The Puzzle of Playful Matters in Non-Dual Śaivism and Sāṃkhya

[Full title: The Puzzle of Playful Matters in Non-Dual Śaivism and Sāṃkhya: Reviving Prakṛti in the Sāṃkhya Kārikā through Goethean Organics]

religions Article The Puzzle of Playful Matters in Non-Dual ´Saivism and Sam . khya: Reviving Prakrti in the S am . khya K arik a through Goethean Organics Geo ff rey Ashton Department of Philosophy, University of San Francisco, San Francisco, CA 94117, USA; gashton@usfca.edu Received: 15 February 2020; Accepted: 10 April 2020; Published: 30 April 2020 Abstract: Abhinavagupta is widely viewed to be a cautious, perceptive, and sympathetic reader (even of his opponents), with some researchers even celebrating him as a pre-modern intellectual historian. But scholars all too often underestimate how and why Abhinava misreads many of his rivals. Abhinava’s treatment of the Sam . khya Karika (SK) illustrates this. Abhinava and Sam . khya alike hold to the doctrine that e ff ects share identity with or reside within their cause ( satkaryavada ) But according to Abhinava, Isvarakrsna (and other Samkhya thinkers) fails to explain how a cause ( sat ) can give rise to its e ff ects ( k¯arya , including the manifestations of e ff ects) without ceasing to be itself, since the underlying material cause ( m ulaprakrti ), e.g., a square, changes its identity from one manifestation ( vyaktaprakrti ) to the next, e.g., a triangle. In place of this, Abhinava argues that only the Pratyabhijña approach can account for satkarya and abhivyakti (manifestation). Causes and e ff ects, Abhinava tells us, are but expressions of how divine super-consciousness (´Siva) appears to itself through the playful manifestation of a seemingly material other (´Sakti). However, a closer reading of the canonical Sam . khya text, the Sam . khya Karika , reveals that this system originally advocated a metaphysics of living nature, not inanimate matter. From this basic yet important correction, Sam . khya could explain the very same playful interface between cause and manifest e ff ect described by Abhinava, since the manifest procreativity ( vyaktaprakrti ) of organic nature exhibits constancy in the midst of its self-transformations. I draw this out through a critique of the modern scientific assumptions that underlie much Sam . khya research, and in its place I develop an organicist reading that is informed by Goethe’s phenomenological science of life. This approach helps to resuscitate core Sam . khya metaphysical categories in terms of their directed and intelligent aliveness (not just their materiality). Moreover, it o ff ers clues to why Pratyabhijña misinterpreted the SK: (1) it gave allegiance to classical Sam . khya commentaries (many of which misconstrued Isvarakrsna’s views), and (2) its organizing philosophical narrative precluded metaphysical dualism and the self-su ffi cient power of nature to conceal itself Keywords: satkaryavada ; vyaktaprakrti ; abhivyakti ; Sam . khya; Pratyabhijña “Nature loves to hide.” Heraclitus, Fragment 123 1 “Nobody is more tender than nature. When she realizes, ‘I have been seen,’ she never again comes into the sight of the witness-self.” 1 Quoted at Hadot 2006 , p. 17: Φ ´ υσις κρ ´ υπτεσθαι ϕιλε Religions 2020 , 11 , x; doi: FOR PEER REVIEW www.mdpi.com/journal/religions Art i cle The Puzzle of Playful Matters i n Non-Dual Ś a i v i sm and ā ṃ khya: Rev i v i ng Prak ṛ t i i n the S ā ṃ khya K ā r i k ā through Goethean Organ i cs Geoffrey Ashton Department of Ph i losophy, Un i vers i ty of San Franc i sco, San Franc i sco, CA 94117, USA; gashton@usfca.edu Rece i ved: 15 February 2020; Accepted: 10 Apr i l 2020; Publ i shed: date Abstract: Abh i navagupta i s w i dely v i ewed to be a caut i ous, percept i ve, and sympathet i c reader (even of h i s opponents), w i th some researchers even celebrat i ng h i m as a pre-modern i ntellectual h i stor i an. But scholars all too often underest i mate how and why Abh i nava m i sreads many of h i s r i vals. Abh i nava’s treatment of the S ā ṃ khya K ā r i k ā (SK) i llustrates th i s. Abh i nava and Sāṃ khya al i ke hold to the doctr i ne that effects share i dent i ty w i th or res i de w i th i n the i r cause ( satk ā ryav ā da ). But accord i ng to Abh i nava, Īśvarakṛṣṇa (and other Sāṃ khya th i nkers) fa i ls to expla i n how a cause ( sat ) can g i ve r i se to i ts effects ( k ā rya , i nclud i ng the man i festat i ons of effects) w i thout ceas i ng to be i tself, s i nce the underly i ng mater i al cause ( m ū laprak ṛ t i ), e.g., a square, changes i ts i dent i ty from one man i festat i on ( vyaktaprak ṛ t i ) to the next, e.g., a tr i angle. I n place of th i s, Abh i nava argues that only the Pratyabhijñā approach can account for satk ā rya and abh i vyakt i (man i festat i on). Causes and effects, Abh i nava tells us, are but express i ons of how d i v i ne super-consc i ousness ( Ś i va) appears to i tself through the playful man i festat i on of a seem i ngly mater i al other ( Ś akt i ). However, a closer read i ng of the canon i cal Sāṃ khya text, the S ā ṃ khya K ā r i k ā , reveals that th i s system or i g i nally advocated a metaphys i cs of l i v i ng nature, not i nan i mate matter. From th i s bas i c yet i mportant correct i on, Sāṃ khya could expla i n the very same playful i nterface between cause and man i fest effect descr i bed by Abh i nava, s i nce the man i fest procreat i v i ty ( vyaktaprak ṛ t i ) of organ i c nature exh i b i ts constancy i n the m i dst of i ts self-transformat i ons. I draw th i s out through a cr i t i que of the modern sc i ent i f i c assumpt i ons that underl i e much Sāṃ khya research, and i n i ts place I develop an organ i c i st read i ng that i s i nformed by Goethe’s phenomenolog i cal sc i ence of l i fe. Th i s approach helps to resusc i tate core Sāṃ khya metaphys i cal categor i es i n terms of the i r d i rected and i ntell i gent al i veness (not just the i r mater i al i ty). Moreover, i t offers clues to why Pratyabhijñā m i s i nterpreted the SK: (1) i t gave alleg i ance to class i cal Sāṃ khya commentar i es (many of wh i ch m i sconstrued Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s v i ews), and (2) i ts organ i z i ng ph i losoph i cal narrat i ve precluded metaphys i cal dual i sm and the self-suff i c i ent power of nature to conceal i tself. Keywords: satk ā ryav ā da ; vyaktaprak ṛ t i ; abh i vyakt i ; Sāṃ khya; Pratyabhijñā “Nature loves to h i de.” Heracl i tus, Fragment 123 1 “Nobody i s more tender than nature. When she real i zes, ‘I have been seen,’ she never aga i n comes i nto the s i ght of the w i tness-self.” 1 Quoted at Hadot 2006, p. 17: Φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλε ῖ . Religions 2020 , 11 , 221; doi:10.3390 / rel 11050221 www.mdpi.com / journal / religions

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 2 of 38 Isvarakrsna, Sam . khya Karika 61 2 1. Introduction Abhinavagupta is widely viewed to be a cautious, perceptive, and sympathetic reader—even of his opponents. Lawrence McCrea points this out and more, even suggesting that Abhinava displays features of a genuine intellectual historian (2016) 3 McCrea takes the example of Abhinava’s study of Buddhist philosophy. He observes that Abhinava broke important new ground in the analysis and presentation of Buddhist thought and its relation to [the Pratyabhijña position] . . and, in doing so, quite transformed the nature of the argument between these competing forces, in e ff ect replacing a clash of abstracted, depersonalized and dehistoricized philosophical positions with a narrative account, in which the proponents of the various Buddhist positions each develops his own view through the analysis and critique of his predecessors (2016, pp. 263–64) 4 In constructing this historical narrative of ideas, Abhinava ascribes names where earlierPratyabhijña thinkers (including Utpaladeva) did not ( McCrea 2016 , p. 266). He demonstrates a notable concern for accuracy: again introducing a new practice for non-dual ´Saiva commentators, Abhinava verifies Pratyabhijña claims about Buddhist theories by referencing the actual corresponding Buddhist texts (2016, p. 265). Lastly, Abhinava frequently shows more interest in the question of “intellectual legacy and interpretation” (e.g., of Dharmakirti’s works) than he does “in attempting to adjudicate the question, [‘whose view is right?’]; he does not appear to make any e ff ort to declare whether he finds thevijñanavadin or the bahyarthavadin reading of Dharmakirti to be the more plausible” ( McCrea 2016 , pp. 276–78) 5 But McCrea notes some exceptions to this approach For example, Abhinava concurs with the Buddhist idealist, ´Sa ˙nkaranandana, that the denial of mind-independent objects demands the rejection of adhyavasaya (determination) in all valid awareness ( pramana ) ( McCrea 2016 , pp. 271–81). However, in demonstrating the superiority of ´Sa ˙nkaranandana’s view over other Buddhist positions, Abhinava “leaves unaddressed what had already become by his time arguably the dominant Buddhist view,” namely, Prajñakaragupta’s argument that idealism entails determination ( adhyavasaya ) for all pramana s ( McCrea 2016 , pp. 280–81) 6 What makes this gap in Abhinava’s study peculiar is that Abhinava was familiar with Prajñ¯akara’s Pramanavarttik¯alam.kara , the text best known for advocating a synthesis of the antibahy¯artha (“external objects do not exist”) and proadhyavasaya positions ( McCrea 2016 , p. 281) 7 What sense are we to make of this lacuna in Abhinava’s writings? Is he just a bad intellectual historian, or were other factors at play in his adoption of ´Sa ˙nkaranandana’s account? 2 Own translation: prakrteh. sukumarataram. na kiñcid astiti me matir bhavati | ya drstasmiti punar na darsanam upaiti purusasya The full translation is: “The thought occurs to me, ‘Nobody is more tender than nature.’ When she realizes, ‘I have been seen,’ she never again comes into the sight of the witness-self.” 3 McCrea writes: “Abhinavagupta’s bibliographically ambitious and historically nuanced recapitulation of Buddhist thought on the bahyartha [external objects exist] issue, and on many others of course, forms one of the central components of what is arguably his magnum opus, and is one of the features that most obviously sets it apart from both earlier and later works in the Pratyabhijña tradition” (2016, p. 283) 4 Pratyabhijña is a medieval school of thought from Kashmir, India, that sought to articulate the personality of the divine figure, ´Siva, and the non-dual relation of the devotee with ´Siva consciousness. To this end, it articulated an idealist philosophy whereby one could experience the “recognition” (“ pratyabhijña ”) of one’s essential identity with ´Siva 5 A point of contention between many Buddhists of Abhinava’s time concerned how to interpret Dharmakirti’s metaphysical stance Vijñanavadin s took Dharmakirti to be one of their own (i.e., “one who a ffi rms that only consciousness exists”), while bahyarthavadin s viewed him as “one who a ffi rms that external objects exist.” 6 Abhinava never quotes the Pramanavarttikalamkara , and in the lone instance where Abhinava names Prajñakara, he does not refer to Prajñakara’s views on determination ( adhyavasaya ) ( McCrea 2016 , p. 281) 7 McCrea explains: “This interesting and distinctive doctrine of Prajñakara’s, which Eli Franco has investigated in some detail, is fairly recondite, and Abhinavagupta’s familiarity with it suggests that he had more than a casual, second-hand awareness of Prajñakaragupta’s work and most likely had access to his Pramanavarttikalamkara ” (2016, p. 281). See Franco 2007 .

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 3 of 38 Given the careful attention that Abhinava typically shows toward rival views and his awareness of the Pramanavarttikalamkara and its significance, it seems plausible that the absence of Prajñakara’s ideas in Abhinava’s story was not a mere accident. McCrea acknowledges “this oversight on Abhinavagupta’s part” and points us in the right direction when he suggests that “Abhinavagupta’s reconstruction of Buddhist philosophical opinion . . [is not] free from distortions and biases” (2016, p. 281). But McCrea does not investigate or explain these “distortions and biases”; he does not explore what these distortions and biases are, wherefrom they arise, etc. Interestingly, though, probing these questions might sharpen our appreciation for Abhinava as an intellectual historian by clarifying his attitude toward others’ ideas and his self-understanding as a story teller 8 Concerning Abhinava’s biases, we know that he regularly interprets his opponents’ positions with a view to incorporating their insights into the non-dual myth of ´Siva consciousness 9 His inclusion of ´Sa ˙nkaranandana’s idealism over that of Prajñakara corroborates this. The non-dual ´Saiva view that the world (i.e., ´Sakti) only seems to exist external to consciousness (´Siva) is not incompatible with the respective ontologies of these two Yogacarins. However, ´Sa ˙nkaranandana’s dismissal of adhyavasaya (determination) (in contrast with Prajñakara’s acceptance of it) helps to better stage the same formulation by Abhinava. This suggests that Abhinava composed his history of ideas based upon criteria that were not those of McCrea’s intellectual historian (e.g., accuracy with respect to historical fact, attention to variation within opponents’ traditions). Rather, they were the criteria of a comparative philosopher intent to broaden the horizons for inquiry into the meaning of concepts and the experiences to which they correspond Seen in this light, Abhinava’s misrepresentation of the historical reality of Buddhist thought was not a mere “distortion,” as McCrea puts it. It was an attempt to “climb higher and higher . . [and] come to see the true nature of things.” Abhinava elaborates that this is made possible by the series of stairs-of-discernment constructed by the predecessors [e.g., ´Sa ˙nkaranandana]. It would, I think, be quite surprising if anyone could by themselves arrive at the correct conclusive view of the thing to be known, just in the first go, without any previous support. Once, of course, you have been put on the right path to a destination, the building of bridges and foundation of a new dwelling-place, etc., are not that surprising Therefore . . I have not denigrated the views of the good thinkers (who have come before me), but it is those very (apparently rejected) views which I have developed, improved and distilled 10 In his evaluation of Buddhist philosophy, Abhinava regarded ´Sa ˙nkaranandana as a “predecessor” or “good thinker” whose “views” could serve as “bridges and [a] foundation” to be “developed” on the pathway to “the correct conclusive view of the thing to be known”—in this case, the interrelation between omnipresent consciousness, the seemingly external world, and the means by which we become aware of how things are. Prajñakara, however, was deprived of such recognition (Abhinava deletes him from his story in spite of his actual influence). These choices involved circumscribing intellectual historical questions (e.g., “What exactly did Buddhist idealists assert?”) within a philosophical inquiry 8 This is in keeping with the spirit of McCrea’s own inquiry. He writes: “Abhinavagupta’s turn toward intellectual history should itself be seen as a noteworthy historical event in Kashmiri intellectual and cultural life at the turn of the millennium, and richly deserves to be made the subject of long and searching scrutiny” (2016, p. 283) 9 This is clearly argued in Lawrence 2013 . This issue is also explored in the context of Abhinava’s writings on aesthetics, specifically, his treatment of ´Sa ˙nkuka’s writings on anukrti ( mimesis , imitation, or representation). For more on this, see Dave-Mukherji 2016 ; Ashton 2019 . 10 “ ¯ Urdhvordhvamaruhya yadarthatattvam dhih. pasyati srantimavedayanti | phalam . tadadyaih. parikalpitanam . vivekasopanaparamparanam k citram . niralambanameva manye prameyasiddhau prathamavataram | sanmargalabhe iti setubandhaprurapratistadi na vismayaya | tasmatsatamatra na d usitani matani tanyeva tu sodhitani ” (Abhinava’s commentary on Bharata’s Natya´sastra , 6.33, in the Abhinavabharati . Translation by Arindam Chakrabarti. Personal correspondence.) For more on this well-known and often translated section from the Abhinavabharati , see Cuneo 2017 (especially pp. 239–47). In this piece, Danielle Cuneo examines various interpretations of this verse with a view to exploring how Abhinavagupta negotiates tradition and innovation.

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 4 of 38 (“What ought it mean to be an idealist?”). Abhinava’s study of Buddhist idealism was already delimited by the Pratyabhijña concern to develop ontological and epistemological frameworks that could support the growth of recognitive awareness (which for Abhinava entailed rejecting both the existence of mind-independent objects and the necessity of adhyavasaya for valid awareness). Founded upon the mythical narrative of ´Siva at play with his consort and other, ´Sakti, Abhinava deployed an interpretive strategy that acknowledged the historicity of both texts and our understanding of them (including the alterity of texts and the limits of our understanding of texts). However, this hermeneutic did not reduce the object of study to a history that unfolds independent of the researcher. It rather sought to investigate how consciousness (e.g., the consciousness of the interpreter) understands itself by othering and subsequently recognizing itself in the object (e.g., the text). Abhinava situated the views of his Buddhist opponents by presenting them as seemingly consciousness-independent facts-in-themselves and then carefully recasting them (unless he excludes them outright) as supporting actors in a drama whose outcome has been determined ahead of time, namely, the conclusive victory of non-dual ´Saivism By displacing literal facts and reorganizing them in order to advance his own philosophical agenda, Abhinava’s methodology indeed performs a certain violence upon his object of study—and McCrea’s “distortions” comment rightly captures this. Ironically, though, McCrea’s characterization of Abhinava enables this violence to continue and misconstrues Abhinava’s own writings, while Abhinava reinvigorates his object of study (albeit, by remodeling the object). For one, McCrea allows the distortions in Abhinava’s history of Buddhist ideas to stand by commending him as an intellectual historian and then not interrogating behavior that contradicts this portrayal. Particularly given Abhinava’s influence upon how posterity would view the intellectual history of South Asia, we might do well to take seriously the questions, “Was Abhinava a good intellectual historian?,” and by extension, “Should Abhinava’s narratives be trusted, let alone considered, as reliable accounts of historical actuality?” A second point follows upon these questions. Insofar as Abhinava is not committed to the kind of historicism that McCrea envisions, he cannot even be called a “failed” historian. According to McCrea’s approach, the intellectual historian is to overcome all prejudices toward the object of study in order for the object to reveal itself on its own terms ( from the inside-out , as it were). But this quest to retrieve the original meaning of the text (“Where and when was the text produced?”, “Who was the intended audience of the text?”, etc.) belies a prejudice against prejudice itself. And as Gadamer aptly warns, this “hidden prejudice” is the most dangerous of biases, since its claims to objective knowledge “make us deaf to what speaks to us” through the encounter with the text, namely, the respective traditions of both the text and the reader ( Gadamer 1994 , p. 272). Not only do historical objects not exist in-themselves (independent of the researcher’s fore-conceptions), they often bear meanings whose disclosure requires us to participate in a co-creative process of renewing and investigating the traditions that speak through the encounter with the object, including our own tradition 11 This is especially true when the object of study is a philosophical text, and Abhinava’s reading of Buddhist texts confirms this. He re-enacts these texts’ call to inquiry in order to understand their tradition (even if he modifies certain details within the tradition), and he does so with a view to restoring his own. Importantly, however, this involves self-consciously putting at risk his own assumptions, e.g., concerning the nature of consciousness, the world, what constitutes valid knowing 12 In order to appreciate Abhinava’s story of Buddhist ideas, then, it is insu ffi cient to merely deploy historicist and philological methodologies. Like the physicist who corroborates a peer’s findings by performing the same experiment (in order to determine if the same results follow), 11 As Gadamer writes, “it is senseless to speak of a perfect knowledge of history, and for this reason it is not possible to speak of an ‘object in itself’ toward which its research is directed” (1994, p. 285). For this reason, he concludes that historical knowledge cannot “stand on par with the knowledge of nature achieved by modern science” (1994, p. 277) 12 David Lawrence illustrates this in his analysis of how thePratyabhijña school formulated a critical epistemology and ontology that could be suitably intelligible to others as a kind of “denaturalized discourse.” In order to internalize selected concerns of the Hindu orthodoxy with its iconographic symbolism and social-ritual praxis, Abhinava and other non-dual ´Saivas put their own theological presuppositions at risk. See Lawrence 1999 , pp. 13, 29.

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 5 of 38 so too must we re-enact Abhinava’s study through our own philosophical inquiry—and not just into the formal definitions or common usages of “ bahyartha ,” “ adhyavasaya ,” and so on, but by directly investigating the experienced phenomena that have been so named. This requires us to examine our own presuppositions about what the English terms, “external objects exist,” “determination,” etc., could mean in our linguistic and philosophical register. Neglecting to do so would not only compromise one’s ability to render the nuance of Abhinava’s words into English, it would transgress the hermeneutic inquiry performed in his writings (that is, it would fail to read his text from the inside out ). This by no means denies or diminishes the importance of the rigorous curatorial work of intellectual historians and philologists. Above all, we must understand the historical circumstance of Abhinava and his opponents if we are to e ff ectively engage their ideas in dialogue. But such research should not transpire as a neutral description. By drawing Abhinava’s comments on the ideas of others into the orbit of historical science, intellectual history suppresses the agency of Abhinava’s and his opponents’ writings as philosophical texts , divorces us from the life of these texts’ traditions, and blinds us to the assumptions of modern scientific objectivity that underlie much of recent scholarship on South Asian philosophies. In short, to cast Abhinava as a proto-historicist sets the wrong intentional frame by which to approach his writings. He meant to be taken seriously as a philosopher and only secondarily as an historian of ideas. As philosophical texts, the writings of Abhinava and other South Asian thinkers invite readers to similarly engage in philosophical inquiry—an inquiry that calls for heightened attunement to how our biases open (not just distort) a fusion of horizons with the text I stage the essay in this way in order to set an appropriate context for encountering Abhinava’s treatment of another rival tradition: Sam . khya. Abhinava stages a debate with Sam . khya concerning how an e ff ect can exist latent within its cause ( satkaryavada ). Not surprisingly, Abhinava emerges victorious in this competition, and by all accounts his victory is well-earned 13 It bears noting, however, that Sam . khya can provide a much more robust defense against the Pratyabhijña attack, and the resources for such a defense are available in its canonical text, the Sam . khya K arika (SK), which (I argue below) grounds satkaryavada in a phenomenological theory of prakrti as organic nature. Moreover, Abhinava was directly aware of the SK and its central place in the tradition, but he overlooked its alternative, more formidable view of prakrti and satkaryavada . The question thus arises again: why did Abhinava not portray his opponents (Sam . khya) with more attention to their variation and sophistication? To a certain degree this is an intellectual historical matter. But I approach it by way of the philosophical hermeneutic advocated above 14 This paper seeks to resuscitate a philosophical question that has been forgotten (or least taken for granted) in readings of the SK, namely, the question of the meaning of nature. Through this, I hope to spark a fresh reading of the SK from which Sam . khya can withstand Pratyabhijña criticisms. But this approach also opens up a richer exploration of the historical dynamics underlying Abhinava’s portrayal of Sam . khya. As I demonstrate later, the question of nature has been disregarded by the two research traditions most responsible for representing Sam . khya to a wider audience: classical, postkarika Sam . khya and modern Sam . khya scholarship. Both failed to appreciate the meaning of “ prakrti ” by reducing it to inanimate nature or inert matter, and they respectively informed Pratyabhijña and contemporary interpretations of Sam . khya. investigation of the intellectual historical problem, “Why did Abhinava neglect the SK?”, thus turns upon the philosophical query, “Why did Abhinava forget the question of the meaning of nature in his study of Sam . khya?” Of course, there is some circularity here: Abhinava’s inattention to the meaning of prakrti in the SK is at least partly due to his reliance upon Sam . khya commentaries that themselves ignored the 13 Abhinava is the victor not just in his rendering of the debate but also in the memory of South Asian intellectual history. The Sam . khya tradition would continue its slide into relative obscurity, especially compared to the growing influence that nondual ´Saivism would enjoy. Abhinava’s cogent refutation of Sam . khya and defense of his own tradition are but one amongst other reasons for this. Rati é aptly observes how persuasive Abhinava’s formulation of satkaryavada is over and against that of Sam . khya (2014) 14 In important respects, this approach is not unlike what Jonardon Ganeri and others have called Global Philosophy ( Ganeri 2016 ).

