause.⁶³⁰ If Kartṛtva is absolutely unseen in Brahman then this passage would have to aim at something else. But nowhere in the Śruti and the Sūtra, Kartṛtva of Brahman is negated. In the first Sūtra instruction is given to engage in an inquiry of Brahman. Thus, having instructed in the first Sūtra, there is no need and occasion to define Māyā (Ajñāna) in the second Sūtra. So there is no scope to Upādānatva attribute/an attribute of Māyā, to Brahman.⁶³¹

The Upādāna or the material cause cannot itself modify into an effect.
 /So the Prakṛti being Upādāna cannot modify itself as the world. It requires a Kartā or a creator to modify as the world.⁶³²
 So the creator is needed for any creation. Otherwise, the very argument goes in favour of Nirīśvarasāṅkhyās, who admit Prakṛti as an independent cause^{632A} for the creation. Hence the Kartṛtva, willingly or unwillingly is to be accepted without any alternative.⁶³³ Further the Kartṛtva is not seen in insentient matter. So Brahman, the supreme being, must be admitted as the Kartā. Referring to the Niskriyatva passage if Kartṛtva is negated then owing to Nirguṇa passage, Ajñāna must be negated. As the soul is described a dependent Kartā in the scriptures,^{633A} there is no room for doubt whether Brahman is the sole Kartā. Brahman is the independent Kartā.⁶³⁴

The passage stating Niskriyatva, denies the Vikriyā or modification in Brahman and not the Kriyā or action. If Lakṣaṇa of Kartrtva, owing to Niskriya passage is Tatastha in Brahman, then Ajnāna must also be taken to mean Tatastha in Brahman owing to the Śruti Ekamevādvitīyam brahmā.⁶³⁵ Vādirāja interprets this passage in the most appealing manner.

In the Advaita, Brahman and Ajnāna are since beginningless. So Ajnāna is to be admitted as second, other than Brahman. The world, then, would be the third one. If the Advitīya Śruti is taken for granted to refute the second one, then, by that, Ajnāna, being second, stands negated and not the world which is the third.^{635A}

Thus, the Advaita-interpretation of the Sūtra and the Śruti gives scope to the defects Ativyāpti^{635B} (attributing Brahma Lakṣaṇa to Avidyā), Asāmbhava^{635C} (negating Kartrtva as Lakṣaṇa) and the like. And hence it is not in accordance either with the Sūtra or with the Śruti.

By the Sūtra, Jamādyasya yataḥ the Brahmalakṣaṇa is given. It is acclaimed that Brahman is Pūrṇa in respect of power, knowledge and the like. For the creation of this wonderful world unlimited knowledge, will, effort, power,

kindness and the like are essential. The Lakṣaṇa of Sṛṣṭyā-dikarṭṛtva, referred to in the Sūtra, is also a Guṇa. Thus by the Lakṣaṇasūtra, Guṇapūṛṇatva or perfectness in respect of the qualities of Brahman is proved.⁶³⁶ By this Lakṣaṇasūtra itself, His absolute distinction from the world of souls and matter is also proved. As Brahman is described the creator, the sustainer, the destroyer, the bestower of knowledge and the like, His Supreme Superiority is also proved. The same Sūtra, delineating the Lakṣaṇa of Jagat-karṭṛtva or creatorship of the world of Brahman (who is absolutely real) establishes reality of the world too.

The Abheda or identity of Brahman with these qualities as explained in the passage Neha nānāsti kincana^{636A} is also suggested by the Sūtra. The fact of Abheda in His qualities is also a merit and is the very nature of Brahman. It means Brahmatva is the very nature of the qualities.⁶³⁷ Brahman is the possessor of all qualities. There is identity between quality and their possessor. There is also the Guṇāguṇībhāva or the relation of the quality and the qualified. To effect these two, the Viśeṣa is to be admitted. These Viśeṣas are infinite in Brahman and help for Bhedavyavahāra as 'knowledge of Brahman' and the like. These Viśeṣas are also the very attributes of Brahman and are of the very nature of Brahman. Otherwise the very usage or expression would be meaningless. All this has the sanction of the Sūtras.⁶³⁸ When Brahman is

declared as the creator, He must have the defectless form. A formless one cannot act and create something. The blissful form of Brahman is glorified in both the Sūtras and Śrutis.^{638A} If the graceful and blissful form is not admitted, then Brahman would cease to get engaged in creation like a potter, lacking hands, cannot create a pot.⁶³⁹

Thus has been shown with relevant examples, irrelevancy of the Advaita-interpretation and relevancy of the Dvaita view.

BHEDA ESTABLISHING THROUGH BRAHMASŪTRAS AND THE INTERPRETATION OF AIKYA ŚRUTI

Really speaking, all the Brahmasūtras declare Bheda or absolute distinction of Brahman from the soul. But some Sūtras do not state the distinction openly. But it is beyond doubt that distinction is nowhere denied. In some Sūtras, apparently it appears as if distinction is denied and identity is accepted. But taking into account the contextual reference of the scriptural passage, Adhikaraṇa and the like, it is evident that distinction is the primary import of all the Brahmasūtras. Vādirāja deals with those Sūtras that ultimately aims at the absolute distinction of Brahman from the soul.

As already said, there are a good number of Sūtras that

establishe distinction, but the Sūtra Sthityadanābhyām ca^{639A} (I.iii.7) is taken first as it involves Yukti or reasoning and as the work is named Yuktimallikā.⁶⁴⁰ In this Sūtra soul and Brahman are described as abiding in the physic. The soul reaps or eats the fruits of his deeds whereas Brahman, without eating, dwells there with His blissful nature. Thus the two reasons as eating the fruits of the deeds and absence of eating, prove the distinction between soul and Brahman.

The Sūtra Śarīraścobhayeṇ hi bhedenainamadhīyate^{640A} (I.ii.20) explains that Śarīra jīva is not an Antaryāmin or indweller. It is the Paramātman who is Antaryāmin. So Paramātman is the supporter and soul is the supported. So there is difference between the two.⁶⁴¹ This Sūtra is to determine the purport of the Śruti Ya ātmani tiṣṭhan...^{641A}

There are some Sūtras quoted here wherein the term Bheda is present and that states distinction clearly. Bhedavyapadeśacca (I.i.17), this Sūtra is in the Ānandamayādhikaraṇa. This states that the Ānandamaya is Viṣṇu and not others, since distinction lies even in the Mukti state. And it is repeatedly stressed in Taittirīya Śruti.^{641B} As the Bheda is there even in the Mukti, it is evident that the Bheda is eternal. Bhedavyapadeśāt (I.iii.5) this Sūtra

deals with the Ātharvānaśruti-Juṣṭam yadā...^{641C} It promises that a devotee should think of and realize Viṣṇu as distinct from him. Bhedavyapadeśācchānyah (I.i.21), this Sūtra specifies that the Antaryāmin is distinct from souls like Indra and others. The Sūtra- Viśeṣanabhedavyapadeśābhyāṃ ca netarau, (I.ii.22) deals with the passage, Yah sarvajnah...^{641D} and states that Viṣṇu is distinct from Kṣarakṣarajīvas^{641E} as He is Omniscient and self-contained.⁶⁴²

Further, two Sūtras Anupapattestu na Śācīrah (I.ii.3) and Netaronupapattēh (I.i.16) justify the distinction of soul and Brahman with proper reasons. At first, it is stated that the attributes of soul are distinct from the attributes of Lord Viṣṇu. Hence there is Bheda. The second states that Viṣṇudharma of bestowing the release is unseen and unreasonable in the soul. So He is Bhinna.⁶⁴³

The Sūtra Muktopasrpya vyapadeśāt (I.iii.2) states that Brahman is an object of attainment even by liberated souls. This Sūtra explains and determines the import of Ātharvāna Śruti Amṛtasyesa setuḥ.^{643A} It proves that Viṣṇu and not others is the supporter of the entire world. The Sūtra Asminnasya ca tadyogam śāsti (I.i.19) explains that the aspirant will have the Yoga (contact or association) of Ānandabrahman as a fruit in release. The Sūtra Prthagupadeśāt

(II.iii.27) dispels the apparently appearing contradiction of the Śrutis Tattvamasī,^{643B} Ahaṁ brahmāsmi,^{643C} Nityo-
nityānam,^{643D} Dvā suparṇā^{643E} and the like. It is stated that the soul is absolutely distinct from Brahman since the import of the Śrutis specifies the distinction.

Then the Sūtra coming in the fourth viz., Phalādyāya sampadyavīhāya svena śabdāt (IV.iv.1) states that the soul of the realized nature, attaining Brahman in release and being distinct from Him, experiences the desired blissful enjoyments. Brahman is Jagajjanmādikarṇa (efficient cause of the creation etc., of the world) but the souls, though liberated, do not have the creatorship of the creation of the world and the like. This is stated by the Sūtra Jagadyāpāra varjaṁ (IV.iv.17) which negates Śṛṣṭyādivyāpāra (the power of creation etc.) in the released souls.

In this way, Bheda is acclaimed in all the Sūtras composed by Vedavyāsa. This is the primary import.⁶⁴⁴

The Surottamatīrtha, in his commentary Bhāvavilāsinī gives a brief account of all the four Adhyāyas of the Brahma-sūtras and mentions that Bheda is the primary aspect enumerated in and determined by all the Sūtras. In the first Samanvayādhyāya, Brahman is described as the premier object

and import (sense) of all the words that generally refer to and convey other things. Other things are not the primier object of expression of words. So there is distinction between the two i.e. Brahman and other objects. In the second Aviredhadyāya, Brahman is declared as defectless (Doṣadūra). So He must be distinct from those who are defective. Thus, distinction is evident. In the Sadhanādyāya, Brahman is described as an object of realization. So, he, who will secure realization, must be different from Him the object of realization. In the last Phalādyāya, Brahman is stated as the bestower of release and is described as an object of attainment. So, He must be distinct from those, on whom He bestows the release.

The Śrutis that appear as if conveying the Abhedārtha, are to be understood in favour of distinction only since the Sūtras have determined that Abhedārtha is not the primary import. In the Śruti Prāṇo Vāhamasmiṣe,^{644A} it appears that Indra is Prāṇa. But he is not. The Sūtra Na Vaktur-ātmopadeśāditi cedadhyātmasambandhabhūmā hyasmin (I.1.29) determines that, at the time of Indra's declaration of this Śruti, there was special presence of Viṣṇu by name Prāṇa. This statement is like the usage 'this is fire' when an iron ball, excessively heated, is seen. In fact that is iron ball only but because of reddish colour, ball is termed as fire.

In the same way, he is Indra only. But owing to the special presence of Viṣṇu by name Prāṇa, he declares 'I am Prāṇa.' So there is no scope for conveying identity. It ultimately conveys distinction. Indra cannot be identical with Prāṇa-nāma Viṣṇu. In this way, with the help of the Sūtras, apparent contradiction of the Śrutis must be dispelled.⁶⁴⁵

Thus Vādirāja, showing accordingly the distinction as the primary import of all the Sūtras, promises that the Sūtras not only determine the Bheda but also the reality of the world. E.g. the Sūtra Sattvāccāvarasya (II.1.17) declares the real existence of the things other than Brahman.

The passage Pare'vyaye sarva ekībhavanti^{645A} seems to declare the Advaitic identity. To determine the import of this passage, the Sūtra Bhoktrāpatteravibhāgaścet syāllokavat (II.1.16) is taken into account. Here, Abheda or identity is treated as Pūrvapakṣa, and it is denied. The Sūtra states that all the liberated souls get together in release like the cows getting together in the cow-pen. This shows that the liberated souls are distinct from each other and also distinct from Brahman. In release the liberated souls are under the control of Brahman. There is only Sthānaikya or the unity of place. Thus the concept Bheda is referred to in all the Sūtras.⁶⁴⁶

This Bheda is Paramārthika and not Vyāvahārika or Mithyā, as understood by the Advaitins. It is essential for attaining the Mokṣa. The Sūtrakāra, proposing an inquiry of Brahman in the first Sūtra as an essential requirement for the attainment of release, has determined distinction in all the Sūtras since Brahman, an object of an inquiry must be distinct from those who pursue the Jijñāsa⁶⁴⁷ an inquiry.

'SAMANYAYĀDHYĀYA' ESTABLISHES GUNAPŪRNATVA THROUGH SARVA-ŚABDAVĀCYATVA

The Advaitins' view is that Brahman is Avācya or beyond all expressions. Because It is inexpressible, It is Nirguna or qualityless or unqualified. So, there is no question of Gunapūrnatva or full qualified as understood by the Dvaitins. Avācya means unable to express by any word. No word expresses Brahman by Mukhyavṛtti (primary power). Sometimes, it is on the basis of implication (Lakṣaṇā), Brahman is conveyed by some words. Words always convey one or other attribute of entities. As no word expresses Brahman and thus It being Avācya, It has no attributes. Attributes, conveyed by Lakṣaṇavṛtti or implication are not at all taken into account. This view of argument of Advaitins,⁶⁴⁸ is not correct.

In Samanyavādhya of the Brahmasūtras, not only the

words, describing ~~and~~ expressing Brahman are taken into account but also other words that express generally other entities, are also explained. It is determined that all the words primarily express Brahman only. As an example different types of words- Nāmātmaka, Līṅgātmaka and others are explained and it is shown that every word describes one or the other auspicious quality of Brahman. The word Brahman in the first Sūtra gives the sense of Guṇapūrṇatva or perfectness in respect of qualities. It is because of Brahman is Sarvaśabda-vācya, (expressible by all words). Etymologically, Brahman means Pūrṇa⁶⁴⁹ or full of perfect. The same fact is determined in all the Sūtras of the first Adhyāya.⁶⁵⁰ The Līṅga is a peculiar Dharma or characteristic denoted by a concerned word. It is in the form of an attribute. So it is as good as saying that even Līṅgātmaka words ultimately convey Brahman by describing His attributes.

The Sūtra Antastadharmopadeśāt (I.1.20), Antaryāmyadhi-
daivādīṣu taddharmavyapadeśāt (I.11.18), Adṛśyatvādiguṇako
dharmokteḥ (I.11.20), Sarvadharmopatteśca (I.1.38) etc., clearly point out that Brahman is expressed by infinite words as He possesses infinite attributes. So He is Guṇapūrṇa, perfect in respect of qualities. He is also Sarvaśabda-vācya or an object of all expressions. If words do not express distinct nature of Brahman, then what is the use of describing

Him by so many words? As Brahman is absolutely real, His attributes are also real.⁶⁵¹

All the words in the Vedas declare Brahman primarily. The Sūtras Śabdādeva pramitah (I.iii.24), Gouṇaścennātma śabdāt (I.i.6) etc., make it clear that Brahman is expressed by all the words. In Him there is Samanvaya or harmonious interpretation of different words. And this Samanvaya stands useless if attributes denoted by the words are denied in Brahman. Because, that ultimately negates the Guṇapūrṇatva of Brahman. Then the very usage Brahman in the first Sūtra would become meaningless and purposeless.⁶⁵²

The Advaita Bhāṣya or Brahmasūtra, mentions that the first quarter of first chapter makes an inquiry of Brahman dealing with some indicatory marks that are clear and explicit whereas the second and the third quarters of the same chapter refers to the indicatory marks that are not clear.⁶⁵³

But, Vādirāja opines that the indicatory marks enumerated in the Br.Sū. are all clear and explicit as they proclaim one or other characteristic or attribute of Brahman. Here, it looks that Vādirāja understands and takes the clear indicatory marks in the sense of characteristics or attributes. As a matter of fact, he refers to the first Sūtra of the third

quarter and defends that the Sūtra declares the positive
 indicative mark clearly as an attribute of the Lord, and He
 also promises that all the Sūtras aim at and glorify the
 attributes of the Lord clearly. ^{653A}

The Sūtras in the third quarter, Dyubhādyāyatanam
 svaśabdāt (I.iii.1) and Muktopasrpya vyāpadeśāt (I.iii.2)
 clearly state that Brahman is the support to heaven, earth
 and the like. He is an object of attainment by the released
 souls. Thus, here also the qualities of Brahman are described.
 So there is no scope for Nirviśeṣatva or attributelessness
 and the like. And moreover, the very expression, as Jiḥnāsā,
 inquiry of Nirviśeṣa attributeless Brahman is defective,
 because an inquiry needs the discussion of the Dharmas or
 characteristics or attributes of entities here of Brahman.

So the opinion of the Sūtrakāra is that ^{that}
 that Brahman is Pūrṇa or perfect with infinite auspicious
 attributes since He is expressed and conveyed by all the
 words. ⁶⁵⁴

ADVAITA VIEW IS CONTRADICTORY TO THE SŪTRA

Owing to the apparent contradiction, seen in the scrip-
 tural passages the Advaitins classify the Vedas as Tatvāvedaka
 or imparting true knowledge and Atatvāvedaka or imparting

wrong knowledge and they consider only Nirguṇaśrutis as Tatvāvedaka.⁶⁵⁵ Āvedaka means communicating or aiming at reality. They state that the passages that aim at reality, (since according to the Advaita, Brahman alone is reality) are Tatvāvedaka and others are Atatvāvedaka. But this classification is not at all upheld by the Sūtrakāra.⁶⁵⁶ Owing to apparent contradiction, it is not agreeable to group the scriptures as above. The third and fourth quarters of the second Adhyāya (Avirodhādhyāya) are meant to remove the apparent conflict or contradiction among the scriptural passages. There, it is proved that all scriptures are Tatvāvedakas only.

On the basis of personal experience as 'I am ignorant,' it is not befitting to attribute Ajñāna or ignorance in Brahman and it is not the contention of the Sūtrakāra also. As already stated, all the Sūtras aim at the absolute distinction between Brahman and the soul. Both are of distinct nature. So personal experience as 'I am ignorant' proves that ignorance is a quality abiding in the souls. This experience does not prove ignorance in Brahman and cannot harm the Sarvajñatva or omniscience of Brahman. The very experience indicates that the soul's experience is an outcome of ignorance.⁶⁵⁷ So the absolute distinction of the soul from Brahman remains unharmed.

BRAHMAN IS NOT NIRĀKĀRA BUT IS OF PŪRNĀNANDADEHA

In defending the Nirgunatva of Brahman the Advaitins hold that Brahman is Nirākāra. If It were Akāravān having a form, then their contention of Nirgunatva holds no good. Therefore, they state that Brahman is Nirākāra or formless. But this view is not tenable, because when Puccha (according to the Advaita) is taken to mean Brahman, the view of Nirākāratva is gone. This is closely examined and discussed in the Ānandamayādhikaraṇa.⁶⁵⁸

The passage Tasya priyameva śirah⁶⁵⁹ states that His form is blissful. Here, śirah stands for not only head but also other limbs. So all organs are blissful. The two arms of Brahman are described as Moda and Pramoda, aspects of bliss. The related passages are Modo dakṣiṇaḥ pakṣaḥ, Pramoda uttaraḥ pakṣaḥ.⁶⁶⁰ Here Moda and Pramoda are not different in nature and essence; they are the two aspects of the same bliss. The right arm called Moda also is blissful like the left one called Pramoda. So difference lies in terms and not in essence.

The passage Ānanda ātma conveys the blissful nature of the middle portion. And the passage Brahma pucchem pratiṣṭhā⁶⁶¹ refers to all the limbs of Brahman. As support of the entire body possessing all limbs, the foot is extolled particularly

and specifically. But it does not negate the blissful nature of other limbs of the body.

The word Brahman, used at the end of that Prakarana, is to be construed with all the statements accordingly. Brahman stands for Pūṇasukha or perfect bliss. The terms Priya, Moda, Pramoda and so on referred^{to} at first, declare that the form of Brahman is blissful including Puccha-foot. The 'Mayat' suffix in Ānandamaya stands for completeness or for abundance. Mayat is also Pūṇatvavācaka or expressive of perfectness and Brahman also Pūṇatvavācaka.⁶⁶² So there need not be any difference in purport or import of several scriptural passages.

In another passage, it is stated that the souls, liberated by the grace of Brahman, will have the blissful enjoyment at their own accord.⁶⁶³ This proves that Brahman, who is eternally liberated, must also be of blissful nature. Thus, the scripture as well as reasoning describe the Puccha is also of perfect bliss. So the term Brahman is Sukhavācaka.⁶⁶⁴ Brahman is Bimba or original and souls are Pratibimbas or reflections. Owing to the Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva also Sukha-rūpatva blissful nature is evident. Because, it is explained that the liberated souls, who are reflections will have blissful enjoyments for having not manifested their blissful nature.

Thus the scriptures clearly state the blissful nature of Brahman.⁶⁶⁵ In view of this, the Sūtrakāra also specifies as Ānandamaya'bhyāsāt.⁶⁶⁶

In these Śruti passages, the primary import is the blissful Brahman is not irrelevant. The Lakṣaṇā is resorted to only when the expressed sense is incompatible.⁶⁶⁷ If it is argued that 'Śiraḥ' is to be understood as like Śiraḥ then, on the same ground in Pucchaṃ Brahma, the primary sense of the term Brahman is to be given up which is not desirable even to the Advaitins.⁶⁶⁸ Moreover, in the same line, the Śruti directs as Sa vā esa puruṣavidha eva⁶⁶⁹ where there is no scope for Lakṣaṇā. The particle 'Eva' determines that Brahman is Puruṣākāra and that is blissful. It does not get modified and hence it is absolutely and eternally real.⁶⁷⁰ So Brahman is of the nature of Pūrṇānanda or perfect blissful. He is blissful with Sukharūpa and He is the Lord Nārāyaṇa. He is eternally deprived of material elements. He, being eternally blissful, becomes an object of blissful experience. Thus the Śruti promises that Ānandamaya is Sākāra with limbs that are also blissful.⁶⁷¹

INTERPRETATION OF APPARENTLY CONFLICTING STATEMENTS OF PŪRNAS SUCH AS TRAYĀNĀM... ETC., OF BHĀGAVATA⁶⁷²

(Pūrṇas also declare Bheda).

The Nirṇeya works are those that convey the determined sense and the Nirṇāyakas are those that give the clues to determine the purport of the Nirṇeya works. The Śruti, Smṛti and Purāṇas are Nirṇeya works and ~~the~~ the Brahmasūtras since determine the import of them, are called Nirṇāyakas. In the Sūtra, as already mentioned, Bheda is pointed out clearly. But in the Purāṇas, in some places, there are some statements that appear as if denying the distinction of the soul from Brahman. And this portion contradicts with other, declaring distinction. At this juncture, one has to seek the help of the Nirṇāyaka works. The Nirṇeya works are original and Nirṇāyakas are the commentaries of them. So Nirṇeyas are to be understood in the light of the Nirṇāyakas.⁶⁷³

To give the correct import of the term Bhida of the Bhāgavata verse Trayāṇām... Vādirāja gives the seven senses (meanings) of the term Bhida.

- (1) Anyonyābhāva - difference of one object from another;
- (2) Bhrama - misunderstanding
- (3) Virodha - opposition
- (4) Buddhibheda - differentiating the opinion or splitting the mind;
- (5) Nāśa - destruction
- (6) Mīśraṇa - mixing up and
- (7) Asaṁyoga - separate existence.⁶⁷⁴

Vādirāja also states the stock examples of these. Difference between pot and cloth is Anyonyābhāva. Mistaking rope as snake involves Bhrama. Mitrabheda is taken to mean Virodha. Buddhibheda as one of the four devices. Nāśa, destruction of a pot and the like. Mixing up of water and milk is an example of Vimśraṇa. Bifurcating or standing apart of the two armies is an example of Asamyoga. In this way, the same term conveys the seven meanings.

The Bhāgavata verse Trayāṇām... does not convey the sense of identity. This verse is spoken by Maitreya or Vidura. The same sage elsewhere in the Bhāgavata itself has made it clear that Lord Viṣṇu is supreme.⁶⁷⁵ And even the episode of Bhṛṅgu's meeting all the three deities proves that Lord Viṣṇu is supreme. Vādirāja critically examines the verse in the light of the meanings given above. He states that the term Bhida, in the verse, does not deny the Bheda of the variety of Anyonyābhāva. And hence, it does not prove the identity of three deities. He proves the fact that there is no difference of opinion so far as the three deities are concerned. The term Bhida denies the difference of opinion. It conveys that though there is gradation and difference among Lord Viṣṇu, Brahmā and Rudra in respect of nature, there is no Buddhibheda (difference of opinion) among them. Vādirāja interprets the verse skilfully and establishes that this verse does not prove any identity among the three deities.⁶⁷⁶

To know the purport of the Purāṇas and to understand their importance, it is necessary to know their types. Here Vādirāja gives the list of all the Purāṇas with classification and stresses that the purport of the Sātvika Purāṇas stands unquestioned, significant and evident. So contradiction, appearing in others, is to be warded off in the light of the Sātvika Purāṇas. The author also says that the three-fold nature of the works, means and fruits, proves it evidently that three deities are neither equal nor identical. So the above verse does not convey either equality or identity, but it does convey the sense of absence of difference of opinion among them.

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INTERPRETATION OF THE BHĀGAVATA VERSE BHAYAM DVITĪYĀBHINIVESATAH..

The Advaitins contend that the Bhāgavata verse Bhayam dvitīyābhiniveśataḥ syāt...⁶⁷⁸ affirms their identity and establishes the unreality of the world. But this contention is not correct. The Dvitiya word indicates world constituting body, family, property and the like. The word Abhiniveśa means attachment. So, the import of the verse is that one has to worship the Lord devotedly, setting aside or giving up close attachment towards worldly objects. The Dvitiya that involves world is not at all denied. So the expression does not agree with the view that 'the belief in the existence of other than Brahman' causes fear. If the word Dvitiya is

meant that there is nothing other than Brahman, then the statements- Bhajettam bhaktyā... and the like serve no purpose.⁶⁷⁹ Because, here duality of Sevyā-sevaka or master and servant variety is clearly stated. Brahman is the first who is Sevyā or the Master and the devotee, who is servant is the second. So the second, other than Brahman, is not denied, and it is also not unreal. The word Gurudevātātma in the above verse, which is an adjective of Budha, directs that his mind should get fixed on Guru and Devatā. But it does not convey the sense of identity. Therefore, with close observation and examination, one has to understand the import of the expression as it is done in the Sūtra Ākāśa-lingāt (I.1.22) where the popular and general sense of the word Ākāśa is given up and the word is aimed at conveying the sense befitting to the context as Brahman.⁶⁸⁰

It is hinted that more attachment towards this world causes fear. To be free from the fear, one has to worship the Lord with his mind fixed on preceptor and deity, with true devotion. So the world, second and other than Brahman is not unreal. We find a good number of statements in the Bhāgavata and in other Purāṇas that instruct the devotees to give up the attachment towards body, family property and the like on account of their being defectful in so many respects and to worship the lotus feet of the Lord.⁶⁸¹

In all these, it is hinted that close and more attachment towards worldly objects causes fear. But nowhere either Ātmaikya or Mithyātva of the world is stated. In the above verse, Abhiniveśa or attachment of the Dvitiya or the world is said to be given up and not the Dvitiya itself.⁶⁸² If the attachment to the world is given up, the world will not become unreal like a house will not disappear or will not become unreal when the house-holder renounces it and resorts to asceticism.

Really, all these things, including Kāla, Karman and the like are under the control of the Lord.⁶⁸³ But it is because of the close attachment, they appear as if under the control of the souls and thus cause fear. But they are not at all unreal and their very existence is not at all negated.

INTERPRETATION OF THE BHĀGAVATA VERSE AHAM BHAVAN NA CA...⁶⁸⁴

In the Śāstras and the Purāṇas, we find a good number of statements, that appear as if conveying the sense of identity. But they are to be understood in accordance with other statements in the same context.

People, who are more affectionate to each other say 'I am thou,' 'Thou are I' and the like. Here both of them cannot be identical. These are the statements spoken out of intimacy, affection, faith and the like.⁶⁸⁵ Vādirāja opines

that on such occasions if the primary sense seems to be irrelevant, then it is to be understood accordingly on implication.⁶⁸⁶

In the Bhāgavata, Haṁsarūpī-paramātmān preaches Prācetus as 'I am thou, not distinct, thou are I, wise will not see any distinction between us two.'⁶⁸⁷ Here Haṁsarūpī-paramātmān is the preceptor and Prācetus is the pupil. Paramātmān, appearing in the guise of a brahmin, teaches Puranjana, who is now born as the daughter of Vidharbha king. Puranjana is Jīvahamsa. Paramatmahamsa is teaching to Jīvahamsa. The apparent identity stated here, should not be taken literally. The preceptor, to ensue devotion in the devotee and to show his deep affection, has spoken thus. Here Paramātmahamsa is Bodhaka-teacher and Jīvahamsa is Bodhya-taught. The Lord wants the soul to get uplifted who is eligible for realizing the philosophical truth but who is now deeply engaged in worldly enjoyments. One is Sarvajña or Omniscient and another is Ajña or ignorant. So how can there be identity between the two? To realize the philosophical truth, complete harmony of the mind is essential. And this expression is uttered to gain the complete harmony of the mind.

Or, it may be Bimba-pratibimbabhāva or relation of

reflective and reflection that is hinted here. Paramātmahamsa is Bimba and Jīvahamsa is Pratibimba. This relation denotes the togetherness of the two and not the identity. Jīva must always live together with Paramātman. So it is also an expression of the relation of Avinābhāva or togetherness of the two.⁶⁸⁸

Vādirāja gives a wonderful order of interpreting and argues that the above verse states the difference and not the identity. If the first pause is given at Ahaṁ bhāvan na ca then that conveys 'I am not thou,' the second sentence is as Tvam anyah that means 'Thou are distinct.' Here the distinction of Paramātmahamsa from Jīvahamsa is stressed. Third sentence is as Tvayi eva ahaṁ instead Tvamevāhaṁ. Then it conveys that the Paramātman is the Antaryāmin or the Indweller in all the souls. Thus, the distinction of the soul from the Paramātman is the primary import of the verse.⁶⁸⁹

Further, it may be asked as to why the Indweller God is not seen? The reply is that He is seen by great seers who are graced with divine sight as it happened in the case of Arjuna.⁶⁹⁰ And they, although knowing the joint presence of God and the soul, do not hold their identity. They have the knowledge of distinction^{of} these two as a swan has in respect of milk and water.

The advice of sage Nārada and also concluding verse of that Purāṇianopakhyāna affirm that Jīvahamsa, being thus initiated and enlightened by Paramātmahamsa gained real knowledge and by His favour became contented.⁶⁹¹ This result also determines that the soul is distinct from Brahman.

KAPILĀKHYĀNA ALSO PROMISES BHEDA

The Kapilākhyāna occurring in the Bhāgavata (third chapter) wherein Lord Kapila preaches to His mother Devāhuti, also destablishes the Bheda.

The Lord Brahman is distinct from Pancabhūtas or five great elements, Indriyas or senses, Manas or mind and also from the Prakṛti, the primary cause of all these. Though He is the primier-source of very existence and the action of all these, He is totally distinct from them like the fire, though the cause of the origin of flames, sparks, smoke and the like, it is distinct from them.⁶⁹²

As the terms Indriyas or senses, Manas or mind and the like also stand for conveying their respective presiding deities, not only Jadājada-bheda or distinction among matters and Jadeśvara-bheda or distinction between matter and God are hinted at but other types of Bhedas are also suggested.

The sentences quoted here are the explanation of the Śruti passage- Ekamevādvitīyam Brahma.⁶⁹³ These declare that Brahman is distinct from both Jīva and Jaḍa. The Śruti- Neti netītyātmā gṛhyah.⁶⁹⁴ states that the Lord is neither Jaḍa or matter nor Jīva or soul. He is distinct from both. This is the import of the Śruti- Ekamevādvitīyam. The term Advitīya does not convey the sense of identity as the Advaitins contend.⁶⁹⁵

The Advaitins hold that Brahman is Akhaṇḍa or partless, Nirākāra or formless, Nirguṇa or attributeless and Avācya or inexpressible.⁶⁹⁶ All these views have been refuted in this Bhāgavata verse. The terms 'Bhagavān' and 'Brahman' prove that Brahman is not Akhaṇḍa as the Advaitins contend.⁶⁹⁷ He is not Nirākāra since He has blissful form. He, being Brahman, is not Nirguṇa as the term Brahman means an embodiment of infinite auspicious attributes.⁶⁹⁸ He is not Avācya as He is the premier object of the import of all the Śrutis. And because of this, Brahman is distinct from souls and matter.⁶⁹⁹ This distinction will also continue to exist even in release.

