

CHAPTER - III
EPISTEMOLOGY IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

1. A NOTE ON EPISTEMOLOGY

Epistemology is one of the main branches of Indian philosophy. The other two branches are Metaphysics or Ontology and Ethics. Epistemology means the theory of knowledge. With the help of epistemology one can acquire valid knowledge. The term epistemology is used in English, American and more rarely in French and in some trends of German bourgeois philosophy. The introduction of the term epistemology is attributed to the Scottish philosopher J.F.Ferrier (institute of Metaphysics), who divided philosophy into Ontology and Epistemology.¹ The term epistemology is derived from “Episteme”, meaning knowledge and “Logos”, meaning science or theory. Epistemology therefore is the theory or science of knowledge. It is a science which enquires into the nature, origin, range and condition of knowledge. It means the theory of valid knowledge, an important division of philosophical theory, the doctrine on man’s ability to cognise reality, on the sources, forms and methods of cognition, the truth and the ways of attaining it. To study and generalize the source and development of knowledge, the transition from non-knowledge to knowledge is dealt in epistemology. Knowledge in general is analysable into ideas- ideas about things of the external world, about men and about one’s own self. It is to be observed that not all ideas are of the same value and validity. Some ideas are true and some are false. The awareness of

1. **DOP**, p.128.

such a distinction between true and false knowledge, what is also referred to as valid and invalid, presupposes an inquiry into the origin and validity of all knowledge. Thus, epistemology is a systematic study about knowledge which is solely centered on knowledge itself.

In Western philosophy special importance is given to epistemology. Philosophers like Kant, Locke, Hume etc. are the main exponent of it. Kant divides the theory of knowledge into two broad divisions, viz. conceptual knowledge and perceptual knowledge.² There is one type knowledge which is prior to both conceptual and perceptual knowledge. That is the knowledge of 'I', i.e. self-awareness. All intuitive knowledge originates from this 'I' consciousness. It doesnot require its source in conceptions of the mind or in sense-perception.

Conceptual knowledge develops according to the inherent structure of the mind and laws of thought. Its truth doesnot require empirical proof. Perceptual knowledge is empirical knowledge. It is tentative and its truth or falsity has to be referred to the external world for verification.

Kant admits that without a prior critical examination of the elements, sources and limits of knowledge, one should not engage in metaphysical discussion. However, the American neo-realist have tried to oppose the general modern trend, initiated by Kant, that the theory of knowledge should precede the theory of reality. They are led to this position by a kind of reaction against the use of epistemology made by most modern idealists for establishing realistic theories of reality.

2. CPR. p.41.

Epistemology and Metaphysics

Epistemology is closely connected with metaphysics or ontology. Epistemology means the 'Science of Knowledge'. It enquires into the origin, nature, validity and extent of knowledge. It is concerned with the conditions of the validity of knowledge. It cannot enquire into the validity of knowledge without enquiring into the nature of the reality comprehended by knowledge. The nature of the reality is investigated by metaphysics.

Epistemology is the theory of knowing, while Metaphysics is the theory of being or reality. Epistemology is the fundamental basis or ground work of metaphysics. Ontology must be preceded by epistemology, since we cannot investigate the ultimate nature of the reality without prior criticism of the organ of knowledge. Thus, we can say there is an intimate relation between epistemology and metaphysics. One cannot stand without the other.

Epistemology and Logic

Logic is the special enquiry into the estimation of evidence. Epistemology is a general enquiry into the conditions of valid knowledge. Epistemology is a more general study than logic. It is closely connected with metaphysics. Logic enquires into the various kinds of proof and the conditions of valid knowledge. It investigates the nature and validity of the various kinds of inference, deduction and induction. Logic avoids metaphysical discussion. But reasoning is not fully possible without some metaphysical discussion. Epistemology is more metaphysical than logic. Epistemology thus becomes closely linked up with metaphysics and both then again with ethics. In Indian philosophy also Epistemology is regarded as an essential part of philosophy. According to late Dr. Ward, Epistemology is a 'systematic

reflection concerning knowledge and which takes knowledge itself as the object of science'.³ In the course of the development of the Indian system interest in epistemology increased and it began to claim a large share in the philosophical discussions of almost every school. From the very beginning of the different systems of philosophy until recent times, discussions on the problems of knowledge (including those of doubt and error) have formed an essential part of philosophy. The reason can be found in the fact that all schools of Indian philosophy, without exception regarded ignorance as the root cause of human suffering, so that they were all bent upon discovering the means and process of true knowledge by means of which reality could be known and life could be so lived as to overcome misery or minimize suffering. Vātsyāyana commenting upon the first sūtra of Gautama, says that the study of the sources of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is necessary, because through it we can know the reality and thereby guide our actions to attain desirable ends and avoid sufferings.

Indian epistemology deals with four main factors, viz. the nature of *pramāṇa*, the nature of *pramā*, the nature of *pramātā* and the nature of *prameya*.⁴ Thus, Indian epistemology comes to involve these four basic factors with the help of which different schools of Indian philosophy try to determine the methods of arriving at the conclusions. In Indian epistemology, two terms are used in the sense of knowledge. They are *jñāna* and *pramā*.

3. HIE: p.3

4. *pramāṇam pramātā prameyam pramitiriti caturvargenaiva vyavahārāḥ parisamāpyate*. NVTT. under NS.1.1.1.

Jñāna means all kinds of knowledge true or false. But when reality reveals true knowledge it is called *pramā* or valid knowledge.⁵ The word '*pramā*' is used only in the sense of true knowledge (*yathārthajñāna*) which is distinct from false knowledge (*ayathārthajñāna*). *Yathārtha* or valid knowledge is a true and definite knowledge of some new facts and is the apprehension which agrees with the real character of the object apprehended.⁶ When one apprehends a jar with the quality of jariness, one's knowledge is valid.

If any knowledge lacks in definiteness or certitude or does not convey any new information or does not represent things as they really are, it is invalid.

Knowledge is the revelation of the objective world to a subject. The function of knowledge is to convert scattered concepts into a theoretically systematised universal form, retaining in them that which may be preserved, passed on to others and developed successively as a stable basis for human activity. Knowledge is termed as understanding (*buddhi*), apprehension (*upalabdhi*)⁷, concepts, judgement, awareness and cognition or cognizance which are synonymous with each other. Just as the light of a lamp shows physical things, so knowledge illuminates all the objects that come before it. 'Knowledge in its strict sense, means a true belief that carries with it an assurance of the truth'.⁸ Hence, knowledge is always true. When one comes across various convictions regarding an object, one feels to verify its validity

5. *tadvati tatprakāṛakānubhavo yathārthaḥ. saiva prametyucyate. TS.37.*

6. *yatra yadasti tatra tasyānubhavaḥ pramā. TC. Vol-1. p.401.*

7. *buddhir upalabdhir jñānam pratyaya iti paryāyaḥ. PPB. p.410.*

8. **POP.** p.217 as quoted in **NTK.** p.54.

by means of various methods which may be roughly called *pramāṇa*.⁹ The special source of *pramā* is called *pramāṇa*. The word *pramāṇa* etymologically means the instrument of valid knowledge¹⁰. So, *pramāṇa* is the means or sources of valid knowledge. It is that which gives rise to valid knowledge of objects.