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 6 of 38 question. But the root of the problem does not bottom out at a first historical moment, since (as I argue below) Abhinava’s own philosophical biases predisposed him to the postkarika attitude toward nature (instead of Isvarakrsna’s). For this reason, Abhinava’s lack of care for the nuances of the SK cannot be exposed strictly through the historicist approach. Examination of Abhinava’s Pratyabhijña-Sam . khya debate concerning satkaryavada must ground itself in a philosophical exploration of the meaning of nature, and from there, a philosophical exploration of the meaning of nature in the SK and non-dual ´Saivism. We should renew the inquiry undertaken in the SK, namely, “What is the meaning of nature?”, as a live philosophical question, not just a question about the SK as a relic of the past. And this requires consideration of our own assumptions about the meaning of nature, especially since our current understanding of the SK has been largely framed by the scientific materialist biases of modern Sam . khya scholarship The paper thus begins by examining non-dual ´Saiva criticisms of the Sam . khya theory of causation ( satkaryavada ). It then moves to re-articulate the Sam . khya defense by thinking from the SK independent of its historically later commentaries. This, however, requires deconstructing how our current understanding of Isvarakrsna’s system has been framed by modern scientific theories about “nature,” “duality,” and “causation.” From this, the essay reconsiders the meaning of these English concepts and closely related terminology in the SK (“ prakrti ,” “ sam . yoga ,” and “ satkaryavada ”) through the lens of an alternative science: Goethe’s phenomenological science of life. As we shall see below, a Goethean interpretation succeeds where postkarika Sam . khyans failed: it rebuts Pratyabhijña criticisms of the Sam . khya version of satkaryavada . Finally, the paper suggests an explanation for why Utpala and Abhinava misread the SK: (1) they relied upon its classical commentaries, which made Sam . khya vulnerable to its opponents’ attacks concerning satkaryavada ; and (2) non-dual ´Saivas read their own biases toward dualism and nature into Isvarakrsna’s doctrine 2. The Pratyabhijña Critique of Causality and Manifestation in Sam . khya It is well known that Sam . khya made a tremendous impact upon the Pratyabhijña system, with thinkers such as Utpala and Abhinava adapting Sam . khya theories in order to develop the theological agenda of non-dual Kashmir ´Saivism. This is illustrated in how they treated Sam . khya notions of causality and manifestation 15 In commenting on SK 9’s doctrine of satkaryavada , Utpala and Abhinava defend the view that the e ff ect must exist before the operation of its cause, since e ff ects cannot be created out of non-existence 16 But they then criticize Isvarakrsna. At IPK 2.4.3 c Utpala charges that, if the e ff ect already exists in the cause, then “there is no point in [the e ff ect’s] acquiring existence” ( na punah. sattalabhenarthah ), since this would render the cause useless (in other words, there is no point in creating that which already exists) ( Rati é 2014 , p. 135). Abhinava supports this point by invoking the stock analogy of clay and pot as cause and e ff ect, respectively: “if, on the other hand, the pot exists [before the operation of its cause], then what else could [still] be asked from the [potter’s] stick, wheel and thread [that are supposed to cause the pot’s existence]?” ( Shastri and Shastri 1918–1921 , p. 139; quoted in Rati é 2014 , p. 135) 17 15 Concerning this point, Rati é writes: “´Saiva traditions (both dualistic and non-dualistic) have early on integrated many aspects of Sam . khya to their metaphysics, cosmology and psychology, so much so in fact that ´Saiva authors sometimes feel the need to specify that ‘the Sam . khyas too’ hold theses that were obviously borrowed from them. From this point of view, Utpaladeva’s borrowing of the satkaryavada is in keeping with the general ´Saiva attitude towards Sam . khya” (2014, p. 128) 16 Rati é explains that “the argument used here is obviously the first reason adduced in Sam . khyakarika 9 in favour of the satkaryavada , namely, ‘because there is no production of the non-existent’ ( asadakaranat )” (2014, p. 132). She later notes how Utpaladeva re-states “the reason that legitimates the Sam . khyas’ satkaryavada : the e ff ect must exist before the operation of its cause, because according to the first reason adduced in Sam . khyakarika 9, there can be no production of what is non-existent, since such a production would be contradictory with its non-existent nature” (2014, pp. 134–35). Please note that my analysis of Utpala’s and Abhinava’s treatment of these themes in Sam . khya literature is largely based upon Rati é ’s impressive 2014 study 17 Rati é notes that Utpala and Abhinava utilize standard criticisms (and their corresponding examples, namely, clay and pot) of Isvarakrsna. This includes Nag¯arjuna ’s ( 1977 ) critique of Sam . khya in the M ulamadhyamakakarika (in particular, MMK 1.6)

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 7 of 38 In response to this objection, the Sam . khya interlocutor replies with a theory of abhivyakti (manifestation): what the cause ( m ulaprakrti ) produces is not the existence of the e ff ect (since the e ff ect already exists latently in the cause) but only its manifestation ( abhivyakti or vyaktaprakrti ) ( Wezler and Motegi 1998 , pp. 128–29; quoted in Rati é 2014 , pp. 136–37). This protects the view that the e ff ect already exists before its so-called production without rendering the cause useless, since the cause is required just for manifesting the e ff ect (i.e., the cause is not required for a ff ecting the actual existence of the e ff ect itself) Not to be outdone, Abhinava subjects the Sam . khya abhivyakti theory to the same analysis as for the produced e ff ect: either the manifestation brought about by the cause did not exist before the operation of the cause, or it did ( Rati é 2014 , p. 141). If the production of the manifestation did not already exist before the cause, then its production is impossible, since something cannot come from nothing (This is the asatkaryavada view, which of course, Sam . khya does not admit.) But if the manifestation did already exist in the cause, then the production of the manifestation is useless, “since there is no point in revealing what is already manifest” ( Rati é 2014 , p. 143). The ontological status of the e ff ect ( karya ), even conceived as manifestation, thus remains a problem Non-dual Kashmir ´Saivas claim to avoid the dilemma just described by arguing that causes, e ff ects, and manifestations are “nothing but ways in which ´Siva consciousness appears to itself” ( Rati é 2014 , p. 150). According to Utpala’s formulation of satkaryavada and abhivyakti , material things (e.g., the pot) and their manifest appearances comprise a collection of e ff ects, and these e ff ects do not exist separate from their cause, namely, the manifesting activity of universal consciousness. Utpala explains: [In fact] this [production of the manifestation] is not new at all. For [when we say] “the lamp produces the manifestation of, e.g., an already existing pot”, [in fact] it is the thing itself [i.e., the pot,] that is acted upon [and therefore constitutes the e ff ect of the action]. And so just as [one can say that] there is a production called the “manifestation” of an existing [e ff ect] such as the pot, in the same way, [one can say] that there is a production by a lamp for instance of the manifestation itself, which [insofar as it is regarded as an e ff ect, merely] consists in the thing [itself, so that just as the thing itself, it] already exists . . Therefore, the thesis that the e ff ect exists [before the operation of its cause] is equally applied to everything, since even manifestation, insofar as it is not distinct from the [object that it manifests], is equivalent with the [already] existing e ff ect that is the thing. And manifestation is the fact that . . [it] consists in the manifesting [agent] ( prakasa ); it is the existence ( avasthana ) in this or that form of the manifesting [agent] that is consciousness, [a manifesting agent] that is devoid of beginning or end ( anadinidhana ), [i.e.,] that [always] already exists In order for manifestation to take place, there must first be a unified entity that self-manifests as the causal process—a process that includes both the apparent material cause (e.g., the clay pot) and the e ff ect (the appearance of the pot). Consciousness represents just such an entity. From an inward intentionality, consciousness turns outward or externalizes itself as the clay, the pot, and even the potter and his instruments. Abhinava explains in the IPV, using the example of a mirror: [O]ne cannot say that being an object of knowledge for both [internal and external] sense organs is in turn either existing or nonexistent [before the operation of the cause], because the [following] is the ultimate truth as regards this [property of being the object of sense organs]: just as, when there is a reflection, inside a mirror, of e.g., a pot that is [in the process of] being created by a potter [also reflected in the mirror], the might ( mahiman ) of such a manifestation belongs to the mirror alone; in the same way, [when there is a reflection], in the vision of a and Uddyotakara’s comments in the Nyayabhasyavarttika , which “put forward a somewhat similar argument [to that of Nagarjuna]” ( Rati é 2014 , pp. 135–36).

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 8 of 38 dream, [of a pot being created by a potter, the might of such a manifestation] belongs to [the dreaming] consciousness 18 Like a mirror, consciousness reveals various forms (clay, a pot, a potter, etc.) without failing to exist as the self-same entity—namely, the omnipotent, omni-present, shape-shifting super-agent, ´Siva ( Rati é 2014 ). “[S]uch [an agency] is possible in the unitary [and] limpid [entity] consisting in consciousness,” Utpala writes, “because [in it] there is no contradiction [between its unity and] its receiving manifold reflections ( pratibimba ).” 19 Abhinava echoes this point in the IPV: [T]he sovereign power ( mahatmya ) [called] ‘limpidity’ is both a di ff erentiation into innumerable manifestations, and unity. And [somebody] standing on the top of a mountain [embraces] in one single cognition the manifestation of the innumerable things found in a city; therefore, agency is possible only for that which consists in consciousness, because [only consciousness] can possess the power of action, since [only consciousness] is capable of assuming di ff erentiation [while remaining] undi ff erentiated 20 Consciousness bears a universal, dynamic power of illumination ( prakasa ) that does not get diminished through seemingly incompatible manifestations. In theorizing this, non-dual ´Saivas believe that they explain not just how the material pot gets produced but how the manifestation or consciousness of the pot arises. The pot, the manifestation of the pot, and indeed, the potter’s consciousness of the pot, all exist as everlasting consciousness revealing itself in a particular form (e.g., the pot) and whose necessary existence resides “beyond rational examination ( acintya ) and cannot be put into question ( aparyanuyojya ),” as Abhinava tells us ( Shastri and Shastri 1918–1921 , p. 141; quoted in Rati é 2014 , p. 148) The Sam . khyan might object that he allows for such an entity that continually transforms itself, namely, primordial matter or primordial nature ( pradhana , m ulaprakrti ) ( Rati é 2014 , pp. 153–54; Moriyama 2016 , p. 293). But Utpala and Abhinava again challenge: Sam . khya’s prakrti lacks the power to endure such transformation, since “an insentient object cannot undergo a change of form without ceasing to exist as such: a square that ceases to have four sides [for example] ceases to be a square” ( Rati é 2014 , p. 154) 21 They elaborate that Sam . khya fails to accommodate this special mahiman (might) 18 Shastri and Shastri 1918–1921 , p. 141 (quoted in Rati é 2014 , p. 148): “ na ca vacyam ubhayendriyavedyatvam api sad asad veti, yato’yam atra paramartho yatha darpanantah. kumbhakaranirvartyamanaghatadipratibimbe darpanasyaiva tathavabhasanamahima, tatha svapnadarsane sam . vidah. ” 19 The entire passage reads: “ jadasyabhinnatmano bhedenavasthiter virodhad ayuktam, svacche cidatmany ekasminn evam anekapratibimbadh¯aran.enavirodhad yujyate ” ( Torella 2002 , p. 60; quoted in Rati é 2014 , p. 154). In his vrtti on the ´Sivadrsti , Utpala likewise comments that “all e ff ects [are indeed mere manifestations of the cause but] exclusively consist in ´Siva, who is nothing but consciousness, according to the principle [stated in] the Isvarapratyabhijña [treatise]” ( iti cinmayasivar upataiva sarvakaryanam isvarapratyabhijñoktanyayena ) ( Torella 2002 , p. 186; quoted in Rati é 2014 , p. 154). Abhinava similarly explains in the IPV that consciousness is like a mirror that can take several forms: “For it is experience itself [that makes us know that] the form of a limpid [entity] such as a mirror can be di ff erentiated into innumerable forms—such as a mountain, an elephant, and so on—while its own nature remains perfectly intact” ( anubhavad eva hi svacchasyadarsader akhanditasvasvabhavasyaiva parvatamata ˙ngajadir upasahasrasam . bhinnam . vapur upapadyate ) ( Shastri and Shastri 1918–1921 , p. 177; quoted in Rati é 2014 , p. 155) 20 Shastri and Shastri 1918–1921 , p. 177 (quoted in Rati é 2014 , p. 155): “ nirmalatamahatmyam etad yad anantavabhasasam . bhedas caikata ca. girisikharoparivartinas caikatraiva bodhe nagaragatapadarthasahasrabhasa iti cidr upasyaiva kart Religions 2020 , 11 , x FOR PEER REVIEW 29 of 40 ph i losoph i cal narrat i ve that precluded metaphys i cal dual i sm and the self-suff i c i ent power of nature to conceal i tself. 5.1. Rel i ance upon Class i cal S ā ṃ khya Commentar i es We cannot say w i th certa i nty why Utpala and Abh i nava d i d not g i ve more careful attent i on to the SK. But one reason l i kely concerns the mater i als to wh i ch they had access i n mak i ng sense of Sāṃ khya theor i es of causat i on and man i festat i on. I t appears that Utpala and Abh i nava depended upon class i cal Sāṃ khya commentar i es that were not comm i tted to Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s organ i c i sm. Recent scholarsh i p suggests that Pratyabhijñā th i nkers engaged the SK pr i mar i ly by way of i ts h i stor i cally later S ā ṃ khya i nterpretat i ons. For example, Abh i nava’s approach to the quest i on of causal i ty at SK 9 i m i tates the methodology found i n several commentar i es, i nclud i ng the M ā ṭ harav ṛ tt i , Gau ḍ ap ā dabh ā ṣ ya , the Jayama ṅ gal ā , the Tattvakaumud ī , and the Yukt i d ī p i k ā . Rat i é observes: [These texts] vary greatly as regards the number of theses [that are g i ven i n k ā r i k ā 9 about satk ā ryav ā da ]… almost all these Sāṃ khya commentar i es i ntroduce the verse i n the same way, i.e., by i ns i st i ng that there i s a d i sagreement ( v i prat i patt i ) among var i ous masters on the subject, so that the l i st of reasons adduced to prove the satk ā ryav ā da i s necessary so as to get r i d of the doubt ( sa ṃ ś aya ) bound to ar i se due to the mult i pl i c i ty of contrad i ctory theses held i n th i s regard (2014, p. 133–34). Go i ng further (and echo i ng the early d i scuss i on i n th i s paper), Abh i nava (along w i th Utpala) defends “the ontolog i cal status of the effect” i n a manner that “ i s rem i n i scent” of how the M ā ṭ harav ṛ tt i i ntroduces satk ā ryav ā da (Rat i é 2014, p. 132) 81 Amongst post- k ā r i k ā commentar i es, the Yukt i d ī p i k ā (YD) and the Tattvakaumud ī (TK) seem to have been the most i nfluent i al (Rat i é 2014; Mor i yama 2016). The YD was stud i ed i n Kashm i r alongs i de other Kashm i r Śa i va texts, and i t i s plaus i ble that Utpala and Abh i nava were themselves fam i l i ar w i th th i s text 82 Meanwh i le, Abh i nava echoes Vācaspat i Miśra when he playfully wr i tes that blue cannot come from yellow—an example meant to i llustrate the SK-supported v i ew that the effect cannot ar i se from non-ex i stence (Sr i n i vasan 1967, p. 96–98; c i ted i n Rat i é 2014, p. 134) 83 Pratyabhijñā rel i ance upon commentar i al l i terature i s even more obv i ous i n i ts treatment of the Sāṃ khya not i on that the cause produces only the man i festat i on of the effect, not the actual ex i stence of the effect. The YD and the TK 81 Ratié notes that Abhinava’s I P VV argument in favor of satk ā ryav ā da “is obviously the first reason adduced in S ā ṃ khyak ā rik ā 9” (2014, p. 132). She further writes that Abhinava’s “dismissal of the thesis that the effect is inexplicable, i.e., both and neither existent and nonexistent, is quite close to that found in the M ā ṭ harav ṛ tti ” (2014, pp. 133–34). 82 Moriyama observes this. He writes: “For instance, with regard to the above term s ā dhyatv ā t , Wezler and Motegi have documented a marginal note found in a Kashmir manuscript of the YD as follows: ‘YD, p. 123, marginal note (5): s ā dhyatv ā d iti. na hi sarvathaiv ā psu na vidyate ’ ṅ kura ḥ . y ā hy ā po b ī jade śā nuprave ś en ā s ī n ā d up ā d ā n ā d antarviparivarttitay ā ṅ kura ṃ janayant ī ti t ā sv apy a ṅ kuro ’sty eveti.’ According to the editors’ introduction (YD, pp. xxiv-xxv), ‘[t]he author, or one of the authors, ... was remarkably familiar with Mahāyā na Buddhism, a fact that would suggest that he/they may have lived before the extinction of Buddhism in Kashmir, i.e., in the 14 th century A.D.’ There is also another marginal note where we find the words ‘Abhinavagupta’s S ā ṃ khyanir ṇ aya ,’ which A. Sanderson has identified as a section of the Tantr ā loka (YD, p. xxv). From such information, it is at least possible to say that this unique Sāṅ khya text had a certain impact in the Kashmir region, where it was studied together with Kashmir Śaiva texts” (2016, pp. 292–93). Elsewhere Moriyama writes concerning Utpala’s familiarity with the YD: “is there any evidence for Utpaladeva’s familiarity with the YD? The latter is not unimaginable when considering Kashmir Śaivism’s close relation to the Sāṅ khya text” (2016, p. 292). 83 Ratié cites Vācaspati Miśra: “[The author of the S ā ṃ khyak ā rik ā s] states the reason why [the effect must exist before the operation of its cause by saying] ‘because there is no production of the non-existent.’ [That is to say:] if the effect is nonexistent before the operation of its cause, its existence cannot be produced; for even innumerable artists cannot make the blue yellow!” ( atra hetum ā ha: asadakara ṇ ā t. asac cet k ā ra ṇ avy ā p ā r ā t p ū rva ṃ k ā rya ṃ n ā sya sattva ṃ kartu ṃ ś akyam. na hi n īl a ṃ ś ilpisahasre ṇ ā pi p ī ta ṃ kartu ṃ ś akyate ) (Srinivasan 1967, pp. 96– 98; quoted in Ratié 2014, p. 134). tvam upapannam, abhinnasya bhedavesasahisnutvena kriyasaktyavesasambhavat .” 21 Rati é points us to IPK 2.4.19, where Utpala states: “And such [an agency] is not possible for [something] insentient, because of the contradiction between the di ff erence and identity [that would ensue for this insentient entity] due to the di ff erence between [various] manifestations [that transformation involves]; whereas it is possible in the unitary [entity] consisting in consciousness” ( na ca yuktam . jadasyaivam . bhedabhedavirodhatah | abhasabhedad ekatra cidatmani tu yujyate ) ( Torella 2002 , p. 186; quoted in 2014, p. 154). Abhinava comments (in the IPV) on Utpala’s views: “‘Such [an agency’ means the following.] The agency in the action that is transformation ( parinamana )—which [Utpaladeva] has described [earlier] as characterized by the freedom ( svatantrya ) to divide and unite numerous, constantly flowing properties [and] as belonging to a property-bearer having an undivided nature—is not possible for [something] such as matter, because [matter] is insentient. For what [we] call insentient has a [self-]confined ( parinisthita ) nature, it has fallen into the state of object of knowledge; and [if we assume it to be such an agent, we] must declare that it is di ff erentiated ( bhinna ) due to the di ff erence between the [various] forms [that it supposedly assumes,] such as blue and yellow, etc.; and [yet], since it has a unitary nature, [it must be]

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 9 of 38 or sakti (power) because its dualism prohibits a mature articulation of satkaryavada and abhivyakti . This is for the following reason: the dualism of prakrti (matter) and purusa (consciousness) implies that the actual material object ( m ulaprakrti , or the pot as unmanifest before consciousness) and its manifestation before consciousness ( vyaktaprakrti as manifest appearance of the pot) are distinct realities, with the pot in-itself (i.e., the pot as unmanifest) serving as a material cause for a new, ontologically distinct e ff ect, namely, the appearance or consciousness of the pot. But this violates the satkaryavada premise that the cause (the pot as unmanifest material thing) and the e ff ect (consciousness of the pot) are not di ff erent, thus implying asatkaryavada . In short, Isvarakrsna and Samkhya generally cannot explain the power of manifestation ( abhivyakti or vyaktaprakrti ), since, among other reasons, it is neither the case that prakrti (the pot in-itself) can produce its own manifestation (it requires the presence of purusa , and even then it ceases to be itself as it changes across moments) nor that purusa can generate prakrti ’s appearance (since the purusa is inactive and impotent) 22 Given the inability of Sam . khya to account for this underlying creative potency (a potency that can produce contradictory forms), Utpala and Abhinava reformulate power and consciousness such that the sakti s of procreativity derive not from prakrti (inanimate matter) but from consciousness, with consciousness now understood as “the agent called the Great Lord” ( Shastri and Shastri 1918–1921 , p. 148; quoted in Rati é 2014 , p. 149). Thus subverting the view of their rival satkaryavadin s, Pratyabhijña philosophers claimed that only their theory of consciousness can safeguard the independence and power required for the playful creativity that manifests in but is irreducible to materiality 3. Shortcomings in the Standard Modern Interpretation of Sam . khya As compelling as Utpala and Abhinava are, I suspect that Sam . khya can provide a more robust formulation of matter, manifestation, and cause–e ff ect relations, and that such a formulation would adequately respond to the Pratyabhijña attack. In a subsequent section of this paper, I explore the broader context of Utpala’s and Abhinava’s treatment of Sam . khya, and from this I o ff er further justification for the methodology that I deploy below. For now, I articulate an alternative Sam . khya reply to the non-dual ´Saiva criticism by establishing three moves. First, I take the Sam . khya Karika (SK) as the resource from which to formulate this rejoinder. Understandably, this move might seem peculiar The Sam . khya views represented in Pratyabhijña texts were mostly consistent with how classical Sam . khya commentaries presented their own tradition, and these commentaries widely recognized the SK to be its canonical source. It thus appears that Isvarakrsna has already been spoken for in the debate staged by Utpala and Abhinava. But as I demonstrate later, Sam . khya commentators neglected important nuances of the SK’s philosophy, which in turn made Sam . khya on the whole susceptible to the non-dual ´Saiva critique. This prompts my second move: I reconstruct Isvarakrsna’s ideas about matter, manifestation, and causality independent of subsequent commentaries. These two moves prepare the way for the third. In order to articulate a formidable Sam . khya in the face ofPratyabhijña arguments, we must recuperate the question of the meaning of nature in the SK. Above all, this requires a deconstruction of the scientific assumptions that prevail in modern interpretations of Isvarakrsna’s text undi ff erentiated, as the blue is. But the same nature cannot bear to be both di ff erentiated and undi ff erentiated, because [this would entail] a contradiction between an a ffi rmation and [its] negation with regard to the same [thing] at the same time” ( evam ityabhinnar upasya dharmin.ah. satatapravahadbahutaradharmabhedasambhedasvatantryalaksanam. parinamanakriyakart Religions 2020 , 11 , x FOR PEER REVIEW 29 of 40 ph i losoph i cal narrat i ve that precluded metaphys i cal dual i sm and the self-suff i c i ent power of nature to conceal i tself. 5.1. Rel i ance upon Class i cal S ā ṃ khya Commentar i es We cannot say w i th certa i nty why Utpala and Abh i nava d i d not g i ve more careful attent i on to the SK. But one reason l i kely concerns the mater i als to wh i ch they had access i n mak i ng sense of Sāṃ khya theor i es of causat i on and man i festat i on. I t appears that Utpala and Abh i nava depended upon class i cal Sāṃ khya commentar i es that were not comm i tted to Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s organ i c i sm. Recent scholarsh i p suggests that Pratyabhijñā th i nkers engaged the SK pr i mar i ly by way of i ts h i stor i cally later Sāṃ khya i nterpretat i ons. For example, Abh i nava’s approach to the quest i on of causal i ty at SK 9 i m i tates the methodology found i n several commentar i es, i nclud i ng the M ā ṭ harav ṛ tt i , Gau ḍ ap ā dabh ā ṣ ya , the Jayama ṅ gal ā , the Tattvakaumud ī , and the Yukt i d ī p i k ā . Rat i é observes: [These texts] vary greatly as regards the number of theses [that are g i ven i n k ā r i k ā 9 about satk ā ryav ā da ]… almost all these Sāṃ khya commentar i es i ntroduce the verse i n the same way, i.e., by i ns i st i ng that there i s a d i sagreement ( v i prat i patt i ) among var i ous masters on the subject, so that the l i st of reasons adduced to prove the satk ā ryav ā da i s necessary so as to get r i d of the doubt ( sa ṃ ś aya ) bound to ar i se due to the mult i pl i c i ty of contrad i ctory theses held i n th i s regard (2014, p. 133–34). Go i ng further (and echo i ng the early d i scuss i on i n th i s paper), Abh i nava (along w i th Utpala) defends “the ontolog i cal status of the effect” i n a manner that “ i s rem i n i scent” of how the M ā ṭ harav ṛ tt i i ntroduces satk ā ryav ā da (Rat i é 2014, p. 132) 81 Amongst post- k ā r i k ā commentar i es, the Yukt i d ī p i k ā (YD) and the Tattvakaumud ī (TK) seem to have been the most i nfluent i al (Rat i é 2014; Mor i yama 2016). The YD was stud i ed i n Kashm i r alongs i de other Kashm i r Śa i va texts, and i t i s plaus i ble that Utpala and Abh i nava were themselves fam i l i ar w i th th i s text 82 Meanwh i le, Abh i nava echoes Vācaspat i Miśra when he playfully wr i tes that blue cannot come from yellow—an example meant to i llustrate the SK-supported v i ew that the effect cannot ar i se from non-ex i stence (Sr i n i vasan 1967, p. 96–98; c i ted i n Rat i é 2014, p. 134) 83 Pratyabhijñā rel i ance upon commentar i al l i terature i s even more obv i ous i n i ts treatment of the Sāṃ khya not i on that the cause produces only the man i festat i on of the effect, not the actual ex i stence of the effect. The YD and the TK 81 Ratié notes that Abhinava’s I P VV argument in favor of satk ā ryav ā da “is obviously the first reason adduced in S ā ṃ khyak ā rik ā 9” (2014, p. 132). She further writes that Abhinava’s “dismissal of the thesis that the effect is inexplicable, i.e., both and neither existent and nonexistent, is quite close to that found in the M ā ṭ harav ṛ tti ” (2014, pp. 133–34). 82 Moriyama observes this. He writes: “For instance, with regard to the above term s ā dhyatv ā t , Wezler and Motegi have documented a marginal note found in a Kashmir manuscript of the YD as follows: ‘YD, p. 123, marginal note (5): s ā dhyatv ā d iti. na hi sarvathaiv ā psu na vidyate ’ ṅ kura ḥ . y ā hy ā po b ī jade śā nuprave ś en ā s ī n ā d up ā d ā n ā d antarviparivarttitay ā ṅ kura ṃ janayant ī ti t ā sv apy a ṅ kuro ’sty eveti.’ According to the editors’ introduction (YD, pp. xxiv-xxv), ‘[t]he author, or one of the authors, ... was remarkably familiar with Mahāyā na Buddhism, a fact that would suggest that he/they may have lived before the extinction of Buddhism in Kashmir, i.e., in the 14 th century A.D.’ There is also another marginal note where we find the words ‘Abhinavagupta’s S ā ṃ khyanir ṇ aya ,’ which A. Sanderson has identified as a section of the Tantr ā loka (YD, p. xxv). From such information, it is at least possible to say that this unique Sāṅ khya text had a certain impact in the Kashmir region, where it was studied together with Kashmir Śaiva texts” (2016, pp. 292–93). Elsewhere Moriyama writes concerning Utpala’s familiarity with the YD: “is there any evidence for Utpaladeva’s familiarity with the YD? The latter is not unimaginable when considering Kashmir Śaivism’s close relation to the Sāṅ khya text” (2016, p. 292). 83 Ratié cites Vācaspati Miśra: “[The author of the S ā ṃ khyak ā rik ā s] states the reason why [the effect must exist before the operation of its cause by saying] ‘because there is no production of the non-existent.’ [That is to say:] if the effect is nonexistent before the operation of its cause, its existence cannot be produced; for even innumerable artists cannot make the blue yellow!” ( atra hetum ā ha: asadakara ṇ ā t. asac cet k ā ra ṇ avy ā p ā r ā t p ū rva ṃ k ā rya ṃ n ā sya sattva ṃ kartu ṃ ś akyam. na hi n īl a ṃ ś ilpisahasre ṇ ā pi p ī ta ṃ kartu ṃ ś akyate ) (Srinivasan 1967, pp. 96– 98; quoted in Ratié 2014, p. 134). katvam . yad uktam . tat pradhanader na yuktam . jadatvat. jado hi nama parinisthitasvabhavah. prameyapadapatitah.; sa ca r upabhedad bhinno vyavasthapaniyo nilapitadivat; ekasvabhavatvac cabhinno nilavat. na tu sa eva svabhavo bhinnas cabhinnas ca bhavitum arhati vidhinisedhayor ekatraikada virodhat ) ( Shastri and Shastri 1918–1921 , pp. 176–77; quoted in Rati é 2014 , p. 154) 22 Pratyabhijña thinkers leveled additional criticisms against Sam . khya related to this topic. Analysis of these complicated arguments is beyond the scope of this paper (in many ways these criticisms are elaborations on the arguments summarized already). For more on Somananda’s and Utpala’s criticism that Sam . khya cannot explain the relation between unmanifest material cause ( prakrti ) and manifestation ( abhivyakti ), see Rati é 2014 , pp. 152–60. An additional criticism that nondual ´Saivas bring against Sam . khya is the “infinite regress” argument. For more on this, see Rati é 2014 , pp. 145–47, 163–67. I respond to these and other non-dual ´Saiva arguments brought against Sam . khya in a separate in-progress paper on the buddhi .