BHEDAŚRUTIS ARE NIRAVAKĀŚAS AND ABHEDAŚRUTIS ARE SĀVAKĀŚAS⁷⁰⁰

Vādirāja argues that, it cannot be said that the Bheda-śrutis convey the sense of distinction due to the Matibheda

or the difference of thinking. Matibheda is possible when there is Svarūpabheda or difference in nature. It is due to the Svarūpabheda, sense of distinction originates. And in the case of the Abhedaśrutis, they can be understood as conveying Matyaikya or unity of opinion, Sthānaikya or unity of place and the like.⁷⁰¹ Therefore, the Bhedaśrutis are Niravakāśas, having or affording no scope for different explanation. The Abhedaśrutis are Sāvakāśas, since there is scope to understand the import through different explanation or implication.

In the Śruti- Dvāsupana sayujā sakhāyau.⁷⁰² the term Sakhāyau conveys that the two have harmonious mind and the term Sayujau states that both of them are abiding in the same place or body. Here Paramatman and soul are the two birds dwelling in one place with harmonious mind. Here there is no scope to convey Matibheda or difference in intellect and Sthānabheda or difference in place. Bheda is distinct due to Svarūpabheda or difference in nature. The dual number specifies that one is distinct from another. And it does not harm the beauty of the sense of Matyaikya and Sthānaikya.⁷⁰³ Not only this, the passage also states the mutually contradictory and opposing attributes of the soul and Brahma. In the soul, there are Baddhatva (boundness), Apūrṇatā (imperfectness) and Karmaphalabhoktṛtva (the state

of experiencing the fruits of his deeds) whereas in Para-mātmān, there are Nityamuktatva, Pūrṇatva (perfectness), and Anātrtva (the state of non-eating the fruits of deeds). Because of this, the distinction between the soul and Brahman is real and eternal.⁷⁰⁴

And in the case of Aikyaśruti, resorting to Lakṣaṇā and setting aside the expressed sense of identity, one has to understand Matyaikya or unity in thought, Sthānaikya or unity in place and the like as in the statements like: They two got together. Here there is no scope for sense of identity.⁷⁰⁵

As there is scope and chance to Matyaikya, Sthānaikya and the like, with regard to Aikyaśrutis there is no scope to realize Matibheda, Sthānabheda and the like with regard to Bhedaśrutis as shown above but the Svarūpabheda. Hence the Bhedaśrutis are Niravakāśas and the Abhedaśrutis are Sāvakāśas.

INTERPRETATION OF THE ŚRUTI NITYONITYĀNĀM...⁷⁰⁶

Vādirāja, gives an elaborate interpretation of the passage Nityo nityānām... and shows that this Śruti states the Pancabhedas (five varieties of distinction) clearly.

The passage conveys that the Lord is Paramanītya or supreme eternal among eternal entities. He is Paramacetana or supreme being among all sentients. He brings qualified souls in Samsāra and affords them chances for pursuing their respective Sādhana. He blesses with eternal bliss to those who are eligible. He, being Indweller of all, is the Lord, who is Independent in all respects. Wise always realize the distinction and not the identity with the Lord. Others do not realize this truth and hence they cannot have the realization of the Lord. It is the very nature of wise that helps them to realize the Lord. Those, who have the realization of the Lord, will attain blissful release. And others have no release due to having no realization.⁷⁰⁷

The passage also affirms that the Lord alone is the independent Doer and none else. The Kartṛtva cannot be ascribed to nescience since it is insentient. This also proves that Brahman is not the material cause of the creation, but He is the efficient and independent cause (Nimitta and Svatantra kāraṇa). So there is no question of superimposition of Kartṛtva and the like on Brahman. Here, it is also explained that the Lord is Omnipotent, Supreme and Omniscient as He, having the knowledge of all entities (including primeval matter), creates the world sportively. So He is Independent and others are dependents.⁷⁰⁸ Neither He is

initiated by others nor He seeks the help of others in creating the world. The souls are dependent, since the very survival of them is under His control and Bhogabhoktriva the state of experiencing the enjoyments is also blessed by Him.⁷⁰⁹

The repeated description of the attributes such as eternity, sentiency, being alone, doership promises that this Śrutī is an interpretation of so many other Śrutis. Ekatva referred to above establishes Abheda between the original form and incarnations of Brahman.

This passage also proves the concept of Viśeṣa, a Sāmarthyaviśeṣa (or distinct power) of the Lord and that helps for Bhedavyavahāra.⁷¹⁰ There is no difference between the Lord and His incarnations, His limbs and His qualities. All are of the same nature. The attributes are absolutely real and not ephemeral.

The Lord, with Indwelling-forms dwells in all. His realization is essential for attaining the release. The liberated ones are identical neither with Brahman and nor with each other. They are distinct from Brahman and also from each other. Brahman is the Lord of the released souls and they have the direct vision of the Lord always. This will never get affected.⁷¹¹

In this passage, the five-fold difference is clearly stated. It is also described that the liberation is of the nature of bliss. And this liberation can be attained through the knowledge of five-fold difference. The sentence Anupaśyanti dhīraḥ indicates that there is gradation with distinction with regard to the nature of the souls in respect of their Aparokṣajnāna or realization. The graded souls are of three kinds and there is mutual distinction among them. The sentence Kāmaṁ yo vidadhāti indicates the plurality of the means of enjoyments and also mutual distinction among them. Yo vidadhāti states that the Lord is the creator of them, and it proves the distinction of matter from Paramātmā. This also proves the Jīva-jadabheda or the difference of the souls from the insentient matter.

As Brahman is the Creator of all means of worldly enjoyments, like Brahman, reality of the world is also proved. It is also stated that the world is eternal in the form of a current. Hence, the process of creation is beginning-less.⁷¹²

Vādirāja opines that, this passage not only established Pancabheda, Tāratamya and the like, but at the same time denies the scope for Advaita-views such as identity between the Lord and the Jīva, identity of Jīva and Jīva, non-reality

of the world, attainment of the Mokṣa through Niṣprakāra-
jñāna, nature of Jīvas, Akartṛtva to Cit and the like.^{712A}

THE IDEA OF JĪVABRAHMAIKYA IS CONTRARY TO REASON

Those, who opine that there being no soul other than Brahman, may say for argument's sake that just as Ākāśa is one and by limiting adjuncts like Ghaṭa, Maṭha and the like it is referred to as Ghaṭākāśa, Maṭhākāśa and so on. Similarly, Brahman also with the limiting adjuncts, assumes the role of Jīva. Or else, it may be also be contended that the Jīvas are the Aṁśas or parts of the all-pervasive Brahman like the water in pots fetched from a lake.

In the Advaita, Brahman is partless (Akhaṇḍa). The Advaita does not accept the view of Aṁśa and Aṁśin in ultimate sense. What all reference about the Aṁśa and Aṁśin, seen in the Advaita works, relates with empirical level (Vyāvahārika).^{712B} Vādirāja, disregarding the view, opines that even this idea of Aṁśa and Aṁśin of the Advaita does not help to prove the identity between Brahman and soul.

If it is argued that the Brahmāṁśa in a body is Jīva, then it is as good as saying that Brahmāṁśa outside the body is not Jīva. Then the very proposition as Brahman is all-pervasive becomes unsound. Further, there cannot be

movements in limiting adjuncts such as body since according to the Advaita, Brahman is Niskriya or passive. And Upādhi or limiting adjunct being insentient cannot have activity of its own. Thus the movements of living bodies become impossible.⁷¹³ As there is no movements or shaking in Brahman, it cannot be said that the body gets activated by Brahman. Thus, the body should become stable or movementless. So the Brahmaṇśa, abiding in a body, since having no movement cannot hope to go to heaven and the like. One may raise the question that movements are seen in grass and the like that are insentient when they are shaken by wind. But the reply is that it is not the mere wind that moves and causes movements in other things, but it is the presiding deity of the wind, being sentient, that moves and causes the movements in others. This is possible provided Kriyāśakti is admitted in presiding deities unlike the Brahman of the Advaitins.⁷¹⁴

As their Brahman is Niskriya, Brahmaṇśa must also be likewise Niskriya. Further it cannot be argued that it is because of the association of Upādhi, viz., body Brahman becomes active since Upādhi is Jada. It is by its nature always inactive.⁷¹⁵ And it is also not reasonable to hold that the body at every step, gets associated with the facing Brahmaṇśa, leaving the one behind. Because, in that case, at every step, there are to be deaths and births.

The above given exposition may seem to be unconnected to the topic of the content. But by close observation and deep reflection, relevancy of the exposition may be known. The main aim of the exposition is to tackle the concepts Upādhi or limiting adjunct, Abhedā or identity and also Niskriyatva or actionlessness of Brahman. On the basis of Upādhi, neither Abhedā of Jīva from Brahman nor the Niskriyatva of them be established. By admitting Upādhi, Deha etc., if Kriyāśakti is taken to be attributed to the Jīvas or Brahmāṇśas then the above shown absurdity and irrelevancy are inevitable. In this way, the given exposition is connected with the context.

If the souls are taken to mean Brahmāṇśas in the limiting bodies, then there cannot be movement in the souls. Because, when Brahman is motionless, how can there be motion in Brahmāṇśabhūtajīvas, souls being parts of Brahman. Without the movement of the mud or clay, the pot made of that cannot move. Further, the body being limiting adjunct, product of nescience cannot generate action since the very nescience is insentient.⁷¹⁶

So it is not proper to state that the souls are Brahmāṇśas and thereby there is identity between them. Because, if that would be the case then as in Brahman according to

the Advaita, there should not be any activity in the souls which are Brahma parts. And it is evident that activity is seen in souls. So even according to the Advaita, the fact that souls are parts of Brahman, cannot be proved. And if, with regard to the limiting adjuncts parts of Brahman are explained, then they differ from body to body, as it is to be bigger in an elephant and very small in ants and the like. This optional view seems to be similar to that of Jainism.⁷¹⁷

It is specified in the Brahmasūtra- Utkrāntigatyāg-
tīnam⁷¹⁸ (II.iii.19) that the soul of atomic nature is having dependent powers. Hence, the soul cannot be identical with Brahman. Nor is it Brahmāṁśa.

In the Advaita, Brahman is motionless by nature. And this Brahman becomes active or will have the motion when getting associated with adjunct by name Māyā.⁷¹⁹ But it is impossible. Because, the nature does not change. He cannot be active even when there is the association of thousands of limiting adjuncts. Because adjunct being insentient is itself inactive. How can then it cause action in others like the space in pot cannot cause movement since by nature it is actionless. In the same way, when Advaita holds that Brahman is actionless by nature, there cannot be action by

any means. Advaita cannot explain the soul of Brahmāṁśa either Sthirāṁśa or immovable part or Caladāṁśa or movable part because the soul, by nature, is inactive. The soul can neither be immovable part of Brahman nor movable part of Brahman. If immovable part is taken then that would be against the experience. If it is taken as movable part, then It should have the movement. But according to them, Brahman has no movement.⁷²⁰

Thus, in the Advaita neither immovable part nor movable part proves identity. According to the Sūtra and the Śruti, soul is Anu.⁷²¹ The souls attain different bodies as they are associated with fruits of actions of each body. Being dependent they are distinct from each other. This is the state of soul. On the contrary, Brahmachaitanya or supreme soul is altogether distinct. It exists always and everywhere. It is pure by nature. It is also indestructible, partless, unchangeable, eternal and firm.⁷²² When Brahman is indestructible, partless etc., there is no chance to have pieces of It as souls. So souls are not at all parts of Brahman.⁷²³ Since Brahman is alone and partless in the Advaita, the very contention that the souls are parts of Brahman is untenable. Nānātva in respect of parts cannot be proved also.

Brahman is endowed with Vicitraśakti or supreme power. He is Omniscience Lord of all and soledoer. He is of the minute as well as of the biggest form. Though, Brahman is capable of doing anything, He never thinks to misuse His power and thereby to assume the form of a soul.⁷²⁴

Now it cannot be argued that the Avidyā or nescience responsible for Brahman assuming the form of the embodied soul, contributes power. Because it is insentient. As nescience is insentient, it has no power of discrimination. So it cannot assist Brahman in assuming the state of soul. Thus, it is evident that neither Brahman can itself assume the form nor can nescience make It to assume the soul form. Brahman of the Advaitins being Nirviśeṣa or qualityless, cannot have the power which is also a quality. If It would have the power of that kind, It could have driven out the nescience making It to assume soul form. And nescience, being insentient cannot have this power. If that is admitted then the Advaita would be similar to that of Nirīśvara-sāṃkhyas.⁷²⁵ Further, it cannot be said that power can be attributed to the qualified Brahman (Ajñāna-Avidyā-viśiṣṭa Brahman). Because originally this power is neither in Brahman nor in nescience. Further, Brahman, knowing the nescience to be the cause of undesirable and unworthy things and of sorrowful transmigration does not want to get associated

with that. Or Brahman will be inactive until It is moved by nescience and It is inactive again when nescience dissociates from Brahman. Thus, really speaking, the idea of a qualified Brahman is baseless and unreasonable. In this way, Brahman assuming soul form is totally impossible.⁷²⁶ Therefore, souls are not parts of Brahman. They are distinct beings. In some Purāṇas they are described as parts of Brahman, but it is to be understood in the sense of dependence. They are under the control of the Lord. The incarnations, Matsya, Kūrma and the like are His Svarūpāṁśas or nature forms. Hence, there is no distinction among them. Whereas there is distinction from the souls as they are not Bhinnāṁśas.⁷²⁷ Therefore, the contention that Brahman assumes the state of soul is not correct. As Brahman is all-pervasive and soul is Anu, the distinction is evident. And this distinction is existing since beginningless time and it will continue to exist even in release. Hence, identity is by no means possible here and hereafter.⁷²⁸ Though the body as adjunct gets destroyed, it is not possible for soul to become identical with Brahman since as already proved, both of them possess opposing aspects like the water in the jar and in the lake. When jar is destroyed the water will not become identical with the water of the lake.

Now, if Brahman is regarded as actionless then Brahma-

formed soul must also be actionless. Because, the inexpressible Māyā or Avidyā of the Advaita, dividing Brahman in parts, cannot contribute power of action to the parts.

In the Dvaita view, there is no difficulty, since it is the Śaktiviśeṣa or His unique form, the very nature of Brahman, which helps Him to assume Anu as well as Mahat forms. So He is of infinite forms. The same Śaktiviśeṣa proves the movement in Him. But the souls possess only Anu form and dependent Kriyāśakti. Hence, both of them are absolutely distinct from each other.⁷²⁹ And Brahman, abiding in all the souls, is one and the same and is perfect and Supreme. He is one with Mahat and all-pervasive form and is infinite with indwelling forms. All these forms are perfect in respect of qualities and are identical with original form. The Śruti- Antarbahīṣca tatsarvamvyāpya nārāyaṇasthitah^{729A} specifies that all-pervasive Brahman is the Nārāyaṇa.

If the Advaitins hasten to admit the possibility of two all-pervasive sentients, then the very concept of the Advaita stands uprooted.⁷³⁰ So they cannot accept two all-pervasive sentients. Therefore, the illustration of Ghaṭākāśa, Maṭhākāśa given at the beginning to prove their identity, is irrelevant. The souls do not conform with the size of the bodies in the form of adjuncts. They are Anus. The

above analogy may be taken with reference to the incarnations of the Lord as His all forms are all-pervasive. Souls are like dust particles flying in the space. So they were not, are not, and shall not be identical with Brahman.⁷³¹

When Brahman is beginningless and souls are beginningless, distinction among them must also be beginningless as explained above. So identity cannot be thought of between soul and Brahman. It cannot be stated that though difference is beginningless, it gets destroyed at the attainment of the release because difference is not the product of nescience. Though, nescience is destroyed by knowledge, difference remains as it is.

The Ekajivavādins hold that it is due to Avidyā, that Brahman attains the soul form. Soul is one only and it is its nescience by which the entire world is fabricated.⁷³² When its nescience is removed, there originates Aikya Jñāna as 'I am Brahman' and by this, the fabricated world ceases to exist. The Bahujīvavādins⁷³³ hold that it is due to the manifold Upādhis, that Jīvas or Brahmāṇśas are many. By knowledge of identity when once adjuncts get destroyed, they getting liberated, attain Brahmasvarūpa. For them the world becomes unreal.

Vādirāja attacks the view of the Ekajīvavādins. He

argues that if the settlement in the world is unreal and sentiency abiding in so many bodies, is unreal, then how can the movements etc., causing effects be possible? The unreality cannot move.⁷³⁴ If it is a real serpent, then only it can move. In the same way, sentiency as well as their living world must be real, then only movements and the like are possible. And it is not the delusion that causes movements. The whole world cannot be taken to mean to be ephemeral. If souls are superimposed on one Cetana, then they are unreal. Since being superimposed, they cannot be the parts of real Brahman and there is no question of identity.⁷³⁵

Further, the view of the Advaitins that all the souls are parts of Brahman is also not tenable. The distinction between soul and Brahman is evident since beginningless time. This is because of their inherent distinct nature and distinct constituent characteristics. Souls, living in different bodies, are of Anu size. Brahman is all-pervasive and of Mahatparimāṇa. Brahman is Niskriyā (not affected by the effects of actions). He is perfect. Souls are active and are affected by actions. And as a result of that they move from one body to another and from one place to another. Brahman is defectless. Souls are defective, and as a result of that they suffer. So such souls cannot be parts of Brahman or forms of Brahman.

The Advaitins hold that like the difference of ether in the pot, souls or parts of Brahman possess unreal difference caused by adjuncts. But it is wrong. Because, if difference is unreal, then the very attributes and effects of that also become unreal. If difference is real, then only all those will be real. Ghaṭākāśa does not move wherever pot moves. And ether in the pot does not get stained with the water or dirt in the pot. It is unaffected like the ether all-pervasive. So if soul would be a part of all-pervasive Brahman he should be actionless and unaffected like the ether in the pot. But the soul is not like that. He is active and hence associated with the fruits of actions. So the distinction between him and Brahman is real.⁷³⁶ As dust particles, distinct from ether and each other, fly in the ether that is motionless and unchangeable, the souls too, distinct from each other and from Brahman and being active abide in all-pervasive Brahman. If they were to be parts of Niskriyabrahma, they must not be Sakriyas as said above. If dust particles are parts of ether, then they must be actionless. But they are active. Since, they are not the parts of ether. In the same way, souls, being active, are not the parts of Brahman.⁷³⁷ If the difference is regarded as empirical, then the very concept difference would be meaningless since it will be no more after the knowledge of sublation. If the knowledge of

sublation is negated then the very idea of empirical difference is useless.

So the five-fold distinction is evident to the experience of all. The state of distinction safeguards the very code or law of worldly behaviour. Let all entities be distinct, soul as a soul, matter as matter and the Lord as the Lord. There is no need to change their states. The soul need not become matter or Brahman and vice-versa. As the scriptural passage- Dhatā yathā pūrvamakalpayat^{737A} states, the creation and the like which are subject to the five-fold distinction, have been continuing since beginningless time and they will continue till eternity.⁷³⁸ The release is not attaining the identity with Brahman but attaining the experience of inherent bliss always.

The passage Sarvam khalvidam Brahma⁷³⁹ refers to the entire world of sentients and the insentient matter. So there is no scope to drop matter from the meaning of the term 'Sarvam.' If at all Aikya or identity is to be understood, let it also be understood with matter and not only with sentient souls. Because, 'Sarvam' stands for all including souls and matter. So the passage is to be understood as everything is under the control of the Lord or everything gets or comes into existence from the Lord. Otherwise,

the contention of proving identity of souls and Brahman leads to undesirable identity of matter with Brahman.⁷⁴⁰ So identity of souls is untenable. If identity between Brahman and soul is voluntarily forced, then all the above mentioned auspicious attributes stand untenable or they are to be abandoned.

Vādirāja taunts at the Advaitins saying that it is good on their part to prefer identity with matter to ^{the} identity with souls since that does not make their Brahman to assume soul form and to undergo the hardships of transmigration. Whereas, it cannot be applied in the Dvaita view, since matter is not capable of doing anything. It is inactive by its very nature.

According to the Advaita, Brahman is Svapraśāsa, that means Svavedyatva is there is Brahman (absence of self-knowledge or realization).^{740A} It can also be found in matter. So identity with matter is preferable. Vādirāja taunts that the passage- Sarvam khalvidam Brahma becomes fruitful and relevant only when the Advaitins hasten to relate entire identity comprising the identity with souls and identity with matter that lead to unreality of the world and also unreality of souls (beings). Let Brahman be also unreal as being. When everything is unreal, then like bondage,

release will also be-come Mithyā.⁷⁴¹ This leads to the absence of Bandha and Mokṣa. Both Mokṣasādhana and Sukha-bokṣtva also become Mithyā. Then the state of Mukti would be nominal and for only name sake.

Thus, if Jīvaikya is related then it appears attributing Baddhatva and Muktatva to Brahman and entire Jagat becomes Mithyā. But the Śruti conveys that the entire world of Jīva and Jada is under the control of Lord.⁷⁴²

In this way the Advaita-interpretation of this Śruti is irrelevant and contradictory to valid perception. It is also against the Brahmasūtras. Bādarāyaṇa has shown the way of interpreting the scriptural statements wherein there appears contradiction as in Mṛdabravīt, Āpo'bruvan and the like.^{742A} Here neither the clay nor the water can speak but it is the presiding deities of clay and water that speak. Thus, relevant to the context and to the valid perception, the Śrutis are to be interpreted.

The expression of Ātmaikya is against the^{to} very code and conduct. It is neither pleasing nor a real one. Pauṇḍrak Vāsudeva was severely punished since he declared that he was the Lord. It was neither pleasing nor a real one.⁷⁴³ The entities that are ever distinct like the cloth and the soap cannot be identical. So the expressive meaning of the Śruti since sublated, should not be accepted as the real meaning.

Even the liberated souls are not identical with each other nor with Brahman. Because, Brahman is ever-released and they are the gainers of release. So there cannot be identity. And their distinct living is also evident. There may be little bit similarity in some aspects like the explicit form: (Sārūpya).⁷⁴⁴ Further,^{they} although gain the required knowledge may not attain release. The gained knowledge has no impact on them. It is only those who are eligible in nature. Knowledge is the only instrumental. In release, similarity may be termed only in respect of the state of liberation. That means one is liberated like others.⁷⁴⁵ Identity cannot be referred to even in case of Sāyujyamuktas. They are also distinct from Brahman. It is true that in the cavity of the heart of the soul, there abide both the soul and Paramātmān. Paramātmān is ever-released and Omniscience whereas Jīva is Niyamya, Alpañña and the like. Jīva experiences the Karmaphala, whereas Paramātmān does not. So both of them are distinct⁷⁴⁶ like milk and water. Thus on account of possessing contradictory qualities and distinct nature since beginningless time cannot be stated and proved.⁷⁴⁷

The Advaitins Īśvara cannot be identical with the world of Jīva and Jada. If Īśvara is incapable of the creation of the world then the world cannot come into existence, since

without Kartā there cannot be any Kārya. If He is taken to be capable, even then He cannot be identical. Because, creator and created must be distinct each other.⁷⁴⁸

If the import of the Śruti is taken as real, then the Advaitins admitting the identity of soul and Brahman, would become unreal and not a reality. And if the import of the passage is taken to be unreal, then also the Advaita becomes not a Tattva that means, it cannot be proved. Since Nirguṇa passage declares Brahman as attributeless identity cannot be talked of.⁷⁴⁹ In spite of knowledge, if nescience is attributed to Brahman there cannot be this Samsāra since that nescience cannot influence and affect the inherent knowledge. If nescience is negated in Omniscient Lord, then also there is no Samsāra (effect of nescience).⁷⁵⁰ Nescience cannot be referred to in Brahman. If nescience is possible, then only soul form, and the like become possible. As it is said that knowledge of Brahman is real, He cannot have the nescience (ignorance) (knowledge of comprehending limited objects). If He has no knowledge, then also there can be no nescience since, absence of knowledge does not lead to or result into any apprehension of nescience.⁷⁵¹

Thus, there is not even a single argument, relevant in all respects, that can help the Advaitins to prove and to assert identity. The very idea or concept identity is against the valid experience and contradictory to the import of the Śrutis.

ADVAITA IS CONTRARY TO NĪTI OR MORAL CONDUCT

The Very idea of contending the state of Brahman in

soul by the Advaitins, is mere superimposition which means false. It is not a real one as poor people sometimes behave as if they are rich ones. As richness appears superimposed and hence false, in the same way, attributing the state of Brahman to soul is false. The very idea appears as an ignorant hopes to get popularity and for that sake he boasts of himself to be too great. But as by mere boasting he will not become great. The soul too, who is very mean and ordinary cannot attain the state of Brahman though boasts of himself.⁷⁵² Hoping to be identical with Brahman is as good as hoping to become the Lord of Lakṣmī, mother of the entire world, which is most unworthy and sinful.

Vādirāja, attacks directly the practical behaviour of the Advaitins saying that the Advaitins, during pleasure, plenty and prosperity declare that they are gods; but when in distress and difficulties, they fall at the feet of gods and worship them. If they themselves are gods then they need not prostrate and worship others.⁷⁵³ The Advaitin treats himself as Brahman but for getting rid of the sin resorts to sacred rivers to take the holy bath and also rushes to the temples. Thus there is no harmony and propriety in his declaration and actual behaviour.

EXPOSITION OF TRIVIDHĀMŚA

Even when Amśāṁśi form of relation is taken into account, it is not possible to prove and establish the identity of Jīva and Brahman. This Amśāṁśi form is three-fold - Bhinn-āmśa (different part), Bhinnābhinnāmśa (different-cum-identical part) and Abhinnāmśa (identical part).

Vadiraja states that as souls are considered Bhinnāmśas, that does not help for or convey the identity. The same word, when referred to different objects, does not lead to either equality or identity. But it conveys the sense of distinction. E.g. the word Hari stands for both frog and Viṣṇu. The mere reference of articulation does not create any greatness in frog the greatness that is found in Viṣṇu. It clearly shows the distinctive features of both. With regard to distinctive features souls are distinct parts unlike Matsya, Kūrma etc., that are recognised as identical forms or forms of nature. Thus the usage of the same word does not convey the same sense with regard to all objects denoted by it.⁷⁵⁴

In the Bhāgavata-Ete Svāmśakalāḥ puṁsaḥ kṛṣṇastu bhagavān svayam⁷⁵⁵ and Jīvāḥ sarve kalāḥ kila, it is clearly stated that identical forms are the incarnations of the Lord Nārāyaṇa such as Matsya, Kūrma. These are the forms of

nature of the Lord. Hence they are identical. Here, they are explained as Svāṁśakalāḥ of the Lord. Whereas souls are explained as only Kalāḥ.^{755A} Thus, it is evident that forms (parts) are of two types: Identical form and distinct part.⁷⁵⁶

Distinct part is the part which is under the control of the Lord. This constitutes the entire world of soul and matter. Different-cum-identical part relates to half-similarity as in the thread and the cloth. Identical form is total similarity and identity that is seen in the incarnations of the Lord.⁷⁵⁷ Souls are distinct parts as they do not possess the auspicious and great qualities of the Lord. Since the incarnations of Matysa, Kūrma and the like are endowed with those great qualities, they are Identical forms.

So far as different-cum-identical part is concerned, it refers to matter entities. Because, in these, the cause of distinction is both perceived and unperceived. There is half-similarity between cloth and thread. Even at the destruction of the entity, half-similarity exists, hence there is both difference and identity. Though cloth is destroyed it is not other than the thread, hence both difference and identity are seen. In this way there are three types in

Aṁśas.⁷⁵⁸ So far as the view of different-cum-identical part is concerned, there is no difference of opinion. There is such a difference only in respect of different part and identical forms.

The Śruti Pūrṇamadaḥ pūrṇamidaṁ pūrṇātpūrṇamudacyate...^{758A} states that like Mūlarūpa or Original form, the incarnations of the Lord are complete in all respects. The Pūrṇatva or perfection is the very constituent characteristic of the nature of the Lord. Hence, they are Identical forms. The above adjective specifies that there is one more Aṁśa which is not perfect and that is the soul. And it is distinct part. Apūrṇāṁśa is never identical with perfect form. Difference is evident between two entities possessing distinct nature. So soul is distinct part.⁷⁵⁹ In this regard, Vādirāja refers to the Bhāgavata verses^{759A} that declare soul as distinct part. The Brahmasūtra- Aṁśo nānāvyapadeśāt (II.iii.43)⁷⁶⁰ makes it clear that soul is Brahmāṁśa in the sense he is distinct part as soul seeks the help or support of the Lord in many ways. Since having relation with Brahman he is stated to be of Brahmāṁśa.

The Advaitins admit the view of Atyantābheda (absolute identity). In that case, the very concept or usage of Aṁśāṁśa-bhāva becomes meaningless. In their view there is

no possibility of Aṁśa and Aṁśih. Both must be Aṁśins, then there can be no identity which means Advaita. In the Dvaita view, Aṁśamśibhāva, with regard to the forms of nature, wherein absolute identity is evident can be referred to, with the help of Viśeṣa. The Aṁśamśibhāva, in case of the forms of the nature, necessitates difference with identity. That means in Aṁśamśibhāva of the forms of nature, difference and identity (with Viśeṣa) go together. They do not stand separated.

This relation of part and whole, together with difference is there in release. Both relation of part and whole and absolute identity cannot be there in one place (except in the case of Svarūpāṁśa). The two are contradictory to each other.

BAHUVĪVAVĀDA

"Śaṅkara does not support the view that the Jīva, limited by Avidyā, is one, as Avidyā is one. For if all souls are one Jīva, then when the first case of liberation occurred, mundane existence should have come to an end, which is not the case. Brahman, limited by the different inner organs born of Avidyā, becomes divided, as it were, into many individual souls, but the difficulties of the relation of Māyā and Avidyā to Brahman led to the formulation of

several theories in the later Advaita, of which the two chief are ekajīvavāda, single soul theory, and aneka jīva-vāda, or the theory of a plurality of souls."⁷⁶¹

The Advaitins' identity is not possible even when souls are held to be many. According to them, souls with distinct Karmaphala are born in different births.⁷⁶² The fruits of their actions and the change in the time of their liberation and the like negate the mutual identity. The identity, not prevailing in Samsāra, cannot be attained due to the above mentioned causes. The distinct nature of the souls in Samsāra does not get changed. In release though they attain Brahman, do not become identical with Brahman, like the threads though conjoined together in cloth do not become identical with each other. Their distinct nature remains unharmed and unchanged. It is simply the change of state from Samsāra to release. So the contention of mutual identity of souls, held by the Bahujīvavādins, is also untenable.⁷⁶³ Further, soul attaining identity with Brahman will lose his soul form and hence how can he be identical with other souls since all souls do not attain liberation at the same time.⁷⁶⁴ Therefore, souls are not identical each other in Samsāra as well as in release. Neither reason nor Śruti supports the view of the Bahujīva-vāda.⁷⁶⁵

Mutual identity of Jīvas would be contrary to reason. Because in that case, experiences of pleasure and pain should be uniform and simultaneous to one and all. If parts of Brahman were to be in many bodies, then there must be uniform experience. But experience changes from one to another.⁷⁶⁶ The idea of mutual identity leads to so many irrelevant and unworthy trends in society.

If identity in nature of souls is going to be admitted then that causes Karmasamkara. That means, sinful acts or may be meritorious deeds of one, should accrue to others. But it does not happen. On the other hand, difference in actions seen everywhere, cannot support and overcome the defects of identity whereas it proves ultimate distinction. So if identity in nature is going to be admitted then that causes so many problems as stated above. And explicit elements such as body, action, since being unreal and superimposed, cannot contribute to different dealing. Only that which is not superimposed can be taken as the means of different dealing. And that is the very nature. And if it is taken to be identical then it cannot survive the different dealing but leads to manifold problems. So this nature must also be taken to be distinct to each other and infinite in number. They are not at all parts of Brahman. There is no identity in nature among them. The facts such as difference

in the experience of pleasure and pain, difference in the source of birth and the like affirm that sentiency, seen in each body, is distinct. And that is the difference in nature.⁷⁶⁷

All the sentient souls are distinct and they are the very Sākṣins of their experiences of pleasure and pain. The Sākṣin is the sentient. Thus distinct sentient souls abide in different bodies.⁷⁶⁸

The idea of mutual identity is also contrary to worldly experience. When one is in distress, nobody will identify with him. But only in the state of prosperity, every one prefers to become one with him. This shows that identical dealing is nominal and is not real. It is the difference which is ultimately real.