Knowledge has three factors viz. the knower (*jñātā*), the known (*jñeya*) and the process of knowing (*jñānaprakriyā*). The knower and the process of knowing can not be separated. But the known is neither completely subjective nor purely mental. It is something outside of us. The known is object to the knower i.e. the subject. This dualism of the subject and the object is present in empirical knowledge. In fact, knowledge at the empirical level becomes possible as a valid and useful factor only if the dualism is recognised. From this, however, we cannot draw any conclusion about the nature of human knowledge as a whole.

Because of the dualism of the subject and object, we have the subjective element and the objective element in all empirical knowledge. Our knowledge of the external world is the knowledge of our sense-experience and the belief that what are presented to us, constitute the real world, i.e. the world as it is, can not be proved either logically or empirically.¹¹

The relation between the knowledge and the object is that of the

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9. *kaḥ punarayaṃ nyāya? pramāṇairarthaparīkṣaṇam*. VB under NS
1.1.1.
10. *tatra pramāṅkaraṇam pramāṇam*, VP. p.7.
11. ROP. pp.115-116.

manifested and the manifested. In an act of cognition, there is an object which is revealed, a self to whom it is revealed and the fact of revelation itself. All these three factors are distinct from each other as they are clearly distinguishable. The objects exist independently in the external world. In an act of cognition, an object is the accusative (*karma*) and the self is the nominative (*kartā*). As for instance, in an act of cognition like “This is blue”, what is apprehended is “this” which appears to be “blue”. Cognition manifested an external object “this” directly to the self. This theory of valid knowledge or *pramāṇa* is known as epistemology.

2. NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE

The topics like nature of knowledge, means of acquiring knowledge and criteria to determine truth of knowledge etc. consist of the subject-matter of the epistemological queries that lead to the formulation of a theory of knowledge. Knowledge is the basis of all practical activities. The function of the knowledge is to illuminate things other than itself.¹² Knowledge refers to an object that is known and it always belongs to a subject that knows. Knowledge can not be independent by itself without implying a knower and a thing known. Knowledge is a self-transcending property of the self.

Different philosophical systems of India have adopted divergent attitude towards the theory of knowledge. *Cārvākas* attempt to analyse knowledge and its means in their own way and took the view that the problem of knowledge is not beyond solution. According to *Jainas*, knowledge reveals our own self as a knowing subject as well as the objects that are known by

12. *pratitih vastvantaraprakāśasvabhāvā*. NR on SV. *Nirālamvanavāda*. p.44.

us.¹³. *Advaita Vedāntins* hold that knowledge is very stuff of the self. There is no difference between self and knowledge. According to Śāṅkara substance and its quality are identical as fire and its heat. Thus there is no difference

According to *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*, knowledge is a mode of *buddhi*. According to them *Puruṣa* or Self is unchangeable and conscious. Pain, pleasure etc. belong to *buddhi* which is an evolute of *Prakṛti*. Knowledge is a mode of *buddhi* which transforms itself into the shape of the object that is cognising. *Puruṣa* becomes active due to the indiscrimination and intelligence of *buddhi*, and as a result the phenomenon of cognition arises.

Vācaspati's view on knowledge is that the self is by nature inactive. All activity belongs to *Prakṛti*. Yet the self due to its proximity is reflected in *buddhi* and through non-discrimination identifies itself to be the knower. When an object comes into contact with the sense-organ, it produces certain modifications in the sense-organ. These modifications are analysed by the mind and are presented to *buddhi* which becomes modified or transformed into the form of the object. *Buddhi*, being unconscious in nature, cannot by itself know the object. But as *buddhi* possesses an excess of *sattva* in it, it reflects the consciousness of the self and appears as if conscious. With the reflection of consciousness of the self in *buddhi*, the unconscious modification of *buddhi* into the form of the object becomes illumined into a conscious state of perception. This is called knowledge. Just as a mirror, due to reflection of light in it, appears to have the light within it, in the same manner, *buddhi* due to a natural excess of *sattva* in it, reflects the consciousness of the self or

13. AHIP, p.182.

Puruṣa and illuminates or cognizes the object.

According to Vijñānabhikṣu, however, when an object comes into contact with the sense-organ the *buddhi* becomes modified into the form of the object. Due to the preponderance of *sattva* in *buddhi*, it reflects the self and appears to be conscious, as a mirror reflects the light and becomes illuminating. Next, *buddhi*, which is modified into the form of the object is reflected back in the self, and the modification becomes manifested. Without this mutual reflection, the apparent experiences of pleasure and pain in the self, which is pure consciousness and free from pleasure and pain, cannot be explained.

Nyāya defines knowledge (*jñāna*) or cognition (*buddhi*) as apprehension (*upalabdhi*) or consciousness (*anubhava*). *Nyāya*, being realistic, believes that knowledge reveals both the subjects and the object which are quite distinct from itself. All knowledge is a revelation or manifestation of objects (*arthaprakāśo buddhi*). Just as a lamp manifests physical things placed before it. Gautama refers to knowledge through the term *buddhiḥ* and states that the term *upalabdhi* and *jñāna* are its synonyms.¹⁴

It is pertinent to make an enquiry as to how knowledge itself is known. According to the *Jainas*, the *Buddhist*, *Vijñānavādins*, the *Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas*, the *Advaita Vedāntins* and the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* thinkers, knowledge is known by itself. According to them knowledge is of the nature of light or illumination. Knowledge as the nature of light does not require

14. “*buddhiḥ*” *upalabdhirjñānamityanarthāntaram*. NS.1.1.15

anything to manifest it. Knowledge is, by nature self-revealing (*svayamprakāśā*) in the sense that it does not require anything to reveal it or to know it. According to this view, knowledge is never an object of knowledge, nor known by other knowledge. If knowledge is known as an object, then each individual knowledge may require another knowledge to know it, and so on.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa accepts the independent existence of external object. Every act of knowledge gives a certain relationship between the knower and the known. It involves some activity on the part of the knower. Knowledge reveals the object but cannot reveal itself. According to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, knowledge is not self-revealing because it is by nature non-perceptible and is known by means of an inference known as *jñātingakānumāna*. But, Prabhākara holds that knowledge is self-luminous. It manifests itself and needs nothing else for its manifestation.

According to *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, knowledge is known not by itself but by another knowledge known as *anuvyavasāya*. According to them knowledge is like the eyes which illumine everything but itself remain in curtain. *Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas* also accept this view regarding knowledge.