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 10 of 38 Modern science approached its object of study (nature) through the lens of Newtonian physics, and Newton viewed nature according to 3 basic premises: (1) external causation: the activity or movement of objects gets caused from without; (2) mereology: objects are constituted from part to whole (and hence, the parts of an object precede the whole); and (3) mechanical behavior: the movements of objects can be measured and predicted according to fixed, mechanistic laws. The example of a billiard ball game illustrates this. As a whole object, a billiard ball can be dissected into strong plastic materials (i.e., parts), with the ball itself comprising part of a greater totality (a billiard game); the motion of the billiard ball requires an external force to act upon it (one billiard ball moves when another collides with it); and the movements taking place within a billiard game operate based upon set rules The modern scientific attitude toward nature has deep roots in Cartesianism 23 Three basic presumptions characterize Descartes’ understanding of the natural world: (1) matter (as res extensa or extended substance) and mind (as res cogitans or thinking consciousness) are fundamentally divided; (2) the activity of objects is independent of our own purposes; and (3) matter is just extended substance and hence lacks intensity or concentrated vital force. Set against the animation, alertness, and autonomy of the cogito, nature qua mere extension involves lifeless, mechanical bits of matter that bear no internal relation to each other and whose motion results from their colliding against each other 24 These assumptions are evident in the standard modern interpretation of Sam . khya 25 According to this reading, creation happens when a purusa (a detached witness consciousness) approaches consciousness-independent prakrti (“nature”) and incites m ulaprakrti (“primal nature” or “fundamental matter”) to transform into the observable natural world ( vyaktaprakrti ) 26 Prakrti has its own design, but it lacks sentience and the capacity to initiate its own movement. In order to explain how prakrti unfolds in the first place, scholars such as Mysore Hiriyanna invoke Newton’s “First Law of Motion”: just as a material body remains motionless unless acted upon by an outside force, so too does prakrti (comprised of three guna s) rest in equilibrium until an external trigger, namely, the presence of purusa , acts upon it (1993, p. 273). By virtue of purusa ’s viewing attendance, prakrti extends into space, with vyaktaprakrti representing the manifest e ff ect ( karya ) that pre-exists in m ulaprakrti as its unmanifest, material causal ground ( sat ) 27 As for the constitution and behavior of prakrti , interpreters o ff er a mereological, mechanistic explanation. Various metaphysical categories ( tattva s) are said to represent the parts that make up the larger whole, prakrti —with many scholars even implying that the tattva s subsist independent of each other 28 Meanwhile, these “parts” function according to fixed, natural (i.e., mechanistic) laws that lie dormant within m ulaprakrti until a separate cause ( purusa ) sets them into motion 23 This brief overview is widely confirmed in scholarship on these topics. For more on the early history of modern science, its roots in Cartesianism, and the prevailing influence of the Cartesian–Newtonian paradigm in modern thinking about nature, see Collingwood 1945 (this monograph on the history and philosophy of science is well-known), Brady 1998 (which focuses upon Goethe’s response to these issues), and Lafleur 1950 (a short but clear account of these issues) 24 Descartes famously conceived of animals as machines (“ b ê te machine ”), specifically, machines that are unable to think. This di ff erentiated animals apart from humans (“ l’homme machine ”). This mechanistic attitude pervades Descartes’ physiology For more on this topic, see Antoine-Mahut and Stephen 2017 . 25 The following studies of Sam . khya and / or the SK (this being a non-exhaustive list) exhibit scientific realist predilections: Colebrooke and Wilson 1837 ; Davies 1894 ; Sastri 1948 ; Radhakrishnan 1927 ; Sinha 1958 ; Eliade 1969 ; Catalina 1968 ; Trimbak Govind 1972 ; Larson 1969 a ; Hiriyanna 1993 ; King 1999; Berger 2015 . Burley ’s 2007 monograph brilliantly diagnoses the external realist biases of Sam . khya scholarship. However, he does not identify the modern scientific basis of this trend in Sam . khya scholarship 26 Gerald Larson, among others, uses these translations. See 1969 a, p. 242 27 Larson writes: “it must be stressed that the manifest world is not derived from purusa . It is derived, rather, from the m ulaprakrti , which is characterized by the three guna s and which emerges or evolves itself in terms of satkaryavada —i.e., transformation, or modification of itself, but always in terms of itself” (1969 a, pp. 176–77) 28 Consider, for example, that the customary reading of Sam . khya metaphysics takes the material world ( prakrti )—e.g., the mahabh utas as the “atomic particles,” “gross elements,” or building blocks of complex entities, and so on—to exist independent of and external to our experience. Burley examines such theories that predominate in modern readings of Sam . khya (2007, pp. 116–24).

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 11 of 38 This interpretation misconstrues the meaning of Isvarakrsna’s doctrine. I briefly touch upon just a few points. First, the purusa is not a mind, cognizing ego, illuminating light, or e ffi cient cause. It is a purely passive, non-intentional, structureless witness (SK 19). Contrary to the Aristotelian or Christian notion of a soul, Descartes’ cogito , or Newton’s scientist, the purusa is not even proto-rational, nor does it have experiences, per se 29 Many scholars have recognized this, pointing out how Cartesianism, in particular, distorts the meaning of “ purusa .” Gerald Larson, one of the leading researchers of the SK, typifies this trend In some of his later writings, Larson explicitly warns us against correlating the purusa to a Cartesian ego 30 Ironically, however, he envisions prakrti in terms of a material “natural world” quite similar to that recognized by Descartes and Newton. This is evident in his early and widely influential monograph, Classical Sam . khya: An interpretation of its History and Meaning (1969). Here Larson renders “ m ulaprakrti ” as “primal nature,” “fundamental matter,” or “material reality,” which implies an ultimate, self-existent, Cartesian-like substance that extends in space and endures over time ( Larson 1969 a , pp. 167, 242) 31 He develops this interpretation further in his 1983 essay, “An Eccentric Ghost in the Machine.” He characterizes prakrti as follows: Both analytically and synthetically, we are dealing with a closed causal system of reductive materialism . . From an analytic point of view, every ‘component’ of the system is a ‘part’ of the totally functioning ‘whole’ (and may well explain why the Sam . khya lends itself to a purely mathematical formulation . . ). From a synthetic point of view, every empirical manifestation is an ‘e ff ect’ that is finally a mere modification of one ultimate, unconscious ( acetana ) material ‘cause’ ( m ulaprakrti ) (1983: 230; text in parentheses is from Larson) While this reading liberates the concept of purusa from the biases of Cartesianism and modern science, prakrti as “nature” continues to be riddled with them. Larson portrays prakrti as a lifeless, insentient machine, reducible to its parts, mathematically ordered, and rule-bound 32 The biases 29 The external realist thesis continues to have purchase in scholarship on classical Sam . khya. For example, Berger’s very impressive study of the concepts of luminosity and personhood across the philosophical traditions of South and East Asia holds to this view. Berger writes about the orientation of the purusa toward material reality: “It is these modifications, and the temporal determinations that emerge from them, that are the objects of the conscious, primordial person ( purusa ), which itself supposedly never changes. The experience of temporality, then, in Sam . khya, involves the apprehension by spirit [ purusa ] of various kinds of actual modifications of primal matter” (2015, p. 77) 30 Larson ’s 1969 a study frequently implies (although seemingly with some ambivalence) that the purusa makes sense of or is conscious of its object, “the world” ( prakrti ). He writes: “the world is understood primarily from the point of view of the individual, witnessing purusa . The analysis of the world in classical Sam . khya is in terms of how the world appears to the individual consciousness. In one sense, then, the classical Sam . khya analysis is a description of what consciousness sees” ( Larson 1969 a , p. 178). In his 1983 essay, however, he explicitly notes that the purusa cannot at all be understood in a Cartesian light. He explains: “Whether one considers the Cartesian position or . . the modern, analytic restatement of it, the interpreter of Sam . khya must admit that the Sam . khya is not a dualism in these senses” (1983, p. 219). Larson then clarifies that Sam . khya (and specifically, the doctrine of the SK) is not such a dualism on account of its conceiving of the purusa as not a typical “ghost in the machine,” but as an “eccentric ghost in the machine”: “Sam . khya represents a critique of the traditional or conventional dualist position and approaches [e.g., Platonic, Aristotelian, Paulinian, Augustinian, Cartesian, Kantian, Jain, Vedantin] . . [it rather advocates] a philosophical view which ‘reduces’ ‘mind’-talk or ‘mentalistic’-talk to ‘brain-processes’-talk or, in other words, construes mind, thought, ideas, sensations, and so forth, in terms of some sort of material stu ff , or energy, or force . . For, according to classical Sam . khya, the experiences of intellect ( buddhi ), ego ( aham . kara ), and mind ( manas ), and the ‘raw-feels’ such as ‘pain’ ( duhkha ) or ‘pleasure’ ( sukha ) . . are simply subtle reflections of a primordial materiality ( prakrti )—a primordial materiality undergoing continuous transformation . . Sam . khya, as it were, refurbish[-es] the ‘ghost [in the machine],’ stripping it of its conventional attributes and reintroducing it as what I am calling in this paper ‘an eccentric ghost,’ eccentric in the sense that it no longer has anything to do with ‘mind’-talk or ‘mentalist’-talk or ‘ego-talk, all of which are fully reducible to guna -talk in good reductive materialist fashion” (1983, p. 220) 31 Larson ’s 1969 a monograph stands as his most influential work on the subject and arguably the most authoritative interpretation of Sam . khya and the SK 32 Note Larson’s intrigue with a mathematical approach to Sam . khya—an approach that is compelling but nonetheless portrays Sam . khya metaphysics as an inquiry into something static, formal, and lifeless. He writes: “Sam . khya philosophy can be construed as generating the natural world utilizing a ‘mathematical’ model or paradigm in a manner not unlike that of ancient Pythagorean philosophy . . [C]onstruing Sam . khya as a kind of archaic mathematical physics (on analogy with Pythagoreanism) may provide one useful avenue for attempting to decipher the nature of the peculiar Sam . khya dualism and its ‘eccentric ghost in the machine’” (1983, pp. 224–25). Mathematics, of course, became a core feature of Cartesian and modern scientific thinking about nature.

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 12 of 38 evidenced here are not idiosyncratic. The first comprehensive survey of Sam . khya ( Garbe ’s ( 1917 ) Die Sam . khya-Philosophie ) approached prakrti through the lens of the physics-dominated natural sciences 33 Over a decade later, Dasgupta’s influential History of indian Philosophy explicitly studied prakrti by way of theories in physics ( Dasgupta 1922–1955 ). 34 In demonstrating the shortcomings of this reading, I make just a few points. For one, prakrti qua the field of manifest reality is not mere matter. “Matter” typically connotes only that which is the object of experience, though most of the tattvas (e.g., buddhi , aham . kara ) are not “material” in any obvious sense, and they certainly are not Cartesian extended substances ( Burley 2007 , p. 99) 35 Furthermore, the tattva s are not separable “‘part[s]’ of the totally functioning ‘whole,’” per Larson’s statement above, since they lack empirical representability in isolation from each other. In short, prakrti neither behaves like nor is configured as a machine Standard modern readings of the SK also misconstrue its dualism. Duality in Isvarakrsna’s system is neither “a metaphysical substance-dualism” (since prakrti is not a substance) nor that of ego (or scientist) set against the natural world ( Burley 2007 , p. 75) 36 The latter form of dualism is implied by common renderings of “ prakrti ” as “world.” 37 As Mikel Burley notes, “world” suggests a mind-independent, “extensive realm of things and events that we have experiences of and thoughts about . . and that invariably stands in opposition to the cognizing subject or mind” (2007, pp. 76–77) The Cartesian–Newtonian paradigm adheres to such a view of the world, but the SK does not. Mind (“ manas ”) and “world” emerge alongside each other and within the prakrtic field Karika s 24–25 specify how this occurs with the aham . kara ’s “double-barreled creation ( dvividhah. sargah )”: the empirical self can be seen as comprised of “the group of eleven” ( ekadasakah ) (including manas , the five modes of sense experience, and the five modes of action), while the five subtle elements ( tanmatrah. pañcakah ) generate the five gross elements that support the external world. Importantly, this indicates not only that the relation between ego and world is internal to vyaktaprakrti but that this relation is fundamentally non-dual. The cognizing subject and the natural world are held in the mahat-buddhi as an aboriginal 33 In the early 1900 s, the natural sciences were deeply entrenched in the methodologies of the physical sciences. I comment upon this more below 34 Seen in this light, Larson ’s 1969 a and 1983 analyses represent part of an unmistakable trend in Sam . khya scholarship that still prevails. As just noted, Larson’s depictions of prakrti as “nature” envision a field of lifeless machinery that extends on a map of numerical, Cartesian coordinates and performs unchanging physical operations 35 The prakrtic evolutes generate experience itself, with the very awareness of being an “I” at all resulting from the activity of prakrti , namely, when the aham . kara produces an ego (SK 24). Burley was attuned to this. He notes that we can speak of prakrti as “matter,” but only insofar as this implies “everything that is not the pure subject [i.e., purusa ]—including acts and formal structures of experience as well as experiential content—as material . . [I]f we do use ‘material’ in this broad sense, then we ought to take special care not to conflate it with its narrower sense of mere experiential content” (2007, p. 100) 36 Another problematic translation of prakrti frequently employed by realist interpreters is “substance” (see Radhakrishnan 1927 ). Larson, who uses similar terminology with respect to m ulaprakrti , does recognize that these translations are in some ways incomplete. But he does not tell us exactly why they are problematic, and he continues to use some of these translations (1969 a) 37 This view is exemplified in the writings of Sam . khya scholars such as Mircea Eliade, Jadunath Sinha, and Berger, among others. Eliade writes: “For Sam . khya and Yoga, the world is real (not illusory—as it is, for example, in Ved¯anta)” (1969: 9; quoted in Burley 2007 , pp. 76–77, 125). Sinha, meanwhile, naively remarks that “According to the Sam . khya-Yoga, perception depends upon two metaphysical conditions. In the first place, it implies the existence of an extra-mental object. In the second place, it implies the existence of the self ( purusa )” (1958, I: 124; quoted in Burley 2007 , pp. 76–77, 125). Even Berger implies the realist misreading that the empirical world exists independently of purusa (which, for its part, merely “reveals” the world). “Without this luminosity [of purusa ], while the natural world would still undoubtedly be there, and would still bring about things, bodies, impulsive a ff ects, and constant dynamic transformation, none of this would be revealed to anyone and would never serve anything that could deservedly be called a purpose [e.g., purusa - artha ]” (2015, pp. 194–95) Purusa - prakrti dualism, as demonstrated in this section, is not equivalent to mind-world dualism—if for no other reason than because prakrti (in either its unmanifest or manifest form) does not correspond to an extra-mental object. Interestingly, some of Larson’s earlier writings hint at a more nuanced interpretation of Sam . khya metaphysics along the lines of Jean-Paul Sartre’s phenomenological ontology ( Larson 1969 b ). Presumably, this approach underlies Larson’s “humanization” of Sam . khya metaphysics in his larger, more prominent work, Classical Sam . khya . But this monograph ( Classical Sam . khya ) does not work out the philosophical nuances of Sartrean phenomenology for Sam . khya metaphysics, and consequently falls prey to many of the same problems found in other realist interpretations. For example, Larson’s reading carries many of the same realist misunderstandings concerning the nature of prakrti examined above. He frequently translates “ prakrti ” as “matter” or “nature,” and elsewhere applies the term “world” in an uncritical manner that bears clear realist connotations (1969 a, p. 175).

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 13 of 38 unity, and when they do emerge through the powers of the aham . kara , they emerge as already together in relation 38 In clarifying the nature of Sam . khya dualism, note that modern interpretations widely fail to identify its two fundamental duads as purusa and just m ulaprakrti —not prakrti on the whole. The SK separates out two distinct categories within the concept of “ prakrti ”: “ m ula - prakrti ” and “ vyakta - prakrti .” Only m ulaprakrti is a duad to purusa , since only these two tattvas are eternal or equi-primordial Vyaktaprakrti bears an entirely di ff erent relation to purusa than does m ulaprakrti Karika 21 gives us perhaps the most clear account of this: “Like the coming together ( sam . yogah ) of the blind and the lame, creation ( sargah ) takes place ( krtah ) thusly as the compresence [ sam . yogah ] 39 of the two [ m ulaprakrti and purusa ] for the purpose of seeing pradhana [ m ulaprakrti ] and isolating purusa .” 40 Purusa and m ulaprakrti are not self-su ffi cient candidates for generating vyaktaprakrti Purusa cannot beget vyaktaprakrti because it is lame ( andha ), and m ulaprakrti cannot produce on its own because its causal potency is blind ( pa ˙ngu ) and hence is not compelled by or toward anything in particular 41 Only together are they able to bring vyaktaprakrti into being; or rather, only their togetherness begets manifest reality, since even the mere sum of these two lacks purposiveness. Isvarakrsna states this much when he writes “creation ( sargah ) takes place ( krtah ) thusly as the compresence ( sam . yogah ) of the two [ m ulaprakrti and purusa ].” 42 Seen in this light, Sam . khya’s two duads— purusa and m ulaprakrti —are inadvertent, non-intentional attendees to the birth of vyaktaprakrti , which spontaneously arises from the bi-polar friction between these two In support of this textual argument, there are at least two philosophical reasons to reject the standard version of Sam . khya dualism, i.e., that m ulaprakrti and vyaktaprakrti form a unified “ prakrti ” that is set against the purusa . The first rides on a puzzle. Modern scholars claim that (a) vyaktaprakrti represents the self-disclosure of m ulaprakrti , (b) this fused and continuous prakrti manifests as a world of objects persisting external to and independent of the multiple purusa s for whose sake it emerges ( purusa - artha ), and (c) the cosmos ( prakrti ) desists from its activity and dissolves into its unmanifest source ( m ulaprakrti ) when a lone individual attains liberation 43 But if this is the case, then how can it be that, when one individual realizes kaivalya , the “world” ( prakrti ) continues to exist for other persons who have not yet achieved liberation? Should not the cosmos dissolve for them as well? 44 The second reason involves another conundrum. Prevailing interpretations hold that, according to the SK, the unfolding of the physical universe shows the increasing predominance of rajas (dynamism, activity) and tamas (inertia, heaviness) along with the dilution of sattva (illumination, lightness). By implication, m ulaprakrti (as the material causal ground of manifest prakrti ) should bear the highest concentration of sattva and the lowest proportion of the other two gunas . But this is not the case: m ulaprakrti is characterized by an equal proportion of the three guna s, while the tattva s of the inner instrument 38 For more on this topic, see Ashton 2018 . 39 I take the term, sam . yoga , to be duplicated, as implied by “ vad .” I translate it as “compresence” in order to convey the sense in which m ulaprakrti and purusa are ontologically distinct from each other (the basis of Isvarakrsna’s dualism), and yet, insofar as vyaktaprakrti exists, they are mutually present or together with each other 40 SK 21: “ purusasya darsanartham. kaivalyartham. tatha pradhanasya | pa ˙ngvandhavadubhayorapi sam . yogastatkrtah. sargah. ” All translations of the SK are my own unless noted otherwise 41 By virtue of its lame-ness, purusa cannot generate even a thought, feeling, desire, or volition, let alone an object or event 42 The passages preceding SK 21 corroborate this interpretation. I briefly take this up later in the paper 43 Burley deserves credit for bringing attention to this puzzle (as a result of which, vyaktaprakrti is seen to be the outgrowth of m ulaprakrti , with these two together comprising a consciousnessor mind-independent prakrti ). For more on this topic, see Burley 2007 , pp. 72–82 44 This problem applies to Larson’s model, and it is one for which he does not pretend to have an answer. Larson writes that “Clearly the exposition of the Sam . khyakarika on this point leaves much to be desired” (1969, p. 196). This puzzle hinges on the notion that “the world” ( prakrti ) does not continue after attaining liberation ( kaivalya )—with it either dissolving immediately upon the isolation of the purusa , or continuing temporarily just until the moment of the subtle body’s death, as suggested by SK 68. Questions concerning the exact nature of kaivalya in Sam . khya persist. Most interpreters understand liberation to consist in the cessation of experience (including Burley 2004 ; Pflueger 1998 ). Others, such as Eliade, suggest that what terminates is simply the relation between the individual (among many) purusa and the singular “world” ( prakrti ). He writes: “It [ kaivalya ] is the enstasis of total emptiness . . [it is] without sensory content or intellectual structure, an unconditioned state that is no longer ‘experience’ (for there is no further relation between consciousness and the world) but ‘revelation’” (1969, p. 93). For more on this topic, see Burke 1988 ; Burley 2004 ; Catalina 1968 ; Larson 1983 ; Sharma 2004 .

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 14 of 38 ( antah.-karan.a ) show a comparatively higher intensity of sattva (over and against rajas and tamas ) than does their supposedly material causal “root” ( m ulaprakrti ). In both of these dilemmas, the standard interpreter struggles to reconcile basic Sam . khya doctrines with the view that prakrti is a singular, metaphysically autonomous entity: the first puzzle cannot account for the plurality of purusa s (SK 18), while the second contradicts the equilibrium of sattva , rajas , and tamas in m ulaprakrti (SK 16). I do not believe that these are inconsistencies in the SK itself (a claim that I defend in the next section). Instead, these problems reveal limitations in the customary reading of Sam . khya—i.e., the one based on modern science 45 This has significant implications for re-thinking satkaryavada . Interpreters commonly take this doctrine to imply material causation. The 20 th-century Sam . khya commentator, Swami Hariharananda Aranya, typifies this view by invoking the stock Indian example of the jar produced from clay A lump of clay is shaped by the potter as a jar. Here nothing that did not exist before comes into existence, but there is only change of position in space of the particles of the stu ff . Anyone who could see the clay in minute portions will see that those portions are only rearranged in a particular manner in the jar. But those who see the whole and are familiar with the use of a jar, will call it a jar and in common parlance may say that a thing that was not in existence before has come into existence. In reality, however, there is only a spread of the mass of clay in a particular manner ( Aranya 1977 , p. 27; quoted in Burley 2007 , p. 93) The jar (e ff ect) exists latently in the clay (material cause) as one of its possibilities, and change involves the mere transformation (or rearrangement) of that which was already present. Wilhelm Halbfass and Larson call attention to SK 9 as “the locus classicus for the satkaryavada ” and its usage of the expression “ upadana-grahanat ,” or “because of the need [ grahanat ] for an (appropriate) material cause [ upadana ]” ( Halbfass 1992 , p. 56; Larson 1969 a , p. 258) 46 Elsewhere (e.g., SK 3) the text appears to detail how the 23 manifest tattva s and perceptible objects flow forth as the causal e ff ects of m ulaprakrti (and other tattva s endowed with creative capacities) 47 All of the manifest tattva s, it would seem, are latent within and materially derive from m ulaprakrti , just as the jar (as e ff ect) latently exists in and derives from the clay (the material cause) However, this interpretation misconstrues the relationship between unmanifest and manifest prakrti s. Consider that, as just shown, vyaktaprakrti does not emerge from m ulaprakrti alone. That which “causes” the manifest tattva s is the compresence of m ulaprakrti and purusa . One might defend the standard reading by arguing that the creation of the jar requires not just a material cause (the clay) but also an e ffi cient cause, namely, the potter’s action, which actualizes the potential of the clay to take the form of a jar. Similarly, vyaktaprakrti requires both m ulaprakrti (as material cause) and purusa (as e ffi cient cause). But this bears clear problems. For one, purusa is not an active agent; “neither creative nor created” ( na prakrtirna vikrtih. purusah ), purusa does not do anything at all (SK 3). Second, the clay-jar analogy describes a relation between two manifest spatiotemporal objects, whereas that between m ulaprakrti and vyaktaprakrti respectively involves an unmanifest prakrti -in-itself and its appearance That is, causation implies temporal succession. But m ulaprakrti is unconditioned, non-spatial, inactive, and eternal or atemporal , i.e., it “stands ‘outside’ [of] time” ( Burley 2007 , p. 94). The relation between 45 My analysis of this puzzle is informed by Burley’s writings in 2007. I am grateful for Burley’s clarification of this issue and his conclusion that standard, i.e., realist models cannot account for this problem 46 The term “ grahana ” means “grasping.” A more accurate translation (not inconsistent with Larson’s) is “because of the grasping [ grahanat ] of a material cause [ upadana ].” For more on this, see Burley 2007 , pp. 94–95 47 SK 3 reads as follows: “Root-procreativity ( m ulaprakrti ) is uncreated; the seven—the great one ( mahat ) and so on—are procreative and created, though the 16 are [merely] created; the purusa is neither procreative nor created.” ( m ulaprakrtiravikrtirmahadadyah prakrtivikrtayah. sapta | sodasakastu vikaro na prakrtirna vikrtih. purusah ).The 23 manifest tattvas are divided into two groups The essential di ff erence between these two groups is that each member of the set of seven ( buddhi [or mahat ], aham . kara , and the five tanmatras , which cause the mahabh utas ) has creative power, while the 16 other tattvas ( manas , the buddhindriyas , the karmendriyas , and the mahabh utas ) are not productive, i.e., they lack causal power with respect to other tattvas.