REFUTATION OF EKAJĪVAVĀDA⁷⁶⁹

"As opposed to anekajīvavāda, there is ekajīvavāda, according to which there is only one self who being bound by one avidyā is deluded and the same Jīva is released when that avidyā is destroyed. Thus, according to this theory there exists only one self (jīva) and all other Jivas and phenomena are but the figments of imagination of that single jīva. The existence of other jīvas and the phenomena, according to this theory, may be compared to the dream of that single jīva."⁷⁷⁰

The Advaitins, who hold the view of Ekajīvavāda, state that soul is one and one only. Owing to the impact of nescience, he sees the entire world of soul and matter as a dream. For him, like a dreamer, the entire world is unreal. The others and matter entities are all superimposed by that soul, product of ignorance.

Vādirāja attacks this view severely and says that the Ekajīvavādin has no discrimination. Because, there would not be distinction in day and night for him. Further, his view suggests that all others are as good as dead in this world, though in reality they get engaged in various activities, assume different bodies one after another. Vādirāja opines that the Ekajīvavādin is not any different from Cārvāka or materialist. Because, the latter declares body as the soul and the former attributes the lone sentiency to himself. For him others are neither souls nor Brahman. The very existence of all others is like a dream. It also appears that he alone attains the liberation after the destruction of nescience. This view looks that even the great Yogins Śuka, Vāmadeva and others, are deprived of attaining release. According to this view of Ekajīvavāda, all kinds of worships, gifts, sacred baths and even sacred studies and hearings are also to be futile since they happen to be the occurrences in a dream.


The view is absurd to the extent as it states that it is the single soul, sleeping since beginningless time due to nescience has created everything.⁷⁷¹

In the Ekaīvavāda the preceptor must be fabrication of nescience. And this preceptor should teach the knowledge of identity to his disciple for the destruction of nescience. If he has the knowledge of identity, he himself should get destroyed first since knowledge of identity removes the nescience. Then, who else is to teach the disciple. Or, at the time of preaching, preceptor will be destroyed and the disciple gaining knowledge of identity attains the release. Thus, the self-destruction to the preceptor and release to his disciple. Thus, it is absurd. If knowledge of identity of preceptor who is product of nescience of single soul, is taken to be real, then the Advaita view as dream is illusion, will be no more.⁷⁷²

The world, if compared with the dream, affirms plurality of souls and not single soul.⁷⁷³ When the entire world is the dream of one soul, then to justify it, there is no other dream as an illustration. Thus, inference also does not support in this regard.⁷⁷⁴ So, illustration of dream is not tenable to the world in establishing the view of single soul. The Brahmasūtra- Sandhye śrṣṭirāhaṇi (III.11.1)

states that the aspect of dream determines the plurality of souls. It also mentions that the dream is fabricated by the Lord according to the mental impressions of the souls and hence it is real. In the waking state the things, created last for longer time whereas the dream-creations exist for a limited time as they are the products of Vāsanā (Manosaṃskāra)⁷⁷⁵ or past impressions.

If all dreams are witnessed by that single soul (that means if the entire world appears to him alone as a dream always) then to whom could there be waking state? Because both these states cannot be there at the same time.⁷⁷⁶ If both the states are taken together, that leads to the defect of Ātmāśraya or sitting on one's own shoulder. Therefore, waking and dream states must be mentioned distinctly.⁷⁷⁷ And in dream, if the plurality of the souls is admitted then also there cannot be the Ekajīvavāda. Further, if presence of the souls, in different bodies, is admitted, then also the Ekajīvavāda would stand no more. If their presence is negated, the view of Ekajīva would be false, since the functions of all the bodies become unreal.⁷⁷⁸ If there is no any Viśeṣa (special difference) between different body and jar, then jar, though matter, must have cognition and sensation. If bodies are distinct from matter (Jīvasahita), there cannot be single soul.

Now, other bodies cannot be the sources of experience to that Ekajīva as his body; because to enter into other bodies for experience he has give up his body and then has to enter other bodies. This causes undergoing the deaths and the births repeatedly for experience. So all the bodies cannot be held as the sources of experience of that Ekajīva.⁷⁷⁹ The singular usage  as soul in Śruti, Smṛti and in other works does not restrict the number of the souls but that stands for and represents the entire group of that class.

Vādirāja says that dream state of the single soul cannot be ^{the} state of wakefulness. Because, in the state of wakefulness, it is evident that there are opposing and variegated functions of different souls with different bodies. If souls are not in those bodies, then functioning must not be seen. So the state of wakefulness does not support the view of single soul.

Further, if the Ekajīva is the creation of Māyā or nescience, then creation of others would also be of nescience. This Māyika cannot see others, products of nescience. And as there are no other souls, no one is there to see the illusory creation. If existence of other souls, is admitted then the view of the Ekajīva would be no more.⁷⁸⁰

Now, it cannot be contended that the Ekajīva is the part of Brahman himself and others sentients acting in different bodies are his Aṁśas, because, he being present in one body, cannot enter into other bodies with his parts. He is not a Yogin to possess and to enjoy that power. Thus, the Ekajīvavāda is not agreeable.⁷⁸¹ So it is to be accepted that, since beginningless time, there have been infinite number of souls, dwelling in infinite number of bodies.

Vādirāja questions as to how the body of the Ekajīva is created. It must be created by some one else. And he, himself, cannot be the creator of the body before its coming into existence. So it must be accepted that, the body is created by someone i.e., Brahman. In this case, why only the body of this soul is created by Brahman? And if not created then, let all the bodies, including the body of the Ekajīva be Nirjīvas. This argument also opposes the view of the Ekajīvavāda.

Now, Vādirāja says that creatorship of the world cannot be attributed to this Ekajīva as it leads to contradictions in view of the Advaita also. Because, in the commentary of benedictory verse of an Advaita work, by name Tattvadīpana, the creatorship of the world is discarded

in the case of Brahmā and Rudra, stating that they do not have the ability of creating the world as they are the products of nescience. Tayoh karyatvena nikhilajagatsarjana samharana samarthyabhavat.^{781A} So how can there be the creatorship of the world to this Ekajīva, who is also a product of nescience and is plunged in the mundane world full of sorrow. Further, the Brahmasūtra has also not only denied the creatorship of the world to the soul, but has clearly attributed it to Brahman.⁷⁸²

Vādirāja raises the doubt as to whether the Ekajīva sees the world fabricated by him? As Advaita denies the creatorship to the cit element, he cannot fabricate the world. ☐ It is the mind and other organs that have created this world. So the Ekajīva cannot see the world. Thus, the very idea of Ekajīva and his fabrication of the world is contrary to reason and experience. Really the soul, who is in atomic form cannot create this wonderful creation. It is possible to All-pervasive One and He is the Brahman.⁷⁸³

BHEDA OR DIFFERENCE IS REAL

The Advaitins to defend their concept of identity advance ☐ an inference as follows: Bhedo mithyā bhedatvāt candra bhedavat. Difference is unreal since being the fact of difference like the difference appearing in two moons.

This inference, no doubt, favours the Dvaita also with the change of the Dr̥ṣṭānta (illustration) Bhedo na mithyā bheda-tvat brahmamokṣavat. Difference is not unreal since being the fact of difference like Brahma and Mokṣa.⁷⁸⁴

The Advaitins refer to the illustration of moons. In the Advaita, Brahman is Sat and the world is neither Sat, nor Asat and nor even Sadasat. It is Inexpressible and other than these three.^{784A}

Really speaking, in the Advaita, release cannot be identified with Brahman.

Bheda between Brahman and Mokṣa is not Mithyā. Even when removal of nescience is taken to be release, it will not be unreal. Because, Avidyānāśa is the fifth in the enumeration of Vastusatta. As already mentioned world is the fourth one (Sadasadvilakṣaṇa) and removal of nescience being distinct or other than the world becomes the fifth one. Prior to the removal of nescience, there is unreality (illusoriness). But release being the counter positive of an ~~absence~~ of that removal of nescience must be other than illusory means real. And this release is distinct from Brahman. Because, like release, Brahman is not the Prati-yogin of Avidyānāśa (removal of nescience). Like this

difference among souls is real. Further, to substantiate this inference, the Śruti declares that Satyam bhidā satyam-bhidā satyambhidā.^{784B} That means, difference is the ultimate reality. If difference in the illustration is regarded as illusory then the Advaita Brahman also becomes illusory (unreal).⁷⁸⁵

The inference that is framed by the Advaitins is not relevant. That means it will not prove Bhedamithyātva. If difference is real in the illustration (difference between moon and its reflection) then, that leads to Sādhyaivaikalya- causing deficiency with regard to probandum (Mithyātva). If difference is illusory (unreal) in illustration due to absence of difference, that leads to Sādhanavaikalya- causing deficiency with regard to reason - Bhedatva. Thus the inference does not prove unreality of the world. When the reason-difference is not there, how can it prove the Mithyātva. Like an unreal serpent cannot cause any fear. So difference remains unaffected and [vindicated].⁷⁸⁶ Thus, illustration does not help to prove unreality of difference. And moreover difference, cited in the illustration will not be an illustration to prove unreality of difference. Because, difference between superimposed moon and unsuperimposed moon is quite real. And this real difference cannot help to prove Sādhya viz., unreality of difference. Difference of

real moon from the unreal one is the very characteristic of that.⁷⁸⁷ A real entity is competent to be existent with its nature. Neither the objects caused by the illusion of a particular entity, and nor the others are identical with this. The distinction of it from other entities is evident and unsublated. In the illustration, the moon unsuperimposed, is distinct from the moon superimposed and also other real entities like the pot and the like owing to their respective individual nature. Therefore, difference is real. When difference is real in Sapakṣa (similar instance) or illustration, then unreality of difference cannot be proved in the subject of a syllogism.⁷⁸⁸ In instance, if difference of unreal moons is taken into account, then difference could not be a reason, since there cannot be difference in unreal entities. Hence, the reason cannot prove the unreality. The Dvaita view does not relate Bheda of Anyonyābhāva in respect of unreal entities.⁷⁸⁹ If an entity is non-existent, then its non-existence is not at all related or is not referred to in respect of negating Tādātmya with other entities. There is no question of relating Anyonyābhāva in this respect. When it is stated that a hare's horn is non-existent then, there is no need to relate its Tādātmyābhāva (identity) with any other entities. So in these cases, the question of difference does not arise. Thus, if both the

moons are unreal like a hare's horn then the question of difference does not arise. And this leads to Sādhana-vaikalya.⁷⁹⁰ Therefore, there cannot be difference of mutual non-existence with regard to unreal entities. One may say that this is a jar and not a cloth. Here, there is mutual non-existence (difference) between jar and cloth. If mutual non-existence (difference) is admitted in respect of non-real entities also, then it amounts to attributing reality to them. So difference of Anyonyābhāva type cannot be related with unreal entities - two unreal moons like hare's horns.⁷⁹¹

At this point Vādirāja examines in detail the four types of Abhāvas, or non-existences- Pratīyogin, Anuyogin and the like. The discussion is so deep and observation is so close. He defends that in the presence of Bheda of Anyonyābhāva, there cannot be any other Abhāvas (negation). The three Abhāvas can be mentioned with reference to their respective counter-co-relates.

So there is no distinction among non-existents. Hence, ^{superimposed} In illustration, the difference of/moon is unreal. This leads to Sādhana-vaikalya in Pakṣa. Difference is possible if there were to be two unsuperimposed moons. The reason- Bhedatvāt is not evident or Prāmāṇika in illustration and

hence causing Sādhanaivaikalya (causing deficiency with regard to reason or means or proban) cannot prove unreality of difference (Sādhya) (probandum).⁷⁹²

Therefore, difference that is superimposed is not a difference at all as silverness in superimposed silver. Hence, difference that is not superimposed between two real entities is real one. In the illustration of the above inference, as moons are unreal or superimposed, difference cannot be thought of and related to. And if that difference is taken to be real, then that causes Sādhyaivaikalya and as unreal leads to Sādhanaivaikalya. Thus, inference itself, is defective.⁷⁹³

Now, Vādirāja deals with another inference of the Advaitins. The Advaitins may frame the inference as: Vimata ātmānaḥ paramātmānaḥ na bhidyante ātmatvāt paramātmavat. The souls are not different from supreme self since having the nature of self like supreme self. This inference is most irrelevant. It is not an inference at all. If it is taken to prove Paramātmatva to soul, then mother can be proved as having wife-hood as there is the common property of femininity (Strītvā) in both of them. Therefore, the mere fact that the presence of a single common property cannot be taken to be a means to prove identity between

any two entities.⁷⁹⁴ This type of inference may pose irrelevancy in arguing and treating a cow as a dog owing to the common property of Paśutva, pot as cloth since having the common property of Dravyatva and so on. So the reasons related here, are fallacious. The defect of fallacious experience is same with regard to the Hetu-Ātmatvāt in inference. So, that cannot prove the nature of Paramātmā that is identity in the Jīva.⁷⁹⁵

In fact, the inference always seeks the support either of perception or of testimony. Independently, it cannot give rise to any conclusion. Hence, it is called Anumāna i.e. following other.⁷⁹⁶ The inference, cited above by the Advaitins is not agreeable to both perception and testimony. It is contrary to the perception of personal experience: "I am not Omniscient" and also to the scriptural passages- Dvāsuparnā⁷⁹⁷ and the like that are Niravakāśas.⁷⁹⁸ The concept of the Advaitins' identity is not at all evident. As the Advaita admits Sarvamithyātva including of scriptures, all scriptural statements conveying identity are unreal, hence identity is also unreal. In the Dvaita view, these statements are taken as not conveying identity. So there is no identity.

Vādirāja advances perception, inference and other

evidences in favour of difference between soul and Paramātmān. Inference is, Vimatau jīvaparamau na abhinnau viruddha-guṇavatvāt tuhinadahanau iva. Embodied soul and Supreme Soul are not identical owing to the possession of opposing and contradictory properties as possessed by snow and fire. This inference is agreeable in all respects. The personal experience as 'I am not Omniscient' constitutes perception. And in the Vedas difference is stated repeatedly through Niravakāśa passages.⁷⁹⁹ In this way, the knowledge of difference is evident and rests on defectless authorities.

The liberated souls cannot be identical with the Lord. The Bhāgavata verse- Na yatra māyā^{799A} states that there is no Māyā in Vaikunṭha. This statement negates the material relation and at the same time affirms the difference in release. When nescience is not there, there cannot be the impact of its effects.⁸⁰⁰ The released are distinct from the Lord and from each other. Thus, the abode of the Lord is away from nescience. It consists of plurality of released souls. It is absolutely real. Difference therein, is also absolutely real.⁸⁰¹

Vādirāja holds that not only the difference is evident but reality of difference is also evident (reality of difference). As difference is proved by the authorities, so also

is reality of difference proved. In this respect, Vādirāja gives the inference. Vimato jīvaparayoh bhedah paramārtha saṁ avidyāstamaye satvāt yathā ātmā. Bheda of Jīva and Paramātmā is absolutely real since being present even after the removal of Avidyā like Paramātmā. This inference proves the reality of difference. The reason, as being present even after the removal of nescience has the support of Āgama.⁸⁰² The statements Na vai sa ātmatmavatāmadhīśvaraḥ bhagavān vāsudevah...⁸⁰³ etc., state that the Lord never gets affected by getting incarnated and the like. The Brahmacaitanya is not the same as Jīvacaitanya since not having the experience of sufferings. He cannot also be identified with matter on the ground that it too has no experience of sufferings. In the insentient, the very question of enjoyment or experience does not arise. Because, He is sentient whereas matter is insentient. The Lord, being Parama Cetana and having no experience of sufferings is distinct from soul and matter.

Vādirāja, referring to the inference of the Advaitins, advances the Anumāna to prove difference. Vimato jīveṣa-bhedah paramārthasat anāditvāt brahmavat. Difference of soul and Paramātmā is real since being beginningless like Paramātmā. Here Anādi-Hetu is accepted by the Advaitins in enlisting the beginningless entities. So as Brahman is

Anādi and Satya, Bheda is Satya since being Anādi. Anādi means not only as that which is beginningless but its presence must be since time immemorial. Otherwise, a hare's horn which is total non-existent, would also become beginningless.⁸⁰⁴ The inference cited above is defectless, since the Hetu-Anāditva is present in similar instance and subject and not in contrary instance. Thus the absolute reality of difference is evident.

THE SCRIPTURAL PASSAGES DECLARE THE DVAITA VIEW

The scriptural passages- Anādimāyayā supto yadā jīvaḥ prabudhyate^{804A} and others declare inherent and ultimate difference. It is stated that soul being caught hold by wrong knowledge has been sleeping. When he gets the Māyā destroyed that means when Māyābandha is removed by the grace of the Lord, he will attain release. Thus, identity is not at all traced. Distinction between the Lord and soul is clear.⁸⁰⁵ Here Jīva is the knower and the Lord is the known. So there cannot be any identity between the knower and the known.⁸⁰⁶

In the passage Advaitam paramārthataḥ,^{806A} the term 'Advaitam' negates the inner distinction within Brahman. It also promises that there is no any other entity which is either superior or equal to Brahman.⁸⁰⁷ Thus these

scriptural passages will not help the Advaitin to prove the doctrine of identity between soul and Brahman. So without any alternative he has to accept difference as real. In some places,⁸⁰⁸ the Lord is glorified as Nityamukta (eternally liberated), Jīva is described as bound. As Nityamuktatva and Baddhatva are opposite to each other, there cannot be any identity between eternally liberated Brahman and bound soul. The state of release in the case of soul, indicates the Sārūpya (similar form) in release. The liberated soul will have the similar explicit form as that of the God.⁸⁰⁹

Vādirāja asks- "Is this identity true or false?" If this identity is not true, then difference is true. If identity is true then second question follows: "Is this attribute distinct or not?" If the very attribute identity is distinct, then the Advaita is given up. If it is not distinct then, it cannot be an attribute of Brahman, since Brahman, in the Advaita, is attributeless.⁸¹⁰ The Advaita cannot talk of identity between attribute and attributed because, the fact of being attributelessness is the only aspect in the Advaita. Therefore, neither identity can be treated as attribute nor can it be identified with Brahman.

Even in the Advaita, Brahman and souls, due to

possessing opposite attributes cannot be declared as identical. And with Lakṣaṇā, setting aside opposite attributes if identity is going to be traced then, that is not at all the identity of soul and Brahman.⁸¹¹

But in the Dvaita view, there is no difficulty. Because, the identity between attribute and attributed is accepted. Attributes such as Omniscience, Omnipotence and attributed Brahman are not distinct. They are identical. The concept of Viśeṣa helps for different dealing. It is the power and also the very nature of Brahman with the help of which distinction is hinted at for dealing without difference in reality or essence. The expressions such as bliss of Brahman, knowledge of Brahman and others do not convey the sense of difference, since they are the very nature of Brahman.⁸¹²

AIKYA ŚRUTIS ALSO DO NOT SUPPORT THE ADVAITA

The scriptural passages, that are considered as Aikya srutis or 'identity-passages' by the Advaitins, and which are regarded as Tatvāvedaka or truth-imparting by them, also do not convey their identity and unreality. The passage Ekamevādvitīyam⁸¹³, Neha nānāsti⁸¹⁴ and others are interpreted by the Advaitins to prove the illusory nature of the world. But really speaking, all these passages neither

prove the illusory nature of the world nor negate the difference between Brahman and the world consisting of sentient souls and insentient matter. The Advaitins hold that these passages declare Brahman as Abadhya or unsublated and world Badhya or sublated. This interpretation does not prove the identity but on the other hand proves the difference between Brahman and the world, since difference is evident between sublated, and unsublated.⁸¹⁵ Even if the world is taken to mean sublated, its reality cannot be eliminated, because, as nature of attributed (of Brahman) its difference is real. If the world is taken as identical with Brahman, then also the world would be real. Thus, neither identity nor unreality can be proved with the help of these statements. The above interpretation of the Advaita ultimately insists on either to accept both Brahman and the world as real or both as unreal. In the same way the passage Tat tvam=asi^{815A} does not state the identity between Brahman and the soul. The term Advitīyam in Ekamevādvitīyam does not negate the second other than the Brahman. But it certainly proves that Brahman is different from the second, that is world. Here, neither the non-reality of the second viz., the world is stated nor the identity is stressed. It is like the expression Anaśva. Anaśva, though something other than Aśva, or horse, does not negate the existence of others. In the same way the term 'Advitīya' also does not

deny the presence of the second viz., the world.⁸¹⁶

And moreover, the term 'Advitīya' is stated in the context of Pralaya world-dissolution. So it also means the Pragabhāva and Pradhvamsābhāva or the prior and posterior non-existence of the world. And that entity to which the prior and posterior non-existence are connected, cannot be subject to Atyantābhāva, total non-existence. And further this 'Advitīya' term does not refer to or indicate the illusory nature of the world.⁸¹⁷ Though the concept unreality of the Advaita, conveys the sense of absence in the past, present and future, the expression Advitīya in the context of Pralaya cannot be understood in that sense. The term 'Advitīya', with reference to the annihilation, suggests that the created world would be absent only during annihilation. It is evident that it was present before annihilation and will be present after annihilation. In addition to Brahman, Time is also present during annihilation. And it is indicated by the term 'Agre'.⁸¹⁸ So with reference to the annihilation, presence of Brahman alone cannot be asserted but also of the world. That means, the world, in the term of primal matter (Mūlaprakṛti) is present even during dissolution.^{818A}

The passage Neha nānāsti kincana does not prove either

identity of the soul and Brahman or does not negate the presence of something other than Brahman. It denies the difference in Brahman and His attributes, between original form and incarnations and so on.⁸¹⁹ The same view is being asserted by the passage Yadeveha tadamutra.⁸²⁰ The passages Neha nānāsti kīncana⁸²¹ and Īśāno bhūtabhavyasya⁸²² are beginning and concluding statements respectively. In both neither identity nor unreality is declared,⁸²³ but identity of Brahman and His attributes, supremacy of Brahman and reality of the world are promised. Vādirāja interprets the passage Neha nānāsti... and says that the Lord is the Ādhāra (supporter) for all.⁸²⁴ The relation of supported and supporter is evident.

THE PASSAGES BRAHMĀHAMSMI AND OTHERS ALSO SUPPORT BHEDA

Vādirāja quoted not only statements that openly declare Bheda, but also those that have been misinterpreted by the Advaitins.

The Advaitins' contend that the passage Brahmā ahamasmi⁸²⁵ states the identity. But it does not. The term 'Brahma' which is in the nominative case, can also be understood in locative sense. Then the expression becomes as Brahmāni ahamasmi that means "I am solely dependent upon Brahman." Vādirāja states that it can also be interpreted

as 'I am controlled by Brahman.'⁸²⁶ Thus, there is no scope for identity. And moreover, to explain such statements one has to take into consideration the context also. The above passage occurs in the Aghamarṣaṇa hymn. Here a qualified soul is offering prayer to God Varuna. The relation of the worshipped and the worshipper is clearly visible. Hence, the soul cannot be declared as identical with God. Vādirāja asks the Advaitin as to whether he intends to declare himself as identical with Jyoti or flame since in the same context there is the statement as Paramjyotiḥ. The Advaitin cannot get himself identified with the Jyoti. So the context is more important. Further, Brahma aham asmi cannot be interpreted as soul is identical with Brahman. Because in the Advaita 'Aham' does not stand for Jīva Caitanya as it is Avācya.⁸²⁷ So 'Aham' stands for Antaḥkarana which is insentient. Now the identity can be traced provided this insentient Antaḥkarana is real. But it is not real as it is a product of nescience. Therefore, Brahman cannot be identified with this insentient matter.⁸²⁸ Thus, the above statement does not help to identify Brahman with soul.

The above passage Brahma aham asmi is nothing but a repetition of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka passage viz., Aham Brahmā asmi.⁸²⁹ since all the scriptural passages (including this) are the declarations of Brahman Himself at the time of world-creation. He cannot intend Himself to get identified with

someone else. So here also, the sense of identity cannot be understood.

The passage Sarvam khalvidam brahma⁸³⁰ does not state the identity between Brahman and matter. Because, Brahman is sentient. He cannot be identified with matter which is insentient. Further, it does not state the identity between Brahman and Soul, since both possess opposite attributes. Brahman is Omniscient whereas soul is knowing little. Therefore, there cannot be identity between the two. Vādirāja promises that the term Sarvam in the passage above conveys the all-pervasiveness of Brahman. His all-pervasiveness is declared here. He, who is all-pervasive and sentient, cannot be identical either with soul of Ekadeśavyāpi or with matter which is insentient. If the sense of identity is understood then, that would become contradictory to the beginning statement of that context Tajjalan iti santassan upāsita.⁸³² In the beginning statement, the relation of worshipped and worshipper is clearly mentioned. And always it is fact that worshipped is distinct from worshipper. The worshipped is not only distinct but also superior to worshipper. Then only the relation of Upāśya-Upāsaka has some meaning. This not only promises the distinction but also the gradation. Therefore, the passage Sarvam khalu cannot be interpreted as against this beginning statement.

So the sense of identity should not be understood here as the Advaitins unfortunately do. The passage is to be understood as 'Brahman is all-pervasive', 'Everything is dependent upon Brahman' and so on. It also means that the entire world is controlled by Brahman. So there is no question of the identity and unreality. And further it does not hold good if Sarvam is meant as Sarva brahmadhiṣṭhāna, since it is not the intended meaning in this context.⁸³³

INTERPRETATION OF EKAVIJÑĀNENA SARVA VIJÑĀNA

The Śruti- Utaṭamādeśam...⁸³⁴ does not help the Advaitin to prove his conception of identity.⁸³⁵ The meaning of the statement seems to be that by gaining the knowledge of one, everything becomes known. According to the Advaita, Brahmajñāna is Nisprakāra (absolute-without distinction). That means it is Cimātrajñāna or knowledge of sentiency. It is the knowledge of Brahman devoid of all attributes and it is only an element of consciousness. But this knowledge which conveys nothing, cannot help to know the knowledge of all other entities. The knowledge of other entities is possible only when there is some relation with that. But Vadiraja argues that as Brahman is attributeless, the knowledge of It is also not concrete and definite. So it does not help to gain the knowledge of all other entities.⁸³⁶

And moreover, in the Advaita, Brahman is Adhiṣṭhāna or substratum and the world is Āropita or superimposed. The superimposed one cannot be known by the knowledge of the substratum. The substratum Brahman is real and it cannot give the knowledge of the superimposed world. In fact the knowledge of Brahman sublates the knowledge of the superimposed snake. In the Advaita, the superimposed one is non-real. And if it is held that the knowledge of Brahman helps to gain the knowledge of the non-reality of all other entities, then it amounts to saying that the gained knowledge is the knowledge of the absence of all other entities. This type of knowledge cannot be considered as knowledge. Such negative knowledge may be termed as Abhāvajñāna of all other entities and not the knowledge of all other entities. So the interpretation of the Advaitins of the passage Eka vijñānena sarva vijñāna stands baseless.

The correct interpretation of the passage is that as there is similarity in respect of reality and the like, between Brahman and the world of souls and matter, the knowledge of Brahman helps to gain the correct knowledge of the world.⁸³⁷ Here this interpretation of similarity neither proves the identity with Brahman nor the unreality of the world. As the Lord is Supreme, All-pervasive and so on, His knowledge is enough to realize the entire reality.

The knowledge of Brahman gives rise to the correct knowledge of the world as the world is created by Him. This is also explained in all Itihāsas, Purāṇas and other authoritative texts.

The Viśvarūpa darśana episode of the Gītā and the universe being shown to Yaśodā by Lord Kṛṣṇa substantiate the above view. Akūra also makes it clear in the Bhāgavata, that all the wonders of the world are the wonders of the Lord.⁸³⁸ Therefore, to know Brahman, is to know the entire world. Further, he, who knows Brahman well, is blessed by Brahman. It is the grace of the Lord that makes us have the knowledge of the whole world. So it is all-knowledge. As Brahman is Omniscient, Supreme doer, Supreme being and so on, and as entire world is created by Him, His knowledge indeed promises the knowledge of entire world.⁸³⁹

So the passage does not mean that as there is nothing other than Brahman, the knowledge of it leads to the knowledge of non-reality of all others. The correct import of the passage is given by Vādirāja as above. Vādirāja ensures that as the knowledge of Brahman is vast and the knowledge of the world is limited, the knowledge of Brahman makes easy to have the knowledge of all other entities.

INTERPRETATION OF TAT TVAM ASI AND REFERENCE OF ŚRUTI-
GĪTĀ AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS
IN SUPPORT OF THAT

The scriptural passage which is widely quoted as the most stable evidence for stating the identity as understood by Advaitins is the passage- Tattvamasī.⁸⁴⁰ Vādirāja opines that it does not help the Advaitins to prove the identity between the embodied soul and Brahman. The real import of the passage is that soul is similar to Brahman in some respects in a limited way.⁸⁴¹ That does not promise complete identity between the two as made much of by the Advaitins.

Vādirāja asserts that this type of expressions are common but nowhere the sense of identity as understood by the Advaitins is conveyed. The expressions like 'He is a tiger' and 'The boy is fire' do not convey the sense of identity. But, it is the similarity with regard to some common properties that is intended here to be conveyed. Similarly, in the case of Tat tvam asi also, the sense of similarity in some respects is to be taken into account. The context in which the statement is taught clearly indicates the difference and not the identity.⁸⁴² The preceding statement also does not talk of identity. The Śruti- Satā somya tadā sampanno bhavati⁸⁴³ states that there is no identity between the soul and Brahman but it is the soul who has close proximity with Brahman at heart

during deep-sleep state. During waking state and dream state the soul abides in the eye and the neck respectively.^{843A} So the passage Tat tvam asi that falls in the same context, cannot be understood in favour of identity of the Advaitins.

Another passage of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad viz., Prājñenātmanā sampariśvaktah⁸⁴⁴ also corroborates the view of the above Śruti that the soul has close proximity with Brahman during deep sleep. Here also the identity is not expressed.⁸⁴⁵ The Sūtra- Susuptyutkrāntyorbhedena (I.iii.42) also proves that there is difference during deep sleep and Utkrānti.⁸⁴⁶ If difference is not accepted then there should not be any difference between deep sleep and release.

The expressions or terms 'Manas' and 'Prāṇa'⁸⁴⁷ that are used in this context, denote soul and Brahman respectively.⁸⁴⁸ And it is also explained that one is regulated by the other. That means soul is regulated by Brahman. The relation of regulated and regulator shows that there is difference between the two. He, who is regulated seeks the shelter of the other.

In the passage of 'Tattvamasi' itself, nine illustrations are given to substantiate the reality and the relation between 'Tat' and 'Tvam.' And all these nine

illustrations clearly state that in this context difference of soul and Brahman is intended. The illustration of salt and water ascertains the difference. When salt is put in the water, no doubt it melts and becomes invisible, but it does not become identical with water. Likewise when rivers flow and join the sea it does not become identical with them. The river-waters do retain their separateness and individuality. The human capacity is limited and as such not enough to distinguish the river-waters from the sea. But that does not rule out the fact of their existing separately. It is only the confluence and not the identity. In the same way when bees collect the flower juice from different flowers and when they form into honey that does not mean that juices of different flowers have attained identity. Their separateness remains unharmed. The close examination makes it clear that they have the variegated tastes. Thus all the nine illustrations of that context prove difference and not the identity.⁸⁴⁹

Vādirāja critically views the context wherein the passage occurs. When Śvetaketu, son of Uddālaka, developed arrogance thinking himself to be highly learned, then this was realized by his father and the father wanted to remove the arrogance of the son. And with that intention he taught this truth. The father wanted to convince the son

that the knowledge is vast and mere recitation of the Vedic hymns would serve no purpose and hence one had to understand the real import of the Vedas. So, his intention was not to convey the identity but the difference. Then only he could make his son give up his arrogance. If the sense of identity was intended then there was no scope to reduce the arrogance, of Śvetaketu. Thus, the context also affirms that the passage declares the difference and not the identity.⁸⁵⁰ The Advaita prefers to have implied meaning with regard to two terms Tat and Tvam. That means the primary meaning of the terms should be given up. As these two terms indicate the opposite attributes, the Advaita prefers secondary meaning to primary meaning. Because, unless and until the sense of opposite attributes is given up, it is not possible to talk of identity. But Vādirāja says that resorting of Lakṣaṇā or indication could be enough for one word- Tat as it shows an element of Laghutva or easiness in interpretation. There is no need to adopt implication for two words- Tat and Tvam. Now the word Tat can be understood as Tatsadrśa or (similar to that) Tatsambandhi (or related to that). This would be the most befitting meaning to the context. So implication may be applied to only one word and not to both the words.⁸⁵¹

Further, the term 'Tat' may also be understood as

Tasmāt. In that case, the meaning of the expression would be 'Thine very existence is from Him!' The sense of Akhaṇḍārthatva also is not tenable and agreeable to the context. Because, it makes the entire discussion and exposition baseless and futile. Vādirāja refers to the statements of the Bhāgavata such as Śrutigītā⁸⁵² and others and proves that even the Bhāgavata does not declare identity between Brahman and the world. He asserts that even Viṣṇusahasra-nāma indicates difference.

