Chapter II.e - The doctrine of Anekāntavāda (the theory of manifoldness)

Anekāntavāda is the heart of Jainism; and nayavāda and syādvāda are its two wings. The word anekāntavāda consists of three words, viz., aneka, anta and vāda. Here aneka means many, anta signifies attributes and vāda means description. Therefore etymologically the whole word means the description of manifold attributes. That means, it is the theory of manifoldness of reality. According to anekāntavāda, reality is pluralistic which expresses itself in multiple forms. A thing is neither an absolute unity nor an absolute plurality. It is both unity and plurality all the time.

The Jainas hold that a particular object can be viewed from different points of view. It can be existent, non-existent, one, many, different and the like. It possesses infinite characters. The term anekānta indicates the ontological nature of reality through which every object possesses infinite number of qualities (anantadharmātmakam vastu), each of which can only be affirmed in a particular sense. The Jainas further hold that all things are anekānta, i.e., na-ekānta which means nothing can be affirmed and negated absolutely, because all affirmations and negations are true only under certain conditions and limitations.

To define the nature of categories like jīva, matter, space etc., the theory of anekāntavāda is applied. According to the Jainas, atoms are of one kind and each atom possesses innumerable aspects of its own. The nature of the self or jīva is conscious, yet it is endowed with the quality of consciousness. Matter or pudgala is that substance or category which undergoes modifications by combinations and dissociations. Ākāśa or space is one, formless, all-pervasive and also divisible in innumerable parts. So, it is not possible for all to know all the qualities of a thing. If one can know all the qualities of a thing, then he becomes omniscient. That means one who can know all the qualities of one thing, become the knower of all the qualities of all things, and also one who can know all the qualities of all things, becomes the knower of all the qualities of one thing. But, human knowledge is limited and so, all our judgments are also limited. This logical theory is known as syādvāda. As a matter of fact, both anekāntavāda and syādvāda are realistic and relativistic pluralism. They are the two sides of the same coin. From the metaphysical point of view, anekāntavāda is that where reality has innumerable characters, while the logical point of view, syādvāda means probable, may be. That means, syādvāda is that where one can know only some aspects of reality. Therefore, the Jainas apply this theory of anekāntavāda in order to describe the nature of a thing.

According to some other philosophers, there are eight types of doṣas which are connected with the Jaina concept of reality. The Jainas hold that reality is both of identity-cum-difference. Reality has two aspects, viz., guṇa and paryāya. Substance or reality and quality are inseparable. There is a relation between them. In the same way, there is a relation between substance or reality with mode. On the other hand, there is a difference between quality and its mode. The Jainas also mention three different views with regard to the relation of quality and mode with a substance. These views are—bhedavāda, abhedavāda and bhedābhedavāda. Bhedavāda view is upheld by Kundakunda, Umāsvāmī and Pujyapāda. Abhedavāda view is upheld by Siddhasena Divākara, Haribhadra, Hemacandra etc.; while bhedābhedavāda view is uphold by Akalaṅka and Prabhācandra.

According to the Jainas, the nature of mokṣa is known through the knowledge of anekānta. But the Vaiśeṣikas hold that knowledge of anekānta is a false-knowledge. So, the false-knowledge is not the reason of mokṣa. They also hold eight types of doṣas like that virodha, vaiyadhikaraṇya etc. doṣas are found in anekāntavāda. They argue that the Jainas accept both sattva and asattva in one thing simultaneously, so these types of doṣas are found. The eight kinds of doṣas are—virodhadoṣa, vaiyadhikaraṇyadoṣa, anavasthādoṣa, saṅkaradoṣa, vyatikaradoṣa, saṃśayadoṣa, apratipattidoṣa and abhāvadoṣa. Virodhadoṣa is a state of mutual opposition. It means that two contradictory characters cannot remain together at the same time, for example cold and heat which cannot remain together at the same time. Vaiyadhikaraṇyadoṣa is an error which arises when two entirely opposite natures of a thing tend to subsist in two different abodes. As for example, nondifference is something which has the character of oneness, while difference is something which has the character of manyness and as such non-difference has a separate locus than difference. Anavasthādoṣa is that in which each of the two aspects of a thing like identity and difference is established by identity and difference respectively. Saṅkaradoṣa is that in which both sattva and asattva are described in one thing. Vyatikaradoṣa is that in which ekatva is found in anekatva, while anekatva is found in ekatva. Saṃśayadoṣa is that state in which there is doubt about the character of identity and difference of a thing. Apratipattidoṣa is that state in which the nature of a thing cannot be established. Abhāvadoṣa is that state where the nature of the things becomes non-existent because of its non-establishment.