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 15 of 38 unmanifest prakrti and manifest prakrti , then, cannot be one of material causation. The SK denies causal dependency in both e ffi cient and material senses of the term In making sense of Isvarakrsna’s metaphysics, especially his understanding of prakrti , dualism, and satkaryavada , I do not support the idealist position—a conclusion that Burley advocates (2007) I retain the view that prakrti denotes “nature” (and that nature has a material form), that the SK holds to a genuine duality of purusa and m ulaprakrti , and that causality is a real phenomenon (it is irreducible to a condition for mental appearances). Nevertheless, I believe that modern Sam . khya scholarship wrongly imputes the assumptions of modern scientific rationality. In order to establish an appropriate context for making sense of Sam . khya (or at least, Isvarakrsna’s version of this doctrine), we must, therefore, return to the question, “what is the meaning of prakrti as ‘nature’?” But this requires foregrounding the hidden implications of the translation, “nature.” Researchers of Sam . khya would do well to at least recognize the distinction between animate and inanimate domains of nature, and they would do far better to deploy an interpretive framework that can disclose the aliveness of prakrti , not just its materiality. One might consider a biological reading of prakrti and related terms, but this would still impose the assumptions of the Cartesian–Newtonian paradigm. This is because, as Newtonian physics unified the natural sciences—with chemistry first giving way, and only later biology—the principles by which scientists examined inert material phenomena came to dominate how living things were perceived. Indeed, modern physics achieved an explanatory power that helped us to identify (and at times control) the physical and chemical constituents of organic phenomena, not just inorganic ones. However, these findings were widely taken to be exhaustive, which turned the organism into a mechanism and ignored the meaning of nature’s vitality. Living things, though, are not mere arrangements of parts, nor is their activity generated and ordered from things external to them. Rather, the organism is marked by an inner organic unity that produces and structures the organism’s movements from within. Wholeness precedes the manifestation of the living thing’s “parts” without being separate from the parts—since the parts are expressions of the living whole. In order to thus recuperate the vital meaning of prakrti as “nature” and respond to some of the puzzles ascribed to Isvarakrsna’s system, let us move beyond the standard modern reading of the SK and revisit the question of prakrti through an alternate philosophy of nature 4. A Goethean Interpretation of the S am . khya K arik a What we see largely depends upon our intentional (or interpretive) frame. If we already anticipate that something is inert, non-living, and mechanical, then our analysis will either bear this out or lead to an impasse if the object does not conform to the conditions of intelligibility demanded by our intentional context. This pertains to how we understand Isvarakrsna’s philosophy of nature, which has both revealed itself and confounded us in terms of our prevailing, scientific realist frame of reference. Notably, Kant’s “rational organics” sharply critiques the Cartesian–Newtonian view of living nature, and a few impressive Kantian-based interpretations o ff er an alternative way of approaching the SK 48 But Isvarakrsna neither espouses idealism (Kant was a transcendental idealist) nor does he negate the life of nature by reducing it to mere appearances that are constructed by a transcendental ego (which e ff ectively divorces living things from their own vital power) 49 In order to step outside of the 48 The most influential Kantian-based studies of the SK include Burley 2007 and Bhattacharya 1956 . Other readings of the SK that display at least some idealist leanings include, among others, Davies 1894 and Singh 1976 . To my knowledge, there is no study of Isvarakrsna’s Samkhya through the lens of Kant’s organics. In a larger work (currently in progress), I explore the implications of such an approach in greater detail 49 Kant attempts to refashion biology as a science of how life appears to us in terms of the concept-forming activity of the understanding. But this merely re-inscribes several of the core assumptions of modern science (i.e., objects are shaped by fixed natural laws) within his analysis of the powers of reason (for Kant, “natural” laws are laws of the understanding). That is, his study of living nature re-locates the powers that produce an organism’s unity (the unity of the various parts of the living thing) within the transcendental ego. Kant’s primary comments on the teleology of organic phenomena (to be distinguished from organic things-in-themselves ) are given in the second part of his Critique of Judgment (1987).

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 16 of 38 realist–idealist debate that has delineated recent studies of the SK, and with a view to underscoring the life of nature in Isvarakrsna’s system, I turn to the theory of organics devised by the German polymath, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. With a thriving scientific research program, Goethe explored nature at an historical point where modern biology was still defining itself and had not fully taken on Newtonian values. In developing his thinking about nature, Goethe echoes some of Kant’s own criticisms of modern biology. But in contrast with a post-Enlightenment audience, Goethe was not indebted to Kantian assumptions about nature; in contrast with Kant, Goethe did not view nature as a field of mental appearances that were tightly determined by rules of understanding 50 Standing between Newtonian science and Kantian organics, Goethe provided a theory of nature that highlighted its vivacity. Goethe’s appraisal of his contemporaries (modern scientists, Kant) maps extremely well onto a criticism of modern Sam . khya scholarship. A Goethean approach bolsters a critique of the two most influential paradigms that have framed modern scholarship on the SK: modern science and Kantian idealism. More importantly, it helps to resuscitate the themes of nature ( prakrti ), cause–e ff ect relations ( satkaryavada ), and manifestation ( vyakti ), and thereby enable a robust Sam . khya reply to the dilemma poised by Pratyabhijña thinkers Goethe warned that Newton’s approach was only useful for studying inorganic nature and impoverished our understanding of natural life. In developing an alternative science of life, Goethe drew upon Kant’s critique of Cartesianism and the epistemology of biology. He incorporated many of Kant’s valuable insights into what Goethe termed “morphology.” 51 This focused upon the structures and limbs of organisms as metamorphoses of a primal phenomenon or “ Urphänomen .” All manifestations of a plant, for example, are transmutations of the self-same primal or ur -plant, which bears an inner antecedent unity that organizes its parts and shows itself in a continuous sequence of regular transformations. This already distinguishes Goethe’s view from that of modern biology. Goethe was centrally concerned with the question of procreativity. His ur -phenomenon bears an organic wholeness that links together the processual design of the organism with its underlying productive power. Outward variations (e.g., the axil [point where the leaf starts to grow], the petiole [main support of the leaf], the veins of the leaf blade, and so on) are expressions of the living thing’s (the leaf’s) inner procreative drive to formation ( Bildung )—a feature that inanimate nature lacks. Modern biology, however, fails to capture this basic aspect of the organism by approaching living nature as reducible to its physical and chemical parts (as if the parts pre-existed the whole, were subsequently combined, and could be separated without losing their essential identity) and whose movements can be captured through mechanistic analysis (e.g., the law of gravity), etc Goethe’s emphasis upon the invigorating principle of organisms also distinguishes his science of life from Kantian organics. Goethe was in search of the actual thing-form of the organism, not the abstract structure of the living thing as mental appearance. His ur -phenomenon bears an organic wholeness that is both formal (it has a structured design) and vital (it births itself of its own power at each moment). Kant, however, deprives the organism of its continual, inward–outward becoming by subsuming the organism to law-like mental operations (that is, the rules by which the understanding constructs the appearance of an organism), thereby stripping the living thing of connection to its antecedent, vital unity ( Kant 1987 ). The organic variations with which Goethe was concerned emerge di ff erently. They reveal the outward forms of the Urphänomen ’s Bildung , or the inner procreative drive to formation that animates all living things. From this, the essence of nature, and hence the object of study for the biologist, is not “nature (already) natured” ( natura naturata ), e.g., nature as pre-determined by natural scientific laws or Kant’s rational laws of the understanding. Rather, nature should be 50 Goethe was a contemporary of Kant and a committed interlocutor of “the philosopher,” as Goethe referred to Kant. But he rejected Kant’s rational organics for the reasons just given. Above all, he believed that Kant failed to establish an appropriate science of life as living 51 Goethe first uses the term morphology in his 1796 notes, although he only uses it in the context of a larger philosophy of biology in his 1817 essay, Zur Morphologie . See Goethe 2016 .

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 17 of 38 approached in terms of its “naturing” ( natura naturans ), that is, the active, purposive vitality that continually discloses itself through coordination of the organism’s limbs, structures, and movements 52 In accounting for how there is an Urphänomen at all, Goethe posits that at the ground of living nature lies an oppositional tension or polarity, not a single entity (a monistic, material substance, a unifying natural law, or a world-construing subjectivity). The living Urphänomen manifests from and as the dialectical equipoise of two principles: a blindly creative will and formal rules that constrain this drive 53 Plants, for example, develop naturally—that is, according to their proper Bildungstrieb —when a balanced opposition is achieved between the unbridled drive of natural life and the compensatory limitations that dwell within the plant 54 Polarity remains an essential part of the organism’s development throughout its growth. Goethe explains that the organism’s will to formation proceeds as an “intensification” ( Steigerung ) of the dialectical interplay underlying nature’s internal form. This indeed involves a real causality, but it is not the causality of mechanics. Unlike the cause–e ff ect relations that characterize the interactions of billiard balls, the movements of living things represent ordered intensifications of the polarity that is internal to the organism. Importantly, living “parts” (e.g., a plant stem) share not just a relation to other living “parts” (the flower that blooms upon the leaf-stem). As Brady explains on behalf of Goethe, the parts share a relation to the singular “representative whole that is continually brought forth [through its many parts]. [The parts represent] an immediate expression of the informing power” that derives from the intensified polarity of the unrestrained will and the organism’s form ( Brady 1998 , p. 101). The physicality of the organism is alive, self-generating, and spontaneously overflows from a concentrated present that shows itself as behaving through “a flux of continual motion” ( Brady 1998 , p. 99). “‘Natural system’: a contradictory expression,” Goethe writes. “Nature has no system; and she has—she is—life and development from an unknown centre toward an unknowable periphery” ( Goethe 1998 , p. 35; quoted in Weik 2017 , p. 341). The cause of life is not separate from the immediate transformations presented by the organism, since living beings are their becoming Largely because of Goethe’s vision of transmutation as evidence of an original life form, some scholars have considered Goethe to be a kind of proto-Darwinian. But what exactly is it that descends and gets modified? In distinguishing their views on this, consider how they understood organisms’ parts in relation to the corresponding “original” life form. Darwin explored the genealogy of successive organisms-in-themselves that could be traced chronologically back to an historical ancestor. All changes of a given plant leaf, for example, were seen to be derived from an earlier existing leaf that evolved through various stages of transformation ( Brady 1998 , pp. 92, 95). But this does not safeguard the kind of organic wholeness that Goethe envisioned. The leaves of Goethe’s ur -plant are irreducible stages of any other leaves; they are not the mere e ff ects of a temporally prior leaf. This is because Goethe’s ancestral plant is not an already formed organism that stands in a linear relation to subsequent plant leaves and other parts. Instead, plant leaves represent spontaneous metamorphoses of a dynamic, formative life-process that continuously generates itself in and through the plant’s appendages. The ur -plant as originary life form self-originates not at a single historical moment—in which case, we could exclude its 52 In order to demonstrate how the organism discloses itself through limbs, structures, and movements that are coordinated in terms of a vital program, Goethe here borrows Spinoza’s distinction between natura naturata (“nature already natured” or determined) and natura naturans (“nature in its naturing”). Others (notably, those in the “New Materialism” circle) have since used Spinoza (among others) in order to show how all material processes, including inorganic ones, have their own creativity, agency, and self-organization 53 In his experiments with color, Goethe demonstrated that the Urphänomen of color was not an extra-mental property that could be quantifiably measured in relation to white light. Rather, it is produced in the converging boundary between light and darkness, and hence is itself half-darkness just as much as it bears a degree of lightness. He applies this analysis to living forms. For more on this, see Goethe’s Theory of Colours ( Goethe 1982 ). 54 Goethe explains that the primal plant comes into being through the dialectical equipoise of a “vertical tendency” (the “inescapable need to grow upward”) and an “horizontal tendency” (“the nourishing, expanding principle that gives solidity to the plant”) ( Seamon 1998 , p. 4). He further links the polarity in plants to a creative tension between nutritive energies (as pure, unrestrained life force) and the organic form of the primal leaf (with its structuring laws).

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 18 of 38 primal creativity at other moments or perceive its originality as somehow diminished across moments Rather, it enacts itself at each moment that the parts manifest any vitality at all. It portrays itself “as alive and active, with its e ff orts directed from the whole to the parts” and the connection between “the whole” and “the parts” expressing an immediate procreativity ( Brady 1998 , p. 96) 55 From this, it would be a mistake to perceive the previous leaf form (e.g., a green leaf during Spring) as the cause of the next (a red leaf during Autumn), as if the existence of the immediately present organism results from something chronologically prior (and hence external) to it. Equally so, it would be a mistake to view the manifold forms of the plant as contradictory or incompatible. Rather, the manifest parts (plant stem, blooming flower on the stem; green leaf, red leaf) uncover what their seeming stillness conceals: the organic wholeness of the Urphänomen as a suddenly arising, “constant relation . . [not] a static particular” (such as an original historical ancestor that uniquely created later organisms in kind) ( Brady 1998 , p. 106) 56 Goethe’s organics establishes a more appropriate framework for investigating the Sam . khya of the SK than do prevailing interpretations. The reconstruction o ff ered here focuses upon three basic aspects of Isvarakrsna’s metaphysics: prakrti , the dualism of purusa and m ulaprakrti , and satkaryavada First, a Goethean approach correctly emphasizes that the question of the meaning of living nature is central to the SK. This is evident in the etymology of “ prakrti .” The term is cognate with the Latin, “ procreatrix ,” and it bears some of the same ambiguities as does the English “procreation” (which itself derives from “ procreatrix ”). “ Pra - krti ” consists of the prefix “ pra -” and the abstract noun “ krti .” “ Pra ” is related to the Latin-English prefix “pro-” and conveys the sense of “forward,” “forth,” “in front,” “onward,” “before,” “away.” “ Krti ” derives from the verbal root, “ √ kr ” (“to do, make”) and the primary su ffi x, “- ti .” According to Panini, the a ffi xation of “- ti ” to the verbal root (here: “ √ kr ”) signifies either the action or a participant in the action ( karaka )—although the grammatical agent ( kartr ) is excluded from being one of these participants in the action 57 Insofar as it denotes a participant in the action, the nominal stem (“- ti ”) implies a passive meaning, such as when “ prakrti ” signifies the result of an action, e.g., “procreation” as progeny or that which has been produced. Insofar as “- ti ” connotes the action itself, “ prakrti ” (again, much like “procreation”) indicates a “procreating activity,” e.g., “Procreation gives rise to o ff spring”. This is not unlike the active meaning of “ krti ” as “doing, 55 Brady elaborates Goethe’s view: all forms of the plant are engaged in “the act of becoming something else . . [they] emerge as partial and become a disclosure of another sort of form,” such as when one leaf modification gives way to the next (1998, p. 106) 56 This distinction between the originary life forms of Darwinian evolution and Goethean morphology is corroborated by Goethe’s warning against a Gestalt -based formulation of life. He explains: “The Germans have a word for the complex of existence presented by a physical organism: Gestalt . With this expression they exclude what is changeable and assume that an interrelated whole is identified, defined, and fixed in its character. But if we look at all these Gestalten , especially the organic ones, we will discover that nothing in them is permanent, nothing is at rest or defined—everything is in a flux of continual motion” ( Goethe 2016 , p. 979). Ascertaining a living thing in terms of its supposed Gestalt renders an identified stage of development into “an abstraction held in arrest by our sensible experience” ( Brady 1998 , p. 105). This mistakenly implies the organism’s self-completion within the specified phase of growth and obstructs the dynamic interdependence between this and other stages. Darwin’s model indeed represents an advance over Linnaeus’s strong dependence upon permanent structures (in his taxonomic categorization of plants into parts, shapes, and other structural features, as generic characteristics of immutable, natural kinds, species, family, etc.). Nonetheless, a Goethean interpretation suggests that Darwin’s evolutionary study typifies the Gestalt -approach. Darwin reifies the so-called historically original form of a given organism. This smuggles into living nature a fixity of representation by stabilizing (and hence, subordinating) the self-manifesting vitality of multiple “derivative” forms in terms of a purported “original,” uniquely self-determining one. The organic variations with which Goethe was concerned emerge di ff erently. They reveal the di ff ering outward expressions of the Urphänomen as an animating power that may weaken from one moment to the next but nonetheless continues to overflow from an intensified present, not an ever-receding past. My analysis here is influenced by Brady’s study of Goethean organics and Darwinian evolution (see Darwin 1859 ; Brady 1998 ). 57 Panini addresses this ambiguity at 3.3.94: “- ti ” is to be used in the feminine gender as the primary derivational a ffi x to the verb in the sense of the action itself and / or in the sense of a participant in the action other than the agent ( striyam ktin bhave akartari ca karake . . krt-pratyaya ). Although this s utra , 3.3.94, merely states “ striyam ktin ,” it can be clarified further by reference to 3.3.18–19. I am grateful to Sthaneshwar Timalisina, David Buchta, and Danielle Cuneo for drawing my attention to these passages and their help in thinking through these passages’ significance for the meaning of “ prakrti ” (personal communications).

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 19 of 38 manufacturing, making, creating” ( Apte 1998 , p. 1282) 58 As an action noun, prakrti refers not just to that which is procreated but also to that process which itself is “procreating,” a “procreating entity” (e.g., a procreating “organ”), or a “procreatress”—albeit, a procreatress who is not an agent in the customary sense (e.g., a grammatical agent) 59 This latter meaning, “procreatress,” underscores another association that “ prakrti ” shares with its Latin cousin, “ procreatrix .” In addition to the meanings given just above, “ procreatrix ” connotes “she that brings forth, a mother,” or a “matrix” (cognate with the Latin “ mater , matris ,” and the Sanskrit “ matr ”) ( Lewis 1918 , p. 654; Partridge 1966 , pp. 1921–22) 60 This rendering is especially pertinent for two reasons. First, the su ffi x, “- ti ,” is a commonly used feminine stem ending, e.g., “ krti ” (“ kr ” + “ ti ” = “doing”), “ ´sruti ” (“ √ sru ” + “ ti ” = “hearing”), and “ pakti ” (“ √ pac ” + “ ti ” = “cooking”). From a radically detached philological perspective, the gender signification might seem irrelevant. But the meaning of words is rarely (if ever) born in a vacuum of linguistic abstractions. Words also derive their meaning from their performative context, their cultural situatedness, and indeed, their philosophical overtones (among other things). This is certainly true with respect to “ prakrti ” and the terminology of the SK and other Sanskrit philosophical texts. That prakrti rests at the heart of Isvarakrsna’s metaphysical inquiry, and that this heart should be feminine, is no small coincidence. The broader significance of “ prakrti ” as feminine stems not just from the authority of grammarians (e.g., Panini), it draws largely from, among other sources, the ´Sakta literature where the goddess is revered as prakrti . This is certainly evident in the works of historically later Tantric and Puranic authors, who deployed this term in view of conveying the feminine potency of nature as a generative matrix—and indeed, these authors frequently associated prakrti with ´Sakti. Not coincidentally, “ sakti ” evinces the same linguistic structure as does “ prakrti ”: the verbal root “ √ sak ” + the a ffi x, “- ti .” No doubt, countless South Asian philosophers deployed the term, sakti , precisely because its grammatical features (action noun, feminine gender) had positive devotional, ritual, and philosophical significance. In the case of the SK, this enriched meaning of prakrti as a powerfully feminine procreating entity helps to unify the ambiguous associations of “ prakrti ” as the procreative activity itself and the procreated result of that act. The linguistic features of prakrti strongly suggest a maternal, self-generating nature (or “naturing”) that spontaneously (since it lacks grammatical agency) manifests as seemingly distinct products of nature’s own fecundity Such practical deployments of prakrti have a deep history in South Asia, and the SK’s metaphysical inquiry qua philosophical practice should be situated within this history. This occasions a second consideration of prakrti as a procreatrix . Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, among others, aligns an “original” Sam . khya with indigenous Indian belief systems that revered a primordial maternal principle whose reproductive activity manifests as the natural world ( Chattopadhyaya 1973 , p. 181). Although he does not explicitly claim that early Sam . khya was an organic materialism (he merely argues that it was a materialism), Chattopadhyaya’s interpretation supports this more nuanced description 61 “ Prakrti ” 58 There is some scholarly thinking that “ pra - krti ” includes “ krti ” as a present participle form, hence suggesting “procreating.” While this is philosophically provocative, this interpretation appears to lack substantial philological support. Nevertheless, the meaning of the noun, “ prakrti ,” is active, which supports the argument presented here and helps to prevent its more sterile connotations elsewhere as static, inert matter 59 Here I borrow Cuneo’s interesting translation of “ prakrti ” as “procreatress” (personal communications with Cuneo) The Sanskrit “ prakartri ” also can be rendered as “procreatress,” although its grammatical construction carries more explicitly agential connotations that Panini disallows for “ prakrti .” As for the notion that prakrti could be an organ, this follows from the discussion above. The term sruti (formed of the verbal root “ √ sru ” and the su ffi x, “- ti ”) can refer to both the act of “hearing” and the “ear” ( Apte 1998 , p. 1577). Similarly, the meaning of “ prakrti ” as “ √ pra ” + krti ” includes both the act of procreating and the organ or instrument of procreating (since this organ is one among other participants in the procreative act, and yet it is not the grammatical agent) 60 Although the term matrix typically conjures up more recent meanings of “matrix” as some sort of mathematical organizational structure, it originally indicated “mother” (“ mater ”), “breeding female” (Latin), and “womb” (Middle English). These associations are found in the Sanskrit term for mother, “ matr ” ( Partridge 1966 , pp. 1921–22) 61 Sonali Bhatt Marwaha oddly refers to Chattopadhyaya’s characterization of Sam . khya as one of “reductive materialism” (2013, p. 195). She uses this characterization in explicit reference to Larson’s interpretation of Sam . khya, doing so presumably in order to legitimate her interpretation by appealing to an influential reading of the Sam . khya system. However, this “reductive materialist” characterization (which she only gives once in the paper) is inconsistent with the rest of her otherwise very

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 20 of 38 originally conveyed something that was neither dead, nor inert, nor a mere object of metaphysical speculation and human control; it did not imply “nature natured” ( natura naturata ), as it does in the modern reading of Sam . khya. Rather, “ prakrti ” denoted the self-ordering, living cosmos, and its vitality was seen to reveal itself as the constantly unfolding, psycho-physical universe (or “nature naturing” [ naturata naturans ], as Goethe terms it). I believe that essential features of this conception of prakrti are retained in the SK. Isvarakrsna’s “ prakrti ” connotes the subtle power of natural life, a self-su ffi cient principle of maternal creativity that underlies—and indeed, gives body to—the life-begetting activity of nature 62 Since the “transformations of primeval matter [ prakrti ]” are not di ff erent than the procreatrix itself, the results of prakrti c activity are governed by their own “natural laws” (albeit, not the mechanistic laws of modern science); they require no spiritual principle or super-agent (e.g., an omnipotent self or God) ( Marwaha 2013 , p. 193). In other words, prakrti as a procreating entity (which includes the action, the result of the action, and other participants in the activity besides the grammatical subject) does not depend upon an agent (in keeping with Panini’s philological point). (She is empty of “I,” as it were.) Early Sam . khya was principally concerned with the disclosure of this “ultimate female principle” that dwells within all things, including one’s own body, and the Sam . khya of the SK followed suit ( Marwaha 2013 , p. 184) These considerations suggest that, instead of exploring the nature of being and associated themes (e.g., “m ulaprakrti” as “an undi ff erentiated plenitude of being,” as Larson terms it [1969, p. 201]), Isvarakrsna continued a typically Tantric-Samkhyan inquiry: “why is there procreativity instead of infertility?”, and “what is the purpose or meaning of procreativity’s manifestation?” This is quite unlike what modern scholars have in view when they take Sam . khya’s prakrti to be an inanimate material that is unable to reproduce, move, or manufacture itself. Left to themselves, merely physical things sit, sink, and submerge—like the clay that bears only the static weight of materiality but not the onward-making impetus (the pra - krti ) for a particular form. Not coincidentally, Isvarakrsna never appeals to the clay-pot-potter analogy (or any other image of inorganic matter) in order to illustrate the nature of prakrti . That this analogy was widely deployed in Indian texts (including later Sam . khya commentaries) suggests that Isvarakrsna was aware of its availability but, not unlike early Samkhyans, deliberately used organic images instead (and indeed, images that evoke a procreatrix )—such as at karika s 39–43, where he speaks of prakrti ’s unfurling as an embryo born of “mother and father” ( matapitrjah , SK 39), or at karika 57, which likens the “profusion” of m ulaprakrti to the nourishing “profusion of unknowing milk” ( ksirasya pravrttih. ajñasya ) 63 Prakrti in the SK is alive and life-giving, like the sap of plants or the milk secreted by a baby’s mother. As organic nature, prakrti is never divorced from its animating power, contrary to prevailing interpretations A Goethean interpretation corrects our understanding of the ground of this informing potency by re-envisioning Sam . khya dualism as a creative oppositional tension, not one involving a detached yet intentional subject (e.g., a Cartesian ego or Newtonian scientist) and a lifeless yet natural world-in-itself. Recall that, as noted above, the SK separates out two distinct categories within the concept of “ prakrti .” We can now translate these categories in terms of the theme of procreativity: “ m ula - prakrti ” or “root-procreativity” and “ vyakta - prakrti ” or “manifest procreativity.” M ulaprakrti corresponds to the first of Goethe’s polarities: the unbridled creative energy that is necessary for things to emerge but in and of itself cannot beget anything because it lacks intention, an objective, or what Goethe identifies as persuasive study of materialism in early Sam . khya—which really implies an organic materialism, not material qua inert, lifeless matter 62 Borrowing from B. N. Seal, Marwaha refers to prakrti as “a positive principle based on the conservation, the transformation, and the dissipation of energy” ( Seal 1915 , p. 251; quoted in Marwaha 2013 , p. 186) 63 Simon Brodbeck observes similar organicist connections (even portraying vyaktaprakrti as an embryo) in prekarika texts that deploy Sam . khya categories. He writes: “The end and re-beginning of the cyclic cosmos (on which we see ´Svetasvatara Upanisad 4.1, with sakti as the female; Bhagavadgita 8.17-19) matches the death of one body and ¯atman ’s taking another The ‘evolutionary’ cosmic model, whereby the material principle is gradually ‘unpacked’, fits the sexual model: the fertilized egg / foetus develops and grows. The four sets of five in the sam . khya tattva -lists are like fingers and toes” ( Brodbeck 2007 , p. 169, n. 36).