The *Nyāya* view of knowledge is an attribute of soul. It copies reality and seems to common sense too simple to need any justification; yet this apparently innocent view involves assumptions that have been uncritically accepted. In its hostility to *Buddhist* subjectivism the *Nyāya* insists that things are the ground of logical truth, that the external world exists apart from our knowledge of it and determines that knowledge that our ideas correspond to

things. It divides the real into two compartments of subjects and objects, and thus transforms the ordinary assumptions of common sense into a metaphysical theory which is inadequate to the facts of consciousness as well as the demands of logic. The main assumptions which vitiate the epistemology of the *Nyāya* are: 1. that self and not-self are sharply separated from one another, 2. that consciousness is the result of the causal action of the not-self on the self, 3. that knowledge is a property of the self. In spite of these metaphysical prejudices, the *Nyāya* contains fruitful suggestions by which its defects may be overcome.¹⁵

Knowledge which is revelation of reality may do its function either in a true manner or in a manner which is false. When reality is revealed valid knowledge is called *pramā* and when this revelation is faulty it is treated as *apramā*. Thus knowledge requires some factors or marks, the presence of which raises it to the status of *pramā*. These factors or marks are variously interpreted by different schools of Indian philosophy as: practical value, novelty, certainty and definiteness. According to *Sāṃkhya-Yoga*, marks of validity of knowledge are certainty, correspondence to object and novelty. The presence of these factors or marks may be technically called *prāmāṇya*. Here, the question naturally arises as to how these factors or marks arise in a certain piece of knowledge. The first part refers to the conditions of their origin, while the second to that of their ascertainment. If they originate or are ascertained through totality of knowledge producing conditions themselves, *prāmāṇya* or validity is technically called *svataḥ* (intrinsic) and if they originate or are

15. IP. Vol.II p.134

ascertained through some conditions additional to those giving rise to valid knowledge, the validity is said to be *parataḥ* (extrinsic) because in this case the validity is caused by some other factor than the conditions giving rise to knowledge. Similarly, the same question arises about the factors leading to invalid knowledge as to whether invalidity originates and is ascertained by the same factors generating knowledge or by others additional to them. We are going to present a detail discussion on *prāmāṇyavāda* in fourth chapter.

Kesāva Miśra's Concept of Knowledge

According to Kesāva Miśra cognition is that which manifests objects.¹⁶ He also mentions that cognition (*buddhi*), understanding (*upalabdhi*), knowledge (*jñāna*) and apprehension (*pratyaya*) – these words are synonymous.¹⁷ The term apprehension is generally used in the sense of perception. According to the *Sāṃkhya* philosophy, *Buddhi* or intellect, which is the first thing evolved out of primordial matter (*Prakṛti*), is altogether different from knowledge, which consists in the reflection of external objects on the soul (*Puruṣa*). Commentators of **TB** say that to reject this *Sāṃkhya* view the word '*pratyaya*' is mentioned here.¹⁸ All knowledge is a revelation or

16. *arthaparakāśo vā buddhiḥ*. **TB**. p.218.

17. **Ibid**.

18. *prakṛteḥ sāksātpariṇāmo buddhiḥ, evam buddheḥ viṣayākāropariṇāmo jñānam, tathāviṣayākāreṇa pariṇamamānāyām buddhau pratibimbitasya cetanapurūṣasya buddhi-vṛtṭyanukāra upalabdhiriti sāmkyamatamapākartum*. **KTB**. p.188. Also in **TBP**.
'*buddhādi... .alam.*' p.251.

manifestation of objects.

According to Keśava Miśra all cognitions are devoid of form.¹⁹ No object reflects its own form in the cognition, because the theory that cognition arises with the form of the object reflected in it has been rejected. For the same reason the inference of the object from its form reflected in the cognition is rejected as the existence of objects like a jar etc. is established by perception. All cognitions are fully defined by the objects presented in them and without being related to the objects no cognition can be perceived by the mind; because the knowledge that arises from any such apprehension is of the form 'I have the cognition of the jar' and not merely of the form 'I have a cognition'.

The definition of *buddhi* found in **TB** is more convenient in practice in many respects. Another definition of *buddhi* given by Annaṁbhadda in the **TS** is that cognition is the cause of all communication or intercourse, and it is the knowledge. The **TSD** supplies a better definition of *buddhi*.²⁰

3. CLASIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE

Indian epistemology deals with two particular terms viz, *jñāna* and *pramā*. All kinds of knowledge is known as *jñāna*. When reality reveals true or valid knowledge, it is called *pramā* and when it reveals false knowledge, it is called *apramā*. The word *pramā* is used only in the sense of valid knowledge or *yathārtha-jñāna* which is different from false or invalid knowledge. In other words, while the word *jñāna* is used to indicate

19. *sarvaṁ jñānaṁ nirākārameva*. **TB**. p.219.

20. **TS**.34.

knowledge from the psychological standpoint that helps in cognition of an object, the word *pramā* means true knowledge in the logical sense which is able to recognize an object with its real nature and character.

Kesāva Misra's View

According to Kesāva Misra, knowledge is of two kinds – experience and recollection. Experience is also of two kinds – valid and invalid one. Recollection is also of two kinds, valid and invalid. Both these kinds occur during wakeful stage. All cognitions in dreams are invalid recollections as all that is apprehended as ‘that’ (in the cognition) appears as ‘this’ (in the dream) due to certain defects.²¹

i) Valid Knowledge

The term ‘*pramā*’ is derived from the root *mā* with a prefix ‘*pra*’ and ‘*tāp*’ which means valid knowledge. Knowledge is the basis of all our practical activities in relation to objects. A fruitful activity presupposes a correct knowledge of objects. One is inclined to action in a particular way with reference to an object or a thing with the expectation that one’s knowledge correctly reveals its nature. All the philosophical thinkers try to analyse valid knowledge in their own way. Philosophers of different systems have forwarded divergent views on the nature of valid knowledge.