Bhedo mithyā bheda tvāt candrabhedavat. The inference advanced by the Advaitins has no support of either perception or of testimony. Hence, the very inference is likely to be disproved by counter inferences. Jīveśvarabhedaḥ pāramārthika saṁ mahāpralayeṣi urvāyā tatvāt brahmavat. The very attempt of resorting to indication is unnecessary. Because, in that case, Brahman, giving away all His auspicious virtues, would have to be declared as only consisting of sentiency. Even this also does not help to prove the supposed identity. And moreover, perception also openly proclaims the difference.⁸⁵³ Thus, identity cannot be established.

Vādirāja, by the by, attacks the epistemology of the Advaita and remarks that according to them the Pramāṇas are

not real as they are the product of nescience. As nescience is unreal, its effects must also be unreal. Therefore, these Pramāṇas or means cannot establish the identity. While resorting to Lakṣaṇā in Tat-tvamasī the Advaitins cite the example So'yam devadattah. But actually, neither the meaning of Saḥ nor of Ayam is given up.⁸⁵⁴ So this example does not confirm their arguments. Because, in the example cited above, Saḥ stands for and denotes time and the place of the past and Ayam stands for and denotes the time and place of the present.

Further, Vādirāja opines that Viśiṣṭaika cannot be traced here. And that will not indicate Viśeṣaika necessarily. Because, in the example Dandī devadattah and Kuṇḍalī devadattah. Devadatta is one and the same but not Dandā and Kuṇḍala. So Viśeṣaika cannot be held.⁸⁵⁵

Now if the aspect of sentiency alone is to be meant with regard to the terms 'Tat' and 'Tvam,' then the very usage of expression would be meaningless. Not only that, the expressions, then by no means convey the sense of identity. And if sentiency alone would be there, then also, the question viz., as to the identity of what remains unsolved.⁸⁵⁶ Therefore, as already mentioned the sense of similarity in certain respects between Brahman and the soul

is intended here. This passage also relates the relation of reflective and reflection. Brahman is reflective and soul is reflection. This relation promises certain similarity and also the control of reflective over reflection.^{856A} Thus, the passage Tat tvam asi does not ascertain the identity.

In defence of this, Vādirāja mentions the episodes of Pauṇḍraka Vasudeva and of Mūcukunda and shows how the knowledge of identity brought about self-destruction and the sense of difference led to upliftment⁸⁵⁷ respectively. He also discusses the Gītā statement Īśvarohamambhogi...⁸⁵⁸ and defends that knowledge of identity will not help to attain the liberation.

THE ŚRUTI DVĀSUPARNĀ... SUPPORTS BHEDA

The passage Dvāsuparnā sayujā sakhāyau...⁸⁵⁹ does not mention identity whereas it clearly states the difference. Here both soul and Brahman are described as two birds abiding in the same tree in the form of physical body. Jīva is described as one who eats the karmaphala whereas Brahman does not. The very fact of eating and non-eating clearly shows the distinction.⁸⁶⁰ There even the Advaita interpretation mentions the two birds as soul and Brahman. Vādirāja opines that the mention of two birds as soul and

Brahman in the Advaita commentary, ascertains the difference and not the identity.⁸⁶¹

The Advaitins interpret the passage with the help of the Adhyāhāra of two words as Pāramārthika and Vyāvahārika. They explain that, in the empirical state, one and the same Brahman eats the fruits of his deeds and in the real state, one and the same Brahman does not eat the fruits of deeds. Thus, the two states as eating and non-eating are taken into account. The opposite nature of these two is discarded by resorting to Adhyāhāra of above words. Hence, both enjoying and non-enjoying of fruit of deeds seem to be possible with regard to one and the same Brahman. In this way, apparent difference as two is simply empirical and hence is not absolutely real. Whereas, the sense as one and the same, which is Pāramārthika is real. The Advaitins hold that difference implied here is only empirical.

This interpretation as well as the contention of the Advaitins is not correct. Because, here Adhyāhāra is not necessary. Generally, Adhyāhāra is resorted to when the particular passage cannot be interpreted in a cogent manner.⁸⁶³ Further, there is no ground or any reason to state eating of fruit of deeds is only empirical. Because, the passage Sośnute sarvān kāmān saha...⁸⁶⁴ declares that

the enjoyment is also there in liberation. And this enjoyment or eating cannot be considered as empirical. It must be Paramārthika.⁸⁶⁵ So the enjoyment and the non-enjoyment are both absolutely real. And this proves the real difference between the two. When there is difference between liberated soul and Brahman, there is no need to stress difference in respect of the unliberated or bound souls.

Further, if there was no real difference, then, there would not have been in the passage the mention of 'two' by using the dual number as Dvā suparnā. Because two attributes of one and the something do not make it to be consisting of two. A jar, possessing colour and form, cannot be considered as two jars. And also a wife, having courage and beauty, cannot be mentioned as two.⁸⁶⁶ In the same way, enjoyment and its absence do not make one and the same as two but convey only two distinct entities. Because of the two attributes one and the same object is not mentioned in dual number. The Bhagavata verse Vidyāmāyo nitya mukto... clearly establishes the distinction between soul and Brahman.⁸⁶⁷

Vādirāja holds that, the inference as Vimataḥ bhedaḥ paramārthasat... proves the difference. It states that difference is evident as reference is made of the souls,

liberated afterwards. And moreover, the illustration also corroborates the proposition that difference is absolutely real like the bliss of liberation.⁸⁶⁸ In the passage Dvā suparnā difference is hinted at on so many grounds. The use of dual number, reference of enjoyment and non-enjoyment and also the usage Anyā promise only the distinction beyond doubt.⁸⁶⁹ The expressions sakhāyau and Sayujau assert that the distinction, hinted at here in the passage, is in respect of nature and not in respect of place and thought that is unity of place and unity of thought. As the passage also deals with the enjoyment of liberation of the liberated souls, it is sure that the difference in nature is taken into account.⁸⁷⁰ Brahman is described here as brilliant. It shows that He is superior and master, another soul is inferior and servant.

The term 'Sayujau' in the passage implies the Sāyujya type of liberation and not the identity. The Sāyujya type of liberation indicates soul's presence in close proximity with Brahman always and not the identity between the two. So there is nothing in this passage that could suggest that the difference between soul and Brahman is simply empirical. The view of the Advaita that Vyāvahārika Bheda referred to elsewhere, is quoted here is also not tenable since according to the Advaita absolute difference is nowhere declared in the entire scripture.⁸⁷¹

Brahman, being Omniscient, Omnipresent, Omnipotent and so on, need not undergo any hardships for his enjoyment. The question of gaining of fresh enjoyment does not arise in His case. He is eternally contented. His activity is for others' sake who are under his control and supervision.⁸⁷² Vādirāja cites the example of how God distributed the nectar and poison obtained in the churning of milky ocean. Neither he tasted the nectar nor he rejected the poison. This shows that he has nothing to gain or lose with efforts. He dwells in all as the inner controller and without experiencing any fruit of actions. Since, He controls, He is the Impeller and as the soul is the controlled, he is impelled.⁸⁷³ Thus, this passage also indicates the relation of impelled and impellor. The very fact is being discussed and narrated with illustrations in the Bhāgavata, in Gītā and in other works.⁸⁷⁴ It is explained there that soul eats the fruit of deeds according to his own deeds. Whereas God being unaffected, simply witnesses and controls the soul. The sufferings and others, seen in soul, are not seen in God. Therefore, soul and Brahman are distinct to each other.⁸⁷⁵ Thus the very expression of the passage denotes one or other unique attributes of both of them and establishes difference as its primary import.

BHEDA IS NOT VYĀVAHĀRIKA OR EMPIRICAL⁸⁷⁶

The Advaitins hold that difference is empirical and not absolutely real. But at the same time they fail to explain this empirical difference convincingly. They cannot say that it is sublated by the cognition of Brahman. And it is evident that it is not sublated by any other knowledge. It shows that the very usage empirical is baseless. Further, difference is not sublated by this cognition of Brahman. But, it is the Brahmaikya that gets sublated. The experience or knowledge as 'I am not Omniscient,' 'I am not the overlord of all' is evident. This experience is the perception. And the knowledge of this perception controverts the idea of the identity fancied by the Advaitins.

According to the Advaita, the experience or knowledge that is sublated by the empirical experience, is called real in appearance. If that is true their Brahmaikya since being sublated as explained above by the experience of empirical perception would become real in appearance.⁸⁷⁷

E.g. the experience of the snake gets sublated by the experience of the rope. Here the experience of the snake is illusory whereas the experience of rope is empirical according to the Advaitins. According to this, in the Advaita, perception of difference is empirical. And as knowledge of identity gets sublated by this perception of

empirical difference that would become Prātibhāsika. So the Advaitins cannot treat difference between soul and Brahman as empirical. Vādirāja says that the efforts of the Advaitins is like a person running out of fear of the scorpion but rushing into the hole of venomous snakes.⁸⁷⁸

The contention of the Advaitins is that the passages like Dvā suparnā... and others that declare Jīveśvarabheda which is only Vyāvahārika, become Atatvāvedaka or conveying false information. But Vādirāja opines that a true follower of the scriptures will not accept this view. Because, really speaking, it is as good as disregarding the scripture as the Buddhists do. A true and rigid follower of the scriptures will rather try his best to prove both difference and identity conveying passages, as Tatvāvedaka. That means all scriptural passages convey valid information when interpreted properly.⁸⁷⁹

In the Advaita, as cognition of Brahman is Nirvikalpaka (without distinction), it can neither establish something nor can it sublate anything.⁸⁸⁰ It can also not sublate the difference. Hence, difference is real.⁸⁸¹ Vādirāja asks: "What is this sublation of difference?" If it is taken to mean Bhedanāśa, then it is not a sublation at all. Because, when something is destroyed nobody says that it is

the sublation of that. Destruction of a jar is not the sublation of that jar. So the sublation of difference is not Bhedanāśa. The Advaitins also hold that the ignorance that causes illusion is going to be removed by the sublating knowledge. The ignorance that causes the illusory experience of the snake, will be removed by subsequent sublating knowledge of the rope. But in the case of difference it is not at all caused by any ignorance. As difference is beginningless in time, it will never get sublated.⁸⁸²

The Advaitins contend that the empiricity is nothing but Arthakriyākāritva (effectiveness causing some activity). But it is not correct. Because, as already pointed out that the Vyāvahārikatva is not a reality according to them. Hence its Arthakriyākāritva does not arise. Otherwise the hare's horn will have to be treated as Pāramārthika (absolutely real) as it is not Arthakriyākāri, a view that is absurd.⁸⁸³ Vādirāja taunts at Advaitins that their Brahman should be treated as Vyāvahārika since being Arthakriyākāri in the form of being Upādāna, Nimitta and Bhramādiṣṭhāna. And It would not become Pāramārthika. So Vyāvahārikatva cannot be defined as Arthakriyākāritva. Vādirāja also opines that whatever is Prātibhāsika in the Advaita will become Vyāvahārika if the above definition of Vyāvahārikatva

is taken into account. The illusory knowledge, related to the substratum (Adhiṣṭhāna), is Prātibhāsika. And this Prātibhāsika, since being Arthakriyākāri, as shown above, can also be considered as Vyāvahārika. As the experience of the snake superimposed on the rope causes fear and the like, it should be treated as Vyāvahārika because it is Arthakriyākāri. But in reality, no one admits this view. Generally when an experience leads to fulfilment of some purpose then it is treated as valid experience and if it does not lead to any fulfilment then that experience is considered to be invalid. In the above case, defining Vyāvahārikatva as Arthakriyākāritva and considering Vyāvahārikatva, that will not be real or invalid, has made the very discussion invalid. Even if Vyāvahārikatva is defined as Avidyākāryatva, that will not fulfil the intention of the Advaitins in establishing identity.⁸⁸⁴ Further, this difference of soul and God is considered as one of the six Anādis by the Advaitins.⁸⁸⁵ When it is Anādi or beginningless it cannot be Avidyākārya or the effect of nescience. And as it is not the product of nescience it cannot be empirical. Thus, the very definition of the Advaitins proves that the difference is not empirical. When it is not empirical, it must be absolutely real.⁸⁸⁶

Vādirāja quotes some other passages that support and

declare difference. The passages Brahmaṇā saha..., Param-
⁸⁸⁷īyotiḥ... clearly state the distinction of the soul from
 Brahman. The former passage states that there is distinc-
 tion between the soul and Brahman in the liberated state.
 The term saha indicates this. And the second mentions
 that soul attains only proximity with Brahman and not
 identity with Him.⁸⁸⁸ Thus, difference of soul from
 Brahman is absolutely real. The Brahmasūtras, cited already⁸⁸⁹
 also declare difference and not the identity.

ANUVĀDYATVA AFFECTS AIKYA AND NOT BHEDA

The Advaitins hold that Bheda śrutis are 'lower' and
Abheda śrutis are 'higher.' Here 'Apara' means they occur
 first and para means 'they occur later.' The view of the
 Advaita is as follows:- Bheda śrutis may be useful at the
 beginning and lower stage whereas Abheda śrutis are useful
 at the ultimate and higher stage. So Abheda śrutis are
 preferred to Bheda śrutis. But, this view is not correct.⁸⁹⁰
 The very classification of passages as higher and lower
 is not correct because all of them are impersonal. When
 one admits scriptures as impersonal, this classification
 does not hold good.

If it is held that Para srutis invalidate the Apara
 ones because Para śrutis occur later, then on this ground

as Smṛtis occur later than even these Para śruti passages, will invalidate the 'higher' scriptures.⁸⁹¹ The world that emerges later may also invalidate Brahman. The contention that Nisedha or negation is superior to Vidhi or injunction is also not correct. Because, in sacrifice, negation of violence is set aside and violated. In sacrifices Paśuhimsā is preferred by the Mīmāṃsakas. Therefore, such classification of scriptural passages will not help the Advaita in any manner. On the basis of conveying the import, the scripture may be grouped as Sāvakāśa and Niravakāśa.⁸⁹² The close observation and study proves that Bheda Śrutis are Niravakāśas and Abheda Śrutis are Sāvakāśas.⁸⁹³ So this makes it clear that Sāvakāśa Śrutis (Abheda Śrutis) are to be explained in accordance with Niravakāśa Śrutis (Bheda Śrutis).

The Advaitins also opine that Bheda Śrutis are only Anuvādakas (repetitions) because, they convey the sense which is already Pratyakṣasiddha (established by perception). As they are Anuvādakas,⁸⁹⁴ there is left nothing to prove. Whereas Abheda Śrutis are not Anuvādakas as they declare the Advaita for the first time. This view is also not correct. Vādirāja asserts that this type of argument may also be advanced against the Advaitins. Brahman is Svapra-
prakāśa or self-luminous and a known entity in the Advaita.

And this Brahman is mentioned in the scriptural passages. Hence, the Advaita Śrutis are Anuvādakas.⁸⁹⁵ Thus, the argument proves Śrutis as Anuvādakas. If Bheda Śrutis are alone considered as Anuvādakas, then is it grouped and mentioned without any purpose or is it for refutation?⁸⁹⁶ In the first case, there is purpose and this purpose is to adduce the Bheda Śrutis as stock Pramanas. Because Bheda Śrutis have the support of Pratyakṣa and Śruti. What is evident by perception is upheld by scriptures. Thus the support of the two creates more confidence in the proposition.⁸⁹⁷ In the second alternative, difference cannot be shown as stained with defect and hence cannot be refuted. The mere fact that difference being opposite of identity, cannot be a defect. If the mere opposition of identity is held as defect, then that will lead to Anyonyāśraya doṣa. Till the validity of Abheda Śrutis is proved, Abheda Śrutis will not be able to invalidate the Bheda Śrutis. And until the invalidity of the Bheda Śrutis is established, the validity of Abheda Śrutis is not final.⁸⁹⁸ As both are scriptures, it is not possible to attribute invalidity to any group. If at all there is a need to attribute, it must be to all the scriptures. Otherwise, the very view becomes opposite of perception and may lead to either the defect of mutual dependence or some other.⁸⁹⁹

As already mentioned that if a fact is supported by two Pramāṇas, then it becomes more stronger. In Bheda Śrutis, as difference is Pratyakṣasiddha, its Anuvāda in the Śruti will strengthen it (difference), then Abheda Śrutis, since lacking such strong support will have to be explained in accordance with Bheda Śrutis. Generally testimony will not come in the way of perception. If at all there is sublation in perception, then only implication is preferred to. But nowhere perception is given up for the sake of testimony. Intuitive perception supports the difference and this difference is rightly upheld by the Bheda Śrutis.⁹⁰⁰ So the Advaitins resorting to implication with regard to Bheda Śrutis, is unnecessary. To support Advaita, there is no fun in resorting to implication. Perception is valid in the case of those that are liable for perception and testimony (Āgama) is valid in respect of those that are beyond senses. That does not mean that perception is invalid.⁹⁰¹

The distinction of soul and Brahman is evident as it is established by perception. And the same is explained in the scriptures. Even if it is considered as repetition, that definitely strengthens the difference doctrine. Anuvāda Sometimes/in the form of mere duplication and repetition becomes invalid and weak but here it is a plus point that

strengthens the very difference. Thus, Anuvāda necessarily does not affect the validity in any way. The significance of validity could be realized by Yāthārthya. Whatever is not Yāthārtha, validity of that knowledge cannot be gained. Otherwise, on the basis of Anuvāda as explained by the Advaitins, Smṛtis are to be considered as Anuvādas since they convey the fact which is already stated in scriptures.⁹⁰² Vādirāja refers to the Bhāgavata⁹⁰³ verse and says that Anuvāda is praised there.⁹⁰⁴ Anuvāda is of two kinds. Sometimes it is for affirmation of something already established, and sometimes it is for refutation. In respect of difference, Anuvāda is for affirmation of difference already established by perception. If all Anuvādakas are held invalid, then all the Advaita Śrutis that are Anuvādakas to each other, cut the validity of each other like the two demons Sunda and Upasunda.⁹⁰⁵ And in Anuvādas that are meant for refutation, there must be Dūṣya and Dūṣaka in one sentence or in one context. On the basis of Anuvāda, passages of one context cannot refute the Śruti passage of another context.⁹⁰⁶ Therefore, the passages as they do not contradict with others, are defectless.⁹⁰⁷ And there is also not a single Śruti in the form of Anuvāda.⁹⁰⁸

The view of the Advaitins that Bheda is stated and prescribed for the sake of worship, is not correct.

Because for worship or adoration, object must be real and its worship-worthiness must be known. Otherwise there may be confusion, because, it is not correct to meditate on three-eyed god Siva as thousand-eyed Indra. Each God is distinct in nature and position. So two gods as objects of meditation, cannot be put together.⁹⁰⁹ Śruti clarifies this and never misleads the worshipper.

OBJECT OF MEDITATION IS NOT MITHYĀ

The object of meditation cannot be a unreal. Because in that case, meditation would be meaningless. The scriptural passage Nedam yadidam upāsate⁹¹⁰ does not negate the real object of meditation. But it stresses on the real object and also on the difference between soul and Brahman.⁹¹¹ It is common to see that people meditate upon god Garuḍa for the removal of the poison and god Viṣṇu for the removal of obstacles.⁹¹² The scripture never misleads with regard to meditation. And this meditation would be fruitful provided there is real difference between the object of meditation and the person meditating. The Brahmasūtra Na pratīke na hi sah⁹¹³ (IV.1.4) makes it clear that Pratīka itself is not God. From this it is evident that the true position of the object is taken into account for meditation.⁹¹⁴ Certainly, an unreal cannot help to realize the real.

Further, the difference between worshipped and worshipper is seen not only in Samsāra but it continues even after liberation. The four types of liberation⁹¹⁵ do not rule out the relation of worshipped and worshipper and do not result in any identity.⁹¹⁶

As already pointed out above, the passage, Nedam yadidam upāsate does not convey the sense of identity. It informs that the mental image of God fabricated for meditation before direct vision or knowledge is not God Himself.⁹¹⁷ This meditation on that mental image, helps us to have the vision of the God in the long run at the Aparokṣa state. The mental image is the mental image. Though it is distinct from God, it is not unreal.⁹¹⁸ Because, it is this through which one will have the direct vision of the God.⁹¹⁹ Vādirāja gives another interpretation of this passage as soul, who is known by Sākṣin is not Brahman. Here Idam stands for soul. Thus, both the interpretations establish the difference.⁹²⁰ As scripture informs about relation of worshipped and worshipper, it can never establish identity. And moreover, it also proves the reality of the object of meditation. If the object of meditation is not real, then the process of Śravaṇa, Manana and Dhyāna would be futile. Hence, the object of meditation must be real and distinct from meditator.^{920A}

The passage Yadā paśyaḥ paśyate rukmavarṇam⁹²¹ promises the distinction of worshipped and worshipper. The distinct attributes of worshipped God such as Rukmavarṇam, Kartāram, Īśam and others affirm that worshipped God is not merely distinct but is superior to the meditating soul. He is the Supreme Lord, Independent Creator and so on. Sāmyam upaiti does not convey identity but asserts that the liberated soul lives in close proximity with the God.⁹²²

BHEDA IS TENABLE IN ALL RESPECTS

The Advaitins question as to whether the difference is distinct, identical or distinct-cum-identical from the entity. Vādirāja replies that this approach or criticism can be set aside very easily. He opines that the reply, given in the case Vyāvahārika Bheda,⁹²³ can be given here also even if difference is taken as absolutely real.⁹²⁴

The passage Neti neti...⁹²⁵ declares that Brahman is different from both the soul and matter. The use of two negative particles ensures the difference from both soul and matter. In the Advaita, as there is nothing to be negated, the interpretation of 'Na' would be baseless. That means, the Advaitins cannot interpret the use of 'Na' twice in the passage.⁹²⁶ The passage Anyam Īśam...⁹²⁷ makes it clear that Brahman is not only different from this

world of the souls and matter but He is also the Overlord of all. It also states that the soul will be relieved of his sufferings of Samsāra, when he realizes the difference between himself and Brahman, the supremacy of the Lord and great auspicious nature of God.^{927A} The ideas of Abheda, Sāmya and Nirgunatva do not help the soul to get relieved of his grief.⁹²⁸ The passages Eṣā sarveśvaraḥ⁹²⁹ and others establish God's overlordship and bring out the difference between the soul and God. The passages also mention that the relation with regard to the difference is Swāmibhṛtya or Master and servant type. At this juncture, Vādirāja quotes the statements of the Gītā⁹³⁰ and the Bhāgavata that openly declare difference and supremacy of the God.⁹³¹ The Bhāgavata verses Vidyātmani bhidā bodhaḥ...⁹³² and Bhedadrṣṭyā abhimanena...⁹³³ and others state that knowledge of difference, Abhimāna or devotion and Nissaṅgakarma or performance of deeds without the feeling of attachment, as the means for liberation. Here Abhimāna is not attachment towards worldly pleasures but it is the Bhakti or devotion to the Lord. And Nissaṅgakarma is the Virakti.⁹³⁴ Thus, all the passages signify the importance of Bheda as the primary means for realization and liberation.

BIMBAPRATIBIMBABHĀVA BETWEEN GOD AND THE EMBODIED SOUL

The passage Yathaisā puruṣe chāyā...⁹³⁵ states that there is Bimbapratibimbabhāva between Jīva and Brahman.⁹³⁶ The illustration cited in the passage, as man and his shadow, signifies and points at three important points. That are: similarity between Bimba and Pratibimba, dependance of Pratibimba on the Bimba and also difference between the two. No doubt that the soul is similar to God in respect of Sat, Cit and Ānanda. The soul is different from the God and also dependent upon Him.⁹³⁷ The same passage also makes it clear that this Bimbapratibimbabhāva ascertains the Sākāratva or Ādhāratva and Swāmitva of God.^{937A} The similarity between the soul and the God is also hinted at in the passage Rūpaṁ rūpaṁ pratirūpo bhabūva.⁹³⁸ God becomes Bimba to infinite souls, assuming infinite Bimba-forms. And all the souls are Pratibimbas. And these are different from God.⁹³⁹

This relation of Bimbapratibimbabhāva establishes the difference between the two. The reflection shadow is not only distinct but it is real. Similarly reflection soul is not only distinct but also real. Though it is said that there is

similarity between reflective and reflection, this similarity is not in all respects, but with regard to only some respects. The mention with dual number ascertains the difference between the two.⁹⁴⁰ The similarity is also not in all respects completely. It is only in some respects with limitations. Souls are declared as reflections (reflected) since they too are real and unsublated like Brahman. Similarity with limitations does not lead to any identity.^{940A}

Sometimes, the reflection of face is described as face. But that does not mean that both are identical, but they are only similar in some respects. Vādirāja justifies this fact by citing an example that it is as good as referring to the lion in the picture as lion. The lion in the picture, exposes its similarity but not identity. The two are distinct to each other.⁹⁴¹ Vādirāja argues that if Bimbā and Pratibimbā were taken to be identical, then reflection of face in hot water should cause burning pain to the real or reflecting face. Similarly, the entities bigger in size should not get reflected in a small mirror. Hence, identity cannot be traced. If at all there might be similarity in all the respects, then only identity could be attributed.

The dependence of Pratibimbā is evident since Pratibimbā

lasts as long as reflective is present near Upādhi or adjunct. When reflective goes away from the adjunct, then reflection disappears. Thus, a reflection is wholly dependent upon reflective.^{941A} It does not make the reflection unreal.

Pratibimba is Bimbakārya. It is tenable completely in other examples. But in the case of the soul, whose very nature is not created, its solely dependent state is taken into account. In Jīva, the presence of Bimba God is Nimitta. He is the Kartā. Upādhi in the form of Jīvasvarūpa is Upādāna.⁹⁴² This is agreeable only in respect of Bimba-pratibimbabhāva of Brahman and the embodied soul. In the example also, the mirror would become Upādāna for reflection. Thus Pratibimba Jīva is Kārya of Bimba God. It is the Upādāna that is modified as reflection. There is no difficulty for the Advaitins to accept this modification as they regard modification of mind into a jar.⁹⁴³ Thus reflection, though modification, is not unreal. If the reflection is regarded as unreal, then there would be difference from real reflective. And if reflection is taken to be real, then owing to two real entities, difference is evident.^{943A} It is as real as Bimba. Because, the cognition of it as Pratibimba does not get sublated.⁹⁴⁴ So reflection is real and it is real and it is distinct from reflective. The very difference in the usage as reflective and reflection, also signifies

the distinction here. Therefore, the God, who is reflective is distinct from Pratibimba reflection soul and reflection soul is as real as God Brahman.⁹⁴⁵

IV. VIŚVASAURABHA

INTERPRETATION OF THE ŚRUTI'PRAPANCO YADI VIDYETA' AND VIKALPO

VINIVARTETA⁹⁴⁶

As in the Bhedasaurabha, difference between God, embodied soul and the world is proved to be five-fold, in this Viśvasaurabha, reality of the world is considered to be established. Because the doctrine of difference would be meaningful provided the related entities are real. The Śruti- Prapañco yadi vidyeta asserts the reality and eternity of the world of five-fold difference. The world comprising of sentient beings and insentient matter is real since beginningless. In this sense, the Śruti appears to be connected with both the Saurabhas, viz., the Bhedasaurabha and the Viśvasaurabha.⁹⁴⁷

The Śruti-passage mentioned above is interpreted by the Advaitins that it indeed supports the Advaita doctrines viz., the Jaganmithyātva (falsity of the world) and the Advaita (absolute identity). But, Vādirāja opines and promises that this passage does not inform anything about the Jaganmithyātva nor about the Advaita. It ultimately

proves the reality of the world with five-fold difference⁹⁴⁸ and also the Supremacy of the Lord. Vādirāja says that this could be understood and realized, only when the passage is interpreted in the light of and in accordance with the context.

The Advaita interpretation of this passage is 'If the world were to be existed, then only it would have been withdrawn. But as it is an illusion, Advaita is the only reality.' This interpretation controverts the very Advaita view. Because according to the Advaita the world is not real. So when the Advaita negates the real existence of the world, how can there be the withdrawal of the same world. The logic of something having existed and then withdrawn is not helpful to the Advaita. There is no Vyāpti or invariable concomitance between existence and withdrawal in the Advaita. If this Vyāpti is taken for granted then Brahman being existent, would have to be withdrawn.⁹⁴⁹ And according to the Advaita, that which is an object of withdrawal (sublation) is an illusion. In that case, Brahman would have to be an illusion.⁹⁵⁰

Therefore Vādirāja insists that the context is to be taken into account while interpreting such passages. The passage previous to this, runs Ānā-dimāyayā supto yadā

jīvaḥ prabudhyate⁹⁵¹ and so on and it has the reference of ignorance, knowledge and also of difference between one matter and the other one soul and the other. So in the above passage- Prapanca... etc., contrary to the previous one, neither non-reality of the world nor the identity could be traced. So it is five-fold difference that is hinted at by the word 'Prapanca.' The etymological explanation of the term 'Prapanca' is 'higher knowledge of five-fold difference'. 'Pra' means Prakṛṣṭa - 'detail, higher knowledge' and 'Panca' means 'five-fold.' Thus, Prapanca means 'five-fold difference' and not simply the world.⁹⁵²

The expression 'Yadi vidyeta' poses the problem as to whether Prapanca were to be created (if it were not beginningless) then that would have perished. But really speaking, this five-fold difference is not created and hence, the question of its perishing does not arise. As it is beginningless, it will not perish.⁹⁵³ This view establishes the eternality of five-fold difference. The term Māyāmātra in

the passage denotes that this five-fold difference is known to the God and also is guarded by Him. Here 'Māyā' is the Prajñā or knowledge⁹⁵⁴ of the God. It also means that it is the knowledge of the God that makes us to know this five-fold difference well. Here Māyā does not convey the sense believed by the Advaitins. The term 'Advaita' indicates the Sarvottamatva or the supreme nature of the God.

The Advaitins consider the term 'Advaita' as there is nothing real other than Brahman. But this meaning is not intended here. It conveys that there is nothing that is equal or superior to the God. So there is no scope to understand that the things other than the God are illusion. Thus, the term 'Advaita' means 'The God is Supreme.'⁹⁵⁵

The correct import of the passage is that 'If the five-fold difference had been caused then one day it will get perished. But as it does not perish, it is not caused or created. It is known to the God and is guarded by Him. He is the only Supreme Being. There is nothing either equal or superior to Him. This interpretation does not contradict with other passages and does not give scope for counter-arguments. This is the only meaning that suits the context. So the context does not suggest either the Jagan-mityatva or the Ātmaikya. Vādirāja splits the compounded words wonderfully as 'Māyāmātram' etc., and explains that Dvaitam māyāmātram means 'five fold difference is not at illusory.'⁹⁵⁶ Such interpretation also suits the context and avoids the contradiction.

The Advaitins interpret the passage- Vikalpo vinivarteta etc., as follows: The difference as teacher, taught and teaching is only an illusory difference. This order is

meant for only teaching. When the truth is understood then there remains nothing. That means, then distinction will not remain. This interpretation of the Advaitins criticises the view of distinction by treating it as illusion. Hence, the Advaitins contend that this illusory distinction is not a reality. But this interpretation is not correct. Because then, there will be contradiction with the previous one. So the correct import of the passage is that the distinction would have been withdrawn if it were created out of illusion. But it is not illusory. And this fact could be known through a competent teacher (Upadeśaka).