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 21 of 38 a form that could provide direction. Admittedly, the purusa is not equivalent to the second of Goethe’s two principles; it does not represent or contribute the form that guides raw creativity. Nevertheless, Goethe’s polarity thesis elucidates the role of purusa in generating vyaktaprakrti . According to this reading, manifest procreativity emerges from the tensional polarity between root-procreativity and pure, nonintentional consciousness M ulaprakrti is the “foundation” of vyaktaprakrti insofar as it secures its “root” or “bottom” (“ m ula ”), while purusa represents the opposing pole—one that e ff ects a counterposing lift or levitation, as it were. Both principles transcend manifest reality; they are always already present by virtue of their absence. Isvarakrsna implies this at SK 21, where he writes that creation occurs ( krta - sarga ) for two purposes ( artha ) that have yet to be realized in empirical life: the purpose of isolating purusa ( purusasya kaivalyartham ) and the purpose of seeing m ulaprakrti ( pradhanasya darsanartham ), both of which cannot be ordinarily perceived because they transcend space and time 64 This does not wholly deny the common translation of m ulaprakrti as “primal matter” or “fundamental nature.” But it specifies that this “matter” or “nature” is alive, potent, and forward-moving (albeit, it bursts forward without a sense of direction due to its lack of sight). Furthermore, while root-procreativity participates in the emergence and sustenance of vyaktaprakrti as its grounding life force, it does not comprise the lone source of manifest procreativity. This extends another Goethean insight. That which vyaktaprakrti manifests ( vyakta ) as a procreating ( prakrti ) is not a blind urge Rather, it exhibits the dynamic interplay between polar life forces: m ulaprakrti and purusa . SK 21 highlights this Vyaktaprakrti represents the self-manifestation not of m ulaprakrti but of the sam . yoga of purusa and m ulaprakrti . Other passages in the text support this reading. Recall karika 39’s use of the metaphor of the human embryo for prakrti . Just as the embryo depends upon a mother and a father ( matapitrjah ) who can fertilize the mother-to-be’s egg, so too does the manifestation of procreativity ( vyaktaprakrti ) require the consummation of a coming together ( sam-yoga ) of maternal “root-pr ocreatrix” (f.) and male purusa (m.) 65 Creation results from a kind of alchemical reaction involving a balanced opposition between gendered principles. This polarity thesis o ff ers an important corrective to prevailing explanations of Sam . khya dualism. The purusa - m ulaprakrti dichotomy is nothing like what modern philosophers and scientists mean by a subject–object duality. It rather denotes a fertile friction Purusa and m ulaprakrti are underlying poles of a genesis linked together by a tensional polarity whose dialectical interplay begets the living phenomenon ( vyaktaprakrti ). Isvarakrsna highlights this at SK 20: “The non-conscious subtle body ( li ˙ngam ), as if conscious, comes to life ( bhavati ) owing to the compresence ( samyogat ) of those two ( tat ) [ purusa and m ulaprakrti ].” 66 The subtle body (the “ li ˙ngam ,” here synonymous with vyaktaprakrti ) manifests “as if conscious” and “comes to life” due to “the compresence” of “that” ( tat ), namely, purusa and m ulaprakrti . The usage of “ tat ” is significant 64 M ulaprakrti ’s transcendence comes from below, i.e., from “ m ula ” as the “root,” “foundation,” or “the bottom” of vyaktaprakrti Its self-concealment owes to its resting submerged just beneath the surface of the field of experience. In this respect, m ulaprakrti is characterized by a certain gravitas : a force or potency that pulls downward into a gravitational epicenter. Nonetheless, this ubiquitous power cannot be perceived directly; m ulaprakrti is known only through its e ff ecting things of weight Purusa , meanwhile, transcends vyaktaprakrti from above. Many of the world’s religions, Indo-European ones especially, deploy motifs of levitation and lightness in order to convey the otherworldliness of a pure, ethereal self. This holds for Sam . khya as well. The SK comprises part of a long and rich history of nuanced Sam . khya usages of “ purusa ” as a cosmic, spiritual essence that is detached from worldly a ff airs. Burley makes the suitable comparison between the purusa and Wittgenstein’s “philosophical self” or “metaphysical subject,” which is “not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather . . the limit of the world—not a part of it” ( Wittgenstein 1974 , p. 70 [5.641]; quoted in Burley 2007 , p. 148). Each individual purusa passively observes the happenings of space and time from a periphery that demarcates vyaktaprakrti just as it recedes from it. But going beyond other formulations of a transcendental consciousness (e.g., Wittgenestein, Husserl), Sam . khya’s purusa represents more than just an outsider peering into an arena of experience The SK makes the purusa into a metaphysical principle that counterposes m ulaprakrti . The purusa denotes a kind of lifting force that extends vyaktaprakrti in an upward direction through its positive resistance to the rooting of m ulaprakrti 65 Just above I referenced SK 39’s account of how vyaktaprakrti unfurls as the fertilized seed of “mother and father” ( matapitrjah ) This exemplifies what Marwaha calls a “genealogical cosmogony”: the universe was produced, she writes, “by sexual urge ( kama ) . . born of the female ( vamobhava ) and as the result of her union with the male” ( Marwaha 2013 , p. 182) Here Marwaha is elaborating on Chattopadhyaya’s view 66 SK 20: “ tasmat tatsam . yogadacetanam . cetanavadiva li ˙ngam | gunakartrtve ca tatha karteva bhavatyudasinah. ”

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 22 of 38 By grammatically subordinating purusa and m ulaprakrti to sam . yoga in a genitive tat - purusa compound (i.e., “the compresence of witness consciousness and root-procreativity”), the karika highlights sam . yoga’s ontological immediacy with respect to vyaktaprakrti (“ li ˙ngam ”). It establishes compresence as that which not only holds together purusa and m ulaprakrti in a procreative relation, but also that which mediates the relationship between, on the one hand, purusa and m ulaprakrti as inadvertent parents (as it were), and on the other hand, vyaktaprakrti as the “procreativity made manifest” (i.e., the result of the procreating activity). Importantly, this verse appears just prior to passage 21’s explanation that the purusa or m ulaprakrti cannot give birth alone, since they bear neither the desire nor the design to produce anything in particular Purusa and m ulaprakrti are fundamental principles, and sam . yoga represents the conjoining of these two forces in a dynamic, life-giving interchange From this, we can respond to the two puzzles noted above and reformulate the Sam . khya doctrine that the e ff ect exists in its cause ( satkaryavada ). The first involves the dilemma of the plurality of purusa s and the singularity of a metaphysically autonomous, fused prakrti (nature as a consciousnessindependent world-in-itself) whose manifestation ( vyakta ) ceases upon one person’s attaining kaivalya In responding to this, I first note that in Chattopadhyaya’s view, pre-Vedic Sam . khya viewed the workings of nature ( prakrti ) through a unified “agriculture-human fertility concept”: it perceived “the human body and nature as two aspects of the same fundamental reality . . in the form of [organic] matter” ( Marwaha 2013 , p. 182; Chattopadhyaya 1973 , p. 333). Isvarakrsna deviates from this earlier view insofar as he does not o ff er a cosmology. Instead, he provides something that is strikingly proximate to Goethe’s organics: a phenomenological account of how a dynamic, dialogically structured sam . yoga manifests as a numerically singular organism—specifically, a human organism. Just as there are multiple purusa s, so too are there multiple vyaktaprakrti s (or manifestations of human-like procreativity) Since each “manifest procreating entity” is generated from a particular sam . yoga (of m ulaprakrti and a corresponding purusa ), then each vyaktaprakrti represents the dialectically ordered, animate naturing that flows through the given living organism. The metaphysics of the SK thus continues the spirit of early Sam . khya: vyaktaprakrti is a living, life-giving Urphänomen that represents a microcosm of the greater universe 67 This opens up a reply to the first puzzle. One organism’s realization of kaivalya entails the dissolution of only its own lived reality, not that of another Having established that vyaktaprakrti discloses the informing, vital power of sam . yoga (not m ulaprakrti or the purusa ), satkaryavada can now be construed in terms of the spontaneous, organic intensification of sam . yoga as polarity. In contrast with unseeing m ulaprakrti and impotent purusa , vyaktaprakrti is a processual, well-coordinated power. Moreover, its forward-focused, vital design is inscribed within sam . yoga’s own “thing-form” (as Goethe would call it)—a “thing” insofar as it really exists ( vyaktaprakrti is not illusory or merely mental), and a “form” insofar as it bears a dialectical structure (involving two polarized principles) 68 Accordingly, vyaktaprakrti unfurls its organic wholeness through an on-going, internally coordinated series of configurations ( tattva s) that transmutate “out of each other [and] . . into each other” ( Goethe 1840 , p. 71; quoted in Weik 2017 , p. 342) Larson captures some of this in his rendering of karika 22: “From [ m ula -] prakrti (emerges) the great one (mahat [or buddhi]); from that (comes) self-awareness ( aham . kara ); from that (comes) the group of 16” (1969, p. 262) 69 This translation describes how various forms or “parts” sequentially follow after each other (e.g., the aham . kara succeeds mahat ). However, it is not the case that the wholeness of vyaktaprakrti derives from its parts—as if the manifest tattva s are irreducible pieces (e.g., wheels, 67 Notably, the cosmos in the “original” Sam . khya was not a cosmic man (as depicted in the Purusa Sukta ) but a fertile mother We find this here as well: vyaktaprakrti denotes the manifestation of the feminine procreatress (not to be confused with roo-procreativity, and certainly not representing the self-manifestation of a cosmic purusa ) 68 To make this claim more precise, it is not the case that the dialectical form of vyaktaprakrti is inscribed within m ulaprakrti or the purusa , with one of these duads subsequently incorporating its other 69 SK 22: “ prakrtermahamstato’ha˙nkarastasmad ganasca sodasakah | tasmadapi sodasakat pañcabhyah. pañca bhutani .”

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 23 of 38 reins, a frame, an axle) that pre-exist the whole (a chariot) and, when assembled together in the right way, give the appearance of a composite whole 70 Rather, the wholeness of vyaktaprakrti is organic, and this part-antecedent, inner unity is what is revealed through the activity or manifestastion of the created ( vikrtic ) tattva s. That is to say, mahat , the aham . kara , etc., and their ordered unfolding express a primordial informing power; they do not express themselves as participants that are separate from or only extrinsically related to the procreating activity. This gets overlooked in Larson’s translation and commentary (just as it gets overlooked in customary readings of the SK), and this neglect stems from his modern scientific biases, namely, mereology, matter as bereft of vitality, etc A Goethean interpretation of satkaryavada features what the standard reading cannot: the connection between vyaktaprakrti ’s productive power and its processual form. My own translation of SK 22 attempts to relate this: “Of [the nature of] procreativity ( prakrteh ) there is the great one ( maham . s ), from that there is the aham . kara , from that there is the body of 16, while from five of those 16 [i.e., from the five subtle elements] there are the five gross elements.” Each tattva (e.g., the aham . kara ) represents not just a transformation or re-configuration of the previous tattva (the mahat - buddhi ), it represents the e ff ect ( karya ) of sam . yoga ’s procreative intensified presence ( sat ) 71 “ Vyakta - pra - krti ” thus makes “manifest” the “forward-procreating” of the m ulaprakrti - purusa polarity, a disclosure that spontaneously generates life from an overflowing vital intensity. Indeed, m ulaprakrti conceived as inert matter cannot turn itself inward-outward; lifeless things are unable to enact pra - vrtti (“forward-turning”) because they lack the intentionality, design, or fertility that would inform their so-called “ prakrti .” But organic nature does exhibit this capacity as a feature of its self-development ( bildung ). In fact, living things ( vyaktaprakrti s) display this manifestation of procreativity relentlessly, even disclosing shapes and forms that only seem to contradict temporally prior shapes and forms, such as when a green leaf appears to transform into a red leaf. From the perspective of Goethean organics, cause–e ff ect relations in Sam . khya metaphysics do not portray one empirical form (e.g., the mahat - buddhi ) changing into another empirical form (the aham . kara ). Rather, they disclose vyaktaprakrti qua the Urphänomen that metamorphosizes from one vikrtic tattva to the next. The empirical tattva s are the constant but organized becoming of vyaktaprakrti (“manifest procreating”) In developing this point, recall the second puzzle that undermines the prevailing modern interpretation of the SK. As per this reading, prakrti is a unified m ulaprakrti-vyaktaprakrti that evolves from one tattva to the next, and with each stage of evolution (e.g., from m ulaprakrti to the mahat - buddhi , from the mahat - buddhi to the aham . kara , etc.) there occurs a steady diminishing of sattva and an increase of rajas and tamas . But while this pattern does hold amongst relations between the empirical tattva s, upon closer inspection it does not hold for the transition from m ulaprakrti to the mahat - buddhi Not coincidentally, scholars widely mistranslate karika 22 to connote that the mahat-buddhi derives from m ulaprakrti by way of material causation 72 But m ulaprakrti is not referred to in this passage—only prakrti is. And as explained above, it cannot be the case that vyaktaprakrti emerges from m ulaprakrti through material causal succession. Goethe’s account of causation—along with my Goethean-informed translation of the SK—o ff ers a corrective to both the puzzle of the guna s and the meaning of “ prakrti ” at the start of verse 22. Consider that sam . yoga is inextricably linked to space and time, and hence it can causally support vyaktaprakrti through its continual intensification. The compresence of purusa and m ulaprakrti has a beginning point (the coming together of two principles that were previously not 70 Though there are some striking philosophical parallels and a deep historical connection between Buddhism and Sam . khya, Isvarakrsna does not subscribe to the mereological thinking of Abhidharma Osto 2018 explores some interesting themes at the intersection of Classical Sam . khya and Theravada, but the topic of part–whole relations (so far as it concerns Sam . khya and Buddhism) is not discussed here or in any other research literature, to my knowledge 71 This does not forgo that m ulaprakrti is a cause in the broad sense of the term: it participates in or contributes to the emergence of vyaktaprakrti in some way. But modern scientific-based models of causality (material, e ffi cient, final) cannot capture this 72 The first word in SK 22 is prakrti . In his commentary on this verse, Larson makes it clear that “ prakrti ” should be taken to mean “ m ulaprakrti .” He explains that it is mulaprakrti that “undergo[-es] transformation or modification [and] issues in the manifest world” (1969 a, p. 173).

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 24 of 38 in proximity to each other); it carries a long history of many lives; and sam . yoga will cease upon the realization of kaivalya , although purusa and m ulaprakrti will persist (SK 68) This view is supported by the apposition of “ sam . yoga ” and “ krta - sarga ” at SK 21: “creation ( sargah ) takes place ( krtah ) thusly as the compresence ( sam . yogah ).” “ Krta - sarga ” here is equivalent to vyaktaprakrti , which implies an additional correspondence between sam . yoga and vyaktaprakrti (i.e., it is equally true that vyaktaprakrti “takes place thusly as the compresence”). The connotations of “ sarga ” give clues to why Isvarakrsna links together these concepts. The term sarga means the “creation,” “begetting,” or “procreation” of “nature” or “the universe” ( Apte 1998 , p. 1655; Monier-Williams 1899 , p. 1040) Additional meanings include: “rush, onset, advance (of troops)”; “stream, gush, rush, or downpour (of a fluid)” ( Apte 1998 , p. 1655); “origin”; “a created being; o ff spring” ( Monier-Williams 1899 , p. 1040) This is confirmed by “ sarga ”’s own verbal root, “ √ srj ”: “to create, produce, make; to procreate, beget; to emit, shed, e ff use, pour forth or out” ( Apte 1998 , p. 1701). From this, we can understand manifest procreation ( vyaktaprakrti ) to be an “emission” or “e ff usion” that “rises up” from a “source” (all meanings of “ sarga ”)—or as Burley interestingly puts it, “ sarga ” connotes a “surging forth,” “rising up,” or a “swelling” (2007, p. 112) 73 The grammatical parallel of sam . yoga and the krta - sarga at karika 21 widens these meanings and extends the interpretation of satkaryavada as a doctrine of “intensification.” The creation, production, or procreation indicated by “ sarga ” involves an outpouring or swelling of the oppositional tension that “takes place thusly as the compresence ( sam . yoga )” (SK 21). Exploring the intimate association between “ vyaktaprakrti ” and “ sarga ” thereby gives further nuance to how, according to Isvarakrsna, cause (“origin”), activity (“begetting”), and e ff ect (“o ff spring”) are unified in a natural causal process Satkaryavada can now be seen as encompassing two distinct but related meanings of causation, and this pertains to completing a response to the puzzle of the guna s. Within the domain of experienced reality—that is, within the field of succession that includes a dwindling of sattva and an amplification of rajas and tamas —causation can be understood in terms of a “manifesting,” “transforming,” or “swelling” in the sense of “B” surges forth from “A” as its temporally prior source. SK 22 utilizes a typical meaning construction of the ablative case in order to specify those manifest tattva s that bear the power of procreation (or the ability to surge forth) (namely, the mahat - buddhi , the aham . kara , the five tanmatras ) and then displays these prakrtic categories in a series. If we interpret these various forms of vyaktaprakrti as changes in inanimate nature or inert matter, then the newly produced e ff ect loses its essential identity (i.e., when the mahat - buddhi gives way to the aham . kara , it is no longer the mahat-buddhi ). Even a biological model can deprive vyaktaprakrti of its procreativity, such as in the case of a Darwinian account wherein the tattva s would be seen to evolve from an historical ancestor. This is because, if satkaryavada is understood solely in terms of an advance from one empirical form to the next, then manifest procreativity remains bereft of (or at least, diminished with respect to) the power that would enable it to sustain its identity, continuity, or unity across moments of transformation. In other words, the modern scientific reading of the SK only allows di ff erence to show itself across change, and hence already prevents nature from exhibiting the capacity to assume distinct forms without ceasing to be itself. In order to rectify this misunderstanding, my interpretation of SK 22 excludes the transition from m ulaprakrti to the mahat - buddhi as part of this succession, and instead it opens with a clarification: “Of [the nature of] procreativity ( prakrteh ).” All of the tattva s mentioned here (the mahat - buddhi , aham . kara , etc.) bear a particular kind of causal power, namely, the causal-generative potency of prakrti qua procreatrix 74 Karika 21’s implication that manifest reality is a surging forth ( sarga ) 73 Burley points to Partridge 1966 , p. 683, and contends that “ sarga ” may be cognate with the English “surge,” which derives from the Latin “ surgere ” (“to rise up, swell, arrive”) ( Burley 2007 , p. 112). These terms are certainly equivalent in sound, but deeper etymological connections are di ffi cult to corroborate. In any case, relating the meaning of “sarga” in terms of “surge” is philosophically revealing 74 Cross-referencing passage 22 against others in the text supports this claim. As SK 3 relates, the tattva s fall into four broad categories: (1) that which is procreative but is not itself created (“ avikrtih ”), which includes only m ulaprakrti ; (2) that which is procreative and created (“ prakrtivikrtayah ”), including “the seven” (“ sapta ”): mahat - buddhi , aham . kara , and the five tanmatra s;

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 25 of 38 bolsters this point. Cause and e ff ect are not ontologically distinct entities or life forms that are tenuously connected by similarity, e.g., “the green leaf changed into a red leaf,” whereby the subsequent leaf represents the e ff ect that replaces (and resembles) the prior leaf as cause. Rather, the appearance of the two as distinct (though related) leaves discloses the well-coordinated swell of vital intensity that is the ur -plant. Seemingly contradictory life forms are thus taken as “A” ( vyaktaprakrti ) manifesting as “B” ( mahat - buddhi ), “A” ( vyaktaprakrti ) manifesting as “C” ( aham . kara ), and so on 75 These manifestations of the living phenomenon ( vyaktaprakrti ) that can be ordered in a temporal succession (e.g., green leaf and red leaf, or mahat - buddhi and aham . kara ) are nothing more than the surging emissions of a playful procreatress that loves to hide “in broad daylight,” as Goethe aptly comments (quoted in Hadot 2006 , p. 375) 76 5. Why Non-Dual Kashmir ´Saivas Misread the S am . khya K arik a I believe that a Goethean reading of the SK not only remedies the misunderstandings induced by modern scholarly interpretations, it enables a viable rejoinder to the Pratyabhijña critique. Recall that Utpala and Abhinava dispute prakrti ’s capacity to maintain itself across varying manifestations (“ abhivyakti ” or the “ vyakta ” of vyaktaprakrti ), just as a square “ceases to be a square” once it loses one of its sides and becomes a triangle ( Rati é 2014 , p. 154). Where Sam . khya fails to explain how material nature bears the power ( sakti ) to appear as a multitude of shapes and forms, non-dual ´Saivas posit consciousness as that which unifies manifestation and power 77 However, it bears noting that Utpala and Abhinava envision Sam . khya—including Isvarakrsna’s doctrine—in terms that are not dissimilar to the version typically o ff ered by modern scholars: “ prakrti ” denotes mere matter or inert nature; material reality ( prakrti ) is the fundamental duad to the purusa ; and m ulaprakrti stands as the material cause of its own manifestation qua vyaktaprakrti (with the purusa obscurely theorized as a pseudo-e ffi cient cause or illuminating light). In order to counter this interpretation, I have focused my attention upon the Sam . khya of the SK and claimed that (1) its metaphysics is a phenomenology of living nature, (2) its dualism connotes an oppositional tension between two polar life forces ( purusa and m ulaprakrti —not prakrti at large), and (3) vyaktaprakrti does not depend on the causal-creative intentionality of either (3) that which is not procreative but is still created ( vikarah. na prakrtih ), which includes “the 16” ( sodasakah ): manas , the 10 indriyas , and the five mahabh u tas ; and (4) that which is neither procreative nor created, including only purusa . Karika 3’s attention to group (2) is especially important for understanding SK 22. The same “seven” (and only these seven) tattva s of the second category are indicated in verse 22, and they are again mentioned in association with their procreative powers. My rendering of “ prakrteh ” in the genitive case captures this: amongst the manifest tattva s, only mahat-buddhi , aham . kara , and the five tanmatra s are “of the nature of procreativity ( prakrteh ).” This is not an anomaly. The grouping of “the seven” by virtue of their prakrtic prowess occurs elsewhere in the text. SK 8, for example, relates that the seven tattva s of passage 3 share the “same procreative nature” (“ prakrtisarupam ”) as m ulaprakrti , while the other vikrtic tattva s (i.e., the group of sixteen) do not SK 9 continues by linking “ prakrti ” to the doctrine of satkaryavada : the e ff ect ( karya ) is “of the [same] nature as the cause” (“ karana - bhavat ”). This gives important clues to the kind of cause–e ff ect relation that is at stake between m ulaprakrti and vyaktaprakrti , particularly at SK 22, and it does so within the broader context of sam . yoga ’s dynamic intensity. Rather than comprising part of an unbroken series of ablative-declined terms that connote successive material causations (with the final cause or telos latent within m ulaprakrti as “fundamental matter”), “ prakrteh ” indicates that procreativity is a basic feature that these seven tattva s inherit from m ulaprakrti (by way of a kind of genetic trait inheritance) 75 To give another example: a caterpillar does not cease to be what it essentially is when it transforms into a butterfly (that is, when a butterfly manifests from or as a caterpillar) 76 In keeping with many scientists, poets, and philosophers before him in the history of Western studies of nature, Goethe often comments on Heraclitus’ cryptic observation that “Nature loves to hide.” For more on this theme, see Hadot 2006 . Heraclitus and Goethe occupy a central place in Hadot’s study 77 Rati é tells us that Abhinavagupta “emphasizes that the main goal of the nondualist ´Saivas in appropriating the Sam . khya satkaryavada is to show that the relationship between the Sam . khya notions of potentiality ( sakti ) and manifestation ( vyakti / abhivyakti ) can only make sense if they are interpreted along ´Saiva non-dualistic lines” (2014, p. 166). She then cites Abhinava’s IPVV: “Therefore it is only in the doctrine of the non-duality [of everything with] consciousness ( cidadvayavada ), [i.e.,] if one acknowledges that all entities consist in reflections ( pratibimba ) in the mirror of consciousness, that the distinction between potentiality ( sakti ) and manifestation ( vyakti ) becomes possible, [since this distinction is then understood as] having as its real nature the acts of folding ( nimesana ) and unfolding ( unmesana ) [through which consciousness conceals and manifests its nature and] which take [infinitely] variegated appearances ( citrita ) thanks to the power of consciousness—and not otherwise” ( tasmac cidadvayavada eva sam . viddarpanapratibimbar upebhavakalape’bhyupagamyamane saktivyaktivibhagah. samvicchakticitritanimesanonmesanaparamartha upapadyate, nanyatha ) ( Shastri 1938–1943 , pp. 312–13).

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 26 of 38 m ulaprakrti as material cause or purusa as e ffi cient cause, but instead reveals the spontaneous, organic intensification of the two in compresence ( sam . yoga ). I believe that this reformulation of prakrti , Sam . khya dualism, and satkaryavada adequately defends at least the SK against the Pratyabhijña attack Prakrti is the procreativity or vital power of living nature Vyaktaprakrti represents nature in its own purposive naturing; vyaktaprakrti is procreativity made manifest as an internally designed, forward-directed, living organism. The underlying, informing power that this living ur -phenomenon manifests (through its naturing) is neither blind procreativity nor an impotent consciousness but the dialectical opposition between them Vyaktaprakrti ’s “parts,” meanwhile, are expressions of the self-same organic wholeness—an antecedent vital unity that relentlessly swells, expands, and pours forth (as sarga ) in various shapes and forms. This involves nothing like the causal models to which modern interpreters and ´Saiva interlocutors appeal in their renditions of Sam . khya Ironically, this rejuvenated vyaktaprakrti exhibits some of the very same features highlighted by Utpala and Abhinava in their account of ´Siva consciousness. In both frameworks, the various manifestations that arise within phenomenal reality express an informing potency whose design is inherently dialogical—and at that, a dialogue marked by gendered poles. We can thus appropriate Rati é ’s description of ´Siva consciousness for depicting manifest procreativity: “ sakti and abhivyakti are only two di ff erent aspects of the same reality: the pure dynamism of [ vyaktaprakrti ]” (my own brackets; 2014, p. 168) 78 Manifestation consists in the fact of living nature’s autopoiesis. This is indicated by the compound term, “ vyakta - prakrti ”: manifestation ( vyakta ) and creative power ( prakrti ) are not separate, but are already fused together in nature’s naturing. Manifest reality is the causal power of nature’s procreative intentionality disclosing itself from within to without in each and all of its diverse manifestations, as well as across its sequenced development. Irreducible to its contents, vyaktaprakrti represents a unified procreating entity that wills its own transmutation in the form of a generative organic process. As evidenced in the strengthening and wilting of the ur -plant, or the change from yellow to green to brown colored leaves, vyaktaprakrti qua living ur -phenomenon “is capable of assuming di ff erentiation [while remaining] undi ff erentiated”—not unlike ´Siva consciousness ( Shastri and Shastri 1918–1921 , p. 178; quoted in Rati é 2014 , p. 156) This rearticulation of Sam . khya materialism as an organicism satisfies the demands of Utpala’s and Abhinava’s dilemma, and it does so without adhering to ´Saiva metaphysical and theological assumptions. It is true that Sam . khya’s vyaktaprakrti is not consciousness or an emanation of consciousness ( purusa ), as non-dual Kashmir ´Saivas point out. But contrary to Pratyabhijña assertions, vyaktaprakrti is not an extension of inanimate matter or even raw procreative power, and it certainly is not devoid of agency. Though vyaktaprakrti is not a self, “I,” or super-agent (a cosmic Purusa or ´Siva), its manifesting power nonetheless exhibits agential-like capacities that non-dual ´Saivas reserve only for consciousness—since indeed, organic nature “can take an infinite variety of forms that are incompatible with each other without ceasing to exist as [itself]” ( Rati é 2014 , p. 155). Based on Rati é ’s account, let us suppose that the non-dualist ´Saivas concede that it is possible for some agency or quasi-agency besides consciousness to manifest things by assuming their various forms. Even then, Utpala and Abhinava counter, “the main problem inherent in the Sam . khya theory of causality is its wrong representation of manifestation: manifestation can only occur if the manifesting and the manifested entity are not distinct” ( Rati é 2014 , p. 155). Although the reductive materialist rendition of Sam . khya struggles to defend itself against this charge, the Goethean organics version does not Vyaktaprakrti qua self-manifesting, living nature includes nature’s own naturing activity (i.e., the ur -plant enacting its drive to formation) and the created forms themselves (the axil, the petiole, the veins of the leaf blade, etc.). I have further supported 78 The whole quotation from Rati é is as follows: “The Sam . khya / Saiddhantika notion of potentiality ( sakti ) thus gets filled with a completely di ff erent meaning: it no longer designates a latent, unmanifest and passive state, but rather, the ever manifest power that consciousness has of concealing itself while remaining manifest—a power that eventually is just another way for consciousness of manifesting itself, so that for the nondualist ´Saivas, sakti and abhivyakti are only two di ff erent aspects of the same reality: the pure dynamism of consciousness” (2014, p. 168).