Bauddha View of Valid Knowledge

According to the *Bauddhas*, valid knowledge is the knowledge of an object not known previously.²² The knowledge of an already known thing can

21. TB. p.219.

22. *avisamvādi jñānam pramāṇamiti saugatā manyante*. Nya.S. under PPN. p.113.

not be taken as valid because the function of knowledge is to prompt activity in relation to an object which is presented by it. Hence, *smṛti* or remembrance is not valid knowledge.²³ Dharmottārācārya, the commentator of *Nyāyavindu* of Dharmakīrti gives two divisions of valid knowledge; viz, *grāhya* and *adhyavaseya*.²⁴ Thus, according to Dharmottara valid knowledge is an invariable antecedent to the achievement of all that a man wants to have. When on proceeding, in reference to the presentation of any knowledge, we get an object as presented by it, and then we call it a valid knowledge. According to Dharmakīrti, valid knowledge is the knowledge which reveals an object capable of successful volition.²⁵

Jaina View of Valid Knowledge

According to the *Jaina* thinkers valid knowledge is the knowledge which is uncontradicted. They say that definiteness is the essential mark of valid knowledge. Vādi Deva Sūri defines valid means of knowledge as a definite knowledge which apprehends itself and an object and which is capable of prompting activity which attains a desirable object or rejects an undesirable object.²⁶ According to Siddhasena also valid knowledge is a

23. *na tāvadavisamvādi jñānam pramāṇam/ smṛterapi tathābhāvaprasakteḥ. PPN. p.113.*

24. *dvividho hi jñānānām viśayaḥ grāhyo 'dhyavaseyaśca. Nya.S. under PPN. p.114.*

25. *pramāṇamavisamvādi jñānam; avisamvādanasābdanirukti, PV. 1.2.*

26. *PNT. i.2.3, as quoted in OIP, p.120.*

cognition, which apprehends itself and an object, and which is non-contradicted.²⁷ A knowledge in itself is valid, since it cannot contradict itself. It is valid or invalid in relation to its object. If it is harmony with its object, it is valid. If it is not in harmony with its object it is invalid.

***Sāṃkhya* View of Valid Knowledge**

According to the *Sāṃkhya* system of thought, *Puruṣa* is immutable and inactive, when *buddhi* or intellect conceives the reflection of *Puruṣa* and the form of the object is revealed, then this revelation is named as *pramā* and the means which remains unrevealed is what is called *pramāṇa*. According to Vācaspati Miśra valid knowledge is the function of the *citta* which apprehends an object which is undoubted, real and unknown.²⁸ He further provides an alternate definition of *pramā* as apprehension (*bodha*) of *Puruṣa* which forms the result of *pramāṇa*.²⁹ The *SS* defines valid knowledge as determination (*paricchitti*) of an object which is not previously cognized.³⁰ *Vijñānabhikṣu* advocates *pramā* as the manifestation of *buddhi* having the form of object into *Puruṣa*.³¹ *Vijñānabhikṣu* further thinks that *buddhivṛtti* may also be regarded as *pramā*. When the result of knowledge is considered to be in *buddhi*, *pramā* will be sense-object contact and when the result of knowledge is considered to be in *Puruṣa*, *pramā* will be the function of *buddhi*.³²

27. **OIP. Ibid.**

28. *taccāsandigdḥāviparītānadhigataviṣaya cittavṛttiḥ. STK. under SK. k.5.*

29. **Ibid.**

30. **SS.1.87.**

31. **SPBh. under ibid.**

32. **EPSPM. p.20.**

·*Sāṃkhya* thinkers hold that ‘*buddhi*’ or cognition takes the form of the object and therefore the truth of a cognition consists in its being a faithful copy of the object. Valid knowledge has correspondence to its object. The object depends on the subject to be known, and the subject requires an object to know.

The Vedānta View

Dharmarājadhvarindra gives two alternative definitions of valid knowledge, viz. valid knowledge is that knowledge which apprehends an object that is not already known and which is not contradicted.³³ They do not accept novelty as an essential factor for valid knowledge nor do they oppose the view of considering novelty as a mark of valid knowledge. He defines *pramā* with and without novelty as a mark of *pramā*. *Viśiṣṭādvaita* School of *Vedānta* believes that the validity of knowledge consists in both the fruitfulness to the object and prompting to the fruitful activity. The valid knowledge is defined therein as that which apprehends an object as it really exists and which prompts fruitful activity.³⁴ The *Dvaita*, the *Dvaitādvaita* and the *Śuddhādvaita* School of *Uttara-Mīmāṃsā* also accepts conformity of knowledge to the object as a mark of valid knowledge.³⁵

Bhāṭṭa Theory of Valid Knowledge

According to Kumārila Bhāṭṭa valid knowledge is a firm or assured cognition of objects which does not stand in need of conformation by other

33. *pramātvamanadhigatāvādhitaviṣaya-jñānatvaṃ*. VP. pp. 7-9

34. *yathāvasthitavyavahārānugūṇaṃ jñānaṃ prameti*. NP. p.36. cf. UIP.

35. SYE. p. 62.

cognitions.³⁶ It should be noted here that Kumāriila and his followers use the term 'pramāna' for valid knowledge and 'prāmānya' in the sense of validity. Pārthasārathi Miśra defines valid knowledge as the knowledge which represents the real nature of an object which was not attained earlier and which was not contradicted by any other knowledge.³⁷ According to him, there are three distinctive features of valid knowledge, viz. (1) Its object is not remembered as having been previously known, (2) It conforms to the real nature of its object and (3) There is a feeling of conviction regarding its conformity or agreement with the real object. Thus, novelty, freedom from doubt and truth are the three essential marks of valid knowledge.³⁸ Valid knowledge is one which produces some new information about something, not contradicted by any other knowledge and not yielded by defective conditions such as defective sense-organs in the case of perceptual knowledge, fallacious premise in the case of inference etc. The *Bhāṭṭa* considers knowledge in its relation to our practical needs. There is no use in knowing what are already known. Knowledge cannot be separated from the practical value it has for us. The objects of our environment are always changing and we have to make

36. *tasmātdṛḍhaṁ yadutpannaṁ nāpi samvādamṛcchati,*

jñānāntareṇa vijñānaṁ tat pramāṇaṁ pratiyatām, SV. 2.80.

37. *kāraṇadoṣavādhakajñānarahitamagṛhitagrāhī jñānaṁ pramāṇamiti
pramālakṣaṇaṁ sucitam. SDK. under MSu. 1.15. p.71.*

38. *arthasya pramāṇāntarādhigatataya 'nanusandhānamarthatathātvaṁ
jñānasya tanniścāyākatvaṁ catritayamapi prāmāṇyamityarthaḥ. NR.
on NRM. p.56.*

fresh adjustment to the changing circumstances and for this purpose knowledge must reveal the changing aspect of things.

The *Prābhākara* View

According to the *Prābhākaras* valid cognition is apprehension, something different from remembrance which is not valid in as much as it arises from the impression left by some previous experience.³⁹ The *Prābhākaras* say that a knowledge illuminates three things, namely the object, its knowledge and the self or knower, just as a lamp lights the things around it, itself and its wick. In every knowledge, in other words, threefold (*triputa*) features, namely, the objects, the form of knowledge and the knower are experienced. It is called triple perception (*triputi pratyakṣa*). Everwhere in substance, genus and quality there is validity and perceptibility for the elements of self and the form of knowledge⁴⁰. Śālikanātha Mīśra, a commentator of *Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā* refutes Bhāṭṭa's definition of valid knowledge. According to him, the need of a previous experience is the cause of invalidity of remembrance. In a continuous perception, the later cognitions arising from sense-object contact, like the first cognition, are different from memory and hence they are valid. Recognition too is valid, because it is not produced solely from impression. It is an experience aided by impression. Memory is not valid inasmuch as it depends on a former experience. It does not determine an object independently.