Vādirāja argues that if the Advaitins question as to whether Bheda is Bhinna, Abhinna or Bhinnābhinna, and so on, then what would be the reply of the Advaitins when the same question is asked with regard to Vyāvahārika bheda. So the difference should be accepted as real.⁹⁵⁷

Thus, these two passages establish both Bheda or difference and Jagatsatyatva or reality of the world, topics of the Bhedasaurabha and the Viśvasaurabha respectively. Vādirāja hence considers these passages as Dehalīlīpa - lamp kept on the threshold that illumines both the rooms.⁹⁵⁸

GĪTĀ, MAHĀBHĀRATA AND PURĀNAS ALSO SUPPORT VIŚVASATYATVA

The Bhagavadgītā verse that runs as Asatyamapratisthante jagadāhuranīśvaram. Aparasparasambhūtaḥ kimanyat kāmahaitukam. supports the view of the reality of the world.⁹⁵⁹ It severely attacks those who consider the world as Asat or Mithyā or unreal. It is stated that this view is not only untenable but it spoils all those who teach and are taught.⁹⁶⁰ Vādirāja opines that this Gītā-statement is the import of several Śrutis, Purāṇas etc. It is evident that the Lord is the prime-agent (Kartā) and none else. The Prakṛti or the primal matter is the only Upādānakāraṇa or material cause and others time, place, etc., are Nimittakāraṇas or instrumental causes. The Lord is also considered as Nimittakāraṇa but He is foremost and prime among all instrumental causes. And the world is created by the operation of all these causes.⁹⁶¹ The Prakṛti, stated above, is nothing but the constitution of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas.⁹⁶² In the scriptures as well as in other works, this Prakṛti is called sometimes as Māyā. It is not the Māyā of the Advaitins, because in that case, it would be only an illusion. It is the Prakṛti that is termed Māyā.⁹⁶³ Therefore, the world-effect of this Māyā-prakṛti, is called Māyāmaya.⁹⁶⁴ And thus, the usage will not make this world as the product of Māyā or illusion of the Advaitins. In that case, the world would be unreal.

Now it cannot be held that this Prakṛti gets modified itself into the world. It, being Jada or insentient cannot modify itself into the world. It is the Lord who creates the world out of this Prakṛti. The Gītā statement- Mayā adhyakṣena prakṛtiḥ...⁹⁶⁵ makes this point clear. As Prakṛti is the material cause of this creation, Ajñāna of the Advaitins cannot be taken to be the material cause for creation, since in no works Ajñāna of the Advaitins is declared as Upādānakāraṇa or material cause. So creation is not the out-come of Ajñāna or nescience. And hence, it is not sublated by Brahmajñāna, as the Advaitins make others believe.

The created world, since being not a product of Ajñāna, cannot totally be non-existent. Neither Brahman nor this world will be destroyed completely. Both are eternal.⁹⁶⁶ It is Anādi or beginningless and Ananta or endless in the sense of Pravāhato nitya or eternal like a current. Brahman is also Nitya or eternal. But the difference is that the world is Pravāhato Nitya whereas Brahman is Svarūpataḥ nitya or inherently eternal. The Mahābhārata verse 'Evam tadanādyantam...⁹⁶⁷ brings out the nature of the world as mentioned above.⁹⁶⁸

THE ŚRUTI SVAPNAMĀYĀ SARŪPĀ ... ESTABLISHES VIŚVASATYATVA

The verses in the Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad that run Vibhūtiṃ prasavantvanye...⁹⁶⁹ and others state the different views regarding the nature of the world and also of the process of world-creation. The Advaitins hold that these verses hint at Brahma Parināma-vāda or the Vikāra-vāda. That means Brahman modifies Itself into various forms of the world. They say that the passage also indicates the illusory nature of the world.⁹⁷⁰ But this is not correct. Modification is not admissible in the case of the God.⁹⁷¹ Because, He is glorified as Nirvikāri or changeless. And moreover, He is not of the nature of modification. Further, the world also cannot be treated as illusory. Because, it is the desire of the Lord who creates the world. So it cannot be illusory. Even the Prakṛti or material cause undergoes the changes and functions according to the desire of the Lord.⁹⁷² The God creates this world by His desire and not by any Māyā as understood by the Advaitins. If the desire of the Lord itself is named Māyā then there is no objection to it. Vādirāja opines that the term Prabhu indicates that the Lord is Sarvottama or Overlord, Sarvaśakta or Omnipotent and the like. He never seeks the help of others (in creation maintenance and the like connected with this world.

Now the question is 'What is the Lord's purpose of

creating this world?' Some misinterpret the verse Bhogārtham sr̥ṣṭirityanye...^{972A} etc., and say that the God creates the world for his own enjoyment. But it is not correct. Because, He is Āptakāma or ever-contented. He has nothing to get fulfilled.⁹⁷³ There are some who hold the view that the God creates the world out of Himself for play.⁹⁷⁴ They think that during Pralaya the God's life would be charmless as there might be nothing and hence He, then, engages in the process of creation. This view is also not correct. Because, Vādirāja says, that if this view is admitted then it would contradict with His Āptakāmatva or self-contentment. So it is neither for enjoyment nor for play that the God creates the world, but it is His very nature that He creates the world. Because, He has no desires including to play, to get fulfilled.⁹⁷⁵ It is clear from the passage 'Ichhāmātram prabhoḥ sr̥ṣṭiḥ' and 'Devasya eṣa svabhāvaḥ...^{975A} The expression 'Ichhāmātram' indicates that He has the desire only for creation and not for any benefit out of that. It also conveys that the God's manifestation as Matsya, Kūrma and so on, is because of His Ichhā or desire.⁹⁷⁶ The Upādāna is not required for the manifestation of God's incarnations. Because, something in the form of Upādāna is required for creation and not for manifestation. All the incarnations of the God are eternal but it is the desire of the God that makes them manifest.

So far as Kāla or Time is considered, it is accepted as only instrumental cause and not as Independent efficient cause. The statement Dravyam karma ca kālaśca...⁹⁷⁷ makes it clear that all these are under the control of the Lord. These become useful and favourable in creation etc., provided the God desires, otherwise not. So it is evident that the God is the Creator, Prakṛti is the material cause, time and the like are instruments.

The term Prabhu in the passage also signifies that the God has no Ajñāna or nescience and the creation of the world is not due to nescience. Since Brahman is Omnipotent, Omniscient and so on, He does not require Ajñāna and such others for creation. And moreover, such a wonderful world cannot be the outcome of nescience. It is the Prakṛti (prime-matter) which is the material course.⁹⁷⁸ Creation is Nitya (Pravāhato) or eternal because, the act of creation of the world is the very nature of the God. The world is present with minute form in the God during Pralaya and the same gets manifested and created by the Lord at the time of creation. This proves that the world, either with minute form or with gross form, is present eternally. Hence, the total non-existence of the world cannot be thought of. It also ascertains the fact that this world is eternally distinct from the God. As it is under the control of the Lord, who is supreme.⁹⁷⁹

The Brahmasūtra-Vaidharmyācca na svapnādivat (II.ii.29)⁹⁸⁰ rejects the view that the world is illusory like a dream. If the creation of the world is compared with the dream or magic then, that would lead to many defects. In the dream, there is a dreamer, his body, bed, and the like who are real. And in magic also, the magician is real, observers are real. So the Advaitins have to specify the real things in the world-creation first and then they can talk of illusory aspect of creation. Therefore, it is not proper to compare the creation of the world either with a dream or with magical creation. Further, the Advaita view that the illusion of the world, after sublation leads to liberation and bliss is also not agreeable and tenable because, an illusory cause can never lead to real effects. Otherwise, the effects liberation, bliss and the like must also be held as unreal.⁹⁸¹ So the world is real: And the reality of the world can be ascertained and also realized as mentioned above. Thus, the passages quoted above establish the reality of the world.⁹⁸²

ŚRUTIS 'VIŚVAM SATYAM' AND OTHERS ESTABLISH REALITY OF THE WORLD

The Īśavāsyā passage Yāthātathā⁴torthān vyadadhāt...⁹⁸³ declares the reality of the world undoubtedly. The Omniscient Lord creates wonderful things in this world. And all of them are real.⁹⁸⁴ The scriptural statement 'Viśvam

satyam⁹⁸⁵ promises the reality of the world. It makes clear that the detailed information mentioned or delineated here, is true to fact. And it has the support of the Pramāṇas. This is evident by the expression 'Praminanti,'⁹⁸⁶ It declares "O God! this world of yours is real. And it is the presiding deities of water who know it well." The God is glorified as 'Maghavān' that means 'He, who possesses all prosperity.' The dual usage of the world affirms the fact that the God creates the world and also regulates it. This indicates the difference between the two. It is also said that it is the presiding deities who know the truth. Here the truth is the 'Niyamya-niyamakabhāva,' or the relation of the controlled and the controller. Vādirāja opines that this statement, not only asserts the reality of the world but also adduces the arguments in favour of this. Thus, the fact that the world is real rules out the view of the Vyāvahārikasattā or the ephemeral reality held by the Advaitins, since the view ultimately aims at non-reality of the world.⁹⁸⁷ The present statement argues: "How can the Lord being Maghavān or possessing all prosperity, create a non-real world?" It is not correct. Because, then the very possession of all prosperity would be meaningless. The dual and plural forms in 'Yuvoh' and 'Āpaḥ' prove that more sentient beings observe the world. It also ascertains the mutual difference among sentients

and also their difference from the world observed. The presiding deities of water and the reference to their knowledge is true. That means the created world is not empirically real but absolutely real like Brahman.⁹⁸⁸ The difference is that, Brahman is eternally real whereas world is real or eternal like a current. Vādirāja opines that this not only establishes the reality of the world but also the Sarvottamatva, Guṇapurnatva and Nirdoṣatva of the God. By the by it also brings out the difference between the God and the world.⁹⁸⁹

The scriptural statement- Yacciketa satyamit⁹⁹⁰ also promises the reality of the world. The correct import of the Śruti is: 'The world that is present for ever, is created by the God. It is real and also serves real purpose. It is covetable one. The God has conquered this world and gifted.' All the expressions of the statement clearly bring out the reality of the world.⁹⁹¹ Like the previous one, it also, by the by proves the difference between the God and the world. All the scriptures thus, shining with the lustre of arguments prove the reality of the world and also glorify the greatness of the Lord. Therefore, Vādirāja opines and appeals that the idea of the unreality of the world is an obstacle for liberation and spiritual delight, and it is the realization of

reality of the world that leads to liberation and also helps to attain spiritual delight.⁹⁹²

AJÑĀNA CANNOT BE THE UPĀDĀNA AND IT CAN ALSO NOT PROVE THE
UNREALITY OF THE WORLD

The God creates this world at the commencement of each Kalpa or universal creation. This proves that the world is never destroyed totally. It remains in minute form during dissolution. That means it would be in the form of Prakṛti or the primeval matter. As the Prakṛti is real its effect the world must also be real.⁹⁹³ The Advaitins say that Ajñāna or nescience is the Upādāna or the material cause of this world, but it is not correct. Because, out of Ajñāna or nescience this world cannot be created. And moreover, a person, interested in creating something, will go for concerned material cause only. That is reasonable and agreeable in all respects. No one puts his efforts to have anything like Ajñāna as Upādāna.⁹⁹⁴

The contention of the Advaitins that this bondage is also an illusion due to Ajñāna and hence, to remove this Ajñāna one has to pursue an inquiry into Brahman and gain the knowledge,⁹⁹⁵ is not correct. Because, this bondage is real and Anādi. It is not an illusion caused by Ajñāna means that which is beginningless, is not a product of

of something.⁹⁹⁶ And removal of this bondage is possible, only when it is real; otherwise not. The question of removing does not arise if the said bondage is an illusion and unreal. So when the bondage is real, it cannot be the illusory product of nescience. And it can be removed by right knowledge, which is also real. Here the knowledge means knowledge of Brahman since it is competent to remove the bondage. And this knowledge of Brahman could be gained when one proceeds to make an inquiry about Brahman. Thus there is proper and agreeable relation among Adhikāri or eligible aspirant, Prayojana the purpose, Viśaya the subject-matter and Sambandha the relation provided bondage and the like are taken to be real, otherwise not.⁹⁹⁷ In the Advaita, there is no concordance and relevancy since it is treated as an illusory effect of Ajñāna which is unreal.

As the beginningless nescience and its product bondage are seen in the embodied soul, since beginningless, the Advaita view that the Brahman is the locus of nescience, is supportless and gone. Because, the presence of Upādāna or cause (that is nescience) and the Upādeya or effect (bondage) are to be present at one place invariably. The view that the nescience is with Brahman and bondage with soul, is wrong.⁹⁹⁸ Further, the nescience, since being beginningless, is of a Bhāvarūpa or positive and hence this nescience

cannot be removed by knowledge.¹⁹⁹ In the Dvaita view, even when the bondage is taken to be beginningless and real, its removal is possible by knowledge as per the declaration of the scriptures.¹⁰⁰⁰ The contention of nescience as beginningless by the Advaitins, poses the difficulty. Even if the nescience is understood as contact of nescience, then also the removal of contact of nescience is not possible since this contact is also beginningless. In the Advaita, beginningless positive entity cannot be destroyed. Therefore, Vādirāja says that acceptance of the nescience as the material cause of the world, makes the very removal of it impossible. So the nescience is not the material cause whereas it is the Prakṛti that is the material cause.

In the Advaita, the removal of nescience is not possible by knowledge. If this removal is accepted then that will lead to the defect Anyonyāśraya or mutual dependence. According to the Advaita, Svarūpajñāna or knowledge of one's own nature is always present. Therefore, it cannot be concealed by nescience. But it might be the Manovṛttijñāna or the knowledge obtained by mental activity that is concealed by nescience. Then, there is the Anyonyāśrayadoṣa as the Manovṛttijñāna is the product of nescience.

If the Manovṛttijñāna is concealed then it is this knowledge that has to remove the nescience through its operation and it can operate and remove the nescience only after the concealing nescience is removed. Thus, there is Anyonyāśrayadoṣa. The same type of Anyonyāśrayadoṣa would be there, even when Svarūpajñāna is taken to be concealed by the Ajñāna.¹⁰⁰¹ Further it cannot be argued that the knowledge functions even when there is the concealing nescience. Otherwise in that case, an object though obstructed by something like a wall, must be seen. But it never happens.

Vādirāja points out that in the Advaita, the removal of the nescience is not possible until the attainment of the final knowledge.¹⁰⁰² The scriptural statement^{1002A} that refers to Akhaṇḍa Brahman, may give rise to Aparokṣajñāna direct realisation and not, to Caramajñāna or the final knowledge. Vādirāja doubts that when the knowledge (direct realization) is not competent to remove the nescience, what guarantee is there that the final knowledge will remove the nescience. This also ascertains the fact that knowledge will not remove the Advaitin's Ajñāna.¹⁰⁰³ So in the Advaita, the procedure of Śravaṇa, Manana etc., and also pursuing the study of the scriptures would become meaningless. And the Gurūpadeśa or preceptor's instruction

and the like is not required for the removal of the nescience that conceals the Adhithāna Caitanya or sentient being substratum. Because, the experience in the case of a pot, a cloth and the like, is gained without any Gurūpadeśa. Thus, the acceptance of Ajñāna leads to such problems. So it is preferred on the basis of the scriptures to accept that bondage is removed by knowledge. There is no necessity to introduce an illusory nescience.¹⁰⁰⁴ Thus, bondage is real, knowledge is real and removal of bondage by knowledge is also real. Hence, nescience is by no means the material cause of the world and it cannot bring about the bondage.

One may doubt about the removal of bondage by knowledge. But Vādirāja promises that, it is not only the bondage that would be destroyed by knowledge, but also the beginningless action of the soul. The scriptural statement Tadā vidvān punyapāpe vidhūya...¹⁰⁵ etc., makes it clear that Karma or action is removed by knowledge.^{1005A} The Brahmasūtra- Tadadhigame Uttara-pūrvāghayoh (IV.1.13) states that knowledge removes the previous action and makes the following and next action ineffective.¹⁰⁰⁶ This proves the very fact as already mentioned that the knowledge is competent to remove the aspects other than nescience. So there is no link between the removal nescience and the

removal of bondage. This ascertains that there is no Vyāpti between Jñāna and Ajñānanāśa, as held by the Advaitins. The removal of bondage is nothing but the function of destruction. And Īśvarajñāna is competent to fulfil the creation, sustenance and destruction. So nowhere the removal of nescience is traced possibly. Thus, there is no Vyāpti as knowledge is the destroyer of nescience (Advaita) since, the very concept is untenable.¹⁰⁰⁷

It is already mentioned that the knowledge of Brahman removes the bondage. Vādirāja makes it clear that the knowledge does not remove the bondage directly, but Brahmajñāna first generates Bhakti or devotion and then removes the bondage.¹⁰⁰⁸ The bondage is nothing but the deep attachment towards worldly things and enjoyments. And this attachment should be turned towards the God. It is possible when one gets the Brahmajñāna through proper Jiñāsa or inquiry. When Brahmajñāna is gained then that develops the devotion in the God. Further, the God removes the bondage through His grace. Thus, the bondage, that is real, is removed by knowledge through devotion and His grace.¹⁰⁰⁹ Here also there is no scope for any nescience of the Advaitins which is according to them illusory.

Further, Vādirāja makes it clear that a real one can

be destroyed. He says that it is not the reality which is the base for non-destruction, but it is the eternity which is the criterion for non-destruction.¹⁰¹⁰ The bondage, though real can be destroyed, since it is not eternal as such. Hence, it is destroyed by the grace of God.

The Advaitins hold that the nescience or the unreality of the world is intended in the Brahmasūtras. But this view is wrong. Because, the Sūtrakāra does not imply the unreality of the world in any way. The mention of the Adhikāri and others eligible for Brahmajñāna ascertains that the topic of inquiry can never be an unreal one. The very interpretation of the Śruti passages by the Sūtras has definite aim (Phala).¹⁰¹¹ So the entire scheme of the sūtras cannot be an illusion.¹⁰¹² Vādirāja praises that the Sūtrakāra, viz., Vedavyāsa has lit the lamp of Sṛṣṭi-karṣṭva of the God at the beginning and then poured oil for burning it in the subsequent Sūtras.¹⁰¹³

Vādirāja says that even the process of destruction does not admit the view of Ajñāna of the Advaitins. It is the Kārya or the effect which is destroyed first and then its Kāraṇa, or cause upto the Prakṛti. And the Prakṛti is the main source of creation and is indestructible. This process affirms that the effect is destroyed first

and then the cause. But the view of the Advaitins is against and contrary to this valid experience. Because, in their view the Upādānakāraṇa viz., Ajñāna is said to have been destroyed first and then the effect viz., bondage is destroyed. But it never happens. And it is not intended by the Sūtrakāra also.¹⁰¹⁴ Moreover, the Advaita also admits the dissolution, starting from Prthivī to the Mahattatva and then its merging into Māyā or Ajñāna. This proves that the effect world is destroyed before its material cause viz., nescience. So the view of Advaita that the world or the bondage is removed by the [] removal of nescience is self-contradictory. To avoid this contradiction, it is to be accepted without hesitation that the Ajñāna is not the Upādānakāraṇa of this world of bondage.¹⁰¹⁵

The Dvaita stand is that there is real Svabhāvājñāna or inherent wrong knowledge that is beginningless. And this is of two aspects: one that conceals and makes the nature of the God unknown to the souls and second that veils the true nature of the souls. It is distinct and individual from one soul to another. And this wrong knowledge is removed by the knowledge through the grace of the God at the time of liberation.¹⁰¹⁶ Bondage is real and beginningless. It is not caused by the illusory nescience

as held by the Advaitins. So whatever is referred to be illusory, cannot be a cause of a real effect and vice-versa and also an object of destruction. The removal of or destruction becomes meaningful only when something is held to be real. So the view of the Advaitins regarding the removal of the bondage through the removal of nescience by knowledge has no meaning at all.¹⁰¹⁷

The nescience of the Advaitin is beginningless. In that list, the entities such as Kāla, Ākāśa and others are also counted. So these entities cannot be the effect of nescience since like nescience these two also are beginningless. So it is not proper to hold that all these are unreal (products of Ajñāna). When the above mentioned entities are not the effects of nescience, the question of their destruction by the removal of nescience does not arise.¹⁰¹⁸ So it is evident that the removal of world or bondage has nothing to do with the removal nescience. And it is also absurd to say that whatever is not removed by nescience cannot be removed at all by other means.

The above argument proves that the world is real and the bondage also is real. The beginningless and endless nature ~~ti~~ proves that the world is not destroyable by the knowledge. It is absolutely real like Brahman.¹⁰¹⁹ And

it is not a product of nescience. It is not removed by knowledge.¹⁰²⁰ It is the bondage which is also real is going to be destroyed by knowledge since both possess opposite nature. The darkness, that is real, can be removed by light possessing the real opposite nature and not by the unreal one. So nescience that is real and in the form of bondage could be removed by knowledge. It is the opposite nature that makes the removal possible and not the unreality.¹⁰²¹

Vādirāja says that even if the nominal withdrawal of Ajnāna by Vrttiñāna is accepted then, that leads to Anyonyāśraya. Because, unless there is withdrawal of Ajñāna there can be no jñāna and unless there is Jñāna there can be no withdrawal of Ajñāna.¹⁰²² According to the Advaita, the Vrttiñāna originates when it encompasses a particular object. And unless the Ajñāna is withdrawn, encompassing of an object is not possible. Vādirāja opines that the illustration of lamp given by the Advaitins is not supporting their contention. Because, the light of the lamp is possible though there is an object or not. But knowledge cannot arise unless it encompasses the object and objects may be encompassed only when the nescience that conceals the object is withdrawn. And this withdrawal is possible only when there arises the knowledge. Thus, there is

Anyonyāśrayādosa.^{1022A} And it cannot be held that inspite of the presence of nescience, let the Vṛttiñāna arise, because in that case knowledge cannot remove the nescience and reveal the objects. Further if opposite nature of nescience and knowledge is not accepted, then it is better and easy to say that the bondage can be removed by knowledge and not through the removal of nescience.¹⁰²³

Another view of the Advaita that Āikyajñāna or identity-knowledge gained from the scriptures removes the nescience and gets destroyed itself for the survival of Ātmaikya,¹⁰²⁴ is not correct. Because, knowledge can remove nescience and not itself like fire can burn other things and not itself.¹⁰²⁵

The opposite nature is the stock base for the destruction of one another. And that which is not of opposite nature, cannot cause any destruction. The nescience of the Advaitins, which is a cause of the effect viz., Vṛttiñāna, neither destroys knowledge nor gets destroyed by knowledge. Because, a cause cannot be opposed to effect in nature. So the idea of the Advaitins that identity-knowledge also gets destroyed itself for the survival Ātmaikya, is not correct.¹⁰²⁶

Though the Svarūpajñāna is concealed by nescience, it exist with nescience and its effects. The Ātmaikyajñāna originates through Manovṛttijñāna of the Śrutis. As a cause of this Manovṛttijñāna, nescience must be there. Thus, if nescience exists along with the Svarūpajñāna and the Vṛttijñāna then, it must be accepted that this Ajñāna leads to the Akhaṇḍārtthajñāna for liberation. If this would be the case then, it (Ajñāna) cannot be an Āvaraṇa or a preventing factor.¹⁰²⁷ Then, there is no sense in relating its concealment as bondage and withdrawal of the same as liberation.¹⁰²⁸

Vādirāja states that the very concept of Bhakti or devotion has no place in the Advaita. He says that even according to the Advaita, knowledge cannot remove nescience. The Advaitins accept a state called Jīvanmukti.¹⁰²⁹ It is between the gain of the Aikyajñāna and the destruction of the Līṅgaśarīra or the subtle body. When the Līṅgadeha is destroyed and Mahā avidyā is withdrawn, then there would be final liberation.¹⁰³⁰ This Līṅgadeha is also beginningless and is due to nescience. The Advaitins accept the view that both these Līṅgadeha and nescience would be active during Jīvanmukti-state even when there is the Aikyajñāna.¹⁰³¹ This makes it clear that the Aikyajñāna cannot remove the nescience. So Vādirāja asks: What guarantee

is there in the removal of nescience by the Aikyajñāna at the time of final liberation as it fails to do so during the Jīvanmukti state? That which is not burnt by wild fire, cannot verily be burnt by house-hold fire.¹⁰³² So the nescience present with knowledge during Jīvanmukti, cannot be removed by knowledge later on. Thus, the very idea of nescience and its removal by knowledge is untenable. It is the Bhakti or devotion an outcome of knowledge that removes the Ajñāna by earning the grace of the God.¹⁰³³ So the Bhakti is the means for liberation and not the Aikyajñāna. And moreover the knowledge of identity cannot effect or lead to devotion.

According to the Advaita, the world is treated as Āropita or superimposed or an illusory projection. That means, it is Ajñānāropita or superimposed by nescience. The Ajñāna of the Advaita has two powers namely, Āvaranaśakti and Viksepaśakti. The Āvaranaśakti is the power that conceals the true nature of Brahman and Viksepaśakti is the power that projects the world as it is.¹⁰³⁴ If this is accepted, then Brahman cannot observe the world before as well as after the concealment. After the concealment, Brahman being concealed by nescience, cannot observe anything including the world and before concealment as there is no projection of the world, Brahman cannot observe it.

Before concealment, there is no world to be observed and after concealment, there is no power to observe. So the world cannot be an illusory projection. It is true and ultimately real. The valid experience and also independent existence of objects ascertain the reality of the world.¹⁰³⁵ The relation of the observer and the observed is pertinent in all respects. So the world is real and not Āropita or illusory superimposition.

The Advaitins hold that Brahman, which is associated with Māyā aspect of Ajñāna, is Īśvara. And the Māyā Īśvara creates this world with his Māyā. The souls behold this Māyā-projected world. But this view is not correct. Because, the instance given by the Advaitins in support of this, is not a convincing and corroborating one. In magic, there may be illusory creation but the observers and their senses such as eyes and others are true. But in the case of souls as they are the creation of Avidyā, they are not true. Thus, the very aspect of illusory creation in the Advaita makes the souls also unreal. And moreover, this Īśvara cannot have the body etc., before the creation of them through Māyā. And as he has no body etc., he cannot create them. Thus, there is no Māyā in him.¹⁰³⁶ The acceptance of the effect of Māyā on Īśvara also leads to undesired conclusions. If it is held that

he is not affected then he is not an outcome of Ajñāna. If he is taken to be affected then he cannot influence it on others. Certainly, a magician who is affected by his own Māyā, cannot operate his Māyā on others. So the Īśvara may be affected or may not be affected by Māyā, but the reality of the world remains unharmed. Because, if the Īśvara has no illusion then the world is true to him. And if he has illusion then the world is true for others. Thus, in both the cases, the world remains true.¹⁰³⁷ Vādirāja asks: "What is the use of the potter and others when Brahman, with Ajñāna creates everything?" But as experience makes the presence of potter and others valid and real through their engagement, the world of wonderful things has to be accepted as real.¹⁰³⁸

The process of origination of the Vṛttijñāna in the Advaita is not acceptable. Because, according to the Advaita the objects are revealed to the observer when there is the withdrawal of Ajñāna temporarily. When the Ajñāna covers the Adhiṣṭhānacaitanya, it is not possible to see the objects. They also accept that there is a separate Ajñāna that covers each aspect of an object like colour, taste etc. But this view gives rise to the acceptance of many Ajñānas that cover the Adhiṣṭhānas.

Further, if there is the withdrawal of nescience (removal of nescience) in case of one, then there may not be any illusion to him. But others may not have the withdrawal of nescience. And for realizing the object they are to be withdrawn one by one. But practically it never happens and hence it is absurd. Vādirāja taunts that the very acceptance of many Ajñānas makes the very small object being heavily loaded.¹⁰³⁹ And as the Adhiṣṭhānacaitanya is outside and the observer sentient soul is inside, it is not possible to have the realization of the object. And it cannot be held that owing to the ultimate oneness of them, the experience is possible. Because, in that case, let the two persons have a common experience since they are also ultimately one. But this does never take place. The Advaitins also say that the Jīva (Antaḥkaraṇa-vacchinnacaitanya) moves out of the body and mingles with Adhiṣṭhānacaitanya and it is the union of the two that reveals the object.¹⁰⁴⁰ This view is also not tenable because, the soul is of atomic size and he has no parts. So his moving outside and reaching the far away objects is impossible. Because, in that case, the body must remain dead till the soul comes back. Hence, the origin of the Vṛttiñāna itself is impossible.¹⁰⁴¹ Further, if it is admitted that the soul within the body goes out and assumes the form of an object, then the experience or

cognition must be 'I am a jar' and not as 'This is jar.'
 But in our experience, we never have the cognition as 'I
 am a jar.'¹⁰⁴² So the process of origination of Vṛttijñāna,
 held by the Advaitins, is not acceptable and hence it is
 not possible to prove that the world is an illusory projec-
 tion (superimposition).¹⁰⁴³ Further, Vādirāja states that
 even the empirical reality cannot be referred to. Because
 if the jar is there prior to illusion, then it is real like
 Brahman. If the experience as 'I am a jar' then it is
Prātibhāsika type (reality in appearance) as in 'I am white.'
 And jar cannot be identified with Cetana being. So
Vyāvahārikatā cannot be attributed to the world.¹⁰⁴⁴

The experiences such as 'This is a jar' and others
 do not refer to the Adhiṣṭhāna, Brahman. But, the very
 statement or experience only refers to the place and time.
 And moreover, it is not the superimposed pot. It is nothing
 but an expression that denotes an already existing entity.¹⁰⁴⁵
 Otherwise reference must be as 'Aham' and not as 'Ayam.'
 Further, in the Vṛttijñāna of an object, the concerned
 object must be true. Otherwise, there cannot be contact
 between the eye and the object. And contact of Adhiṣṭhāna-
caitanya with the senses like eye, is not possible as
Adhiṣṭhānacaitanya is a colourless object. This also
 makes it clear that the Adhiṣṭhāna Brahman as such is not

there and no expressions and experiences refer to this.
 So the things in this world are present without any Āropa
 or superimposition, and hence the world is true.¹⁰⁴⁶

THE TRUE WORLD MUST BE ACCEPTED AS PRADHĀNA TO PROJECT AN
 ILLUSORY WORLD

The Advaitins hold that the things such as jar and others are created by nescience on the Adhiṣṭhānacaitanya. If this is accepted then created things must exist in all the times, as nescience and Adhiṣṭhānacaitanya are beginningless. Further, the created things must also be everywhere. But it is not the fact. When certain features of a similar object are present in an object, present before the eyes then, there arises an illusion. The conch-shell, as it appears similar to silver in brightness, one mistakes it for silver. But the Advaita Brahman cannot have any features of other objects as there have been no objects before the illusory projection of the world. So there cannot be any illusion of these objects. The objects, present must be true. Further for justifying the illusions, if corresponding similar objects are to be thought of, then it amounts to accepting the world of true objects. And this ultimately rules out the falsity of the world.¹⁰⁴⁷

Thus, the above explanation proves that there must be both Adhiṣṭhāna and Pradhāna (similar object for projecting an

illusion). And projection of an illusion is possible provided both the Adhiṣṭhāna and the Pradhāna are real. As shell is real, silver though illusorily projected, is real somewhere. It is because of the appearance of similar features such as brightness, the shell is mistaken for silver in the given context. And reality of both the shell and silver remains unharmed. It shows that both Brahman, the Adhiṣṭhāna and the real world to serve as the Pradhāna are necessary to project an illusory world. This proves the presence of the real world.¹⁰⁴⁸

Vādirāja also argues that, the projection of the world in the Adhiṣṭhāna, is possible only when there¹⁵ another real world (Pradhāna). And if that also is considered as Mithyā then projection is not possible. And if the projection or superimposition is momentary, then it does not disprove the¹⁰⁴⁹ reality of the world. Moreover, both Adhiṣṭhāna and Pradhāna must be real at the same time. If one of these two would be missing then also superimposition or projection is not possible as seen in the superimposition of silver and serpent. When conch-shell and rope are present, at the same time, the presence of silver and serpent are necessary somewhere else.¹⁰⁵⁰

The Advaitins state that the nescience is the material

that cause/produces the world-illusion. Vādirāja argues that the material cause cannot be the cause of an illusion. But it is the defect that is responsible to produce an illusion. The defect, during its operation produces the effect, viz., illusion and then it vanishes. As soon as the defect disappears, the illusion also disappears. The defect of distance causes the illusion of a person in a pole. But when the distance is covered the defect vanishes and there is no illusion of a person. In the Advaita the nescience is considered as the material cause. But it is evident that the material cause of an object is not at all a defect and hence it cannot be the cause to produce an illusion of that object. Clay, the material cause of a jar, is not at all considered as a defect to produce the illusion of a jar. In the same way, threads are also not responsible for producing an illusion of a piece of cloth.¹⁰⁵¹ So nescience of the Advaita, being the material cause cannot produce the illusory world. It can only prevent the knowledge. Vādirāja, citing examples, defends the above argument. He says that a wall or darkness may prevent the vision or appearance of an object but it cannot produce either knowledge or illusion of it. So the nescience can prevent the knowledge but it cannot produce either knowledge of any illusion.¹⁰⁵² Therefore, the nescience cannot be taken to be a defect for the projection of the illusory

world. As there is no proper aggregation of Adhiṣṭhāna, Pradhāna and Doṣa in the Advaita, there is no possibility of the projection of an illusory world. Therefore the world is not unreal. It is real.¹⁰⁵³

Vādirāja also points out that, as there is no substratum, fit and agreeable for superimposition and also as there is no any other world that is real and standard for superimposition, the created and existing world is real like Brahman.¹⁰⁵⁴ Thus, the world, being unsuperimposed entity, is absolutely real like Brahman. And the statements, the expressive meaning of which stand sublated, are to be understood in a different manner or implication.¹⁰⁵⁵

THE ADVAITA VIEW IS CONTRARY TO ANUBHAVA

Vādirāja shows that the view of the Advaitins regarding the world is contrary to the Anubhava also. In defence of this, he not only traces the valid perception of ordinary beings, but refers to the authentic authorities such as the Bhāgavata, Gītā and the like.