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 27 of 38 this argument through philological analysis of the feminine “- ti ” stem ending of the active noun, prakrti This equally applies to vyaktaprakrti as both the act of manifest procreating (or procreativity manifesting itself) and the result of this activity, namely, procreation made manifest. The manifestation of prakrti thus di ff erentiates itself as active manifesting and manifested entity while remaining undi ff erentiated as the dynamic procreatrix continually engaged in recreation In staging their inter-scholastic debate with Sam . khya, Utpala’s and Abhinava’s goal was to “achieve [a] complete reversal of meaning of the satkaryavada principle” and thereby prove the agency of consciousness as the ground of manifest reality ( Rati é 2014 , p. 129). This exchange was fruitful—at least for non-dual ´Saivism. It helped them to clarify and then resolve a possible glitch in the theory of how an e ff ect could exist within its cause (per their theory of manifestation as a power of consciousness and their critique of Sam . khya’s abhivyakti theory) 79 Through this, Utpala and Abhinava advanced “the original way in which they understand consciousness and its relationship to manifestation” ( Rati é 2014 , p. 164). But while they made e ff orts to (more or less) accurately represent the accepted Sam . khya position of their time, their formulation of Sam . khya nevertheless misrepresents the view of Isvarakrsna, whose SK was available to them (if only indirectly by way of later commentaries) 80 Above all, they take the Sam . khya satkaryavada to be centrally concerned with the causation of inorganic material, although as I have demonstrated above, this is not the case in Isvarakrsna text: cause-e ff ect relations involve the intensification of living nature. My comments here do not intend to demonstrate that the Pratyabhijña critique of Sam . khya in general lacks sound philosophical backing. To say the least, Utpala and Abhinava persuasively argue that a translation of Sam . khya terminology into their closest Pratyabhijña equivalents cannot resolve the dilemma at issue. However, they do not foreclose all other possible Sam . khya responses to the problem that they highlight. Certainly, the SK can supply one such possible response. Viewed as a metaphysics of procreativity, Isvarakrsna’s Samkhya o ff ers a compelling theory of how an e ff ect can exist within its cause and still accommodate the relationship between nature (as cause) and its own self-manifestation. It follows from this that, if one accepts the legitimacy of the interpretation that I presented above, then Utpala and Abhinava did not achieve a “complete reversal of meaning” or a “perfect contradiction with the Sam . khya dualism of matter and consciousness”—or at least, they did not achieve this with respect to the dualism, etc., of Sam . khya’s definitive text, the SK ( Rati é 2014 , p. 127). What they have instead reversed or contradicted is a version of Sam . khya that failed to sophisticate the procreative naturing of nature The oversights of Abhinava are especially curious given (a) how cautious, incisive, and charitable an interpreter he typically is, (b) his awareness of the SK and its central importance to Sam . khya, and (c) the considerable attention that he devotes to Sam . khya throughout his writings on causality and manifestation—in spite of Sam . khya’s decline in influence by the time of Utpala and Abhinava Sam . khya is one of Utpala’s and Abhinava’s most frequently referred-to interlocutors on the interrelated topics of causality and manifestation, though other dar´sana s (Nyaya, for example) appear to have shown a “relative indi ff erence to this opponent” ( Taber 1986 , pp. 128–29; quoted in Moriyama 2016 , p. 287). This moves the question: why did Utpala and Abhinava neglect the organicist features of Isvarakrsna’s theories of causality and manifestation? Did they operate with an overly simplified version of Sam . khya, or were other factors (e.g., hidden prejudices) at play here? I explore two reasons for this: (1) they based their interpretation of the SK upon Sam . khya commentaries, although these commentaries themselves misconstrued Isvarakrsna’s understanding of prakrti , dualism, satkarya , and manifestation; and (2) their treatment of Isvarakrsna’s system was motivated to recapitulate a 79 On the importance of Sam . khya for nondual ´Saivism, see Torella 1999 . 80 Utpala and Abhinava may (or may not) have misread other Sam . khya texts as well. This question is not at issue here and is beyond the scope of this paper. My concern is simply with how, in the process of their presenting the Sam . khya position, they overlooked important nuanced di ff erences between Isvarakrsna’s ideas and those of later Samkhya thinkers, and in doing so, how they misrepresented the philosophy of the SK.

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 28 of 38 philosophical narrative that precluded metaphysical dualism and the self-su ffi cient power of nature to conceal itself 5.1. Reliance upon Classical Sam . khya Commentaries We cannot say with certainty why Utpala and Abhinava did not give more careful attention to the SK. But one reason likely concerns the materials to which they had access in making sense of Sam . khya theories of causation and manifestation. It appears that Utpala and Abhinava depended upon classical Sam . khya commentaries that were not committed to Isvarakrsna’s organicism Recent scholarship suggests that Pratyabhijña thinkers engaged the SK primarily by way of its historically later Sam . khya interpretations. For example, Abhinava’s approach to the question of causality at SK 9 imitates the methodology found in several commentaries, including the Matharav Religions 2020 , 11 , x FOR PEER REVIEW 29 of 40 ph i losoph i cal narrat i ve that precluded metaphys i cal dual i sm and the self-suff i c i ent power of nature to conceal i tself. 5.1. Rel i ance upon Class i cal S ā ṃ khya Commentar i es We cannot say w i th certa i nty why Utpala and Abh i nava d i d not g i ve more careful attent i on to the SK. But one reason l i kely concerns the mater i als to wh i ch they had access i n mak i ng sense of Sāṃ khya theor i es of causat i on and man i festat i on. I t appears that Utpala and Abh i nava depended upon class i cal Sāṃ khya commentar i es that were not comm i tted to Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s organ i c i sm. Recent scholarsh i p suggests that Pratyabhijñā th i nkers engaged the SK pr i mar i ly by way of i ts h i stor i cally later Sāṃ khya i nterpretat i ons. For example, Abh i nava’s approach to the quest i on of causal i ty at SK 9 i m i tates the methodology found i n several commentar i es, i nclud i ng the M ā ṭ harav ṛ tt i , Gau ḍ ap ā dabh ā ṣ ya , the Jayama ṅ gal ā , the Tattvakaumud ī , and the Yukt i d ī p i k ā . Rat i é observes: [These texts] vary greatly as regards the number of theses [that are g i ven i n k ā r i k ā 9 about satk ā ryav ā da ]… almost all these Sāṃ khya commentar i es i ntroduce the verse i n the same way, i.e., by i ns i st i ng that there i s a d i sagreement ( v i prat i patt i ) among var i ous masters on the subject, so that the l i st of reasons adduced to prove the satk ā ryav ā da i s necessary so as to get r i d of the doubt ( sa ṃ ś aya ) bound to ar i se due to the mult i pl i c i ty of contrad i ctory theses held i n th i s regard (2014, p. 133–34). Go i ng further (and echo i ng the early d i scuss i on i n th i s paper), Abh i nava (along w i th Utpala) defends “the ontolog i cal status of the effect” i n a manner that “ i s rem i n i scent” of how the M ā ṭ harav ṛ tt i i ntroduces satk ā ryav ā da (Rat i é 2014, p. 132) 81 Amongst post- k ā r i k ā commentar i es, the Yukt i d ī p i k ā (YD) and the Tattvakaumud ī (TK) seem to have been the most i nfluent i al (Rat i é 2014; Mor i yama 2016). The YD was stud i ed i n Kashm i r alongs i de other Kashm i r Śa i va texts, and i t i s plaus i ble that Utpala and Abh i nava were themselves fam i l i ar w i th th i s text 82 Meanwh i le, Abh i nava echoes Vācaspat i Miśra when he playfully wr i tes that blue cannot come from yellow—an example meant to i llustrate the SK-supported v i ew that the effect cannot ar i se from non-ex i stence (Sr i n i vasan 1967, p. 96–98; c i ted i n Rat i é 2014, p. 134). 83 Pratyabhijñā rel i ance upon commentar i al l i terature i s even more obv i ous i n i ts treatment of the Sāṃ khya not i on that the cause produces only the man i festat i on of the effect, not the actual ex i stence of the effect. The YD and the TK 81 Ratié notes that Abhinava’s I P VV argument in favor of satk ā ryav ā da “is obviously the first reason adduced in S ā ṃ khyak ā rik ā 9” (2014, p. 132). She further writes that Abhinava’s “dismissal of the thesis that the effect is inexplicable, i.e., both and neither existent and nonexistent, is quite close to that found in the M ā ṭ harav ṛ tti ” (2014, pp. 133–34). 82 Moriyama observes this. He writes: “For instance, with regard to the above term s ā dhyatv ā t , Wezler and Motegi have documented a marginal note found in a Kashmir manuscript of the YD as follows: ‘YD, p. 123, marginal note (5): s ā dhyatv ā d iti. na hi sarvathaiv ā psu na vidyate ’ ṅ kura ḥ . y ā hy ā po b ī jade śā nuprave ś en ā s ī n ā d up ā d ā n ā d antarviparivarttitay ā ṅ kura ṃ janayant ī ti t ā sv apy a ṅ kuro ’sty eveti.’ According to the editors’ introduction (YD, pp. xxiv-xxv), ‘[t]he author, or one of the authors, ... was remarkably familiar with Mahāyā na Buddhism, a fact that would suggest that he/they may have lived before the extinction of Buddhism in Kashmir, i.e., in the 14 th century A.D.’ There is also another marginal note where we find the words ‘Abhinavagupta’s S ā ṃ khyanir ṇ aya ,’ which A. Sanderson has identified as a section of the Tantr ā loka (YD, p. xxv). From such information, it is at least possible to say that this unique Sāṅ khya text had a certain impact in the Kashmir region, where it was studied together with Kashmir Śaiva texts” (2016, pp. 292–93). Elsewhere Moriyama writes concerning Utpala’s familiarity with the YD: “is there any evidence for Utpaladeva’s familiarity with the YD? The latter is not unimaginable when considering Kashmir Śaivism’s close relation to the Sāṅ khya text” (2016, p. 292). 83 Ratié cites Vācaspati Miśra: “[The author of the S ā ṃ khyak ā rik ā s] states the reason why [the effect must exist before the operation of its cause by saying] ‘because there is no production of the non-existent.’ [That is to say:] if the effect is nonexistent before the operation of its cause, its existence cannot be produced; for even innumerable artists cannot make the blue yellow!” ( atra hetum ā ha: asadakara ṇ ā t. asac cet k ā ra ṇ avy ā p ā r ā t p ū rva ṃ k ā rya ṃ n ā sya sattva ṃ kartu ṃ ś akyam. na hi n īl a ṃ ś ilpisahasre ṇ ā pi p ī ta ṃ kartu ṃ ś akyate ) (Srinivasan 1967, pp. 96– 98; quoted in Ratié 2014, p. 134). tti , Gaudapadabhasya , the Jayama ˙ngala , the Tattvakaumudi , and the Yuktidipika . Rati é observes: [These texts] vary greatly as regards the number of theses [that are given in karika 9 about satkaryavada ] . . almost all these Sam . khya commentaries introduce the verse in the same way, i.e., by insisting that there is a disagreement ( vipratipatti ) among various masters on the subject, so that the list of reasons adduced to prove the satkaryavada is necessary so as to get rid of the doubt ( sam . ´saya ) bound to arise due to the multiplicity of contradictory theses held in this regard (2014, pp. 133–34) Going further (and echoing the early discussion in this paper), Abhinava (along with Utpala) defends “the ontological status of the e ff ect” in a manner that “is reminiscent” of how the Matharavrtti introduces satkaryavada ( Rati é 2014 , p. 132) 81 Amongst postkarika commentaries, the Yuktidipika (YD) and the Tattvakaumudi (TK) seem to have been the most influential ( Rati é 2014 ; Moriyama 2016 ). The YD was studied in Kashmir alongside other Kashmir ´Saiva texts, and it is plausible that Utpala and Abhinava were themselves familiar with this text 82 Meanwhile, Abhinava echoes Vacaspati Misra when he playfully writes that blue cannot come from yellow—an example meant to illustrate the SK-supported view that the e ff ect cannot arise from non-existence ( Srinivasan 1967 , pp. 96–98; cited in Rati é 2014 , p. 134) 83 Pratyabhijña reliance upon commentarial literature is even more obvious in its treatment of the Sam . khya notion that the cause produces only the manifestation of the e ff ect, not the actual existence of the e ff ect. The YD and the TK appear to be those texts from which Utpala and Abhinava derived abhivyakti as a mechanism for explaining vyaktaprakrti as the mere appearance of the e ff ect (i.e., not the e ff ect itself) of its supposed cause, m ulaprakrti . Certainly, non-dual ´Saivas could not have taken this doctrine from the SK itself, since Isvarakrsna never refers to “ abhivyakti ” nor does he develop such a theory of 81 Rati é notes that Abhinava’s IPVV argument in favor of satkaryavada “is obviously the first reason adduced in Sam . khyakarika 9” (2014, p. 132). She further writes that Abhinava’s “dismissal of the thesis that the e ff ect is inexplicable, i.e., both and neither existent and nonexistent, is quite close to that found in the Matharavrtti ” (2014, pp. 133–34) 82 Moriyama observes this. He writes: “For instance, with regard to the above term sadhyatvat , Wezler and Motegi have documented a marginal note found in a Kashmir manuscript of the YD as follows: ‘YD, p. 123, marginal note (5): sadhyatvad iti. na hi sarvathaivapsu na vidyate ’ ˙nkurah.. ya hy apo bijadesanupravesenasinad upadanad antarviparivarttitaya˙nkuram. janayantiti tasv apy a ˙nkuro ’sty eveti’ According to the editors’ introduction (YD, pp. xxiv-xxv), ‘[t]he author, or one of the authors, . . was remarkably familiar with Mahayana Buddhism, a fact that would suggest that he / they may have lived before the extinction of Buddhism in Kashmir, i.e., in the 14 th century A.D.’ There is also another marginal note where we find the words ‘Abhinavagupta’s Sam . khyanirnaya ,’ which A. Sanderson has identified as a section of the Tantr¯aloka (YD, p. xxv). From such information, it is at least possible to say that this unique Sa ˙nkhya text had a certain impact in the Kashmir region, where it was studied together with Kashmir ´Saiva texts” (2016, pp. 292–93). Elsewhere Moriyama writes concerning Utpala’s familiarity with the YD: “is there any evidence for Utpaladeva’s familiarity with the YD? The latter is not unimaginable when considering Kashmir ´Saivism’s close relation to the Sa ˙nkhya text” (2016, p. 292) 83 Rati é cites Vacaspati Misra: “[The author of the Sam . khyakarika s] states the reason why [the e ff ect must exist before the operation of its cause by saying] ‘because there is no production of the non-existent.’ [That is to say:] if the e ff ect is nonexistent before the operation of its cause, its existence cannot be produced; for even innumerable artists cannot make the blue yellow!” ( atra hetum aha: asadakaranat. asac cet karanavyaparat purvam. karyam. nasya sattvam. kartum. sakyam. na hi nilam silpisahasrenapi pitam. kartum. sakyate ) ( Srinivasan 1967 , pp. 96–98; quoted in Rati é 2014 , p. 134).