39. *anubhūtiḥ pramāṇam sā smṛterananyā smṛtiḥ punaḥ, pūrvavijñāna-saṃskāramātrajamjñānamucyate. PPN. 5.1. p.104*

40. *sākṣāt-pratītiḥ pratyakṣam meya-mātr̥ pramāsu sā, meyeṣvīndriya-yogothā dravya-jātiguneṣu sā. PPN. 5.4. p.104.*

The *Vaiśeṣika* View

The *Vaiśeṣikas* consider non-contradictoriness and definiteness as the mark of valid knowledge. Praśāstapāda in his *bhāṣya* on the VS does not define valid knowledge, but distinguishes between *vidyā* and *avidyā*, the former includes perception, inference, *arṣa* and memory, and the later includes doubt, illusion, indefinite cognition and dream. Śrīdhara commenting on the *bhāṣya* defines *vidyā* as firm, uncontradicted and definite cognition⁴¹. Thus, the definition introduces definiteness as a mark of valid knowledge. It is clear that *vidyā* is valid knowledge and *avidyā* is invalid knowledge and that memory is valid knowledge. This definition mentions an additional mark of valid knowledge, viz. *adhyabasāya*.

Nyāya View of Valid Knowledge

According to the *Naiyāyikas*, the validity of knowledge consists in the objectivity or the faithfulness of the knowledge towards the object. Valid knowledge is the knowledge which states the existence of something as it is⁴². It is definite and an assured cognition of an object, which is also true and presentational in character. Valid knowledge excludes all kinds of non-valid knowledge, such as memory, doubt, error, hypothetical argument etc. Memory is excluded because it depends on previous experience. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, author of the NM opines that memory is not valid and that it is excluded from valid knowledge by inclusion of the word 'arthopalabdhi' in the definition. So,

41. *niḥsandigdḥvādhitādhyavasāyātmiḥ pratitirvidyā tadviparitā cāvidyeti.* NK. p.414.

42. *tadvati tātprakārahānubhavo yathārthaḥ. saiva prametyucyate.* TS.37.

Jayanta defines valid knowledge as an apprehension produced by an object. The later *Naiyāyikas*, however, defined valid knowledge as true experience and they opposed experience to memory by asserting that an experience is different from memory. Doubt and the rest are excluded either because they are not true or because they are not definite and assured cognitions. It appears from this that *pramā* has three main characteristics, namely, assuredness, truth and presentativeness.

As to the first characteristic it can be said that *pramā*, or valid knowledge is a definite categorical assertion as distinguished from all indefinite, problematic and hypothetical knowledge. In *pramā*, there is a feeling of assurance in what is known. That is valid knowledge is always connected with a firm belief. All assurances or firm beliefs, however, are not *pramā*. In illusion we firmly believe in what is false. *Pramā* implies something more than a subjective certainty. The second characteristic of *pramā* is that it is true or unerring (*yathārtha*) knowledge. Knowledge is true when it is not contradicted by its object (*arthavyabhicāri*). This means that knowledge is true when it reveals its object with that nature and attribute which abide in it despite all changes of time, place and other conditions⁴³. What is once true of an object is always true of it, devoid of space and time. To know a thing truly is to know as characterized by what is characteristic of it (*tadvati tatprakāraka*). Hence, according to *Nyāya*, the truth of knowledge consists in its connection to facts.

43. NVTI, pp. 5-21.

Keśava Miśra's View on Valid Knowledge

Like Annāmbhaṭṭa, Keśava Miśra also mentions in his book TB that *pramā* is used to mean only valid knowledge. Here, *pramā* or valid knowledge is defined as the right apprehension of an object.⁴⁴ It is a correct apprehension in which the object is cognized as it is. According to him, the word 'yathārtha' is used in the definition of *pramā* only to exclude all kinds of invalid knowledge such as doubt, misapprehension and hypothetical apprehension.⁴⁵ By the use of the word 'anubhava', remembrance is excluded. The author defines anubhava as all knowledge other than remembrance.

After giving the definition of *pramā* as 'yathārthānubhava' he intends to show that he tried to avoid the defects mentioned in the text. It is defined as 'anubhava *pramā*' the definition would be so wide as to include doubt etc. and therefore the qualification 'yathārtha' is added. Again the word 'anubhava' is used in the definition to exclude remembrance from the definition. Lastly, the author intends to make the definition more explicit and for this purpose the word *anubhava* itself is explained so as include all knowledge other than remembrance.

According to Keśava Miśra *pramā* is caused by valid instruments of cognition such as perception etc.⁴⁶ For example the perception of jar etc. by

44. *yathārthānubhavaḥ pramā. TB. p 8.*

45. *yathārtha iti ayathārthānām saṁśayaviparyayatarkajñānānām nirāsaḥ. Ibid.*

46. *yathārtho 'visamvādi. sā ca pratyakṣādibhiḥ pramāṇairjanyate. TB. p.218.*

the faultless visual organ; the inference of fire through the knowledge of the reason, smoke, the apprehension of the potency of a word like 'gavaya' by seeing similarity to the cow; the knowledge that the sacrifice Jyotiṣṭoma is the means to attain heaven by hearing or reading such vedic sentences as 'one desirous of heaven should perform the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice'.

Thus, all the philosophers unanimously hold validity or truth as the characteristics of *pramā* but differ in respect of the mark of validity or truth. The above discussion of the nature of *pramā* further reveals that according to some schools like the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* and the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*, novelty also is an essential part of differentia of valid knowledge. Some philosophers like the *Vaiśeṣikas* and the *Jainas* do not consider novelty as a mark of valid knowledge since they include remembrance (*smṛti*) into the case of valid knowledge. Some schools like the *Advaita* are different to the controversy. Dharmarājadhvarindra defines *pramā* in two ways, viz. with and without validity as the mark of valid knowledge. The *Mīmāṃsakas* and the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* have accepted novelty as a mark of *pramā* to exclude remembrance from the domain of valid knowledge. The *Jainas* accept remembrance among the forms of valid mediate knowledge. The *Advaita Vedānta* is different to the problem. The *Naiyāyikas* consider the presentative knowledge (*anubhuti*) as a mark of *pramā* and excludes remembrance (*smṛti*) which is not the presentation of an object but reproduction of previous experience solely caused by the impression (*samskāra*) of the past experience.

The recognition of novelty as an essential factor of valid knowledge further enquires about the inclusion of persistent knowledge of the same object

(*dhārāvāhika jñāna*) into the valid knowledge, because the persistent knowledge is considered as a form of valid knowledge by all Schools of Indian philosophy.