The Bhāgavata verses- 'Na yatra śrūyate māyā...¹⁰⁵⁶ and Māyā vyudasya citśaktya...¹⁰⁵⁷ make it clear that the Māyā of Advaitins is not there in the God.¹⁰⁵⁸ It is said that great sages Sanaka and others glorify and meditate upon

a real God who is ever free from delusion. If He too becomes deluded, no one would have praised Him.¹⁰⁵⁹ The Bhagavadgītā also clarifies that "the thought that grasps all things as illusory is Tāmasic in nature." This means only those who are of impure nature, behold and understand the world as an illusory creation.¹⁰⁶⁰ And the reference of Yogic perception, mentioned in the Śrutis and others, affirms that the object of perception must be real. Then only their perception has some meaning. The observance of religious austerities and the like is prescribed to realize the Truth and not the illusory nature of the things. Vādirāja says that the serpent-ornament on god Śiva is not a Rajjusarpa. So the falsity or illusory nature of the world cannot be acceptable as the very idea is baseless.¹⁰⁶¹ There is not a single scriptural statement that declares and supports the idea of the falsity of the world.

The Advaitins advance the view that the Mithyātva of the world is contended to overcome the difficulty in the Dṛg-drśya relation or the relation between the seer and the seen. According to the Advaita, experience or cognition is Mānasa or mental. It is called Dṛk. And the external object is called Drśya. When there is relation of these two, then only there is the knowledge

of the object. Hence, the object is taken to be mental in this sense. And this realization or knowledge of the relation is possible if it is considered as Superimposed on Brahman. So the experience is termed as the modification of Antahkaranāvacchinna Caitanya and the Dr̥śya or object as the modification of Viśayāvacchinna Caitanya. The Caitanya (the sentiency) is the source of these two. The relation of these two is described as Adhyāsa, Adhyastatva relation in the Advaita.¹⁰⁶² Vādirāja says that this stand is not correct. Because, it is not a novel and distinct relation apart from Jñāna-Jñeya or knowledge-known relation. Only difference is that Jñeya in Adhyāsa is considered as illusory whereas it is real in Jñāna-Jñeya relation. When the Jñeya object is, ^{true,} the relation between the experience and the object can be related without any difficulty. Even if this relation is not possible, the ground as well as the absence of jar cannot be rejected. In support of this, Vādirāja cites an instance most appealing one. If key of the temple door is unfound, it is not agreeable to demolish the temple.¹⁰⁶³ Hence, the difficulty in Dr̥g-Dr̥śya relation does not help to prove Jaganmithyātva because the very relation stated by the Advaitins is absurd.

In defence of this, Vādirāja, quoting the Bhagavadgītā statements, ridicules the view of the unreality of the

world of the Advaitins and states that even the Bhagavadgītā does not support and uphold the unreality view of the world.¹⁰⁶⁴

Further, Vādirāja asks: What is the Adhiṣṭhāna in Drg-Drśya relation of the Advaitins. Where actually is there the superimposition? Is it on the Śuddhacaitanya or on the Ghaṭāvacchinna Caitanya (qualified Caitanya) or on the Ghaṭopalakṣita Caitanya (indicated Caitanya)? Verily, the superimposition is not possible in the case of the latter two since the Adhiṣṭhāna such as Ghaṭa or pot has not come into existence. Because, it will come into existence only after the superimposition. And as the pot and the like become the cause of both the Adhiṣṭhāna and the Adhyasta it will lead to Ātmāśrayadoṣa or the defect of sitting on one's own shoulder. And as the Śuddhacaitanya is Niraṁśa or partless the superimposition on it, will be the superimposition on all things in all places. Then one has to see and experience all things at all places.¹⁰⁶⁵ But really speaking, it will not happen. Hence, the very Adhyāsa in the relation of Drg-Drśya is baseless and untenable. Therefore, the relation of Jñāna-Jñeya is better. It constitutes the Viśaya-viśayi relation and will not lead to any absurdities pointed out above.

If the Adhyāsa is upheld then, as all experiences

involve Brahmajñāna, it should lead to liberation. Because, in the experience of Adhyāsa, experience of Adhyasta (superimposed) is gained along with the experience of Adhiṣṭhāna. It must be experienced in all Adhyāsa experiences. So Vādirāja ridicules that the Brahmajñāna in these experiences, should lead to liberation.¹⁰⁶⁶ But it never happens. And moreover, there is no scope for arguing that Savikalpakajñāna or distinctive knowledge of pot, cloth and the like will come in the way and prevent liberation; because, if once Brahmajñāna originates its operation cannot be prevented by anything. And if it is not capable to ward off the preventing factors and accomplish liberation here and now, then it can never do so. Burning of fire cannot be obstructed by the spread of grass. Fire burns the entire green with grass to ashes.¹⁰⁶⁷ In the same way, if at all there is knowledge of Brahman which is the Adhiṣṭhāna in the illusory experience, that Brahmajñāna, being competent by nature should lead to liberation. But it does not happen. So the very concept of superimposition is not agreeable. And it will not serve any purpose to prove the things of the world as unreal.

The Advaitins refer to the Śruti 'Tamevabhāntamanubhānti sarvam...'¹⁰⁶⁸ etc. and say that this statement points at the origin of the Vṛttijñāna. Their interpretation

of this passage is: "The experience of Adhiṣṭhāna Brahman is the source of all experiences when that is revealed by the temporary withdrawal of Ajñāna." Vādirāja says that there is no scope for such interpretation. The import of the statement agreeable to the context is "Sun reveals all objects first and then we know them with our eyes."

The sun's revealing the objects is also mentioned in the Gītā- Yadādityagatatamejo jagadbhāsayate akhilam...¹⁰⁶⁹

Vādirāja gives two different and deep meanings of this statement. One is: All the luminous entities such as sun, moon and others derive their brilliance from the God.¹⁰⁷⁰

Second is: "The God is self-luminant and He does not require anything else to get illumined Himself whereas others solely depend upon Him to know themselves and also to know other things."¹⁰⁷¹ It also means that the knowledge of the God helps to self-realization. Thus, there is no hint or clue regarding the process of the Vṛttijñāna in this passage.

Vādirāja also assures that, the above given passage glorifies the self-realizing or luminous nature of God and also His all knowing nature of the world. He is extolled as Omniscient in this passage.¹⁰⁷²

THE MEANING OF BĀDHA IN THE ADVAITA IS UNTENABLE AND HENCE
DOES NOT SUPPORT MITHYĀTVA

The Advaita holds that at the gain of Brahmajñāna, all the entities other than Brahman stand sublated. This is what is called Bādha or sublation in the Advaita. But Vādirāja says that the Advaita cannot explain this sublation properly. He poses the question: "Is this Bādha true or not?" If it is held true then, it is nothing but accepting another real entity which in turn makes the very sublation impossible, and also spoils the very idea of Advaita. And if it is not true, then it cannot sublimate any entity. Thus in both the cases, the theory of sublation cannot be sustained.¹⁰⁷³ In the Advaita the Brahmajñāna or the sublating knowledge is taken to destroy the nescience and then the world. Thus it is not sublation but destruction like the destruction of a pot. Further, 'sublation' is explained as the realization of the absence of the object relating to all the three times- past, present and future. But this is not correct. There is not a thing that could deny certain thing at all the three times basing on the relating.¹⁰⁷⁴ The denial is possible provided something is real at sometime.

Vādirāja promises that the 'Ekamevadvītiyam' Śruti does not deal with any kind of sublation. It does not deny

the presence of objects other than Brahman. But, it states that there is not even a single object equal or superior to Brahman. Likewise the Śruti- 'Neha nānāsti...' also does not deny the objects other than Brahman but it denies the internal differences in Brahman in respect of His qualities, incarnations and the like. Thus, these passages do not support the 'sublation' and the Viśvamithyātva. As Vyāvahārikasattā means ultimately non-existence, it cannot afford the chance of some type of real existence to any objects. The acceptance of the Vyāvahārikasattā does not make the objects real for their sublation.¹⁰⁷⁵ Vādirāja says that the Śruti 'Bhidyate hrdayagranthih'^{1075A} does not refer to either sublation or total destruction. It mentions the destruction of Karma, Punya, Pāpa and the like. So by the Brahmajñāna neither sublation nor even the destruction of the entire world is possible. The world has been there since beginningless times and so far none has experienced its sublation. Thus, the very fact proves the reality of the world. Vādirāja states also the syllogism: "World is absolutely real since it does not get sublated like Brahman." This argument is defectless in all the respects and hence establishes the reality of the world. The passage, 'Viśvam satyam'^{1075B} also substantiates the reality of the world. Thus, there is not even a single evidence, may be of any kind, that could refer to Jaganmithyātva.¹⁰⁷⁶

The Advaita considers this world as Sadasadvilakṣaṇa or inexplicable as either existing or non-existing. That means, it is neither real nor unreal. It is different from both. The Advaitins say that the passage 'Nā-asad-āsīt no sad-āsīt...'^{1076A} supports their Sadasadvilakṣaṇa concept. But, really speaking it does not support. Because, if Asad is understood as it stands for Atyantābhāva or absolute non-existence then, there is no point in negating once again by 'Na āsīt.' The Atyantābhāva as its very name clarifies, can never be present either in Pralaya or in Sṛṣṭi. Therefore the expression 'Na āsīt' regarding it serves no purpose. And as Sat or existence is not expected to be in Pralaya by the Advaitins there is no need to deny it. So this passage does not explain the Sadasadvilakṣaṇatva of the Advaitins. It simply conveys that Asat is always absent and Sat is absent only during Pralaya. And further, as Sat is meant to be Brahman by the Advaitins, their contention is supposed to deny even the existence of Brahman during Pralaya. Hence it leads to Brahmamithyātva¹⁰⁷⁷ which no Advaitin will ever dare to accept. Thus the passage does not support the Sadasadvilakṣaṇatva and the Jagan-mithyātva of the Advaitins. The reality is the prime-import of all the passages as shown above.

ŚUKTIRAJATA IS NOT SADASADVILAKṢANA AND ASAT-PRATĪTI POSSIBLE

The Advaita-concept of Sadasadvilakṣana means neither real or existing nor unreal or non-existing. The world, according to the Advaitins, is Sadasadvilakṣana that means it is neither real nor unreal. As an example they refer to the Śuktirajata or the shell-silver and Rajjusarpa or the rope-serpent. The Śuktirajata and Rajjusarpa should be distinguished from a Śaśaviṣāṇa or hare's horn and or the son of a barren woman. Vandhyāputra. The Śaśaviṣāṇa is totally non-existent whereas the Śuktirajata, being real and unreal, is not totally aAsat. Hence it is Sadasadvilakṣana. The Śuktirajata or Rajjusarpa are real to the extent that they are not real because they are sublated. The Advaita-argument is 'Sat cet na bādhyeta, asat cet na pratiyeta.' Vādirāja says that this argument is defective and fallacious. Because, both the Rajjusarpa and the Śuktirajata are also Asat. He argues that Asat-Pratīti, the knowledge of non-existent is possible, that means there can be the knowledge of Śaśaviṣāṇa. But it is true that this knowledge of Asat is defective verbal comprehension. In ordinary verbal comprehension, true relation between the word and the corresponding object is necessary. But in the case of Asat it is not possible. Though defective, verbal comprehension is possible in the case of Asat. The defective comprehension or verbal experience of Śuktirajata or Rajjusarpa does not lead to any Sat-Pratīti because the two are

Asat. Vādirāja argues that there is no difference in both the experiences of Śaśaviṣāṇa and Śuktirajata or Rajjusarpa. Because the non-existent state of the entity that is experienced, is common in both the cases.¹⁰⁷⁸ So there is no ground to treat them separately or differently. In the case of the Śaśaviṣāṇa, the defective experience is verbal and in the case of the Śuktirajata, defective experience is perceptual. But experience, being defective, is common in both. And moreover, the entities, referred to in both the cases, are Asat. Hence, both the experiences are about the Asat or non-existents.¹⁰⁷⁹

But the Advaitins defend and argue that both the Śuktirajata experience and the Śaśaviṣāṇa-experience are to be distinguished. Because, illusion of Rajata takes place only in respect of Śukti and illusion of Sarpa in Rajju. And this happens due to previous experience of Rajata or Sarpa. He, who has no previous experience of these, cannot have the illusions. So the contents of previous experience are not totally Asat. But in the case of the Śaśaviṣāṇa-comprehension the entity is totally Asat. But this argument is not correct. Because, the Rajata or Sarpa that were experienced earlier cannot be the contents of this experience because they are not physically present in this experience. It is the element of similarity of the objects

already experienced and of the object present before, that leads to illusion. If there is no similarity then there can be no illusion. The contents or objects of previous experience are no doubt, real but the contents of this experience are as much Asat as the Śaśaviṣāṇa. The previous experience, through similarity, leads to illusion but it cannot contribute the reality to the contents of this experience. The defects may be different in respect of the Śuktirajata and the Śaśaviṣāṇa but common fact is that both the experiences are Asat-nature. And as already mentioned, there is every possibility to have the verbal cognition or perceptual cognition of the Asat. And this cognition is due to the defects involved. So the world cannot be Sadasadvilakṣaṇa. And its cognition is possible in either case, real or unreal.

REFUTATION OF VIŚIṢṬAJÑĀNA ORIGINATING FROM VIŚEṢANAJÑĀNA

The Advaitins explain that the Viśiṣṭajñāna or distinctive knowledge originates from the Viśeṣanajñāna or the knowledge of attributive. In their opinion, the content of the previous experience of true Rajata is the Viśeṣaṇa. That means the previous experience is Viśeṣanajñāna. And the Śuktirajata experience is the Viśiṣṭajñāna. It is this Viśeṣanajñāna that is responsible for the Viśiṣṭajñāna. But Vādirāja says that in the Śuktirajata

experience it is not the previous experience of true silver as Viśeṣaṇa that is responsible but it is the similarity of shell and silver that has led to the shell-silver experience.¹⁰⁸⁰ But this experience involves a non-existing silver as the content of the experience.

Then one may raise the objection: How does the non-existing silver get related with the eye? If not, without the contact of the eye and the object how can there be perceptual experience? Vādirāja replies that it is impossible to trace and to show the relation since the very object silver is not at all real. Even the Advaitins cannot show the contact in this case. Here the contact is not with the unreal silver but it is with the shell itself. And this shell due to defect and similarity, is taken to be responsible to lead to the illusion of a non-existing silver. The shell-silver experience and hare's horn experience are of the same kind. There is no difference at all. To prove this, Vādirāja advances a syllogism: Vimataḥ śūktirajataḥ na asataḥ vyatirīcyate trikālyāṁ niṣedhyatvāt and promises that there is no difference between the shell-silver experience and the hare's horn experience, since the contents of both the experiences are unreal. Hence, it is not possible for the Advaitins to establish Sadasadvilakṣaṇatva or Mithyātva of the world on the basis of the shell-

silver because, as shown the shell-silver itself is not inexplicable.

SATTĀ OR REALITY OF BRAHMAN IS NOT ADHIṢṬHĀNAGATA

According to the Advaita, it is not the jar as an entity that is perceived but it is the Sattā or reality of Brahman, underlying the jar that is perceived. It believes that things have no reality of their own in this world. But this view is not correct. Because, Pratyakṣa or perception alone is sufficient to prove the reality of the things of the world.

The direct perceptual experience of the things as 'Ghataḥ san', 'Paṭaḥ san' ascertains the reality of the things of the world.¹⁰⁸¹ When this experience of reality originates, it will not come in the way of past and future experiences. Because, this experience has the reference with past, present and future. And it is perceived by the eye supported by the Sākṣin. The Sākṣin is capable to perceive even the time factor, may be past, present and future. So when the defectless eye perceives the reality of the things with reference to the time present, then it is understood that the reality of the things stands perceived with reference to the past and future also. There also the support of the Sākṣin is evident.

Here the defectless nature of the senses like eye is most important and also responsible for the perception of the reality. It is the defectless nature of the senses that with the support of the Sākṣin, widens the scope of the present perception or comprehension of reality stretching to the past and the future. When the eye perceives a thing having colour, it not only perceives the colour of the object but also the reality of the object. Because, the colour itself is not an object or reality. Neither the colour has any colour nor the reality of the colour has any colour. It is the colour of the object. So the perception of the coloured object means perception of the colour as well as the reality of the object. And the perception of this reality is not restricted to the present time but to the time in general. So it ascertains the fact that objects with their reality are always perceived by defectless senses. If senses are defective then the comprehension of the reality of the object is not possible. Thus, the reality of the things of the world could be established by perceptual experiences.

According to the Advaita, the things of the world such as jar and others have no reality. It is the Sattā or reality of Brahman that is reflected. The experiences like 'Ghaṭaḥ san' and others are related to this Sattā

that is underlying (Adhiṣṭhāna). But this view is not tenable. Because, Vādirāja doubts as to what happens in the case those experiences such as Nīlo ghataḥ, Nīlo pataḥ and the like? To what does this Nīlatva belong? Is it only reflected in Ghata? According to the Advaita, this Nīlatva should be understood as belonging to Brahman. And in experiences as Asaḍ rajātam, Asattva should also belong to Brahman. As Sattva of Ghata belongs to Brahman, on the same ground Nīlatva as well as Asattva should also be taken as belonging to Brahman.¹⁰⁸² But this is unworthy and also contrary to the Advaita. Because, in that case, in view of the experiences, Brahman would be having attributes (Nīlatva) sometimes and it would be Mithyā (Asaḍ) sometimes. Thus it lands into absurdity. Hence, in the experiences San ghataḥ and others Sattva is the Sattva of Ghata and not of Brahman. Because, as Ghata etc., are Pratyakṣa, Brahman is not Pratyakṣa; when Brahman is not Pratyakṣa how can the Sattā of It be Pratyakṣa in Ghata? Vādirāja says that it is not possible to see the invisible ghost in visible objects. In the same way Sattā of Brahman cannot be seen in Ghata etc. It is the Sattā of respective entity seen there. Further the experiences such as Bhūtale ghataḥ san ākāśe ghataḥ asan ascertain the fact that Sattva and Asattva are referred to Ghata and not to Brahman. The Sattva and Asattva factors of material objects cannot be referred to as belonging to Brahman.

Further, Vādirāja points out the possibility of explaining the experiences of Ghataḥ san, according to the Advaita. The Advaita-contention is that the Sattā of Brahman is reflected in the experiences. And this type of experience may be explained in one of the four ways: 1) The Sattā of Brahman - the Adhiṣṭhāna continues to be present in Ghata etc.; 2) The Sattā does not continue, but the Brahmaniṣṭhā Sattā is superimposed; 3) The Sattā is in Brahman. The Ghata is experienced as Ghata and not as San ghataḥ. The Sattā that is experienced belongs to Brahman; 4) The Ghata has separate Sattā and the same Sattā is experienced as it is.¹⁰⁸³ In the first case, however, the Sattā is accepted in Ghata. And hence, the purpose of attributing Sattā is served. In the second view the Sattā being superimposed leads to the superimposition of Cittva also since, in the Advaita, Sattva and Cittva are inseparable. If the Sattva alone is superimposed then it indicates the absence of the Cittva in the Ghata etc. Hence the Cittva in the Ghata stands sublated. When the Cittva stands sublated then, on account of invariable concomittance the Sattva also stands sublated. And in the Advaita whatever stands sublated is Prātibhāsika. But the Ghata and others are treated as Vyāvahārika in the Advaita. It is evident that the Ghata and others that are Jada are distinct from Cit. So the Sattva of the Ghata etc., is not same as the Sattva

of the Cit. The Sattva of the Cit cannot be present in the Ghaṭa etc., that are Jada. The Sattva of the Cit and the Sattva of the Jada are distinct to each other.¹⁰⁸⁴ In the third alternative, the Sattva is stated as belonging to Brahman. If that would be the case, how can then it get reflected in the experiences Ghaṭaḥ san and the like. And the acceptance of transfer of the Sattā of Brahman to the Ghaṭa and the like leads to the acceptance of Anyathākhyāti-vāda of Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas. But both the Dvaita and the Advaita do not accept this. Therefore, the third alternative is untenable. The fourth case that accepts the Sattā for entities like the Ghaṭa, is welcomed. Because, here it is not the Vyāvahārika Sattā or ephemeral reality that is taken into account but the Pāramārthikasattā, the ultimate reality. It is also not the Prātibhāsika sattā or illusory reality. Because, this Sattā for Ghaṭa does not get sublated. It stands unsublated since the experience of the Sattā of the Ghaṭa is Pratyakṣa or perceptual experience. The contention of the Advaitins that it is the Śabda-pramāṇa or testimony that supposes the sublation, is not correct. Because, in such cases, the testimony cannot invalidate the experience derived from perception. When there arises the conflict between perception and testimony, the latter is to be reinterpreted and explained in accordance with perception.¹⁰⁸⁵ To

ascertain as to which Pramāṇa is stronger and which is weaker, there are certain criteria which are Upajīvyā-Upajīvaka, Niravakāśa-Sāvakāśa and the like. And the principles such as Pūrvāpara, Vidhi-niṣedha and others that are accepted and advocated by the Advaita, do not serve any purpose. Further, this pattern of Pūrvāpara lands to prove the Smṛti to be superior to the Śruti. And the Vidhi-niṣedha principle may lead to negate sacrificial Himsā. So these principles cannot determine the strength or weakness of the Pramāṇas.

The Pratyakṣa or perception is Upajīvyā and hence it is stronger. If at all there is conflict between perception and inference, the inference is to be rejected in favour of perception. And if there is conflict between perception and testimony, then testimony is to be interpreted and explained in accordance with perception.

Therefore, Vādirāja says that experience of Sattā in the expressions San ghataḥ and the like has valid support of perception. And this experience, which is relevant in all respects, cannot be overthrown by any other Pramāṇas. So in the experiences San ghataḥ and the like it is the Sattā or reality of the Ghata that is experienced and not the Sattā of Brahman underlying it.

PRATYAKSA IS PRABALA

In the experiences of the pot and others, Pratyaksa or perception is the superior authority or valid means of knowledge or means of valid knowledge. And this perception cannot be sublated by any other Pramāṇas. If at all there are some defects then the experience of this perception is not valid. A defectless perception is the superior valid means of knowledge to others. In the experiences of pot and the like as there are no defects, perception is unobstructed. Perception in such cases reveals and confirms the reality of those objects. Thus, perception helps to prove the reality of the things of the world. Since the nescience is not related with insentiency, it cannot be a defect in respect of insentient things.¹⁰⁸⁶ Even according to the Advaita, nescience cannot be there as a defect. Because, at the time Ghaṭapratyakṣa, nescience concealing the Adhiṣṭhāna caitanya underlying the pot, is withdrawn. Therefore, in the Ghaṭapratyakṣa there cannot be nescience as a defect.

As already stated perception being Upajīvyā or supporting evidence is stronger. Accordingly the perception of the world becomes Upajīvyā and testimony cannot invalidate it. Vādirāja says that even the Brahmaparokṣa and the Aikya-śrutis of the Advaita cannot invalidate the perception

of the world because in the Advaita, Brahmāparokṣa is Niṣprakāra and the Śrutis are Akhaṇḍārtahabodhaka. If it is held that these two contradict the perception then, the very nature of Niṣprakāratva of Brahmāparokṣa and Akhaṇḍārtahatva of the Śrutis would be no more. Hence, these do not invalidate the reality of the world which is substantiated by perception. And on the other hand, passages Ekaviñnānena sarvaviñnāna and others prove the reality of the world. Because, Sarvaviñnāna or the knowledge of all is possible only when there is Sarvasatyatva or the reality of all. And this is none other than Viśvasatyatva.¹⁰⁸⁷

If inference contradicts perception then, it is sure that concerned inference is fallacious. Hence, inference cannot invalidate the perception since perception is superior to inference. And moreover, inference functions on the basis of the source of information already ascertained by perception. Perception free from defects cannot be invalidated by testimony (Āgama).

Further, superficial meaning of Āgama or scriptural statements is not valid always and every where. The expressed meaning of Ādityoyūpaḥ, Yajamānaḥ prastaraḥ and such other passages serves no purpose. If this literal or superficial meaning is insisted on, then there is no practical utility of these statements. Hence, it becomes

rather clear that whenever there is a conflict between Āgama and perception, Āgama is to be reinterpreted in accordance with perception. Vadiraja points out that even the Advaitins do not interpret the passages- Tattvamasi and the like literally. Because, in that case the literal interpretation conveys the Viśiṣṭaika which is not at all accepted by the Advaita. In the same way, the literal import of the passage Sarvam khalvidam Brahma appears to convey the identity of the insentient and the sentient. But the Advaita does not accept this identity.¹⁰⁸⁸ Vadiraja refers to the scope of the grammar and asserts that there is every possibility and also sanction of the grammar to understand the particular case meaning with regard to another in the Veda. He also quotes the reference of usages of the Gītā and the Mahābhārata where the word Sarva is used in connection with different case-meaning. This confirms that there is scope to reinterpret the scriptural passages to avoid their conflict with perception. So as perception of the world is defectless, it cannot be disproved by any other means of knowledge.

DREAM-OBJECTS ARE REAL AND ASAT HAS NO ARTHAKRIYĀKĀRITVA

So far the objects experienced during the waking state are proved as real. Not only these objects are true but even the objects seen in the dreams are also true. The

true nature of dream-objects is explained by the Sūtrakāra in the Brahmasūtra-Sandhye sr̥ṣṭiḥ āha hi (III.11.2) and others.¹⁰⁸⁹ There it is explained that the dream-objects are produced by Vāsanā or past impressions and hence they are subtle. But their true nature is not negated. No doubt that the nature of the dream-objects differs from that of the objects of waking state. It is because of the cause. This difference does not harm their true nature. This is also evident from the fact that they cause certain effects such as pleasure, fear and so on. As the dream-objects are true, their experiences are also true. The objects, seen during a dream, may not be seen in the waking state. And this also does not disprove their true nature. As the objects, seen in the dream have some effects, there must be some causes that produce them. Because, only real causes produce real results. An unreal cause can lead to no results. And there is no condition as such that causes must be of the same nature in all respects.¹⁰⁹⁰

Vādirāja refers to the Advaita view that the cause precedes the effect. It is the true Adhiṣṭhāna caitanya as a cause that leads to the effect of Āropita. Thus, it proves that without a cause, an effect cannot take place. So the dream-objects, being effects must have causes of

their own. And that is the Vāsanā or previous impressions. And there are some causes that are present everywhere and at all times such as Ākāśa, Kāla and others. Brahman is also the ever-present cause of all creations,¹⁰⁹¹

The Advaita view that in the ultimate analysis, the scriptures are also unreal but they produce the true knowledge of Ātmaikya, is not correct. Because, whatever is unreal or non-existent has no Arthakriyākāritva or capacity to give rise to desired fruits. That means non-existent cannot produce a real thing. So too false statement cannot give rise to true knowledge. Vādirāja opines that the false knowledge originates from false circumstances. Because of false circumstances it may happen sometimes that the lustre of the gem is mistaken for gem, a Śākhācandra for Candra and the like. Here it is the false circumstances that produce false knowledge. So if scripture is held to be unreal Mithyā then the knowledge, originated from it, must also be unreal. So the Ātmaikya-knowledge, caused from unreal scriptures, will also be unreal. And this unreal identity will not lead to any real liberation. Thus acceptance of passage as unreal lands the Advaitins in unreality in all respects. Because, unreal passage cannot produce true knowledge and then unreal knowledge cannot lead to true liberation. Thus, it results into

everything to be unreal that has no Arthakriyākāritva or effectiveness.

DRŚYATVA AND OTHER HETUS DO NOT PROVE MITHYĀTVA BUT SATYATVA

The Advaitins hold that the causes or reasons viz., Drśyatva or being seen, Jadatva or insentiency and Pari-
cchinnavatva or limitedness establish the unreality of the world. Really speaking, these causes do not prove unreality of the world. Vādirāja critically examines and proves that on the other hand these causes or reasons establish the reality of the world. Drśyatva is the fact of being the object of experience. It cannot prove Mithyātvā since it is not Nirupākhya. The Nirupākhya is that object which has no form of expression of its own. Therefore, it is nothing but non-existent. Further it cannot be described in anyway. But if an object is Drśya, then it cannot be of formless nature. The Drśyatva ascertains the respective form of the object and it is quite opposite of formlessness. So Drśyatva since ascertains the form of the object, does not prove unreality of that object, but proves reality of the same. Thus, Drśyatva does not help to prove unreality of the world. Similarly, the second reason, insentiency also proves not the unreality of the world. But it proves that the world is not sentient. It is only the negation of sentiency

and not of the reality of the world. And the third reason Paricchinnavatva deals with the proves the nature of limit in respect of space, time and the like but not unreality of the world. Thus, all these reasons do not establish the unreality of the world. As there is no difference ultimately in the Vyāvahārikasatyatva and the Mithyātva according to the Advaitins, the world cannot also be considered as Vyāvahārikasatya. And moreover, neither of these reasons prove this Vyāvahārikasatyatva. Therefore, the world is as real as Brahman.¹⁰⁹²

Vādirāja asserts that the Viśvapratyakṣa or perception of the world cannot be erroneous. Because, there must be some or other defect for an erroneous perception. As there is no any defect in Viśvapratyakṣa, it cannot be erroneous. And Avidyā of the Advaita can also not be a defect in this respect. If this Avidyā is taken to be a defect then what would be the nature of Avidyā, the defect. Vādirāja explains this Avidyā in three ways:

- (1) It is a defect without having any definite role;
- (2) It is a defect that prevents true knowledge;
- (3) And it is a defect that produces erroneous knowledge.

In the first case, the Avidyā is a defect but as there is no any particular role to be played, even merits will become demerits in some cases. In the second alternative,

Avidyā, being a defect, may prevent Brahmajñāna which is true knowledge but not the Viśvapratyakṣa. So Avidyā cannot be a defect for Viśvapratyakṣa and as it is not a defect it cannot be held to its illusion. In the third case, as Avidyā or nescience is untenable, the view that Avidyā produces erroneous knowledge is not correct. Because, the knowledge of pot and the like does not consist of any erroneous element. It is not experienced by perception. So there is no scope for Avidyā, making something erroneous. And further when something is mistaken for something else then, only there arises erroneous knowledge. But in the knowledge of a pot it is not mistaken for something else. So nescience being unreal, cannot be a defect in the knowledge of the things of the world. Hence, there is no change for any erroneous experience due to this.