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 29 of 38 manifestation (the SK never theorizes manifestation apart from the powers of prakrti ). Rati é helpfully shows that the YD and the TK appropriate this doctrine from Varsaganya (or V Religions 2020 , 11 , x FOR PEER REVIEW 30 of 40 appear to be those texts from wh i ch Utpala and Abh i nava der i ved abh i vyakt i as a mechan i sm for expla i n i ng vyaktaprak ṛ t i as the mere appearance of the effect (i.e., not the effect i tself) of i ts supposed cause, m ū laprak ṛ t i . Certa i nly, non-dual Śa i vas could not have taken th i s doctr i ne from the SK i tself, s i nce Īśvarakṛṣṇa never refers to “ abh i vyakt i ” nor does he develop such a theory of man i festat i on (the SK never theor i zes man i festat i on apart from the powers of prak ṛ t i ). Rat i é helpfully shows that the YD and the TK appropr i ate th i s doctr i ne from Vārṣagaṇya (or V ṛṣagaṇa), author of the i mportant but now lost Sāṃ khya text, the Ṣ a ṣṭi tantra (2014, p. 130) 84 Th i s suggests the follow i ng. F i rst, the YD and the TK (among other post- k ā r i k ā texts) recogn i zed the SK to be spec i ally author i tat i ve i n convey i ng Sāṃ khya doctr i ne but also requ i r i ng further art i culat i on and development i n order for the system to adapt to emerg i ng challenges i n the South As i an academy. By rev i s i ng Sāṃ khya through an appeal to the Ṣ a ṣṭi tantra (among other l i kely sources), commentators preserved the doctr i ne aga i nst i ts opponents. Second, Utpala and Abh i nava (and many other opponents of Sāṃ khya) may have taken i t for granted that class i cal Sāṃ khya commentar i es represented the best ava i lable defense of the i r canon i cal texts (i.e., the SK). At least partly for th i s reason, they leaned heav i ly upon the YD, the TK, and other commentar i es i n order to clar i fy Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s text and Sāṃ khya generally. But wh i le class i cal commentators successfully defended Sāṃ khya aga i nst some cr i t i c i sms by go i ng beyond the SK, they nonetheless made the system vulnerable to other attacks by overlook i ng i mportant nuances of Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s ph i losophy. Cons i der, for i nstance, that the Pratyabhijñā cr i t i c i sm of Sāṃ khya’s satk ā ryav ā da i s pred i cated on the v i ew that “the Sāṅ khya expla i ns the evolut i on of the world from a s i ngle, mater i al cause” (Mor i yama 2016, p. 295). The YD, the TK, and most other commentar i es hold to such a read i ng of Sāṃ khya metaphysics. Among other th i ngs, th i s i s i mpl i ed by the i r deploy i ng metaphors of i nan i mate mater i al th i ngs, such as the stock example of clay and pot 85 But th i s fa i ls to develop the centrally i mportant organ i c d i mens i on of Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s mater i al i sm, and i t also i gnores the i nt i mate relat i onsh i p that Īśvarakṛṣṇa marks out between procreat i v i ty and man i festat i on. I n the SK, “ vyakta ” i s t i ed to— i ndeed, i t i s grammat i cally and ontolog i cally subord i nate to—" prak ṛ t i .” An i nqu i ry i nto the nature of man i festat i on (“ vyakta ” or “ abh i vyakt i ”), then, should take place w i th i n the context of the larger quest i on, “What i s the mean i ng of prak ṛ t i ?”, that i s, “What i s the mean i ng of procreat i v i ty made man i fest?” However, th i s i s neglected i n the abh i vyakt i theory of the YD and the TK. I nstead of theor i z i ng matter and i ts appearance as express i ons of nature’s l i v i ng power, the authors of the YD and the TK re-art i culate Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s system as a k i nd of reduct i ve mater i al i sm—prec i sely the k i nd of mater i al i sm that came under attack by non-dual Śa i vas. Th i s i s i llustrated i n how Utpala and Abh i nava i nterpret SK 9 through the YD’s theory of sahak ā r i n . “ Sahak ā r i n ” denotes “aux i l i ary cause,” of wh i ch there are two types: (1) those that, “un i t i ng 84 Ratié elucidates: “Thus the Yuktid ī pik ā , relying on Vārṣagaṇya’s assertion that the universe appears and disappears without coming into being or being altogether destroyed, explains that although the effect is not made to exist by the cause—since it already exists in the cause in a latent form or as a potentiality ( ś akti )—it is revealed or made manifest by the cause; and just as it is not really produced but merely manifested by the cause, in the same way, it does not really suffer destruction but only ceases to be manifested. The effect is thus the result of a process of transformation ( pari ṇ ā ma ) explained in terms of mere appearance ( ā virbh ā va ) and disappearance ( tirobh ā va ) and not in terms of arising and annihilation” (2014, pp. 136–37). In support of this claim, she cites the YD: “ k ā ra ṇ ā n ā ṃ tu ya ḥ parasparasa ṃ sarg ā t sa ṃ sth ā navi ś e ṣ aparigraha ḥ , tasya virodhi ś aktyantar ā virbh ā v ā d vyaktis tirodh īy ata ity etad vin āś a ś abdena vivak ṣ itam. tath ā ca v ā r ṣ aga ṇ ā ḥ pa ṭ hanti–tad etat trailokya ṃ vyakter apaiti na sattv ā t. apetam apy asti vin āś aprati ṣ edh ā t. sa ṃ sarg ā c c ā sya sauk ṣ mya ṃ sauk ṣ my ā c c ā nupalabdhi ḥ . tasm ā d vyaktyapagamo vin āś a ḥ .” “Rather, the manifestation ( vyakti ) of the [effect], which has assumed a particular arrangement through the merging of [its] causes into one another, disappears due to the manifestation of another potentiality ( ś akti ) that contradicts [the first one]—this is what the word ‘destruction’ [really] means. And accordingly, the followers of V ṛ ṣagaṇa teach [the following]: ‘All this threefold world withdraws from manifestation, [but] not from existence. [And] even though it withdraws [from manifestation], it exists, because [we] deny [the possibility of] destruction. And because of its merging [into primordial nature, the world] is subtle; and due to its subtlety, it is not perceived. Therefore, destruction is the disappearance of manifestation” (Wezler and Motegi 1998, pp. 128–29). 85 As alluded to earlier, there are countless examples of post- k ā rik ā commentaries that use the clay-pot analogy, including the YD, the TK, and the M ā ṭ harav ṛ tti . Much of this is demonstrated in Ratié 2014 (e.g., 132–33, 138) and Moriyama 2016 (e.g., 291). sagana), author of the important but now lost Sam . khya text, the Sastitantra (2014, p. 130) 84 This suggests the following. First, the YD and the TK (among other postkarika texts) recognized the SK to be specially authoritative in conveying Sam . khya doctrine but also requiring further articulation and development in order for the system to adapt to emerging challenges in the South Asian academy. By revising Sam . khya through an appeal to the Sastitantra (among other likely sources), commentators preserved the doctrine against its opponents. Second, Utpala and Abhinava (and many other opponents of Sam . khya) may have taken it for granted that classical Sam . khya commentaries represented the best available defense of their canonical texts (i.e., the SK). At least partly for this reason, they leaned heavily upon the YD, the TK, and other commentaries in order to clarify Isvarakrsna’s text and Samkhya generally But while classical commentators successfully defended Sam . khya against some criticisms by going beyond the SK, they nonetheless made the system vulnerable to other attacks by overlooking important nuances of Isvarakrsna’s philosophy. Consider, for instance, that the Pratyabhijña criticism of Sam . khya’s satkaryavada is predicated on the view that “the Sa ˙nkhya explains the evolution of the world from a single, material cause” ( Moriyama 2016 , p. 295). The YD, the TK, and most other commentaries hold to such a reading of Sam . khya metaphysics. Among other things, this is implied by their deploying metaphors of inanimate material things, such as the stock example of clay and pot 85 But this fails to develop the centrally important organic dimension of Isvarakrsna’s materialism, and it also ignores the intimate relationship that Isvarakrsna marks out between procreativity and manifestation. In the SK, “ vyakta ” is tied to—indeed, it is grammatically and ontologically subordinate to—“ prakrti .” An inquiry into the nature of manifestation (“ vyakta ” or “ abhivyakti ”), then, should take place within the context of the larger question, “What is the meaning of prakrti ?”, that is, “What is the meaning of procreativity made manifest?” However, this is neglected in the abhivyakti theory of the YD and the TK. Instead of theorizing matter and its appearance as expressions of nature’s living power, the authors of the YD and the TK re-articulate Isvarakrsna’s system as a kind of reductive materialism—precisely the kind of materialism that came under attack by non-dual ´Saivas This is illustrated in how Utpala and Abhinava interpret SK 9 through the YD’s theory of sahakarin “ Sahakarin ” denotes “auxiliary cause,” of which there are two types: (1) those that, “uniting with the material cause, give rise to the e ff ect through transformation of the material cause,” and (2) those that “do not unite with the material cause but operate externally to it, e.g., the stick and wheel a potter uses to fashion clay” ( Taber 1986 , p. 120; quoted in Moriyama 2016 , p. 289). In both varieties, the sahakarin (e.g., a stick, a wheel, or even a soul or purusa ) “penetrates” ( pravesa ) into the material cause (the clay) in order to create or manifest specific features ( visesa / sesa ) in the form of the e ff ect 84 Rati é elucidates: “Thus the Yuktidipika , relying on Varsaganya’s assertion that the universe appears and disappears without coming into being or being altogether destroyed, explains that although the e ff ect is not made to exist by the cause—since it already exists in the cause in a latent form or as a potentiality ( sakti )—it is revealed or made manifest by the cause; and just as it is not really produced but merely manifested by the cause, in the same way, it does not really su ff er destruction but only ceases to be manifested. The e ff ect is thus the result of a process of transformation ( parinama ) explained in terms of mere appearance ( avirbhava ) and disappearance ( tirobhava ) and not in terms of arising and annihilation” (2014, pp. 136–37). In support of this claim, she cites the YD: “ karananam. tu yah. parasparasamsargat samsthanavisesaparigrahah., tasya virodhisaktyantaravirbhavad vyaktis tirodhiyata ity etad vinasasabdena vivaksitam. tatha ca varsaganah. pathanti–tad etat trailokyam . vyakter apaiti na sattvat. apetam apy asti vinasapratisedhat. sam . sargac casya sauksmyam . sauksmyac canupalabdhih.. tasmad vyaktyapagamo vinasah .” “Rather, the manifestation ( vyakti ) of the [e ff ect], which has assumed a particular arrangement through the merging of [its] causes into one another, disappears due to the manifestation of another potentiality ( sakti ) that contradicts [the first one]—this is what the word ‘destruction’ [really] means. And accordingly, the followers of V Religions 2020 , 11 , x FOR PEER REVIEW 30 of 40 appear to be those texts from wh i ch Utpala and Abh i nava der i ved abh i vyakt i as a mechan i sm for expla i n i ng vyaktaprak ṛ t i as the mere appearance of the effect (i.e., not the effect i tself) of i ts supposed cause, m ū laprak ṛ t i . Certa i nly, non-dual Śa i vas could not have taken th i s doctr i ne from the SK i tself, s i nce Īśvarakṛṣṇa never refers to “ abh i vyakt i ” nor does he develop such a theory of man i festat i on (the SK never theor i zes man i festat i on apart from the powers of prak ṛ t i ). Rat i é helpfully shows that the YD and the TK appropr i ate th i s doctr i ne from Vārṣagaṇya (or V ṛṣagaṇa), author of the i mportant but now lost Sāṃ khya text, the Ṣ a ṣṭi tantra (2014, p. 130) 84 Th i s suggests the follow i ng. F i rst, the YD and the TK (among other post- k ā r i k ā texts) recogn i zed the SK to be spec i ally author i tat i ve i n convey i ng Sāṃ khya doctr i ne but also requ i r i ng further art i culat i on and development i n order for the system to adapt to emerg i ng challenges i n the South As i an academy. By rev i s i ng Sāṃ khya through an appeal to the Ṣ a ṣṭi tantra (among other l i kely sources), commentators preserved the doctr i ne aga i nst i ts opponents. Second, Utpala and Abh i nava (and many other opponents of Sāṃ khya) may have taken i t for granted that class i cal Sāṃ khya commentar i es represented the best ava i lable defense of the i r canon i cal texts (i.e., the SK). At least partly for th i s reason, they leaned heav i ly upon the YD, the TK, and other commentar i es i n order to clar i fy Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s text and Sāṃ khya generally. But wh i le class i cal commentators successfully defended Sāṃ khya aga i nst some cr i t i c i sms by go i ng beyond the SK, they nonetheless made the system vulnerable to other attacks by overlook i ng i mportant nuances of Īśva rakṛṣṇa’s ph i losophy. Cons i der, for i nstance, that the Pratyabhijñā cr i t i c i sm of Sāṃ khya’s satk ā ryav ā da i s pred i cated on the v i ew that “the Sāṅ khya expla i ns the evolut i on of the world from a s i ngle, mater i al cause” (Mor i yama 2016, p. 295). The YD, the TK, and most other commentar i es hold to such a read i ng of Sāṃ khya metaphysics. Among other th i ngs, th i s i s i mpl i ed by the i r deploy i ng metaphors of i nan i mate mater i al th i ngs, such as the stock example of clay and pot 85 But th i s fa i ls to develop the centrally i mportant organ i c d i mens i on of Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s mater i al i sm, and i t also i gnores the i nt i mate relat i onsh i p that Īśvarakṛṣṇa marks out between procreat i v i ty and man i festat i on. I n the SK, “ vyakta ” i s t i ed to— i ndeed, i t i s grammat i cally and ontolog i cally subord i nate to—" prak ṛ t i .” An i nqu i ry i nto the nature of man i festat i on (“ vyakta ” or “ abh i vyakt i ”), then, should take place w i th i n the context of the larger quest i on, “What i s the mean i ng of prak ṛ t i ?”, that i s, “What i s the mean i ng of procreat i v i ty made man i fest?” However, th i s i s neglected i n the abh i vyakt i theory of the YD and the TK. I nstead of theor i z i ng matter and i ts appearance as express i ons of nature’s l i v i ng power, the authors of the YD and the TK re-art i culate Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s system as a k i nd of reduct i ve mater i al i sm—prec i sely the k i nd of mater i al i sm that came under attack by non-dual Śa i vas. Th i s i s i llustrated i n how Utpala and Abh i nava i nterpret SK 9 through the YD’s theory of sahak ā r i n . “ Sahak ā r i n ” denotes “aux i l i ary cause,” of wh i ch there are two types: (1) those that, “un i t i ng 84 Ratié elucidates: “Thus the Yuktid ī pik ā , relying on Vārṣagaṇya’s assertion that the universe appears and disappears without coming into being or being altogether destroyed, explains that although the effect is not made to exist by the cause—since it already exists in the cause in a latent form or as a potentiality ( ś akti )—it is revealed or made manifest by the cause; and just as it is not really produced but merely manifested by the cause, in the same way, it does not really suffer destruction but only ceases to be manifested. The effect is thus the result of a process of transformation ( pari ṇ ā ma ) explained in terms of mere appearance ( ā virbh ā va ) and disappearance ( tirobh ā va ) and not in terms of arising and annihilation” (2014, pp. 136–37). In support of this claim, she cites the YD: “ k ā ra ṇ ā n ā ṃ tu ya ḥ parasparasa ṃ sarg ā t sa ṃ sth ā navi ś e ṣ aparigraha ḥ , tasya virodhi ś aktyantar ā virbh ā v ā d vyaktis tirodh īy ata ity etad vin āś a ś abdena vivak ṣ itam. tath ā ca v ā r ṣ aga ṇ ā ḥ pa ṭ hanti–tad etat trailokya ṃ vyakter apaiti na sattv ā t. apetam apy asti vin āś aprati ṣ edh ā t. sa ṃ sarg ā c c ā sya sauk ṣ mya ṃ sauk ṣ my ā c c ā nupalabdhi ḥ . tasm ā d vyaktyapagamo vin āś a ḥ .” “Rather, the manifestation ( vyakti ) of the [effect], which has assumed a particular arrangement through the merging of [its] causes into one another, disappears due to the manifestation of another potentiality ( ś akti ) that contradicts [the first one]—this is what the word ‘destruction’ [really] means. And accordingly, the followers of V ṛ ṣagaṇa teach [the following]: ‘All this threefold world withdraws from manifestation, [but] not from existence. [And] even though it withdraws [from manifestation], it exists, because [we] deny [the possibility of] destruction. And because of its merging [into primordial nature, the world] is subtle; and due to its subtlety, it is not perceived. Therefore, destruction is the disappearance of manifestation” (Wezler and Motegi 1998, pp. 128–29). 85 As alluded to earlier, there are countless examples of post- k ā rik ā commentaries that use the clay-pot analogy, including the YD, the TK, and the M ā ṭ harav ṛ tti . Much of this is demonstrated in Ratié 2014 (e.g., 132–33, 138) and Moriyama 2016 (e.g., 291). sagana teach [the following]: ‘All this threefold world withdraws from manifestation, [but] not from existence. [And] even though it withdraws [from manifestation], it exists, because [we] deny [the possibility of] destruction. And because of its merging [into primordial nature, the world] is subtle; and due to its subtlety, it is not perceived. Therefore, destruction is the disappearance of manifestation” ( Wezler and Motegi 1998 , pp. 128–29) 85 As alluded to earlier, there are countless examples of postkarika commentaries that use the clay-pot analogy, including the YD, the TK, and the Matharav Religions 2020 , 11 , x FOR PEER REVIEW 29 of 40 ph i losoph i cal narrat i ve that precluded metaphys i cal dual i sm and the self-suff i c i ent power of nature to conceal i tself. 5.1. Rel i ance upon Class i cal S ā ṃ khya Commentar i es We cannot say w i th certa i nty why Utpala and Abh i nava d i d not g i ve more careful attent i on to the SK. But one reason l i kely concerns the mater i als to wh i ch they had access i n mak i ng sense of Sāṃ khya theor i es of causat i on and man i festat i on. I t appears that Utpala and Abh i nava depended upon class i cal Sāṃ khya commentar i es that were not comm i tted to Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s organ i c i sm. Recent scholarsh i p suggests that Pratyabhijñā th i nkers engaged the SK pr i mar i ly by way of i ts h i stor i cally later Sāṃ khya i nterpretat i ons. For example, Abh i nava’s approach to the quest i on of causal i ty at SK 9 i m i tates the methodology found i n several commentar i es, i nclud i ng the M ā ṭ harav ṛ tt i , Gau ḍ ap ā dabh ā ṣ ya , the Jayama ṅ gal ā , the Tattvakaumud ī , and the Yukt i d ī p i k ā . Rat i é observes: [These texts] vary greatly as regards the number of theses [that are g i ven i n k ā r i k ā 9 about satk ā ryav ā da ]… almost all these Sāṃ khya commentar i es i ntroduce the verse i n the same way, i.e., by i ns i st i ng that there i s a d i sagreement ( v i prat i patt i ) among var i ous masters on the subject, so that the l i st of reasons adduced to prove the satk ā ryav ā da i s necessary so as to get r i d of the doubt ( sa ṃ ś aya ) bound to ar i se due to the mult i pl i c i ty of contrad i ctory theses held i n th i s regard (2014, p. 133–34). Go i ng further (and echo i ng the early d i scuss i on i n th i s paper), Abh i nava (along w i th Utpala) defends “the ontolog i cal status of the effect” i n a manner that “ i s rem i n i scent” of how the M ā ṭ harav ṛ tt i i ntroduces satk ā ryav ā da (Rat i é 2014, p. 132) 81 Amongst post- k ā r i k ā commentar i es, the Yukt i d ī p i k ā (YD) and the Tattvakaumud ī (TK) seem to have been the most i nfluent i al (Rat i é 2014; Mor i yama 2016). The YD was stud i ed i n Kashm i r alongs i de other Kashm i r Śa i va texts, and i t i s plaus i ble that Utpala and Abh i nava were themselves fam i l i ar w i th th i s text 82 Meanwh i le, Abh i nava echoes Vācaspat i Miśra when he playfully wr i tes that blue cannot come from yellow—an example meant to i llustrate the SK-supported v i ew that the effect cannot ar i se from non-ex i stence (Sr i n i vasan 1967, p. 96–98; c i ted i n Rat i é 2014, p. 134) 83 Pratyabhijñā rel i ance upon commentar i al l i terature i s even more obv i ous i n i ts treatment of the Sāṃ khya not i on that the cause produces only the man i festat i on of the effect, not the actual ex i stence of the effect. The YD and the TK 81 Ratié notes that Abhinava’s I P VV argument in favor of satk ā ryav ā da “is obviously the first reason adduced in S ā ṃ khyak ā rik ā 9” (2014, p. 132). She further writes that Abhinava’s “dismissal of the thesis that the effect is inexplicable, i.e., both and neither existent and nonexistent, is quite close to that found in the M ā ṭ harav ṛ tti ” (2014, pp. 133–34). 82 Moriyama observes this. He writes: “For instance, with regard to the above term s ā dhyatv ā t , Wezler and Motegi have documented a marginal note found in a Kashmir manuscript of the YD as follows: ‘YD, p. 123, marginal note (5): s ā dhyatv ā d iti. na hi sarvathaiv ā psu na vidyate ’ ṅ kura ḥ . y ā hy ā po b ī jade śā nuprave ś en ā s ī n ā d up ā d ā n ā d antarviparivarttitay ā ṅ kura ṃ janayant ī ti t ā sv apy a ṅ kuro ’sty eveti.’ According to the editors’ introduction (YD, pp. xxiv-xxv), ‘[t]he author, or one of the authors, ... was remarkably familiar with Mahāyā na Buddhism, a fact that would suggest that he/they may have lived before the extinction of Buddhism in Kashmir, i.e., in the 14 th century A.D.’ There is also another marginal note where we find the words ‘Abhinavagupta’s S ā ṃ khyanir ṇ aya ,’ which A. Sanderson has identified as a section of the Tantr ā loka (YD, p. xxv). From such information, it is at least possible to say that this unique Sāṅ khya text had a certain impact in the Kashmir region, where it was studied together with Kashmir Śaiva texts” (2016, pp. 292–93). Elsewhere Moriyama writes concerning Utpala’s familiarity with the YD: “is there any evidence for Utpaladeva’s familiarity with the YD? The latter is not unimaginable when considering Kashmir Śaivism’s close relation to the Sāṅ khya text” (2016, p. 292). 83 Ratié cites Vācaspati Miśra: “[The author of the S ā ṃ khyak ā rik ā s] states the reason why [the effect must exist before the operation of its cause by saying] ‘because there is no production of the non-existent.’ [That is to say:] if the effect is nonexistent before the operation of its cause, its existence cannot be produced; for even innumerable artists cannot make the blue yellow!” ( atra hetum ā ha: asadakara ṇ ā t. asac cet k ā ra ṇ avy ā p ā r ā t p ū rva ṃ k ā rya ṃ n ā sya sattva ṃ kartu ṃ ś akyam. na hi n īl a ṃ ś ilpisahasre ṇ ā pi p ī ta ṃ kartu ṃ ś akyate ) (Srinivasan 1967, pp. 96– 98; quoted in Ratié 2014, p. 134). tti . Much of this is demonstrated in Rati é 2014 , (e.g., pp. 132–33, 138) and Moriyama 2016 , (e.g., p. 291).

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 30 of 38 (e.g., the pot) ( Moriyama 2016 , p. 291). But this portrayal of Sam . khya metaphysics does not convey Isvarakrsna’s vision. As demonstrated above, vyaktaprakrti in the SK is not inert, non-intelligent matter that requires something to unite with it or an external cause ( sahakarin types 1 and 2, respectively) Rather, it is a living organism that generates itself of its own power and design M ulaprakrti , for its part, is a raw, non-intentional procreativity that contributes to the birthing of vyaktaprakrti but connotes neither a material cause (it is not “primordial nature,” as implied by the YD’s interpretation) nor something that transforms itself into vyaktaprakrti (for reasons given above) ( Wezler and Motegi 1998 , p. 129; quoted in Rati é 2014 , p. 136). This leads to consideration of a related incongruity between the YD’s sahakarin thesis and the doctrine of the SK. According to Isvarakrsna, it is the sam . yoga of m ulaprakrti and purusa that self-manifests in the form of vyaktaprakrti . The YD, however, alters the nature of this “compresence” ( sam . yoga ) with its auxiliary cause hypothesis. In the SK, the only “thing” that transcends and subsists independent of m ulaprakrti —and hence, could “unite with” or “operate externally to” m ulaprakrti , per the YD description of sahakarin s 1 and 2, respectively—is the purusa But from the perspective of the SK, it cannot be the case that the purusa is a supporting cause, since the purusa is neither an agential nor an e ffi cient cause. Moreover, taking the (SK’s) purusa to be a sahakarin wrongly implies a “causal complex” (what Abhinava terms a samagri ) or a collection of various other sahakarin s that are equiprimordial to and subsist independent of m ulaprakrti ( Moriyama 2016 , p. 293) 86 It is not surprising that Isvarakrsna never mentions a theory of sahakarin or anything like it. Contrary to the YD’s portrayal, he does not enlist the purusa to “take the role of a sahakarin as a co-operating factor for the arising of various things from primordial matter” ( Moriyama 2016 , p. 293) 87 From this, the “auxiliary cause” theory not only disregards important features of the SK’s satkaryavada It misconstrues it (albeit, perhaps unbeknownst to its own authors) by claiming to illuminate or amplify our understanding of the views given in (or at least implied by) the SK 88 The YD (in addition to the TK and other SK commentaries) misrepresents subtle but nonetheless core aspects of Isvarakrsna’s system, including the causal–creative relationship between m ulaprakrti , purusa , and vyaktaprakrti . Moreover, this oversight, conjoined with its explicating the “ vyakta ” of “ vyaktaprakrti ” in terms of abhivyakti theory, e ff ectively made Sam . khya’s doctrine of cause–e ff ect relations susceptible to Pratyabhijña criticism. Indeed, based upon the YD’s account, manifestations (clay pots) qua mere material things cannot undergo transformation (once a clay pot, now a clay figurine) without losing their essential identity, since they have already been stripped of their vital nature ( prakrti ) 5.2. Utpala and Abhinava as Philosophical Readers In probing other reasons for why Utpala and Abhinava misread Isvarakrsna’s doctrine, consider their respective treatments of non-Pratyabhijña systems generally. Utpala presents Sam . khya ideas of 86 Abhinava and other non-dual Kashmir ´Saiva philosophers often sought to articulate the Sam . khya view of causality in terms of a network of causal factors. This is seen as early as the writings of Somananda, who also seems to have articulated the Sam . khya doctrine in terms of the YD and TK commentaries. Rati é explains: “In a particularly telling passage, Somananda reminds us that the Sam . khyas justify the preexistence of the e ff ect in its cause by arguing that the e ff ect can only arise if it is related to the factors of action, so that it must exist when these factors of action engage in activity, because their action must be exerted on something: according to the Yuktidipika, the object on which the causes act, i.e. the e ff ect, must exist when they start acting, otherwise the relation ( sambandha ) between the e ff ect and the factors of action would remain inexplicable” (2014, p. 151) 87 It also is not the case that the purusa is a “soul” in Sam . khya (or at least, not in the SK), counter to Moriyama’s translation at 2016, p. 293. It is unclear whether this is Moriyama’s own translation of “ purusa ” or whether this translation gets suggested by the YD itself 88 Several Sam . khya scholars contend that the YD largely fails to develop the philosophy of the SK. Burley, for example, writes: “Although its rediscovery has been heralded by some as being of such great significance as to render all previous scholarship ‘outdated,’ my own view is that such claims are exaggerated. The Yuktikipika’s significance derives mostly from the information it provides about disputes between proponents of Sam . khya and those of rival Indian systems, especially Buddhism. What it does not do, in my opinion, is shed any new light upon the meaning of the classical text itself. While I have, then, consulted the available editions, I have not treated the Yuktidipika as any more or less authoritative than the other traditional commentaries” (2007, pp. 9–10). I agree with Burley’s point here.

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 31 of 38 causation, manifestation, and liberation alongside his treatment of Nyaya theories of the same in his Isvarasiddhi . His interest in Nyaya largely centers around the now lost argument for the existence of God given by the classical Nyaya philosopher, Aviddhakarna: Utpala was intent to establish the reality of ´Siva, and Nyaya was useful to this end ( Moriyama 2016 , p. 287). However, in order to determine the nature of God’s personality and its significance for the individual person’s attaining liberation—that is, in order to show that God is ´Siva and ´Siva is a playful, creative divinity—he ultimately had to refute Nyaya. This o ff ers clues to understanding Utpala’s appraisal of Sam . khya. Sam . khya helped Utpala to demonstrate that e ff ects (e.g., phenomenal reality) exist latent in their cause (´Siva). But of course, in order to secure non-dual ´Saiva theological goals—namely, ´Siva alone is the cause that exhibits itself in all things—he had to discredit the Sam . khya view that phenomenal reality results from prakrti I believe that this abiding concern at least partly underlies his clustering together of Isvarakrsna’s doctrine with that of historically later Sam . khya commentaries. Sam . khya views of the material world, causation, dualism, and so on, were strategically generalized and then recast in order to portray how “´Siva, understood as a universal and all-encompassing consciousness, is the sole agent” of creation ( Rati é 2014 , p. 128) This proclivity on the part of Abhinava is more subtle. In drawing this out, recall the earlier discussion of how Abhinava omits important contributions in the history of Buddhist thought (e.g., the Pramanavarttikalamkara ) and oversimplifies significant ideas ( vijñanavada or “mind-only”). I revisit this issue here in order to draw a parallel with how Abhinava approaches the history of Sam . khya philosophy. While classical commentators influenced Abhinava’s thinking about the SK, he was not a passive recipient of the text’s meaning through these commentaries. He read Sam . khya texts with a certain intent—an intent to organize them into a story of ideas (in this limited respect I agree with McCrea’s argument). However, Abhinava exercised a methodological choice di ff erent than that of McCrea’s intellectual historian. He overlooked important distinctions in Sam . khya in order to absorb the views of his rival into the mythical narrative of ´Siva at play with his consort and other, ´Sakti Abhinava subordinated historical facts to a philosophical story wherein ´Siva only pretends to be a passive, impotent self ( purusa ) juxtaposed against seemingly insentient matter ( prakrti ). Lawrence’s comment here applies: Abhinava’s (as well as Utpala’s) underlying goal was to demonstrate how the individual can re-enact “the non-dual ´Saiva myth and rituals of ´Siva emanating and controlling the universe through his power and consort ´Sakti [ . . ,] lead[ing] the adept towards identity with ´Siva by disclosing his or her possession of his immanent ´Sakti” (2013, p. 90). Terms ( prakrti , satkaryavada , etc.) and structures (dualism) of the SK registered within Abhinava’s history of ideas only insofar as they could be overcoded within the central myth of ´Siva-´Sakti. This meant that the autopoietic unfolding of nature had to be re-thematized as the self-expression of a divine Super-Agent (i.e., ´Siva) By way of a lengthy Conclusion, let us thus consider two philosophical biases that are encrypted in the non-dual ´Saiva treatment of Sam . khya and the SK, in particular: anti-dualism and anti-naturalism 5.2.1. Anti-Dualism Bias One prejudice that we find Utpala and Abhinava reading into Isvarakrsna’s system is that of anti-dualism. Recall that, in their treatment of Sam . khya’s abhivyakti doctrine, Utpala and Abhinava render the purusa - prakrti dichotomy in terms of a duality between awareness of manifestation (of the material object) and the material object itself, respectively. Rati é summarizes the Pratyabhijña view examined above: “The Sam . khya notion of sakti eventually boils down to the idea that things can exist apart from their manifestation, since for the Sam . khyas it designates the unmanifested state [ m ulaprakrti ] in which the e ff ect exists before the cause reveals it, or the state in which the e ff ect could be manifested but is not” (2014, p. 166). While this criticism may hold with respect to some Sam . khya commentaries, it misrepresents Isvarakrsna’s dualism. For one, duality in the SK involves purusa and m ulaprakrti , not purusa and prakrti . Second, this dichotomy of purusa and m ulaprakrti is not one of awareness of manifestation and the thing-to-be-made-manifest, respectively. As a non-intentional, inactive, structureless awareness, the purusa neither manifests objects nor cognizes things as objects (SK 21). In fact,

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 32 of 38 Isvarakrsna ascribes the power of prakasa (illumination or manifestation) to vyaktaprakrti —specifically, to the mahat-buddhi 89 M ulaprakrti also transcends space and time, and hence never presents itself (as implied by SK 21). This raw, undirected, procreative power is not even an unmanifest thing or the seedbank wherefrom objects arise. Manifest objects rather emerge from within the capacities of vyaktaprakrti itself. Manifesting awareness, manifest object, and their interrelation are held in an aboriginal unity within vyaktaprakrti (specifically, the mahat-buddhi ) ( Ashton 2018 ). The dichotomy of purusa and m ulaprakrti is thus not at all a subject–object relation, as implied by Utpala’s and Abhinava’s account. Instead, it marks a tensional polarity that begets living nature ( vyaktaprakrti ) and nature’s own interplay of manifestor and manifested While Utpala and Abhinava may simply be unaware of these details of Isvarakrsna’s dualism, even so, their misunderstanding is not purely accidental 90 One reason why they devoted so much attention to refuting Sam . khya was to discredit the dualism of their rival Saiddhantikas. Moriyama notes that “Utpaladeva’s Isvarasiddhi was motivated by Sadyojyotis’ Naresvarapariksa , an important work on ´Saiva dualism” (2016, p. 288). Rati é further explains that non-dual ´Saivas “adopted not only the principle of the satkaryavada but also the Sam . khya distinction between sakti and abhivyakti : the latter distinction fits with a dualistic system in which things and their phenomena can exist apart from each other. Yet, as Somananda and Utpaladeva point out, this distinction remains problematic in a dualistic system” (2014, p. 166) 91 Pratyabhijña thinkers were concerned to articulate the re-absorption of manifest reality (´Sakti) within consciousness (´Siva). To this end, they overcoded terminology and frameworks from rival systems in order to more clearly formulate the non-duality of consciousness (´Siva) and its unified powers of creation and manifestation (the sakti s, with “´Sakti” also designating ´Siva’s consort). Rati é writes: The non-dualist ´Saivas, on the other hand, can a ff ord to solve the problem of abhivyakti by merely playing with the two principles that constitute the very foundation of their metaphysics: everything is a manifestation of consciousness, and the essence of consciousness is a freedom to apprehend itself as what it is not without ceasing to be itself. The Sam . khya / Saiddhantika notion of potentiality ( sakti ) thus gets filled with a completely di ff erent meaning: it no longer 89 The SK uses the metaphor of a lamp ( pradipa ) in order to relate the meaning of the mahat-buddhi . It appears to do so in order to specify two features or powers of the mahat-buddhi (notably, two operations that are commonly thematized in Indian epistemologies): illumination ( prakasa ) and discernment ( adhyavasaya ). Isvarakrsna specifies the buddhi (not just prakrti or the karana ) as the precise source of prakasa . However, much Sam . khya scholarship muddies this issue by wrongly attributing illumination to purusa . Classical Sam . khya commentators help to perpetuate this misunderstanding. Vacaspati Misra andVijñanabhiksu, for example, tell us that the buddhi makes the subtle body ( li ˙ngam ) appear “as if conscious” ( cetanavad iva , SK 20) by reflecting the light ( prakasa ) of purusa . However, the SK positively denies that purusa bears any aptitudes, per se (since purusa is “lame” [ pa ˙ngu ]). As a passive witnesshood ( akartrbhavah , saksitvam ), the purusa does not possess the capacity for assertion—not even shining ( prakasa ) (SK 19). Furthermore, Isvarakrsna himself, in contrast with later commentators, never mentions together “ prakasa ” and “ purusa ,” and even implies that the illuminatory potencies of the buddhi stem from its relation with m ulaprakrti . Consider that prakasa is attributed to the buddhi due to its uniquely high concentration of the sattva guna ; it is sattva which enables the buddhi to shine a light “like a lamp” ( pradipa - vat , SK 13). But the sattva guna (along with rajas and tamas ) derives from m ulaprakrti , not purusa . This represents an important deviation from the Vedantic-leaning texts of adhy¯atma (as well as a distinction from classical schools such as Nyaya), wherein the buddhi participates in the reality of the self. According to Isvarakrsna’s more unorthodox view, the buddhi cannot represent an attribute or stage in the evolution of the self ( purusa ). For further analysis of this issue, see Ashton 2018 . 90 In the least, non-dual ´Saivas recognized Sam . khya’s purusa to be a purely passive witness consciousness. Rati é cites Abhinava’s introduction to IPK 2.4.19, where he writes that Sam . khyans “do not consider that this [matter] has no agency, contrary to the Person ( purusa ) [who remains inactive]” ( na hi purusavad asyakartr. tvam isyata ) (2014, p. 154). Of course, this meaning becomes altered in the Pratyabhijña system. Meanwhile, non-dual ´Saivas do not appear to have a correlative category for m ulaprakrti 91 Rati é elaborates: “While criticizing the way in which the Sam . khyas understand the distinction between potentiality and manifestation, the ´Saiva non-dualists might thus be implicitly targetting by the same token their dualist cousins: whereas a Saiddhantika scripture such as the Mrgendratantra s adopts the theory of abhivyakti but shows no knowledge of the dilemma that the asatkaryavadin s oppose to this theory and that the ´Saiva non-dualists exploit, his commentator Nar¯ayan.akantha (an important Saiddhantika author who had read Utpaladeva) seems to be painfully aware of it. Quite amusingly, he justifies this scriptural silence as an expression of contempt for a purely sophistic argument, but the way in which he himself attempts to overcome this di ffi culty seems to leave unresolved the problematic statement that the e ff ect’s manifestation preexists in some unmanifest state” (2014, p. 167).