The Sources of Valid Knowledge

The special source of *pramā* or valid knowledge is called *pramāṇa* as we have mentioned earlier. *Pramāṇa* derivatively means the instrument of valid knowledge (*pramāyāḥ karaṇam*). Hence, we can say that *pramāṇa* is the means or source of right knowledge. It gives us only valid knowledge of objects. So it has been said: there cannot be any right understanding of things except by means of *pramāṇa*. A subject arrives at the valid knowledge of objects by means of *pramāṇa*, for the existence and nature of objects are to be ascertained only by such cognitions as are based on *pramāṇa*.⁴⁷ Again *pramāṇa* is the caused of valid cognition of objects inasmuch as it gives us a knowledge of objects as they really are and exist in themselves. *Pramāṇa* has a real correspondence with objects in the sense that the nature and attributes of objects, as revealed by *pramāṇa*, uncontradictorily true of them, despite all variations in time, place and other conditions.⁴⁸

The term *pramāṇa* is derived from the root *mā* with a prefix *pra* and suffix *lyut*. *Pramāṇa* is defined as the *karaṇa* or the extraordinary cause of a *pramā* or right knowledge. Now the distinction between *karaṇa* (means) and *kāraṇa* (cause) is to be followed. A cause is the invariable and unconditional antecedent of an effect. Conversely, an effect is invariable and unconditional consequence. There are three kinds of causes, namely, the constituent

47. VB. 1.1.1. 4.2.29.

48. NVT. 1.1.1. 4.2.29

(*samavāyī*), the non-constituent (*asamavāyī*) and the efficient (*nimitta*). The constituent causes are the substratum in which the effect inheres, e.g., the threads of the cloth. The non-constituent causes is the mediate cause of an effect. It determines the effect only insofar as it stands as an inherent attribute of the constituent cause. In relation to the effect, “cloth,” the contact of threads is the non-constituent cause. So also the colour of the threads is the mediate cause of the colour of cloth. The efficient cause is different from both the constituent and non-constituent causes. It is not merely the passive substratum in which the effect inheres, nor any inherent attribute of the substratum that indirectly determines the effect. Rather it is the agency that acts on both the constituent and non-constituent cause and makes them produce the effect. In relation to the cloth, the loom and such other agents constitute the efficient cause. It is the efficient cause that is to be regarded as *karāṇa* or means. Now reverting to the definition of *pramāṇa*, it is said that *pramāṇa* is the unique operative cause (*kāraṇa*) of right knowledge.

Nyāya View of Pramāṇa

According to the *Nyāya system of thought*, *pramāṇa* is the unique operative cause (*kāraṇa*) of right knowledge. *Pramāṇa* is the complex of specific conditions, other than the subject and the object, which do not normally fail to produce valid knowledge.⁴⁹ The *Naiyāyikas* explain the term *karāṇa* in the sense that is most conducive to the production of the effect. There is, however, difference of opinion regarding the nature of *karāṇa*

49. cf. NM. p.15.

between the old and the new *Naiyāyikas*. According to the old *Naiyāyikas* the *karāṇa* is a cause which is peculiar and operative.⁵⁰

The modern *Naiyāyikas*, on the other hand, define *karāṇa* as the cause which is invariably and immediately followed by the product. Thus, *karāṇa*, according to the ancient *Naiyāyikas*, is the nature of substance, while according to the modern *Naiyāyikas* it is the nature of operation (*vyāpāra*) itself. For example, in the case of cutting the wood with an axe, the *karāṇa*, according to the ancient *Naiyāyikas*, is the axe itself, while according to the modern *Naiyāyikas*, it is the operation of the axe. Among the *Naiyāyikas*, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa defines *pramāṇa* as the totality of causal conditions. The *pramā*, according to Jayanta, is the totality of all the sentient and non-sentient factors which lead to the knowledge of an object which is in turn different from illusion.⁵¹

Different systems of Indian philosophy are taking different views regarding the nature and number of the sources of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*). In fact the number of *pramāṇas* accepted by various schools differs from one to eight. In the system of *Cārvāka*, there is only one *pramāṇa* and that is perception (*pratyakṣa*). The *Vaiśeṣikas* and the *Bauddhas* admit two *pramāṇas* viz, perception and inference (*anumāna*). The system, of *Sāṃkhya* believes in only three *pramāṇas* namely, perception, inference and verbal testimony

50. *vyāpāravadasūdhāraṇamkāraṇam karaṇam*. TS. p.36.

51. *avyabhicārinīmasandigdham arthopalabdhi vidadhati bodha bodhasvabhā*. NM.1.12.

(*āptavacana* or *śabda*). The *Naiyāyikas* admit these three *pramāṇas* along with comparison (*upamāna*). The *Prābhākara Mīmāṃsikas* add one more *pramāṇa* called postulation (*arthāpatti*) to these four. The followers of *Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā* and the *Advaitins* recognise the above five with the addition of non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*) to them. The *Paurāṇikas* admit the above six with the addition of possibility (*sambhava*) and tradition (*aitihya*)⁵². Some *Tāntrikas* recognize *ceṣṭā* (indication) also in addition to the above as the source of valid knowledge. Others add *pratibhā* (vivid imagination) as a source of valid knowledge to the list and thus, the total number of *pramāṇas* are ten. These sources are necessary for the establishment of valid knowledge. The different *pramāṇas* in short are as follows:

- **Pratyakṣa (perception)**

Knowledge which is produced by the contact of a sense-organe with an object is called *pratyakṣa*. Perception gives a direct knowledge of reality, because by it we directly apprehend the reality, whereas other means give only a direct knowledge. For example, when a jar directly comes in contact with sense-organe, i.e. eye, there arises a perceptual knowledge of jar.

52. *pratyakṣamekaṃ cārvākāḥ kaṇḍasugatau punaḥ /
anumānaṅca taccātha sām̐khyāḥ sabdaṅca te api//
nyāyaikadeśino' pyevam upamānaṅca kecana/
arthāpattiyā sahaitāni catvāryāḥuḥ prabhākaraḥ//
abhāvaḥ saṣṭhanyetāni bhāṭṭāḥ vedāntinastathā/
sambhavaaitihyayuktāni aṣṭau paurāṇikāḥ jaguḥ//* TRA. as quoted in
BP. p.260.

- **Anumāna (inference)**

Anumāna literally means such knowledge that follows some other knowledge. *Anumāna* depends on previous experiences. This knowledge follows other knowledge, e.g. where there is smoke there is fire.

- **Śabda (verbal testimony)**

Knowledge depends on reliable authority and also depends on *ākamkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *āsatti* of a sentence or different sounds arising from musical instruments, bamboos, etc.

- **Upamāna (comparison)**

The knowledge of similarity is generated by *upamāna*. Knowledge which arises from the presence of some common factors in a thing, which was experienced previously in another thing e.g., a citizen, hears the word *gavaya* when he intends to go to a forest for the first time. Then he is instructed by an experienced inhabitant of the forest that a cow is similar to a *gavaya*. On seeing an unfamiliar deer resembling a cow he remembers the instruction of the forest dweller. He then ascertains the meaning of the word *gavaya* that the animal seen is denoted by the word *gavaya*.