But, Prabhācandra has put some arguments in his Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa about these eight types of doṣas. He says that these eight kinds of doṣas are not found in the Jaina theory of reality and in anekāntavāda. The following are the chief arguments put forward by Prabhācandra:

1. Firstly, Prabhācandra argues that the thing in its own nature is sattva, while in relation to another nature it is asattva. Guṇa is identical with dravya, while it is separate from paryāya. Moreover, virodhadoṣa is of three kinds, viz., sahānavasthālakṣaṇa, parasparaparihārasthitilakṣaṇa and badhyaghātakarūpa. But, none among these three kinds of doṣas can be seen in the Jaina theory of reality and anekāntavāda. There is no virodha in the form of sahānavasthālakṣaṇa (not remaining together in one locus). For according to the Jainas difference and nondifference or existence and non-existence can be envisaged in one thing in relation to itself and other things. The second kind of virodha, i.e., parasparaparihārasthitilakṣaṇa (to remain in a thing by giving up one another) also is not possible. Just as colour and taste remain in one mango without giving up one another, similarity difference and non-difference can remain in one thing without giving one another. Badhyaghātakarūpa-virodha is found in case of snake and mongoose which cannot remain in one place since one is killer and other is the killed. But this type of virodha also is not possible in case of difference and nondifference, as there no such relation between them. Thus, there is neither virodhadoṣa in the reality nor in anekāntavāda.

2. Vaiyadhikaraṇyadoṣa is not found in the Jaina theory of reality,because bheda and abheda, sattva and asattva can have the same thing as their ādhāra.

3. Thirdly, Prabhācandra says that there is no possibility of anavasthādoṣa in the Jaina theory of reality and in anekāntavāda. Because abheda is the dharmī (substantive), while bheda is the attribute of a substance.

4. Fourthly, Prabhācandra argues that neither saṅkara nor vyatikara doṣas would arise between bhāva and abhāva. Because, bhāva would be empty without abhāva, similarly abhāva would be meaningless without bhāva.

5. Lastly, he also says that there is neither saṃśaya nor apratipatti nor abhāva in the Jaina theory of reality and in anekāntavāda. Because, the Jainas have already been mentioned that the things possess many characters, positive as well as negative. Anekānta means many-sided. So, bheda and abheda, sattva and asattva are found in the same things.

So, the Jaina theory of reality and anekāntavāda are free from all these doṣas.

Types of Anekāntavāda:

According to Prabhācandra, anekāntavāda is of two types, viz., kramaanekānta and akrama-anekānta. In Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, Prabhācandra says that krama-anekāntavāda is that where a thing is endowed with different characteristics at different points of time. On the other hand, akrama-anekāntavāda is that where a thing is endowed with different characteristics at the same time. These two anekāntavāda is known as paryāya (mode) and guṇa (quality). Paryāya and guṇa are not one in number, but there are various attributes of these two. Hence, a thing which is the combination of guṇa-paryāya is known as anekānta. Thus, anekāntavāda propounds that reality is many-sided and complex, i.e. an object has infinite number of attributes. Anekāntavāda does not regard the onesided point of view of a thing.