And further, in the Advaita, the Avidyā belongs to Brahman and not to any other since Brahman alone is Sat. When it is said that the Avidyā belongs to Brahman it may produce erroneous experience in Brahman but not in souls, the matter and means of knowledge like Pramāṇas, perception and others. So Avidyā, since being not connected with the world, cannot prove unreality of the world. In the Advaita, Brahman is declared to be the Adhiṣṭhāna for pot and other objects. And for attributes potness and the like, the very

objects become Adhiṣṭhāna or locus. So the fact that Brahman is the locus is given up. And these potness and the like, cannot be the erroneous projections of Brahman.¹⁰⁹³ If Brahman is taken to be the locus for potness then very idea would be a endless one.

The Advaitins hold that the world is unreal because, the nescience is the material cause for the world. But it is not correct because nescience cannot be the material cause for the world. Because, it is our stock experience that the objects in the world have respective material causes. E.g. a pot has the earth as its material cause therefore, nescience need not be fabricated and taken to be as material cause. According to the Advaita also, nescience is withdrawn at the time of perception of objects pot and others. That means the nescience in the form of material cause is not present at the time of perception. It amounts to saying that mud is not present when a pot is perceived. That means effect remains without a cause, which is absurd. Hence, nescience can never be the material cause for the world. And world is not the illusory projection.¹⁰⁹⁴

It is proved that the objects of the world are real. As the objects are real, the attributes of these objects are also real. The Advaitins hold that the attributes

potness and the like, are not real. But this contention is not correct. Vādirāja doubts as what is the ground for this negation of attributes? Is it with reference to Brahman? If the denial of the attributes is with reference to the objects then, the attributes of one object may be observed in some other objects as all of them are illusory projections. And if the denial of the attributes is with reference to Brahman then the very denial will not affect the real presence of objects. Thus, it proves the reality of the attributes of the objects. So potness and the like are as real as the very objects. As there is no any sublation of the experience, these attributes are not at all simply ephemeral. Hence, all the attributes such as Jāti, Guṇa, Karma and other of the things of the world are real.¹⁰⁹⁵

In the Advaita, the means of valid knowledge like perception are the products of nescience. And hence, their contention is that they are not true in the ultimate analysis of Truth. But this is wrong. Because, this nescience is not the material cause for this world. As already pointed out earlier, this world stands unsublated to our valid perception, and these means cannot be due to nescience. Otherwise the experience of the world must be sublated. The argument of the Advaita that there is no

real world since there are no means to establish it and there are no means since there is nothing to be established, involves Anyonyāśrayadōṣa.¹⁰⁹⁶ Not only that, the very contention and argument of the Advaita would cause the negation of the very existence of Brahman. So means like perception and the like are not due to nescience.

Vādirāja argues that the nescience of the Advaita, since being beginningless, is to be considered as true. As it is beginningless one more nescience need not be envisaged for this nescience. When nescience is true, how then the means of knowledge be false? Though they are taken due to nescience, they are not false. Further, just without taking into consideration the beginninglessness of nescience, if it is argued that nescience is unreal then, it cannot be proved by the valid means perception and others that arise out of it. Thus, the very concept nescience stands baseless. And this cannot establish the unreality of the world.

One more contention of the Advaita that whatever is Arthakriyākāri is Mithyā. As there is Arthakriyākāritva in the world, it is not real. This contention of the Advaita verily denies the practical utility of the things of the world. So Arthakriyākāritva must be taken to be

the prime-base of reality. If not then, that amounts to saying that thirst can be quenched by mirage. Thirst is satisfied when one drinks water and not by mirage. Otherwise, there should not be any difference between water and mirage.¹⁰⁹⁷ And acceptance of different degrees of reality does not help the Advaita to prove unreality of any kind. Difference in the degrees of existence is not the criterion for unreality and reality but it is the sublation and non-sublation that ascertains the unreality and reality.

Therefore, it is evident that reality is responsible for Arthakriyākāritva. The Advaitins, who accept Arthakriyākāritva of the world, have to admit voluntarily the Satyatva of the world.¹⁰⁹⁸ The idea of Vyāvahārikasatyatva of the Advaita does not contribute Arthakriyākāritva of any kind. Because, the very idea of Vyāvahārikasatyatva is nothing but Asattva or non-existence. And a non-existent cannot be Arthakriyākāri. Thus, it is proved that wherever there is Arthakriyākāritva there is Satyatva. So the world is real as it is Arthakriyākāri.

This real world is created by Brahman. He being sentient, is the creator of this world. That which is insentient and material does have the power of creation. Therefore, nescience of the Advaita since being material,

cannot be the creator. It cannot contribute any Arthakriyā-kāritva to the world. The Bhāgavata and authorities works declare that Brahman is the sole Independent creator of this world. Hence, the Arthakriyākāritva of the world is due to Brahman. So the reality of the world remains unaffected.

Vādirāja promises that not only perception and scriptures establish the reality of the world, even inference also establishes the world-reality. The syllogisms pots and the like are real because there is unobstructed contact in between eye and those things. Pillar, pitcher and other objects are real since those are connected with each other; establish the reality of the world.¹⁰⁹⁹ When defectless sense organs produce the knowledge, the knowledge must be true. And the objects of this knowledge are also true. The verses Nayatva Māyā..., Āpaśca Pramīnanti and others make it clear that the Lord does not create anything illusorily. When there is no illusory creation, the knowledge, gained, need not be about illusory objects. Thus, neither scriptures nor inference nor even perception supports the unreality view of the Advaitins. All these authorities support the reality of the world.

TEN ARGUMENTS AGAINST ĀROPA

Here Vādirāja summarises the ten arguments that are adduced in the Viśvasaurabha for the refutation of Mithyā-tva or unreality. The arguments are delineated by the way of exposing defects in the Advaita contention of Mithyātva or unreality.

Prof. K.T. Pandurangi has succinctly enlisted them as follow:-

"(1) Nowhere in the Śruti the reality of the world is denied;

(2) Nowhere in the Śruti it is stated that the world does not exist at all the three times (and merely appears);

(3) The so-called Advaita Śrutis which are supposed to imply Mithyātva are Akhaṇḍārtbabodhaka. Therefore, they are not capable of conveying anything more than the Akhaṇḍārtha of Ātmaikya. Hence, they do not convey Mithyātva of the world;

(4) The final Brahmapramāṇa which is supposed to imply Mithyātva of other things is also not capable of it since it is Nirvikalpaka and cannot convey anything more than Brahman.

(5) The attributes Ghaṭatva etc., are not denied in their respective abodes and therefore, their unreality cannot be established.

(6) The Śabda-pramāṇa is found suitably reinterpreted whenever it conflicts with Pratyakṣa. Therefore, so-called Mithyātvā Śrutis have to be reinterpreted to conform to Pratyakṣa that establishes Viśvasatyatva.

(7) Ekavijnānena sarvavijnāna is possible only if other things are true.

(8) There are Śruti passages that directly state Viśvasatyatva.

(9) Āropa of the world over Brahman cannot be properly explained.

(10) If so called Mithyā Śrutis have to be honoured why not honour the Śrutis like Asadeva idam agre āsīt and consider Brahman as Asat? If Asatva Śruti has to be suitably reinterpreted, then the so called Mithyātvā Śrutis also have to be reinterpreted to avoid conflict with Viśvasatyatvapratyakṣa.¹¹⁰⁰

Thus, Vādirāja establishes that it is not possible to establish the Viśvamithyātvā by any means of knowledge. All the means jointly and ultimately declare the Viśvasatyatva. Vādirāja humbly acknowledges the credit to Madhva and says that it is he who has given these ten arguments to prove the reality of the world refuting the unreality tried to be established by the Advaitins.

V. PHALASAURABHA

ŚRAVANA, MANANA AND NIDHIDHYĀSANA ETC., ARE THE MEANS OF LIBERATION

Śravaṇa, Manana and Nidhidhyāsa are the three aids of the mind that in course of time, enable the mind to attain the Aparokṣajñāna of the Lord. The contention of the Advaita is that the knowledge alone removes nescience. But it is untenable. Because, if knowledge alone were to remove nescience, then, liberation would have been immediately after knowledge. But this does not happen. And moreover, if it is said that nescience does not become an obstacle to Manovṛttijñāna, then Brahmasākṣātkāra, through the mind would be for ever. But it never happens.¹¹⁰¹ So to get removed the obstacle, sacred hearing etc., are wanted. The contention of the Advaita is defectful since it leads to Anyonyāśrayadoṣa (mutual dependence) of two types. If nescience becomes an obstacle to the mind for Brahmadarśana or even if it does not become, the defect of mutual dependence is inevitable. When nescience is removed, there is Brahmadarśana and at Brahmadarśana only nescience can be removed. Secondly, if nescience is not an obstacle then there should be always direct vision and if there is direct vision always then there cannot be obstacle of nescience.¹¹⁰² So if nescience is accepted then, there cannot be Sākṣātkāra and also the release. So the view of the Advaitins that

knowledge by its very nature removes nescience and no God's grace is required for liberation, is unsound. The God's grace is the only ultimate resort to attain the liberation.

To have the Darśana of the Lord through His grace, sacred hearing, repetition and meditation are the three aids, with the help of which, mind gains the power to have the vision of the Lord. Śravaṇa is the study of scriptures in prescribed manner. The study is the understanding of the scriptures as determined by Śāstras. Manana is an inquiry of this purport through appropriate reasons. Dhyāna is the meditation on the auspicious attributes of Lord. These three aids are to be put into practice until each leads to the next. Mind is the main and prime aid in realization. the mind when obstructed with the obstacle ignorance cannot realize the God. The above mentioned three aids become prime-sources or means for removing the obstacle of mind.¹¹⁰³

The one, who undergoes the course of practice of these three aids accordingly, becomes a qualified one. God, pleased with the meditation of this devotee, will bestow His grace upon him, remove the obstacle of ignorance and grant His direct vision. He will also grant His Darśana. In the Śrutigītā of the Bhāgavata, God is praised as sole

competent to remove the ignorance.¹¹⁰⁴ This obstacle, ignorance, has two aspects. One is Jīvacchādikā that conceals the nature of the soul and the other Paramācchādikā that makes the nature of the Lord unknown. God will destroy the first and withdraw the second one. He withdraws the second one, now and then until the final liberation.¹¹⁰⁵ That is why God is sometimes seen and sometimes not seen by such seekers. This will continue until the final liberation and this state is called Jīvanmukti state. If it is argued that one can attain the liberation by the very nature and origin of knowledge also then, there must not be any delay in attaining the liberation. By the time ignorance with its effects such as Kāma, Karma is removed by knowledge, immediately one should attain the liberation. But this does not take place. Therefore, God's grace is inevitable. Lord is the sole giver of release. At the time of attaining the release, Lord will remove both the obstacles and disclose His blissful form and make it visible to the liberated then forever according to their inherent ability. Thus, liberation is strictly under the control of and subject to the grace of the Lord.¹¹⁰⁶

Another view of the Advaitins, related to this, is that sacred hearing is also the direct means to attain the direct cognition and hence sacred hearing may also be

sufficient to have direct cognition like repetition and meditation.^{1106A} But this is not correct. Because, hearing is not permanent. And moreover, if it is said that direct vision is possible just after hearing then, hearing alone to be considered as Sādhana and not the others. But in the Śruti, all the three aids Śravaṇa, Manana and Nidhi-dhyāsana are prescribed as Sādhanas one after another.^{1106B} Meditation is prescribed after repetition. Hence, for direct cognition, meditation is the direct Sādhana and not the hearing. With the help of these three aids, mind gains the direct cognition and then attains the vision of the Lord. Hearing helps to have the indirect cognition and never assists to gain the direct cognition. The statements as 'Pot is in the house' and others cannot be cited as examples in respect of the direct vision. Because, at the listening of the word Brahman, the direct vision of the Lord will not take place. So hearing, though first aid, is not the direct means for direct vision. Meditation is the prime whereas hearing and repetition are auxiliary to that.

The Śabdapramāṇa or verbal testimony does not lead to direct cognition. The Advaitins hold that testimony leads to direct cognition. The stock example quoted in this regard is Daśamah tvam asi - 'You are the tenth person.' When some one counts nine persons around him and fails to perceive

himself as tenth; then another person points out and says 'You are the tenth person.' Thus through this statement, he gets the direct cognition - direct knowledge of himself. This is an example wherein testimony leads to direct cognition. On the same ground, the Advaitins argue that the statement or expression 'Tat tvam asi' leads to direct cognition. But this theory is not correct. In the instance given by them, the testimony or the statement does not give the direct knowledge as 'I am the tenth person.' But it only removes the distraction of the mind. Then he realizes that he is the tenth person. This is Mānasajñāna. The testimony only helped him to draw his attention towards himself. And this is not the direct cognition; whereas Mānasajñāna as 'I am the tenth person' is the direct cognition. Thus, testimony conveys only possible sense always and nothing else. So, the undistracted mind, engaged in the meditation of the Lord, will realize Brahman as in the case of the Mānasajñāna, 'I am the tenth person.'¹¹⁰⁷ And moreover, a Yogin, who is engaged in deep meditation and whose external organs are actionless, has no use of testimony through which he can have the direct vision. But it is the meditation that helps his mind to have direct cognition and then direct vision. So testimony is of no use in Brahma-darśana. 'Mānasajñāna gets originated without the articulation of any śabda. Therefore the view that testimony leads

to direct cognition is untenable. Mere listening of the word 'pot' does not make the pot visible. Thus, the mind of a Yogin, when deeply immersed in the meditation, will produce the direct cognition and help him to have the vision of Brahman. In the Śruti, hearing is stated first then repetition and lastly meditation. Meditation is the direct and prime aid that leads to direct cognition and direct vision.¹¹⁰⁸ Further, the view of the Advaita has no practical application and utility. Because, he, who listens to the word 'food', cannot have the satisfying experience. This experience can be seen in him, who is actually taking the food. Thus, it is evident that mere hearing will not cause Brahma-darśana.¹¹⁰⁹ Since the Advaitins subscribe to the view of Anvitābhidhāna, no statement can lead to Nirvikalpakañāna. Therefore, testimony cannot lead to direct cognition directly. It is the meditation that leads to direct vision directly by the grace of the God. This has the support of Bhāgavata and Bhagavad-gītā.

Meditation is the main aid and by this meditation the dirt of the mind will be wiped away. The purified mind will become the cause of Brahma-darśana. Thus meditation is the direct means ~~and~~ whereas hearing is an indirect one.¹¹¹⁰

In this way, Śravaṇa, Manana and Nidhidhyāsana are the three aids of mind for Brahma-darśana. Meditation is the main. Brahma-darśana is possible only when there is no obstacle. In case of obstacle, repeated hearing, repetition etc., are required through which the obstacle could be removed. More than this, it is the grace of God that is ultimately the ground for direct vision.¹¹¹¹ It is made clear in the Śruti passage Yamevaiśa vṛṇute tena labhyah.^{1111A} The passage also promises that object of realization is Sākāra. The view of the realization of Nirākāra of the Advaitins is baseless and unsound. The God is Sākāra having Cidānandaśarīra (form of knowledge and bliss). This form of God is realized in the liberation by all the liberated souls. The liberated souls are also having the form of knowledge and bliss.

DVEṢA, KĀMA, BHAYA AND OTHERS ARE NOT MEANS OF LIBERATION

So far it is said that direct cognition, originated from hearing and others leads to liberation. Bhakti is the prime-aid to secure the grace of the Lord. This devotion leads to release through the God's grace. Thus, knowledge, devotion and others are the steps for liberation. Haribhakti and others are not demerits (Doṣas) but they are the very requisites and praise worthy steps for liberation. This devotion in the Lord originates from instant hearing and the like.¹¹¹²

But, however, in the Bhāgavata, the verse running Gopyaḥ kāmāt bhayāt kaṁso dveṣāt caidyādayo nṛpāḥ^{1112A} appears as if stating the Kāma, Bhaya, Dveṣa and others are the means of liberation. But it is not the real import of the verse. Really speaking, it was not the Kāma and the like, mentioned above that led to liberation but it is the Bhakti that enabled them to gain the grace of the Lord and to attain the liberation. E.g. Śiśupāla, who was Dvārapālaka in Vaikuṇṭha and who was of pure nature, was made to come down to the earth due to curse. It was the curse that made him to entertain Dveṣa with the Lord. When the effect of curse was removed, he with pure devotion, secured the grace of the Lord and attained the release. In the Brahmasūtra, Vedavyāsa has determined that Bhakti graced with Jñāna, is the sole means of liberation. The Śruti-Nānyaḥ panthāḥ vidyate ayanāya^{1112B} also states the same.

So Śravaṇa, Manana, Dhyāna, Sākṣātkāra, Bhakti and Prasāda are the steps for liberation.¹¹¹³

Referring to the import of the Śruti passage, Yadā paśyaḥ paśyate..., Vādirāja promises that this passage declares the realization of Sākāra and Saguṇa Brahman. So it is evident that realization of Sākāra and Saguṇa Brahman

is the only means for attaining liberation and not the knowledge of identity of attributeless and formless Brahman. The term Sāmyam in the Śruti does not mean equality but it means proximity. So it is evident that true devotion is the means of liberation.

PROCESS OF LIBERATION

In the last and fourth Adhyāya (chapter) of the Brahmasūtra (Phalādhyaṃya), Utkrānti, Mārga, Gāmya and Bhoga are described. The qualified aspirant, seeker at the gain of direct knowledge (direct vision of God) in a particular life, goes out of his material body through Brahmanādi. Then he goes to the world of Brahmā through the path of Arcis etc. There he lives until the Brahmā completes his hundred years. This, a period of hundred years of Brahmā, is called Para. The qualified souls after at the gain of direct knowledge come to this place. And living in this place is called the state of Jīvanmukti, for they have not yet attained the final liberation. On the completion of hundredth year of Brahmā, all the souls qualified for liberation and staying in Brahmaloka, will move out with Brahmā. This is called Mahāpralaya or final annihilation. All these souls will attain the liberation along with that Brahmā.¹¹¹⁴

The Brahmā conducts all the qualified souls with him to the river Virajā. This river is Aprākṛta, non-material (that means it does ^{not} contain the material element - water). It is free from Sattva, Rajas and Tamas and is only Cid-rūpa. And it is also Lakṣmīātmaka. All the souls led by Brahmā are made to take both thereby which they get their Liṅgaśarīras or subtle bodies destroyed. Then they join the souls already liberated and staying in the three abodes of Lord Viṣṇu, Śvetadvīpa, Anantāśana and Vaikunṭha. Then, they together with already liberated ones, move into the belly of Lord Vāsudeva. This state is called Parāntakāla, Paramamokṣa, Brahmalaya and also Mahāpralaya. And at the end of the Kalpas or ages the fire of annihilation, emanated from the mouth of Saṅkarṣaṇa burns down the entire creation. Then the Samvartaka clouds, showering heavy rains wash away every thing. The water will be made dried by Tejas which will be in turn extinguished by Vāyu. Vāyu merges into Ākāśa (ether) and that merges into Ahaṅkāra. And Ahaṅkāra merges into Mahat and that in Prakṛti. And so far as Prakṛti is concerned it does not merge into anything else. It being the primal cause and matter, is eternal like God. In this state it remains in minute form. ¹¹¹⁵

REFUTATION OF THE 'SARVANĀŚA' VIEW OF THE ADVAITINS

The process of Pralaya or annihilation as stated above clearly indicates that nothing is completely destroyed. The Advaitins hold that this world is the product of Ajñāna or nescience. And it will be destroyed by the knowledge. Thus, they consider the right knowledge as the cause of destruction. But this view is baseless. Nothing is totally destroyed by the right knowledge. The unreality of this world will not take place by knowledge. Even in annihilation, only created things (effects) will be destroyed and not the original or primal cause.

And moreover, a wise will not get the things destroyed by his knowledge. So the view of complete destruction is nowhere found. When things perish, they leave behind their causes. When these causes perish, they again leave their subtle causes.¹¹¹⁶ This process continues and ultimately leads to the survival of Prakṛti or primal matter (primal material cause). There is no such thing that undergoes complete destruction.¹¹¹⁷ And, one cannot say that there is destruction of all destruction, because destruction itself is indestructible. So by all means, total annihilation is impossible. The very expression as Sarvanāśa is wrong. Because, even according to the Advaita, Brahman is real and Avināśi - indestructible.

If it is admitted that, other than Brahman, everything gets destroyed, then, Jīva, different from Brahman, will also have to be destroyed. If difference between Brahman and the soul is taken to be unreal, then the Advaita cannot refer to world as separate from Brahman and liable for destruction. And if the destruction of real things is admitted then, the destruction of Jīva, his characteristics and also of other eternal things, may also take place. Thus, the acceptance of the destruction of real things, definitely and ultimately leads to the destruction of Brahman, as It being real. Therefore, complete destruction is impossible.¹¹¹⁸ That which is eternal, real, subtle and is under Lord's control, is undestructible.

Thus, after having refuted the view of total destruction of the Advaita, Vādirāja diverts his attention to the Sarvanāśa view of Tārkikas. According to them, everything originated with Adṛṣṭa or unseen cause or power, perishes completely and also there is no re-creation. Thus, this is a very strange view. Because, at the end of each age, the created world perishes and again it is going to be created at the beginning of next age. This is happening since time immemorial. Here, only effect (Kārya-world) is going to be perished and not its prime cause which is Adṛṣṭa. If it is held that Adṛṣṭa too perishes, then there

would not be any re-creation. So Adṛṣṭa which is prime cause will not perish whereas it becomes the cause of re-creation. So the Sarvanāśa view of the Advaita and of the Tārkika is baseless and untenable. The Śruti declares that, God creates the world as in past. This disproves the very fact of Sarvanāśa or total destruction.

LIBERATION IS THE ATTAINMENT OF THE ABODE OF LORD VIṢṆU

In this context, the Advaita view of liberation is refuted. The Advaita holds that liberation is the gain or attainment of identity (Ātmaikya). But Vādirāja says that identity cannot be the liberation. According to him, it is the attainment of highest place. If the view of identity is admitted, then the very concept liberation of attaining highest place, would be futile. The highest place is the abode of Lord Viṣṇu. It is also called Vaikunṭha. The liberated souls, attaining this highest abode of Lord Viṣṇu, enjoy their inherent bliss. There, they will have the vision of God always. That place is away from the Tamas, it is ever illuminous. It is the place, after attaining which, one will not come back to transmigration. It is the state of final release.¹¹¹⁹

This state of liberation is not the state of Jīvanmukti. But it is other and superior to that. In the Bhāgavata,

Lord Kṛṣṇa says that the worlds, upto Brahmaloka, (Satyaloka) are subject to rebirth whereas his abode Vaikunṭha, attainment of which will not cause any rebirth. So the liberation is the attainment of close proximity with the Lord, it is the attainment of the lotus-feet of Him, or it may also be explained as dwelling in the abode of the Lord.¹¹²⁰ Śveta-dvīpa, Anantāsana and Vaikunṭha are the three abodes of the Lord, and attainment of these is the liberation.

Then, the question may be raised as to whether, like the created world, the abode of the Lord is subject to the process of creation and destruction. Vādirāja says that in the description of the creation and destruction, Lord's abode is not included. This shows that, Lord's abode is not subjected to creation and destruction,¹¹²¹ whereas all other worlds such as Satyaloka and others are subjected to the process of creation and destruction.

The god Mukhyavāyu conducts the qualified souls, who have fulfilled the prescribed course Sādhana, to the Lord and recommends for the attainment of the release. The Chāndogyaopaniṣad also states that, the qualified souls, after attaining the release, will not come back. It is the abode of the Lord which is totally free from the defects of Samsāra (transmigration). Hence, the attainment of

release is not possible, with unworthy means. It is similar to the Lord so far as defectless nature is concerned. Like the Lord, it is also free from birth, death and the like. It is Cetanātmaka (sentient) and pervasive. The Lord is the sovereign king of this.

If the release the attainment of another and highest world is not admitted, then the prescription of the course (Sādhana) and the path of Arcis etc., would be useless. In fact, Arcis etc., is the path of attainment of release and release is the gain of the abode of the Lord.

The above explained opinion disregards the views that instant ascending is the release and attainment of the Brahmatva is the release. Because, as Brahman is all-pervasive, there cannot be either the movement of ascending or the process of attainment of Brahmatva. Because, Brahman is supreme and distinct. So there cannot be the gain of Brahmatva.

Here, it is acclaimed that, knowledge (devotion-Bhakti) is the prime means of attaining this final release. Bhakti involves the relation of servant and served between devotee and the Lord. And this proves the difference between the Lord and the soul even in release. As there

lies difference in release, there is also gradation in release among liberated souls.¹¹²²

The Bhagavadgītā describes the state (place) of release as that, where the sun shines not the moon does not illuminate, and even the fire burns not it. After attaining once, the liberated will not return to transmigration. And that is the highest abode of the Lord.¹¹²³ And this release is not merely the destruction or removal of displeasure as Tārkikas contend, but it is the state of experiencing the bliss and blissful knowledge.

In Parāntakāla, that is at the end of the age, Brahmā, taking the three typed Jīvas, enters into the belly of the Lord. Then along with Sātvikas he takes both in the Virajā river. This river is of the nature of goddess Lakṣmī. This river discriminates as to who is liberated and who is not. It is free from material elements and effects. It is Aprākṛta (spiritual). It is the destroyer of transmigration. All those souls, after bath, get their Liṅgaśarīra (subtle body) shattered and then enshrine with their blissful nature. Then Brahmā, getting deeply immersed in the experience of bliss of Dhyāna (contemplation) for hundred years, gets the nature manifested, along with his retinue like past liberated Brahmas and experiences the bliss in

swelling. The removal of subtle body and also manifestation of the blissful nature is called Sārūpya release. And others, Sālokya, Sāmīpya and Sāyujya take place according to the eligibility of the liberated souls. In the release, the forms that the liberated souls assume, are not of Prakṛti (matter). So there is no question of rebirth.

The Sādhanas or the means for attaining such release are prescribed in Śāstras and they are the knowledge of difference between the Lord and the soul, performance of deeds without aiming at fruit or result and absence of feeling of Svātantrya (independence) in the souls. Among these, the knowledge of difference and devotion are primary and Niṣkāmakarmanuṣṭhāna or performance of the deeds without the feeling of attachment, is the secondary. All the liberated souls, including Brahmā, have no rebirth.

The qualified souls, though relieved of Prārabdha karma cannot attain release independently at their own will. Only with Brahmā, they can attain it. And in some cases they are supposed to undergo and experience the effects of Prārabdhakarma knowingly or unknowingly. And after the bath in Virajā, there will not be any Prārabdhakarma. The eligible souls attain the final release during Parāntakāla or at the end of final annihilation.¹¹²⁴

ABSENCE OF AIKYA AND SARVAMOKṢA; SĀKĀRATVA AND TĀRATAMYA
TO MUKTAS

As there are three types of souls, all of them will not attain the liberation. As already stated, only Sātvikas attain the liberation. In this context, Vādirāja literally deals with two Śruti passages, Śṛṇvevīra ugramugram...^{1124A} and Parā pūrveṣām...^{1124B} The import of these passages is that the Lord sends the Asuras to the darkness (tamas) and Sātvikas such as gods and others to Vaikunṭha release abode of bliss. He makes the Sātvikas to enjoy the pleasures thereof. So far as Rājasas or middle one are concerned, till they are relieved of the Līṅgadeha or subtle body, they go to heaven and hell and will have the mixed experience. When that subtle body of them is destroyed, they are given the state of mixed experience of pleasures and displeasures. Thus, without change and without fail, different souls will have different states and different goals to be attained. And the Lord, being supreme surpasses all these. Moreover, He is described as eternally liberated (Nityamukta). So there cannot be any identity between the Lord and souls. Further, as different souls attain different states, there cannot be release of bliss to all.¹¹²⁵ Even the qualified do not attain the release themselves. They seek the grace of the Lord. So how can there be identity between the Lord and the souls? The Śruti,

Yedha mānadvit...^{1125A} states that the Lord never likes and tolerates the identity and equality. When such is the case, the question of attaining the Brahmatva (identity) is gone afar.¹¹²⁶ In the Bhāgavata, it is made clear that the engagement in Pravṛttikarma in case of Asuras, will not enable them to attain upliftment. Thus, both the Śruti and the Smṛti declare that Asuras will never attain the release (Sarvamokṣa) is impossible one. In the Bhagavadgītā also Lord Kṛṣṇa makes it clear that, those, who hate Him, who do not tolerate His supremacy, who try and hanker for identity, will roam in unworthy births and at the end, without attaining the Lord, will fall in the deep darkness. In the case of Jaya, Vijaya and others, who hated the Lord due to the curse, this cannot be applied. Their hatred is temporary. As long as there had been the effect of curse, they opposed Lord and did mischiefs. By the time, the curse was dispelled, they assumed their original Sātvika form and were blessed with release by the Lord through His grace.

The liberated souls are infinite in number. Among them there are some, who attained the release early and others later. Some are released together and hence are called Jñātis and others Ajñātis. All the released are affectionate and intimate each other. They are like close

friends. In respect of knowledge and the like, they are not even or equal. There is gradation. The gradation hinted here is always with difference. They are not distinct from their pure and blissful nature. All the organs are of the nature of knowledge and bliss. All are graced with beautiful and charming forms. So in release, the question of formlessness, (Nirākārata) does not arise. The Śruti passage, Te ha nākam mahimānah...^{1126A} makes it clear that they flourish and enshrine with their own greatness. All of them dwell in and enjoy the pleasures of various kinds. They do not have any displeasure. Approaching the Lord, they get manifested their blissful nature and enjoy in different places.

There is gradation even in the enjoyment of the released. It is because of the difference in their inherent eternal ability and also in respect of spiritual efforts of each released soul. Therefore, the Śruti, enunciates the Ānandatāratamya or gradation in the enjoyment of bliss of the liberated.¹¹²⁷ If this gradation is not admitted, then the doubts related to the difference with regard to the efforts and the like, cannot be cleared off. And it is not logically sound to view that same result will take place with different efforts. Ānanda-mīmāṃsā in the Taittirīya Śruti deals with the Svarūpānanda (natural bliss)

with gradation. Therefore, the gradation, declared in the Śruti, with regard to bliss, is related to release. Thus, even in the release, there is gradation and it cannot be ruled out. The passage Yato vāco nivartante...^{1127A} acclaims the infinite bliss of the Lord which is the very nature of Him. In the same context, passages that deal with the enjoyment of bliss of different liberated souls, are also seen. So, it is clear that, entire context of that Śruti refers to Svarūpānanda or natural bliss and not any other type.¹¹²⁸

As the Śruti (knowledge of Śruti) ensures the feeling of detachment towards mundane pleasures and initiates the souls for upliftment, it is clear that the Śruti does not talk of anything about mundane pleasures and other things in this context. In the state of Samsāra, the natural bliss is unknown and not experienced. Therefore, the explanation of natural bliss with gradation, seen in the Śruti, is related with liberation and not with transmigration. Mānuṣānanda, described in the Śruti, is not of the embodied souls, since they have pleasure for some time and displeasure for some time. They do not enjoy instant bliss. If blissful nature is denied in the case of liberated souls, then that would be the release of Tārkikas, since according to them release is the state of absence of displeasure.

It does not entertain any pleasure. Therefore, gradation in the enjoyment of bliss, is to be accepted. And this gradation never entertains the possibility of Aikya but it proves difference evidently.¹¹²⁹

Since, in transmigration, pleasure is not permanent and is mixed with displeasure, gradation cannot be determined ultimately. The degree in the enjoyment of pleasure, in Samsāra, varies from time to time, place to place and from situation to situation. Whereas this variation does not occurs in the release. In the release, gradation is an ever established entity. Gradation in bliss, exists on account of the graded and different means of enjoyment. Without taking into account the difference in the means of enjoyment, reference of gradation would be meaningless and baseless.¹¹³⁰ And this gradation asserts the mutual difference among souls and difference with the Lord even in the release.¹¹³¹ Thus, gradation is proved through Yukti, Śruti and Smṛti. Yukti (reason) is as there is graded difference in the means, the same must be there in results.

There are some statements such as Mama sādharma-
māgatāḥ...^{1131A} and others, that apparently give the sense of equality. But it is to be understood in the sense as free from or absence of displeasure and other mundane defects.

So equality is impossible and gradation is inevitable. Even the Lord cannot undo it or change it.