- **Arthāpatti (postulation)**

Arthāpatti is the presumption of something for the explanation of a known fact. When one notices apparent contradiction in various forms of knowledge he presumes something to remove the apparent contradiction in it. What is presumed is said to be a distinct source of knowledge, e.g. when a particular person named *Caitra* known to be alive is not found in his house it is assumed that he must be somewhere outside.

- ***Anupalabddhi* (non-apprehention)**

Knowledge by which we immediately cognize the non-existence of an object is called *anupalabddhi*. For example absence of rainfall indicates that the connection of cloud and wind has not happened.

- ***Sambhava* (probability)**

The *Paurāṇikas* are the propounders of *sambhava* as an independent means of knowledge. If one says that he has a hundred rupees in his pocket, listening this, the listeners remark that it is highly probable that he has ten rupees in his pocket. The *paurāṇikas* call this process of knowing as *sambhava*.

- ***Aitihya* (tradition)**

The *Paurāṇikas* are the propounders of *aitihya* as an independent means of knowledge. “There is a ghost in this tree” is an example provided to explain the nature of *aitihya*.

- ***Ceṣṭā* (indication)**

Some *tāntrikas* recognize *ceṣṭā* also in addition to the above as the source of valid knowledge. Thus, by the movement of the hand one can make another understand “to go” or “to come” or by raising a finger or fingers one can make another understand, the numerical number “one”, “two”, “three” etc.

- ***Prtibhā* (imagination or intuition)**

Some thinkers consider *prtibhā* as one of the valid means of knowledge. One who has repeatedly experienced the particular objects as giving rise to pleasure, fear etc. the knowledge of that object arises merely through the utterance of the word denoting that object even without the

presence of that object. This is imagination. For example, when it is stated that a tiger lives here, the action as sweating and trembling body takes place merely through the earlier practice even without the presence of external objects. Again some thinkers consider *pratibhā* as the power of immediate understanding of something without conscious reasoning or study. It is a conviction of certainty that comes quite suddenly and instantly.

ii) Invalid Knowledge

Invalid knowledge (*apramā*) is the wrong apprehension of an object. It is the manifestation of an object which is actually not so.⁵³ It is what apprehends an object as different from it.⁵⁴ Valid knowledge is a true and definite knowledge of some new facts. If any knowledge lacks definiteness or certitude or does not convey any new information or does not represent things as they really are, it is invalid. Invalid knowledge includes remembrance (*smṛti*), doubt (*samsāya*), error (*viparyaya*) and hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*). Remembrance is not valid because it is not presentative cognition but a representative one. The object remembered is not directly presented but recalled indirectly. Doubt is not a certainty in cognition. Error is misapprehension as it does not correspond to the real object. Hypothetical reasoning is not true knowledge. It is like this “if there were no fire, there can be no smoke.”

53. *tadabhāvavati tatprakārahānubhavo' yathārthaḥ. saivāprametyucyate.*

TS. 38.

54. *tattvānubhavaḥ pramā, atattvajñānam apramā. SPI. p.59.*

According to Kumāṛila there are three kinds of invalid knowledge, viz. error or illusion (*mithyājñāna*), non-cognition or ignorance (*ajñāna*) and doubt (*samsāya*).⁵⁵ Error or illusion represents an object in a form which does not belong to it. Illusion in Indian philosophy is discussed in different theories known as the *khyātivādas*. There are five theories of illusion namely *ātmakhyāti*, *asatkhyāti*, *akhyāti*, *anyathākhyāti* and *anirvacaniyakhyāti*.⁵⁶ Doubt is invalid not because it is false but because it doesnot have certainty. Neither it makes a definite assertion nor a denial.

According to *Vaiśeṣika* philosophy invalid knowledge is of four kinds: (1) doubt (*samsāya*), (2) illusion (*viparyaya*), (3) indefinite perception (*anadhyavasāya*) and (4) dream (*svapna*).⁵⁷

Nyāya includes doubt (*samsāya*), with its varieties of conjecture (*ūha*) and indefinite cognition (*anadhyavasāya*) as well as error (*viparyaya*) and hypothetical reasoning.⁵⁸ Kesāva Miśra accepts invalid experience (*ayathārtha jñāna*) as that which does not conform to the real nature of the object

55. SV. 2.54.

56. *ātmakhyātirasatkhyātirakhyātiḥ khyātiranyathā/
tathānirvacaniyakhyātirityetat khyātipañcakam// FN.1 under VD. p.11.*

57. EPSPM. p.26.

58. *ayathārthānubhavastrividhaḥ samsāyaviparyayatarka bhedaḥ. TS. 70.*

apprehended and it is caused by invalid instruments of cognition. It is of three kinds – doubt, ratiocination and misapprehension.⁵⁹

Doubt

The invalid knowledge, doubt is an indefinite knowledge which characterizes an object in mutually conflicting ways. As for example, some tall thing is perceived, but one can not ascertain whether it is a man or a post.⁶⁰

Gautama defines *samsāya* as the knowledge of conflicting notions with regard to the same object.⁶¹ Vātsyāyana explains five forms of doubt. The first form

of doubt is the contradictory knowledge (*vimarsā*) about the same object due to the apprehension of common characteristics (*samāna-dharma*) and which depends on the remembrance of the special characteristic of each (*viśeṣapekṣa*).⁶² For instance it is a pillar or a man? The second form of doubt

is due to the apprehension of the unique characteristics of many objects. By ‘many’ is meant objects of similar as well as dissimilar nature. Doubt is due to the apprehension of characteristics of such manifold objects, the unique characteristics being perceived in both types of objects.⁶³ The third form of

doubt is due to the contradictory statements about the same object (*vipratipatti*). The word ‘*vipratipatti*’ means contradictory assertion about the same object. The word ‘contradictory’ means opposition (*virodha*) i.e. the

59. **TB.** p. 219.

60. *nānākoṭyavalambyekam jñānam samsāyaḥ yathā sthānurvā puruṣo veti*
Nya.S. on **PPN.** 3.2. p. 43.

61. *samānānekadharmopapattervipratipatterupalabdhyanupalabdhyā*
vyavasthātasca viśeṣapekṣo vimarsāḥ samsāyaḥ. **NS.** 1.1.23.

62. **VB.** Under **Ibid.**

63. **Ibid.**

impossibility of co-existence (*asahabhāva*). For instance, there is an assertion that the self exists. And there is the other the self does not exist. The co-existence of existence and non-existence is impossible in the same locus. Nor is there any ground proving either of the alternatives. In such a circumstance, the failure to ascertain the truth comes to be the form of doubt.⁶⁴ The fourth form of doubt may be due to the irregularity of apprehension. One apprehends water in the tank etc. where it does not actually exist. Therefore, after apprehending an object somewhere and in default of any proof determining the existence or non-existence of the object, one doubts whether the object apprehended is actually existent or non-existent.⁶⁵ The fifth form of doubt may be also due to the irregularity of non-apprehension. Though actually existing under the root, the peg (*kīlaka*) and water are not perceived. Again, though actually non-existing, the object which has not come into being or which is destroyed is not perceived. So, after non-apprehending somewhere, one doubts whether the object non-apprehended is actually existent or non-existent.⁶⁶ These are the five forms of doubt as stated by Vātsyāyana.