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 33 of 38 designates a latent, unmanifest and passive state, but rather, the ever manifest power that consciousness has of concealing itself while remaining manifest—a power that eventually is just another way for consciousness of manifesting itself (2014, pp. 167–68) But this excludes the formulations of nature and manifestation in the SK. As I have argued above, Isvarakrsna’s vyaktaprakrti is not passive, unintelligent matter, but self-animating, directed, living nature that bears its own capacities to conceal its integral unity (i.e., the non-duality of cognizing self and cognized object) in the midst of disclosing its many organic forms Prakrti denotes the power (or sakti ) of procreation. This power construed as vyaktaprakrti includes the capacity to manifest or reveal an interplay of shapes, forms, and identities. From this, the sakti of living nature in the SK is not di ff erent than the manifestation of ´Siva’s non-dual consort, ´Sakti, although this dynamism (in the SK) pertains to nature itself, not consciousness. But Utpala and Abhinava neglect this subtle but important nuance, and this at least partly results from a hermeneutic attitude that oversimplifies Sam . khya as a subject–object dualism—likely in order to discredit the dualist vision of their closest rivals, the Saiddhantikas 5.2.2. Anti-Naturalism Bias A second bias that we find in Pratyabhijña readings of the SK is anti-naturalism. In demonstrating this, I return to some comments made earlier: organic materialism (or organicism) has a deep history in South Asian thought and culture, and Sam . khya may be closely tied to this history. Chattopadhyaya, for example, vigorously argues that a proto-materialistic, Tantric worldview predates the appearance in India of Brahmanical emphases on a masculine “Supreme Being” that controls or oversees the natural world (e.g., a cosmic soul, purusa , or atman ) (1973) 92 He further theorizes that Sam . khya was closely aligned with this pre-Aryan, anti-Vedic, naturalistic view, and represented “a more explicit philosophical re-statement of the theoretical position implicit in Tantrism” ( Chattopadhyaya 1973 , pp. 359–48; quoted in Marwaha 2013 , p. 185) 93 Chattopadhyaya’s contention that Sam . khya materialism (by which he really meant an organic materialism) grew from a Tantric thought complex is not idiosyncratic (1973, p. 442). Sonali Marwaha draws our attention to how similar observations are made by H. P. Sastri, Heinrich Zimmer, Dandekar, and Garbe (2013, p. 187) Many of these same scholars (including Chattopadhyaya, Jacobi, Dahlman, and Garbe) point out that Sam . khya underwent significant alteration in its later iterations. Among other things, this involved an increased emphasis upon metaphysical speculation over pragmatic concerns and greater focus upon an audience of “trained dialecticians” instead of “the masses” ( Marwaha 2013 , pp. 186–87). Of particular significance to this discussion is a shift within Sam . khya from a naturalist or organic “materialistic basis to a spiritualistic one,” which several researchers link to the influence of Vedanta ( Bhattacharya and Larson 1987 , p. 43; Chattopadhyaya 1973 , p. 431; Larson 1969 a , p. 27; Marwaha 2013 , p. 187). In keeping with his hypothesis that Sam . khya predated the arrival of the Aryans, Chattopadhyaya identifies this “spiritualistic” turn occurring as early as the first Upanisads—a claim that challenges common views that these texts contain the “germs of original Sam . khya thought” 92 According to Chattopadhyaya, Tantra is older than the written form, and for this reason it is di ffi cult to trace its origins He points to concrete material relics that were found in the Indus ruins, which he suggests place Tantra’s origins or existence to at least 5000 BCE ( Chattopadhyaya 1973 , pp. 320–23). He further notes that, according to SB. Dasgupta, “Tantrism is neither Buddhist or Hindu in origin: it seems to be a religious undercurrent, originally independent of any abstruse metaphysical speculation, flowing on from an obscure point of time in the religious history of India” ( Dasgupta 1946 , p. 27; quoted in Chattopadhyaya 1973 , p. 182) 93 The details of this hypothesis are beyond the scope of this work. Marwaha, however, does o ff er the following note concerning Chattopadhyaya’s justification for this thesis. She writes: “References supporting this hypothesis are found in the Kapilasya Tantra, the Sastitantra, also in the Sam . khya Karika, thePatañjala Tantra and the Atreya Tantra He further adds that if the term Lok¯ayata originally stood for the beliefs and practices broadly referred to as Tantrism, the original Sam . khya may be viewed as the most important development of the Lokayata tradition in Indian philosophy. This implies that original Sam . khya was a form of uncompromising atheism and materialism” ( Chattopadhyaya 1973 , pp. 362–63; cited in Marwaha 2013 , pp. 185–86).

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 34 of 38 ( Marwaha 2013 , p. 187) 94 He contends that the early (as well as middle) Upanisads look to assert the superiority of Vedantic concerns (the unity of consciousness and Being) over pre-Vedic Sam . khya ones (investigation of the workings of nature), often by rendering Sam . khya categories (e.g., pradhana ) subservient to an all-powerful, omniscient God who “produces [the natural world] with his own magical powers” ( Chattopadhyaya 1973 , pp. 253–54; quoted in Marwaha 2013 , p. 187). Marwaha observes that this attack against Sam . khya was often linked to an anti-materialism bias—and I would argue, an anti-organic materialism or anti-naturalism bias—that runs throughout much of the history of Indian philosophy and is especially observable in later Vedanta. Among others, Badarayana, ´Sa ˙nkara ( Thibaut 1890 , p. ii. 1.2), and Ram¯anuja ( Muller 1879 , pp. xiviii, 411) defended the doctrine of Brahman against the Sam . khya position by recasting typically Sam . khya terminology in a Vedantic frame (cited in Marwaha 2013 , pp. 187–88) 95 The influence of Vedanta manifests even in the commentarial tradition of Sam . khya. Larson and Bhattacharya write: “[One] wonders what Sam . khya was before the Vedantins got their hands on it . . Somewhere in these ancient traditions there appears to have been a clear break with the original genius and vitality of the system, and the later traditions of Karika - Kaumudi -Sam . khya, Samasa -Sam . khya, and S utra -Sam . khya present the system through a Vedanta prism” ( Larson and Bhattacharya 1987 , pp. 40–41). Daya Krishna likewise observes that many interpretations of the SK are rather un-Sam . khyan in character by virtue of their “repeated tendency to assimilate Sam . khya to something else, whether theistic or monistic, [is this] not a violation of the spirit of Sam . khya as a distinctive philosophical position?” ( Krishna 1968 , p. 198). While atheism and (a unique form of) dualism are essential to Isvarakrsna’s doctrine, we should carefully note that prakrti as living nature is equally central to the SK and that naturalism may be even more definitive of early Sam . khya as a “distinctive philosophical position” (to echo Krishna) than were atheism and dualism. In other words, it may be organicism that links the SK to “the original genius and vitality of the system” (repeating Larson and Bhattacharya). By contrast, the commentaries examined above (especially the YD and the TK) express the anti-organicism trend as found in Vedantic treatments of Sam . khya (albeit, to a lesser degree) Among other things, this is evidenced in their lack of attention to the organic nature of prakrti and the SK’s theorization of manifestation as a power of living nature. Through their oversimplification of prakrti as mere matter (e.g., in their deployment of the clay-pot analogy) and their analysis of abhivyakti as uprooted from procreativity, they abandoned a core feature of Sam . khya (namely, its recognition of nature as an intelligent, self-manifesting organism) in lieu of a felt need to render it intelligible within a Vedantic frame Isvarakrsna was not immune to Vedantic influence. He incorporates several Brahmanical themes into his system, e.g., the purusa as transcendent self, liberation ( kaivalya ) as an organizing goal, etc However, the SK remains committed to the organic materialism of earlier Sam . khya. Consider that Isvarakrsna formulates the purusa (and other orthodox Indian categories) in terms of a genealogical metaphysics—although significantly, a metaphysics of the individual natural organism, not nature writ large (i.e., this is not a cosmology). As a numerically singular procreation ( vyaktaprakrti ) that 94 Oldenberg, for example, sees Sam . khya as originating in the early Upanisads. Chattopadhyaya instead hypothesizes that Sam . khya originates much earlier but is only acknowledged here (cited in Marwaha 2013 , p. 187) 95 Badarayana, for example, refers to Samkhya as “ pradhana vada ” and “ pradhana karana vada ” (“the doctrine of primal nature” and “the doctrine of primal nature as the first cause,” respectively) (quoted in Marwaha 2013 , pp. 187–88). Marwaha explains: “This was in contrast to the Vedanta philosophy of Brahma vada or Brahma karana vada, wherein Brahman was the first cause, the ultimate reality and the principle cause of consciousness. As Chattopadhyaya notes (1973, pp. 372–75), Badarayana devotes a considerable portion of the Brahma S utra [to] the refutation of the materialist position of early Sam . khya Of the 555 s utra s of the text, at least 60 were designed to refute the doctrine of the pradhana, while only 43 were devoted to the refutation of other rival schools such as the Jaina and Buddhist views. Furthermore, of the 60 aphorisms refuting the doctrine of pradhana, 37 were designed to prove its non-Vedic and anti-Vedic character. After a further analysis, Chattopadhyaya concludes that if Sam . khya was not understood as a materialistic tradition, there would have been no need for the substantial opposition that it faced from the idealistic schools, which held that the first cause was a spiritual principle. However, the later Sam . khya Karika and the Sam . khya S utra compromised on the original position and conceded to the orthodox Vedantic viewpoint” (2013, p. 189).

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 35 of 38 manifests ( vyakta ) the dialectical interplay of two gendered principles ( purusa and m ulaprakrti ), the concept of vyaktaprakrti replicates the Sam . khya paradigm (commonly found in prekarika texts) of the individual living body as an energetic focus or microcosm of the greater universe qua macro-organism This emphasizes the real-ness of phenomenal life; it closely aligns the generative sakti that is prakrti with the powers of manifestation (powers that the purusa and m ulaprakrti lack); and it establishes continuity between the experience of kaivalya and the natural development of the organism (what Goethe refers to as Bildungstrieb or “inner drive to formation”) 96 Unlike in many Vedantic systems, liberation ( kaivalya ) in the SK is the telos of nature’s own play of revealing and concealing, progressively leading to the full disclosure of purusa ’s already-given freedom Utpala, Abhinava, and other non-dual ´Saivas failed to recognize these subtle dimensions of Isvarakrsna’s organic materialism, and instead generalized the concept of prakrti in terms of postkarika commentarial views. This is illustrated in Pratyabhijña analysis of prakrti in terms of the clay-pot analogy—a move that enabled Utpala and Abhinava to theorize prakrti qua inert matter as the other to purusa , and to also render prakrti as dependent upon the creative intentionality of an external entity (just as clay requires a potter to transform the clay into a pot). Since the only being that Sam . khya recognizes as external to prakrti is the purusa , and Sam . khya’s purusa is bereft of the requisite agential powers, the only solution, Pratyabhijña thinkers argued, was to absorb the Sam . khya notion of the purusa into its agential narrative ontology (as the twelfth of 36 tattva s) and reformulate the true self as the super-agent, ´Siva. This is in keeping with their treatment of other rival schools: non-dual ´Saivas overcame philosophical ambiguities in Sam . khya by eliding nuance and variation and, wherever possible, recapitulating Sam . khya categories ( purusa , prakrti ) in terms of the central myth of ´Siva-´Sakti. Indeed, ´Sakti is not actually a dull material body that acts over and against the self The Pratyabhijña system evinces many of the same Tantric assumptions found in Chattopadhyaya’s “original” Sam . khya, e.g., its positive valuation of the feminine, materiality, and the manifestation of otherness. Nevertheless, the same anti-naturalist bias that is evident elsewhere in much of orthodox Indian philosophy also displays itself in non-dual ´Saivism (albeit, to a lesser degree). Depriving nature of her playful procreativity, Utpala and Abhinava recast prakrti as inert, unintelligent matter that merely gets presented (as a square, as a triangle) but never gets to hide Funding: This research received no external funding Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflicts of interest References Editions Mainkar Trimbak Govind, trans. 1972, Sam . khyakarika of Isvarakrsna with Commentary of Gaudapada . Poona: Oriental Book Agency, [SK] Nagarjuna. 1977 M ulamadhyamakakarikah . Edited by J. W. de Jong. Madras: The Adyar Library and Research Centre, [MMK] Shastri, M. K., ed. 1938–1943 Isvarapratyabhijñaviv Religions 2020 , 11 , x FOR PEER REVIEW 29 of 40 ph i losoph i cal narrat i ve that precluded metaphys i cal dual i sm and the self-suff i c i ent power of nature to conceal i tself. 5.1. Rel i ance upon Class i cal S ā ṃ khya Commentar i es We cannot say w i th certa i nty why Utpala and Abh i nava d i d not g i ve more careful attent i on to the SK. But one reason l i kely concerns the mater i als to wh i ch they had access i n mak i ng sense of Sāṃ khya theor i es of causat i on and man i festat i on. I t appears that Utpala and Abh i nava depended upon class i cal Sāṃ khya commentar i es that were not comm i tted to Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s organ i c i sm. Recent scholarsh i p suggests that Pratyabhijñā th i nkers engaged the SK pr i mar i ly by way of i ts h i stor i cally later Sāṃ khya i nterpretat i ons. For example, Abh i nava’s approach to the quest i on of causal i ty at SK 9 i m i tates the methodology found i n several commentar i es, i nclud i ng the M ā ṭ harav ṛ tt i , Gau ḍ ap ā dabh ā ṣ ya , the Jayama ṅ gal ā , the Tattvakaumud ī , and the Yukt i d ī p i k ā . Rat i é observes: [These texts] vary greatly as regards the number of theses [that are g i ven i n k ā r i k ā 9 about satk ā ryav ā da ]… almost all these Sāṃ khya commentar i es i ntroduce the verse i n the same way, i.e., by i ns i st i ng that there i s a d i sagreement ( v i prat i patt i ) among var i ous masters on the subject, so that the l i st of reasons adduced to prove the satk ā ryav ā da i s necessary so as to get r i d of the doubt ( sa ṃ ś aya ) bound to ar i se due to the mult i pl i c i ty of contrad i ctory theses held i n th i s regard (2014, p. 133–34). Go i ng further (and echo i ng the early d i scuss i on i n th i s paper), Abh i nava (along w i th Utpala) defends “the ontolog i cal status of the effect” i n a manner that “ i s rem i n i scent” of how the M ā ṭ harav ṛ tt i i ntroduces satk ā ryav ā da (Rat i é 2014, p. 132) 81 Amongst post- k ā r i k ā commentar i es, the Yukt i d ī p i k ā (YD) and the Tattvakaumud ī (TK) seem to have been the most i nfluent i al (Rat i é 2014; Mor i yama 2016). The YD was stud i ed i n Kashm i r alongs i de other Kashm i r Śa i va texts, and i t i s plaus i ble that Utpala and Abh i nava were themselves fam i l i ar w i th th i s text 82 Meanwh i le, Abh i nava echoes Vācaspat i Miśra when he playfully wr i tes that blue cannot come from yellow—an example meant to i llustrate the SK-supported v i ew that the effect cannot ar i se from non-ex i stence (Sr i n i vasan 1967, p. 96–98; c i ted i n Rat i é 2014, p. 134) 83 Pratyabhijñā rel i ance upon commentar i al l i terature i s even more obv i ous i n i ts treatment of the Sāṃ khya not i on that the cause produces only the man i festat i on of the effect, not the actual ex i stence of the effect. The YD and the TK 81 Ratié notes that Abhinava’s I P VV argument in favor of satk ā ryav ā da “is obviously the first reason adduced in S ā ṃ khyak ā rik ā 9” (2014, p. 132). She further writes that Abhinava’s “dismissal of the thesis that the effect is inexplicable, i.e., both and neither existent and nonexistent, is quite close to that found in the M ā ṭ harav ṛ tti ” (2014, pp. 133–34). 82 Moriyama observes this. He writes: “For instance, with regard to the above term s ā dhyatv ā t , Wezler and Motegi have documented a marginal note found in a Kashmir manuscript of the YD as follows: ‘YD, p. 123, marginal note (5): s ā dhyatv ā d iti. na hi sarvathaiv ā psu na vidyate ’ ṅ kura ḥ . y ā hy ā po b ī jade śā nuprave ś en ā s ī n ā d up ā d ā n ā d antarviparivarttitay ā ṅ kura ṃ janayant ī ti t ā sv apy a ṅ kuro ’sty eveti.’ According to the editors’ introduction (YD, pp. xxiv-xxv), ‘[t]he author, or one of the authors, ... was remarkably familiar with Mahāyā na Buddhism, a fact that would suggest that he/they may have lived before the extinction of Buddhism in Kashmir, i.e., in the 14 th century A.D.’ There is also another marginal note where we find the words ‘Abhinavagupta’s S ā ṃ khyanir ṇ aya ,’ which A. Sanderson has identified as a section of the Tantr ā loka (YD, p. xxv). From such information, it is at least possible to say that this unique Sāṅ khya text had a certain impact in the Kashmir region, where it was studied together with Kashmir Śaiva texts” (2016, pp. 292–93). Elsewhere Moriyama writes concerning Utpala’s familiarity with the YD: “is there any evidence for Utpaladeva’s familiarity with the YD? The latter is not unimaginable when considering Kashmir Śaivism’s close relation to the Sāṅ khya text” (2016, p. 292). 83 Ratié cites Vācaspati Miśra: “[The author of the S ā ṃ khyak ā rik ā s] states the reason why [the effect must exist before the operation of its cause by saying] ‘because there is no production of the non-existent.’ [That is to say:] if the effect is nonexistent before the operation of its cause, its existence cannot be produced; for even innumerable artists cannot make the blue yellow!” ( atra hetum ā ha: asadakara ṇ ā t. asac cet k ā ra ṇ avy ā p ā r ā t p ū rva ṃ k ā rya ṃ n ā sya sattva ṃ kartu ṃ ś akyam. na hi n īl a ṃ ś ilpisahasre ṇ ā pi p ī ta ṃ kartu ṃ ś akyate ) (Srinivasan 1967, pp. 96– 98; quoted in Ratié 2014, p. 134). tivimarsini by Abhinavagupta . 3 vols. Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies 60, 62 & 65; Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press, [IPVV] 96 Marwaha makes the following keen observation about the purusa (and prakrti ) from a Tantric point of view: “If the tradition of the original Sam . khya is traced back to [the] early Tantra view (with primacy [ascribed] to the procreation process, [and with] the literal meaning of the term purusa as male and prakrti as female), then referring to the original meaning of purusa [as male] may be more appropriate. Chattopadhyaya cites the Sam . khya Karika to clarify the meaning of purusa , where words such as puman and pu ˙ msah. (meaning, the male) (Samkhya Karika, 11, 60) are used as substitutes for purusa The purusa of Samkhya is not to be seen in the Vedantic sense; rather, it is conceived as the solitary, bystander, spectator and passive witness of procreation. It was the passive spectator of an essentially real-world process. Chattopadhyaya reminds us of the Tantra view of the human body as a replication of the larger universe. Thus, just as a child in the [early] matriarchal society has no real kinship with the father, so the universe, in spite of being real, has no real relationship with the purusa (1973, pp. 407–8)” (cited in 2013, p. 193).

Religions 2020 , 11 , 221 36 of 38 Shastri, M. R., and M. K. Shastri, eds. 1918–1921 Isvarapratyabhijñavimarsini . 2 vols. Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies 22 & 33; Srinagar: Nirnaya Sagar Press, [IPV] Srinivasan, S. A. 1967 Vacaspatimisra’s Tattvakaumudi, ein Beitrag zur Textkritik bei kontaminierter Überlieferung Altund Neu-indische Studien 12. Hamburg: De Gruyter and Co, [TK] Torella, Ra ff aele, ed. and trans. 2002, Isvarapratyabhijñakarika of Utpaladeva with the Author’s V Religions 2020 , 11 , x FOR PEER REVIEW 29 of 40 ph i losoph i cal narrat i ve that precluded metaphys i cal dual i sm and the self-suff i c i ent power of nature to conceal i tself. 5.1. Rel i ance upon Class i cal S ā ṃ khya Commentar i es We cannot say w i th certa i nty why Utpala and Abh i nava d i d not g i ve more careful attent i on to the SK. But one reason l i kely concerns the mater i als to wh i ch they had access i n mak i ng sense of Sāṃ khya theor i es of causat i on and man i festat i on. I t appears that Utpala and Abh i nava depended upon class i cal Sāṃ khya commentar i es that were not comm i tted to Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s organ i c i sm. Recent scholarsh i p suggests that Pratyabhijñā th i nkers engaged the SK pr i mar i ly by way of i ts h i stor i cally later Sāṃ khya i nterpretat i ons. For example, Abh i nava’s approach to the quest i on of causal i ty at SK 9 i m i tates the methodology found i n several commentar i es, i nclud i ng the M ā ṭ harav ṛ tt i , Gau ḍ ap ā dabh ā ṣ ya , the Jayama ṅ gal ā , the Tattvakaumud ī , and the Yukt i d ī p i k ā . Rat i é observes: [These texts] vary greatly as regards the number of theses [that are g i ven i n k ā r i k ā 9 about satk ā ryav ā da ]… almost all these Sāṃ khya commentar i es i ntroduce the verse i n the same way, i.e., by i ns i st i ng that there i s a d i sagreement ( v i prat i patt i ) among var i ous masters on the subject, so that the l i st of reasons adduced to prove the satk ā ryav ā da i s necessary so as to get r i d of the doubt ( sa ṃ ś aya ) bound to ar i se due to the mult i pl i c i ty of contrad i ctory theses held i n th i s regard (2014, p. 133–34). Go i ng further (and echo i ng the early d i scuss i on i n th i s paper), Abh i nava (along w i th Utpala) defends “the ontolog i cal status of the effect” i n a manner that “ i s rem i n i scent” of how the M ā ṭ harav ṛ tt i i ntroduces satk ā ryav ā da (Rat i é 2014, p. 132) 81 Amongst post- k ā r i k ā commentar i es, the Yukt i d ī p i k ā (YD) and the Tattvakaumud ī (TK) seem to have been the most i nfluent i al (Rat i é 2014; Mor i yama 2016). The YD was stud i ed i n Kashm i r alongs i de other Kashm i r Śa i va texts, and i t i s plaus i ble that Utpala and Abh i nava were themselves fam i l i ar w i th th i s text 82 Meanwh i le, Abh i nava echoes Vācaspat i Miśra when he playfully wr i tes that blue cannot come from yellow—an example meant to i llustrate the SK-supported v i ew that the effect cannot ar i se from non-ex i stence (Sr i n i vasan 1967, p. 96–98; c i ted i n Rat i é 2014, p. 134) 83 Pratyabhijñā rel i ance upon commentar i al l i terature i s even more obv i ous i n i ts treatment of the Sāṃ khya not i on that the cause produces only the man i festat i on of the effect, not the actual ex i stence of the effect. The YD and the TK 81 Ratié notes that Abhinava’s I P VV argument in favor of satk ā ryav ā da “is obviously the first reason adduced in S ā ṃ khyak ā rik ā 9” (2014, p. 132). She further writes that Abhinava’s “dismissal of the thesis that the effect is inexplicable, i.e., both and neither existent and nonexistent, is quite close to that found in the M ā ṭ harav ṛ tti ” (2014, pp. 133–34). 82 Moriyama observes this. He writes: “For instance, with regard to the above term s ā dhyatv ā t , Wezler and Motegi have documented a marginal note found in a Kashmir manuscript of the YD as follows: ‘YD, p. 123, marginal note (5): s ā dhyatv ā d iti. na hi sarvathaiv ā psu na vidyate ’ ṅ kura ḥ . y ā hy ā po b ī jade śā nuprave ś en ā s ī n ā d up ā d ā n ā d antarviparivarttitay ā ṅ kura ṃ janayant ī ti t ā sv apy a ṅ kuro ’sty eveti.’ According to the editors’ introduction (YD, pp. xxiv-xxv), ‘[t]he author, or one of the authors, ... was remarkably familiar with Mahāyā na Buddhism, a fact that would suggest that he/they may have lived before the extinction of Buddhism in Kashmir, i.e., in the 14 th century A.D.’ There is also another marginal note where we find the words ‘Abhinavagupta’s S ā ṃ khyanir ṇ aya ,’ which A. Sanderson has identified as a section of the Tantr ā loka (YD, p. xxv). From such information, it is at least possible to say that this unique Sāṅ khya text had a certain impact in the Kashmir region, where it was studied together with Kashmir Śaiva texts” (2016, pp. 292–93). Elsewhere Moriyama writes concerning Utpala’s familiarity with the YD: “is there any evidence for Utpaladeva’s familiarity with the YD? 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