INTERPRETATION OF THE ŚRUTI PASSAGES YATRA TVASYA... AND OTHERS AND THE REFUTATION OF ADVITĪYATVAPRĀPTI

The idea of the Advaitins that liberation is attaining the state of being alone (loneliness) is impracticable and untenable. When man is alone, he is not happy. A preceptor, a pupil, a beast, or a crow always long for the company of others, to be happy. The loneliness does not ensure any happiness. Even in the practical life, every one tries to get something other better as he is not at all happy with single possession. When an article is lost, he hankers for another. If living house is burnt away, demands for a new one. So when all this is taken into account, it proves beyond doubt that to be alone or loneliness is nowhere found and preferred to. Thus the liberation is the form of Advitīyatvapṛāpti or loneliness as the Advaitins contend, is impossible. It is described that the liberated delight with their companions. If they were to be alone then, living in the company of others and also blissful enjoyments, are all impossible. If Ātman is admitted as only one, then there is no possibility of any functions and dealings. Moreover, this Ātmaikyā view will be against the Śruti passages such as Tatkena kam paśyet... 1131A

If the Advitīyatva view is accepted then the liberation cannot be claimed as Puruṣārtha or prime goal to be attained. Therefore, as there is the presence of different souls and manifold objects (duality) in Samsāra in the same way, even in the release, duality is to be accepted inevitably. So there are infinite liberated souls having blissful forms and also there are infinite means of enjoyments.

The passages Yatradvaitamiva bhavati..., Sarvamātmavābhūt...^{1131B} and others never state any identity but declare the difference. The liberated do have the blissful forms with blissful organs. If this is not accepted then the very fact of their enjoyment is impossible.

The passage, Na pretya sanjñā asti^{1131C} does not negate the Svarūpañāna or innate knowledge in case of liberated. It only denies Prākṛtajñāna or material knowledge. This ascertains that, the liberation is not Prakṛti or matter, but it is Aprākṛta or spiritual. Hence Prākṛtajñāna or material knowledge cannot be there in the release.

The passage, Yatratvasya sarvamātmaivābhūt^{1131D} is interpreted as, in transmigration, the soul, with its mind associated with so many things, concentrates on and deals with them. But in the state of release, this will not happen.

The liberated concentrates as only one, That is the Lord. There is no second, in the sense that the Lord is the main object of his concentration. It does not negate the presence of other things. This passage also does not support the attainment of loneliness of the Advaita. Or it may also be meant that the passage describes the state of a Yogin. The Yogin, sitting in a serene and secret place, meditates as God. At that time, except God, nothing is the object of his meditation. In the Samsāra, organs of the body are different, whereas in the release, all the organs are the part and parcel of the very nature of liberated. In the release, all the organs are concentrated on God. Why only in the release, such type of deep concentration is seen even in this world on some occasions. A person, engaged in the dice game and a dancer in dancing have no attention towards something other than that. When this is the position of a person in the Samsāra, the released, getting deeply engaged in concentration, will never see and know something other than the God.

In the Samsāra, there are two entities, one is soul (sentient) and another is matter (insentient), And this soul lives always associated with matter. So the body has the character of Dvittva (possession of both the sentiency and insentiency). In the release, as there is no any

matter (insentient), there lies only spiritual or Aprākṛta body. The whole form is of the very nature of the Cetana. All sorts of enjoyments take place with the help of Svarūpendriyas or blissful organs. Thus, it is to be noted that the passage states the manifestation of the very nature of the liberated.¹¹³²

The passages, Paramam sāmīyamupaiti..., Saha Brahmapā vipāścita..., Paramjyotirupasaṅkramya..., Etamanna mayamātmanamupasaṅkrāmati...^{1132A} and others describe the release as a fruit or result of knowledge. These passages do not refer to any identity. They also not deal with any sheath (Kośa) but mainly aim at Paramātmān, since they appear in the part (Prakarana) that explains the state of release.¹¹³³

The passage Yatra dvaitamiva bhavati... refers to either Aparokṣajnāni or released. It describes the two states such as Jāgrt and Suṣupti. Vādirāja opines that whatever may be the reference but it does not talk of any Advitīyatva. The passage, Yatra tvasya sarvamātmāivābhūt describes the state of deep sleep or Suṣupti. In Jāgrt or awakening state, Bhedavyavahāra is experienced distinctly. But in the state of deep sleep, on account of deep sleep or concentration, the soul is almost inactive and the God alone is active. Therefore, that wise Yogin or released

is unaware of the external affairs of the world. The present passage as well as the passage, Pareavyaaye sarva ekibhāvanti...^{1133A} promise and state that all the organs of the released deeply concentrate on Lord. In this way no Śruti talks of any identity between Brahman and the soul.¹¹³⁴ As Śruti appears in and deals with the context of release, it aims at explaining the effect or result of release. In the state of liberation there is no darkness in the form of Ajnāna. There are no merit (Punya) and sin (Pāpa). There is enjoyment of all pleasures and also manifestation of blissful nature. Vādirāja says that this is not possible in the state of Jīvanmukti. Because, a Jīvanmukta may have no effects of Punya and Pāpa, but as he is still living in this world with the same body, he has no privilege to enjoy to the desired objects unlike a released one. Otherwise the gods (Jīvanmuktas) would not have churned the milky-ocean for nectar. The above passage refers to final release of four kinds and states that the attainment of this will not cause any rebirth (Samsāra).

The passage, Sarvān kāmān samaśnute...^{1134A} is interpreted by the Advaitins as, Mukta attaining the identity with Brahman enjoys all the pleasures. So there is no individual pleasure for finally liberated. It is there only during Jīvanmukta state. But this is wrong. Because, the particle 'Saha' in the passage gives the sense of

sameness of time and not the identity. In Samsāra as objects of enjoyment vary from being to being, in the state of release also, they differ from one released soul to another. So individual enjoyment of pleasures too prevails in the release. So the interpretation of the passage is as, finally released souls enjoy pleasures with Brahmā (four-faced) in the abode of the Lord.

Difference between the soul and supreme soul (Brahman) is pertinent even in the release. Thus all passages aim at and declare the difference and not the identity or Advitīyatva.¹¹³⁵

As king is different and does not intend to consider or treat the arrested as equal to him, the God too, who is the Lord of liberated as well as unliberated, does not wish the souls to be equated with him. Although, finally liberated are graced with similar form (Sārūpya), they are not given the Śrīvatsa and other ornaments that are Lakṣmīātmaka. So, even the released souls remain as servants of the Lord. The Lord, although graceful and affectionate towards His devotees, does not offer self-identity like a king, though pleased with, will not give his wife to anybody.¹¹³⁶ Therefore, it is evident that the release is not the attainment of Advitīyatva. The passages do not

refer to Ātmaikya or Advitīyatva but aim at difference in all respects.

VAIKUNṬHA IS LAKṢMYĀTMAKA

Vaikunṭha or the abode of the Lord is free from material elements. (Prākṛta elements). It is spiritual. The Bhāgavata verse, Na yatra māyā kimutāpare...^{1136A} states that in the abode of the Lord, there is no Māyā and its effects. In fact, it is goddess Lakṣmī who constitutes Lord's abode. Therefore, it is called Lakṣmyātmaka. Goddess Lakṣmī is eternally liberated. Even in final annihilation, she will not get perished. The God, who is eternally liberated, is the Lord of that abode. It does not mean that, only the abode Vaikunṭha is spiritual, but, all the three (Vaikunṭha, Anantāsana and Śvetadvīpa) are spiritual and are of the forms of Lakṣmī. The Śrībhāg (portion) in all the three abodes of the Lord, is imperishable, even during the annihilation. Whereas, other two parts, namely, Bhūbhāga and Durgābhāga are subject to destruction during annihilation.¹¹³⁷ The abodes of the Lord are crowded with released souls. Not only the abodes are spiritual but, the things available there are also spiritual. Vādirāja mentions that the abodes of Brahmā, Rudra and of other gods are the products of material elements. (No doubt, the abodes of Brahmā and others, unlike the human, consist of

more Sattva element of the matter (Prakṛti). Even then they are not of the nature of sentiency and are also not the abodes of released). But the abodes of the Lord, since being spiritual, are superior to them. Vādirāja says that not only the abode but also the Lord. That means, the Lord is superior to all other gods. Not only the Lord, but also His wife, goddess Lakṣmī is superior to those gods. In the abodes of the Lord, only those, who are finally released, live and they are always ardent and devoted to the Lord. Although released are experiencing blissful enjoyments, they are lords of nothing. Although graced with four arms and the like, they are not capable to enjoy the doership or creatorship of anything. They are similar to the God only in respect of explicit form but not in any other respects.¹¹³⁸

The released souls are not born during the next world creation and are not perished at the time of world destruction (Pralaya). They do not have any birth, death and the like. They have the form of knowledge and bliss. Since having blissful form, they enjoy only bliss. On this basis, the souls are broadly classified as released and unreleased. And among unreleased, there are three types, Sāttvika, Rājasa and Tāmasa. And it is held that only Sāttvikas are entitled to attain the release.¹¹³⁹

THE LORD'S ABODE IS NOT EMPTY

As already mentioned, the Lord's abode is not empty, since being crowded with released souls. Vādirāja wants to state that it is not only the released souls that dwell there but the means of their enjoyments are also present there. Even they are also spiritual. Vādirāja argues that when the things, product of matter and present in the heaven and other worlds, are being worshipped and coveted by one all, then what to state about the means of blissful enjoyments of the released in Lord's abode. Further, it is not that only the human beings are liberated and enjoy in release. Even birds, animals and other are also found in the release with innate, original and blissful form.

The Lord's abode, being spiritual, is superior to other abodes of gods. There is no mixed experience of pain and pleasure here. The released souls are not either identical or equal to each other or with the eternally released God. They are different with gradation. This gradation is an account of the difference in the enjoyment of bliss and this absolutely depends on there innate and eternal nature.¹¹⁴⁰

INTERPRETATION OF THE ŚRUTI, RŪPAM RŪPAM PRATIRŪPO BHABHŪVA^{1140A}

This Śruti passage proves the possibility of the difference in the nature of the souls. The nature of the souls is not uniform and of same kind. The passage refers to released souls, stating that each and every liberated soul is the Pratibimba or reflection of one or another form of God who is reflective. It does not mean that the embodied soul is not the reflection of God. Vādirāja assures that the relation of reflective and reflection is truly realized at the time of release and not in the state of Saṁsāra. The Lord is glorified as Pururūpa, that means He is endowed with infinite forms. All the liberated souls are reflections to Him.

In this passage, the Lord is praised as Indra, that means He is endowed with eternal supreme unlimited treasure or wealth. This term does not refer to Indra, who heads the heaven, since his treasure is not eternal and it is limited. All the forms of the Lord get manifested through his special power. They are not the products of any Karma. The term Māyā in the passage is taken to mean an unthinkable, unlimited eternal supreme power of the Lord. But it never gives the sense of Advaita concept of Māyā. The Lord takes a number of forms through this special power of His own. As the forms of the Lord and

also the souls are infinite each and every soul becomes the reflection of one or another Bimba form of God. The realization of respective Bimba-form of the Lord is the prime means of final release. Vādirāja stresses the point that though the forms of the Lord are infinite, they are identical, whereas the souls, although reflections, are neither identical each other nor with God. They are distinct. Thus, the passage proves the variety and difference in the nature of the souls and also the relation of reflective and reflected.¹¹⁴¹

The qualified souls attain the release only when they realize the respective Bimba form of the Lord.¹¹⁴² The passage Tadasya rūpasya praticakṣaṇāya...^{1142A} refers to both soul and Supreme soul (Lord). One is seer and another is seen (seeable). Thus, the ultimate reality of these forms is evident. The term Māyā in the above passage aims at and refers to the greatness of the Lord. Hence, it cannot be understood as the Māyā of the Advaita concept, which is ultimately unreal.

The passage also promises that there is no Māyā (illusion) in the release. There, everything is spiritual. The objects of enjoyments, though utilized, will not come to an end. They are eternal and real. All this is possible

by the Lord through His special power. This power of the Lord makes everything possible that normally looks difficult and impossible. When this is the case, there cannot be the talk of either identity or of attributelessness of the Lord. Though, the Lord is Omniscient, Omnipotent, He will not mind Himself to make possible what is impossible. Because, whatever is absolutely impossible is nothing but invalid. He will never utilize His special power for such invalid destructive and unworthy purpose. Because, the Lord is not intended to achieve self-destruction for, the very idea of identity destroys supremacy and the view of attributelessness disproves the very special power. So, the idea of mutual identity, identity with the Lord, attainment of the Advitīyatva, declaration of the view of formlessness and attributelessness etc., are all baseless and invalid. Therefore, there is neither Māyā (illusion) nor its effects in the abode of the Lord (release).¹¹⁴³

Thus, the release is not the state of either identity or of emptiness. It is the state of experiencing one's own bliss by the grace of the Lord. It is spiritual, extra-ordinary and crowded with infinite number of liberated souls. And there lies absolute difference in between souls and the Lord. This difference is called Viśeṣa which is possible by the very nature of all.¹¹⁴⁴ And this Viśeṣa

nature helps to realize the difference in between souls and the Lord.

In the Advaita, as release is devoid of all distinctions, the very fact of enjoyment is not possible. According to the Advaita, there remains nothing for enjoyment and the like. So release accordingly would be nothing but a Śūnyamokṣa.

So the liberation which is real and difference-based is the only release attaining which one will not have the experience of any displeasure and will not come back to transmigration.

The Viśeṣa, referred to above, is the peculiar and individual nature of each entity that establishes the difference mutually. Viśeṣa is there in the Lord, it is also there in the Svarūpadeha of the liberated souls. The Viśeṣas, present in the souls, are controlled by the Viśeṣa of the Lord.¹¹⁴⁵

The very fact proves the difference between the Lord and other liberated souls. The Lord is eternally liberated and others attain the release, only when they fulfil the prescribed course of Sādhana and gain the grace of the Lord.

The Lord is the ultimate resort and support to all, including released, and hence, He is acclaimed as Superior to and Supreme.¹¹⁴⁶

INTERPRETATION OF THE ŚRUTI PASSAGE DVITĪYĀD VAI BHAYAM
BHAVATI^{1146A}

The above passage does not deny the existence of other entities. And it also does not convey the identity. Advaitins contend that this passage negates the existence of the entity other than Brahman. But this is not correct. As this passage comes in the context of Ekāki na ramate,^{1146B} it cannot deny the presence of other things.

Vādirāja understands and interprets the passage in different ways without spoiling the significance and beauty of the context. Here the term Dvitiya, according to Vādirāja, gives a good number of meanings. One may be afraid of second Āśrama (stage of life) as being householder since it leads to mixed experience by making him to get involved in Samsāra. One may be afraid of the second among the two Punya or merit and Pāpa or sin. Men are supposed to be afraid of the second among the company of the good and the bad. They may also be afraid of second world that is secular world. Here first is the abode of the Lord. They are afraid of the second world since it

is also the cause of rebirth. Thus, the passage states that the Lord, who is the source of spiritual delight and enlightenment, is not the cause of any fear. It is the worship of the Lord with pure devotion that enables to gain His grace and attain the liberation.¹¹⁴⁷

If this meaning is not admitted then the very import of the passage becomes contradictory and also opposes the import of other passages of the same context. And it will not help even for Advaitins in proving identity etc. Because, the world consists of both sentient and insentient things. And according to the Advaita, the insentient world is unreal. If identity is to be held and admitted then, Brahman too, since being compared with the second (world), will become Mithyā. And this type of identity stands sublated by the reason. Thus, the passage will not convey the sense of identity. So Vādirāja opines that, the sense of identity and absence of other entities, cause fear.

Therefore, the correct import of the passage is that, one has to cultivate and develop the feeling of detachment towards this world of sorrow. This world is second. He, who admires and gets immersed in this, has fear from this. So a qualified teacher, desirous of attaining the liberation, should give up the feeling of attachment. If this is

given up, then there is no fear from it. Hence, this passage has nothing to do either with identity or with the non-existence of the second entity. It precisely relates the necessary and required steps for attaining the release.¹¹⁴⁸

THE ŚRUTI PASSAGES ARE NOT AKHANDĀRTHAPARA

The contention of the Advaita is that the passages are Akhandāarthapratipāḍaka. If this view is held, then the very concepts, identity, attributelessness and unreality are supposed to be given up. Because, Akhandā means the ultimate presence of only one entity. But, unless there is second entity, identity is impossible. And also, when the presence of second entity is totally negated, there is no charm in proposing the unreality. Thus, the aim of considering the passage as Akhandārthapara, will not yield any results such as identity and others.

Vādirāja states that, this work does not only aim at refuting the Advaita concepts or views but ensues valuable guidance to the honest so that they can have the peace, in mind, content in heart and devotion at the feet of the Lord.¹¹⁴⁹

Therefore, all the passages such as Amṛtasyaiṣa setuḥ, Muktānām parama gatiḥ^{1149A} and others declare that the God is the Lord to all liberated. He is the sole support, guide and controller even in the release. No single Śruti passage conveys the sense of Akhanda. All the passages proclaim the greatness of the Lord in one or other way.

THE PAVAMĀNA AND PŪYAMĀNA ŚRUTIS DECLARE THE GREATNESS
OF MADHVA

The last two chapters of sixth Aṣṭaka and first five chapters of seventh Aṣṭaka of Rgveda, contain Pavamāna hymns. Vādirāja says that these hymns, when properly interpreted, give an account of the deeds of the incarnations of god Mukhyavāyu that are Hanumān, Bhīma and Madhva. The expressions, Pavamāna and Soma, found in these hymns refer to the forms of Vāyu.

The hymn, Sa pūrvyaḥ...¹¹⁵⁰ states that Pavamāna (Vāyu) is incarnated as Madhva. Pavamāna means he who purifies. Soma means he, who abides in all living beings in the form of controlling the very breathing of them during all the states (awakening, dreaming and sleeping). Soma also means he who is also an efficient cause in the process of creation and who abounds in divine richness. In the above passage, the expression as Madhva, is clearly

made. The adjectives in the passage are more significant and glorify the greatness of the forms of Vayu.¹¹⁵¹ The term Vevijāna glorifies Madhva and states that Madhva is he, who establishes the five-fold difference. Pūrvyaḥ refers to the fact of being Jīvottama. Śyenaḥ means he, whose Lord is blissful. It is also explained that at the time of final annihilation he (Vāyu) swallows or destroys the outskirts or flap of Tejas. His form is fierceful. He is furious to vicious and silent in the case of virtuous. Since, time immemorial, all the forms of god Vāyu are specially meant for correct preaching of right knowledge. Therefore, they are called Gomati. Vāyu with his Bhīma (furious) form destroys the subtle body or Līngadeha of qualified souls after their gaining direct knowledge. Next to the Lord He is also the bestower of release. The forms of Vāyu are also called Indus, since fulfilling the desires of devotees and being rich in divine wealth.

The hymn, Ajitaye apahataye...¹¹⁵² which contains the expressions of Pavamāna and Soma, refers to the incidents (Pavana movements) of Hanumān, Bhīma and Madhva. The hymn deals with the adventurous activities of the forms of Vāyu. Vādirāja gives the derivative meaning of the term Pavana as he, who is capable of purifying. He also explains each and every term of the passage and assures that Madhva is the incarnation of Vāyu.

The hymn, Prasenāni śūro agre...¹¹⁵³ particularly refers to Bhīma form of Vāyu as the real leader of Pāṇḍava family and party. It also conveys that Hanumān was the leader of Vānara family and party. As this passage describes the valourous deeds of Hanumān and Bhīma, it can also be explained with reference to Madhva.

Further, two hymns of same context, Somaḥ pavate... and Brahmā devānām...¹¹⁵⁴ have the reference of Madhva clearly and explicitly. Here Madhva is described as Janaka in various senses. The expression Viṣṇoḥ janitā signifies that it is Madhva who made the people conscious and known about the supremacy of Lord Viṣṇu. Matīnām janitā glorifies him as giver of right knowledge. Vādirāja opines that the repetition of the expression Janitā indicates that Madhva has dispelled the fear and ignorance through his outstanding contribution. He is described as Janitā prthivyoh, since he established the reality of the world.¹¹⁵⁵

The Śruti Prāvīpat...¹¹⁵⁶ clearly mentions that Madhva is the great teacher who taught real and right knowledge. Here, he is acclaimed as great preceptor (Jagadguru). It is well described and known fact that god Vāyu incarnated on earth as Madhva and unveiled the treasure in the form of the import of the Śruti passages.

Thus, like previous passage, this also describes the greatness and gives an account of manifold deeds of Madhva form of Vāyu.¹¹⁵⁷

Another Śruti of the same context, Unmadhva ūrmi...¹¹⁵⁸ relates the greatness of Madhva. He is called Mahiṣa as he is superior among all the souls. He is referred to Ūrmi as he is highly qualified and well-versed. He is glorified as Apah since he sportively swims in unlimited ocean of Śāstras. He is called Atiṣṭhat as he showed that all the Vedas and Vidyas primarily and ultimately declare the greatness of the Lord.

One more Śruti, Saptasvasr...¹¹⁵⁹ mentions that it is Madhva who has understood the real import of all the Śāstras since the knowledge or understanding of these is essentially required for the realization of the Lord, Madhva, unveiling the correct import of all the Śāstras, has rendered the devotional service at the feet of the Lord. Hence it is evident that he is Vāyu incarnated.¹¹⁶⁰

Another Śruti passage, Viṣṭambho diva...¹¹⁶¹ refers to Madhva. Viṣṭambha means supporter. He is described as the supporter in the sense of establishing the reality of the world. The term Amśuḥ conveys that Madhva too is

endowed with the same natural strength of original form of Vāyu. He is called Utsa as he has great enthusiasm in respect of Haribhakti.

The Śruti running, Simham na santa...¹¹⁶² brings out the fact that Madhva is the supreme and ardent devotee of Lord incarnated Narasimha. It is also explained that he is foremost among those fortunate, who have the privilege of having direct studentship of the Lord.¹¹⁶³

The Śruti passage, Pradhārā Madhvo...¹¹⁶⁴ deals with the academic success and prosperity of Madhva. Agriyaḥ conveys that Madhva enshines with complexion of supreme knowledge. The term Mahīrapaḥ denotes that Madhva is well-versed in all Śāstras. He is called Haviḥ as he is adorable and being worshipped by other gods. He is Haviḥ, since he is very dear to the Lord and as he is the foremost among the gods, invoked in Jñānayajña.

Another hymn, Asmabhyaminda...¹¹⁶⁵ also consists of the praise of Madhva. He is called Indrayuḥ as he is devoted and also always associated with the Lord by name Indra. Vādirāja says that the term Indra primarily and ultimately aims at the Lord for having unlimited and eternal treasure, unlike the Indra who heads the heaven. Vādirāja

also promises that the term Madhva is significant and meaningful since he (Madhva) is the bestower of bliss in the form of imparting the right knowledge to all the qualified.

Thus, in all these hymns, the glorious deeds of god Vāyu, are described with reference to his forms, Hanumān, Bhīma and Madhva.

TAPTASUDARŚANA MUDRĀDHĀRANA IS ALSO MENTIONED IN PAVAMĀNA
HYMNS

The hymn, Yena devah pavitreṇa...¹¹⁶⁶ clearly states that Taptamudrādhārana should be done with Sudarśanacakra. (the Lord's weapon, wheel as a holy mark). Vādirāja argues that here the term Pavitra stands for Sudarśana and not for Daśapavitra which is used in sacrifices. It is clear from the reference as Sahasradhārā (having thousand (more) edge points). It is well-understood that with the help of this holy mark, purity of the body and mind could be gained.

Vādirāja also makes it clear that when and from whom the above mentioned holy mark is to be received. One has to receive this holy mark from a well-known scholar and teacher.¹¹⁶⁷ He also says that on other days, the above mentioned holy mark is to be enmarked with Gopīcandana.

In one of the hymns of the Rgveda, the Taptamudrā-dhārana is clearly mentioned. The hymn is, yet te pavitrām...¹¹⁶⁸ Vādirāja says that this hymn is also the praise of Madhva. If the term, Pavitra is taken to mean as Daśapavitra, then it cannot be heated. So it also ascertains that Pavitra is Sudarśana. Vādirāja also makes it clear that both the marks, Sudarśana and Śaṅkha are to be got imprinted on both the arms. He also states that Sudarśana is to be made of gold and Śaṅkha of silver.

In the Pavamāna hymns, not only god Vāyu is praised but also the Lord who is the Indweller of god Vāyu. Vādirāja promises that all the hymns or verses of Veda, primarily aim at and glorify the Lord and the same hymns can also be understood as the praise of god Vāyu. So the Lord is the primary object of glorification and god Vāyu is the next or secondary object of glorification of all the Vedic passages. And this god Vāyu, abiding in all Gurus (teachers), accomplishes the sacred deeds. The above cited passage clearly indicates that it is god Vāyu with his Madhva form, being present in sacred fire, Sudarśana and in Gurus (spiritual teachers), offers the Taptamudrā to all the devotees.¹¹⁷⁰

Similarly, the verses of Pūyamāna hymns also glorify

and Vāyu and Mudrādhāraṇa. The verse, Pavitram te vitatam..¹¹⁷¹ glorifies the Lord indwelling in god Vāyu. By the by it also relates the necessity of Taptamudrādhāraṇa. Vādirāja stresses that this Taptamudrādhāraṇa is also an essential means to secure the grace of the Lord and it is with this that the souls gain the eligibility for the performance of sacred religious duties.

Vādirāja opines that the glorification of Madhva, seen in the Pavamāna and Pūyamāna hymns, is nothing but the great and an elaborate praise of Madhva formed god Vayu.¹¹⁷²

MADHVA IS VĀYU INCARNATED.

Vādirāja, referring to some Śruti passages, declares that Madhva is Vāyu incarnated.

The passage, Idam te pātram..¹¹⁷³ consists of the praise of Madhva. The Lord is described as Indra that means He is possessing unlimited treasure. And the Lord by name Indra abides in Madhva and hence, Madhva is called Sanavittam. It means he is blessed with pure knowledge, devotion and feeling of detachment.¹¹⁷⁴ And he is also glorified as the main or prime object of presence (Sannidhāna) of the Lord. Madhva is also described as he, who is capable to discuss, understand and bring out the real

import of the Veda.¹¹⁷⁵ He is acclaimed as Pūrṇaśāṇi as he is also Sarvaśāṇi (Omniscient) next to the Lord. He is called Āhava since he, abiding in the qualified souls accomplishes the Jñānayaśāṇi. He is spiritual teacher not only to the sages but also to the gods.

Another verse, Madhvo vo nāma...¹¹⁷⁶ deals with the glorious description of the three incarnations of god Vāyu. It is also explained that Madhva formed Vāyu came down to the earth and lit the lamp of right knowledge for the upliftment of the good.

The passage, Tadasyapriyamabhipātho...¹¹⁷⁷ describes the glory of the Lord and Madhva together. The first half of the passage brings out the significance of the sipping of Viṣṇupādodaka. The second half describes Madhva as Mukhyabandhū, in the sense, foremost among the devotees of Lord Viṣṇu.¹¹⁷⁸

THE BALITTHĀSŪKTA DESCRIBES THE THREE INCARNATIONS OF VĀYU

The hymn, Balitthā tadvapuṣe...¹¹⁷⁹ describes the three incarnations of god Mukhyavāyu, viz., Hanumān, Bhīma and Madhva. The first and second represent the states of Brahmacarya and Grhasthya respectively. The third one represents Sanyāsa.

In the above passage, the term Matī signifies and denotes Hanumān. Hanu means knowledge. So Hanumān is he, who has vast right knowledge.¹¹⁸⁰ The second form Bhīma is glorified as Pitumān. Pitumān is he, who eats¹¹⁸¹ plenty. It is well-known fact that, Bhīma ate plenty when he was sent to kill the demon Baka. The third form is referred to by the name Daśapramatī. As Daśa stands for complete or vast and Pramatī for knowledge, and it is an equalent of Pūrṇaprajña, who is Madhva.¹¹⁸²

In the same hymn, Madhva is described as Mātariśvā. It means he, who churning out the unlimited ocean of the Śāstras brings out the greatness of the Lord who is dwelling in the cave of the heart of all. It also means he, who show the way of realizing the indwelling form of the god. The term Dohase conveys that Madhva milks and gives the relevant and agreeable exposition of the Śruti. He is called Pradiva as he is engaged always in preaching the gods and the good. It also indicates that he is endowed with extra-ordinary lusture. The term Ādhave states that Madhva is foremost and superior among all beings and also the best among well-qualified.¹¹⁸³ Thus, the Balitthāsūkta extols the majestic glory of all the three forms of god Vāyu.

ESTABLISHING THE ULTIMATE SUPREMACY OF THE LORD THROUGH
DISCARDING THE VIEWS OF JĪVAKARTRTVA ETC.

This is really a complicated and controversial topic in the philosophy, particularly in the Dvaita as to who is the Kartā (Doer). The general logic and common experience ascertain that the soul is the Doer. But the deep inquiry poses the question as to who is the real and independent doer.

Vādirāja examines this view in its fitness and critically explains it. He, himself, as if representing all, says that he knows nothing as to what is good and what is bad. Neither he is capable of doing something nor undoing. He acts, as initiated and activated by the Lord like the doll's dancing as being regulated by state-manner. Thus, he admits that he is not an independent and real doer.¹¹⁸⁴

Soul, although like matter, is a dependent; he is not matter since, he is a sentient one. He is capable to act only when initiated and activated by the Lord. Because, it is well experienced that the soul, although minds, is not capable in doing something good. It is also known fact that, the soul, although wishes not, does something wrong. So what all happens, is owing to the will of the Lord and, what not happens, is also at the will of the Lord.

The past Karma cannot be held as the sole initiator or activating agent for the performance of present deed. Because, further it may be questioned as to what was responsible for that past deed. And thus, it ultimately, leads to endless regression. And Karma, being Jada (insentient) neither can act itself nor can activate others. Further, as already said, the soul cannot activate this Karma according to his will. Thus, it is evident that both, the soul and matter are dependent. Difference is only in respect of sentiency and insentiency. Therefore, an independent being is to be inevitably admitted and He is the Lord. He, being Independent in all the respects, can activate the entire world comprising of souls and matter. 1185

The very fact that the birth and death are not under the control of the soul, ascertains the dependence of the soul. Like soul, even the Karma and others are also under control of the Lord. Śruti passage also substantiates that it is the Lord by whom, this world is created, sustained and destroyed. He is Independent activating agent of the entire universe. So it is not proper to hold the view that there is something that activates. Because, as already said, it leads to ad infinitum. And this view also becomes contrary to Śruti passages. So admitting an

Independent Lord, as prime initiator to the actions of all, is most welcome.

Then, the question arises as to why there is distinction as good and bad in the actions when there is only one independent Preraka (initiator)? Reply is, it is because of the inherent eternal ability (Svarūpa yogyatā) of the souls. The Lord activates the souls according to this ability. And, even this ability, like soul, is dependent and hence cannot make the soul to function. So, neither the soul himself, nor his inherent ability and nor even the matter (Karma etc., that is insentient) is held Preraka or activating agent for functioning.¹¹⁸⁶ Even the Adṛṣṭa or unseen power cannot be traced as the cause of functioning. Because, like Karma, it is also Jada. As without the presence of the potter, mud cannot get changed itself into a pot, in the same way, functioning cannot take place without the independent Lord who is the prime and sole activating agent.

When the souls are incapable of doing their functions independently, the question of becoming Preraka or initiator to each other and creating the world etc., is gone afar. Further, the factors, time, Prakṛti and others

cannot be considered as activating agents, since they themselves are insentient and require something else for functioning (movements).¹¹⁸⁷

So, the Lord is the sole and Independent doer and prime activating agent of entire world. He is the possessor of all the three powers of creation, sustenance and destruction, independently.¹¹⁸⁸

The critical examination of a few passages, at this point, by Vādirāja, is to make it clear that the sole and independent doership of the Lord is thus evident and unobjectionable, since it being supported and substantiated by the supreme authority, Veda. The given exposition also promises that it is not the souls only that are not real and independent doers but also the gods like Brahmā, Rudra and others. Therefore, what all happened so far, has been according to the will of the Lord, what is happening at present, is also controlled by the Lord and what will happen in the future, will also with the blessings of the Lord.

From this point till the end of the Phalasaaurabha, Vādirāja gives the summary of the detailed exposition of the entire work given so far, in nut-shell.