The Vārtikakāra is definite in saying that the first three kinds of doubt are the only three varieties of doubt and that the portion '*upala...sthātasā*' in the *sūtra* is only a qualification for the first part.

Doubt is defined by Keśava Miśra in this way, when in one and the same object there arises the apprehension of two or more conflicting

64. **Ibid.**

65. **Ibid.**

66. **Ibid.**

notions, that become doubt.⁶⁷ It is of three kinds. The first variety is that caused by the observation of certain common attributes of two things while not noticing any differentiating features between the two; e.g. whether the object ahead is a tree stump or a person. In this case on seeing an object at a distance the observer does not notice any curvedness or crevices that would enable the object being recognized as a tree stump; nor does he see any clear definition of head, hands, ect. which would enable the object being recognized as a person. At the same time he observes some features common to both the stump and a person such as tallness, shortness, etc. Then he gets a doubt in the form 'Is this a stump or a person?'. The second variety of doubt is that arising from the difference of opinion about one and the same thing when there is no special reason to ignore or accept either; e.g. whether sound is eternal or not. It happens like this. When one says that sound is eternal another that it is not, the hearer who sees no special grounds either way, doubts whether sound is eternal or not.

The third variety is that caused by abserving some peculiar attitude or characteristic, without noticing anything special, in an object. For example when one apprehends smell which is the special quality of earth, but which does not indicate whether it subsists in eternal or non-eternal things and when he does not see any special reason (to decide either way), the doubt arises

67. *ekasmin dharmini viruddhanānārtthāvamarsā saṃśayaḥ*. TB. p.223.

whether earth is eternal or not. Because it will be non-eternal if smell is not present in eternal things and it will be eternal if smell is not present in non-eternal things.⁶⁸

Keśava Miśra has followed the *Vārtikakāra* and has summarised his views as above mentioned way. The modern *Naiyāyikas* would limit *saṃśāya* to two varieties, the first arising from the grasp of *sādhāraṇadharmā* and the second arising from that of *asādhāraṇadharmā*.⁶⁹

Tarka or Hypothetical Reasoning or Ratiotination

In ordinary parlance ‘*tarka*’ means ‘argument’. But, here, it is used in a highly technical sense. It is a type of implicative argument by which we may test the validity of the conclusion of any reasoning. It is defined as the ‘*prasañjana*’ of an inadmissible negation from the two negations having equal force on account of their being in the same space and time.⁷⁰ *Tarka* is a particular type of reasoning. It is not based on any perception. It is like this, we see a mass of smoke rising from distant house and say that the house has caught fire. A friend contradicts this and says that there is no fire. Now we argue: if there is no fire there cannot be smoke. Thus, with regard to the inference of fire from the perception of smoke, there are two alternative positions, namely, that the smoky object is fiery, and that it is not fiery. From the latter position we deduce the proposition that the object is not smoky

68. TB. p.224.

69. BP. under k. 130.

70. *aniṣṭa-vyāpaka prasañjam tarkaḥ tulyatvenābhā vayoḥ pratyābhāva vacanam prasañjanam. SPI. p.81.*

which is contradicted by our direct experience. This is expressed in the form of a hypothetical proposition, viz. if the object be fireless, it must be smokeless. Since reasoning like this is not to know the fire, but to confirm our previous inference of fire from smoke, it is not valid knowledge. Hence, Vātsyāyana thinks that it does not give us determinate knowledge, but it leads indirectly to valid knowledge. He observes that tarka is neither included in any means of valid knowledge nor a distinct one but by knowing the reality it assists the *pramāṇas*.⁷¹

According to Keśava Miśra, *tarka* is a kind of hypothetical reasoning leading to an undesirable result.⁷² It consists in arguing that if, out of two concomitant things, the concomitant (*vyāpya*) one is present, the presence of the other, its correlate *vyāpaka*, should also be present; e.g. if a jar were to exist here it should be perceivable like the spot (where it stands). This kind of hypothetical reasoning helps instrument of valid cognition. It is in this way. Suppose someone includes that there is no fire in the hill after doubting about its existence (from seeing smoke issuing from it). Then if another were to tell him 'if there is no fire in the hill there would be no smoke also', this kind of

71. a) *na tvavadhārayati, na vyavasyati, na niścīnoti evam, evedam iti.*

VB. under NS.1.1.40.

b) *tarko na pramāṇa samgrhito na pramāṇāntaram / pramāṇānām-anuḡrāhakastattva jñānāya kalpyate / VB. under NS. 1.1.1.*

72. *tarko 'niṣṭaprasaṅgaḥ. TB. p. 228.*

argument is what is called tarka. It helps in establishing the presence of the probandum in the subject which is the object of the inference. Because it points out the absurdity of the hill being smoky in the absence of fire (its cause), it is an aid to inference. Someone says that tarka is included under doubt; but this is not correct as *tarka* has only one thing as its object and that too a definite one (while doubt objectifies two contradictory things in one object).⁷³ Commentator of TB, Rudradhar Jha also accepts this view.

Illusion or Misapprehention (*viparyaya*)

Illusion represents an object in a form which does not belong to it. According to Kumāriḷa, Illusion reveals an object differently from what it actually is.⁷⁴ In the YS, illusory knowledge is defined thus – *viparyayo mithyājñānamadrūpa pratisthām*.⁷⁵ Here, the most common synonym of *viparyaya* is *bhrama*.

Kesāva Mīśra doesnot make a detail discussion on it. According to him, misapprehention is knowing a thing as what it is not and hence an error;⁷⁶ for instance, on seeing a piece of shell etc. which is not real silver, one apprehends it as ‘this is silver’.

73. *saṁśāyasya cānekakoṭivīṣayatvānṣkoṭivīṣayatvādvā tarkasya saṁśāye 'ntarbhāvā sambhavāditi*. KTB. p. 202.

74. EPSPM. p.27.

75. YS. 1.8.

76. *viparyayastu atasminstadgrahaḥ. bhrame iti yāvat*. TB. p.218.

Recollection or *smaraṇa*

Recollection or memory is knowledge of one's past. It is a representative cognition of past experience due to the impressions produced by them.⁷⁷ According to Keśava Miśra recollection is of two kinds, valid and invalid. Both these kinds occur during wakeful stage. All cognitions arising in dreams are invalid recollections as all that is apprehended as 'that' (in the cognition) appears as 'this' (in the dream) due to certain defects.

77. *samskāramātrajanyam jñānam smṛtiḥ*. TS.35.