A study of the philosophy of Jainism

by Deepa Baruah | 2017 | 46,858 words

This page describes the Classification of Pramana from the study of the philosophy of Jainism: one of the oldest religions in India having its own metaphysics, philosophy and ethics. Jainism is regarded as an ethical system where non-violence features as an important ethical value.

Chapter II.c - Classification of Pramāṇa

Every system of Indian philosophy accepts pramāṇa as a valid knowledge. But there is a difference of opinion among all the system about the numbers of pramāṇa. The Cārvākas accept only perception as pramāṇa. The Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas accept perception and inference as pramāṇas. The Sāṃkhyas and the Yogas recognize perception, inference and verbal testimony as pramāṇas. The Naiyāyikas recognize perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas adds presumption to perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. Kumārila Bhāṭṭa and the Advaita Vedāntins accept six pramāṇas, viz., perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony, presumption and nonapprehension.

But the Jainas do not agree with the above classification. They recognize only two pramāṇas, viz., (i) pratyakṣa-pramāṇa and (ii) parokṣa-pramāṇa. All other pramāṇas come under these two types of pramāṇas. Pratyakṣa-pramāṇa is of two kinds, viz., (a) sāṃvyavahārika-pratyakṣa and (b) mukhya or pāramārthikapratyakṣa. Sāṃvyavahārika-pratyakṣa is of two kinds, viz., (i) sensuous and (ii) non-sensuous. It has four stages, viz., (i) avagraha, (ii) īhā, (iii) avāya and (iv) dhāraṇā which actually come under mati-jñāna. Mukhya or pāramārthikapratyakṣa is of three kinds, viz., (i) avadhi, (ii) manaḥparyāya and (iii) kevala. Parokṣa-pramāṇa is divided into five categories which are caused by pratyakṣa- pramāṇa. Its five categories are—smṛti, pratyabhijñāna, tarka, anumāna and āgama. Now in the following lines, these two kinds of pramāṇas i.e. pratyakṣapramāṇa and parokṣa-pramāṇa and their divisions are discussed in details:

(a) Pratyakṣa-pramāṇa:

The Jainas hold that the word pratyakṣa is derived from the word akṣa. Hereakṣa means the self or jiva which knows all theobjects in space. Māṇikyanandi defines pratyakṣa or perception as clear or distinct (viśadam) knowledge. Prabhācandra points out that whatever knowledge is not clear, that is not called pratyakṣa, just as, inference is not clear, so, it is not pratyakṣa. So, pratyakṣa- pramāṇa means clear knowledge.

But what is this clarity of knowledge. Māṇikyanandi says that clarity means the apprehension of an object without the mediation of any other cognition or the apprehension of the objects as possessed of its distinctive character. Thus, clarity of knowledge means that knowledge which does not require any other knowledge in order to manifest its object. So, perception means clear knowledge. Inference is not clear knowledge, because it is based on the other knowledge like the vyāptijñāna. But perception is clear, because it is not based on any kind of other knowledge for manifesting its object.

Some arguments are also put by the opponents that the definition of clarity of knowledge is not true, because in perceptual knowledge like īhā, etc., there is found mediation of avagraha etc., and so, it cannot be called clear in the above sense. Prabhācandra replies that this argument is not tenable because avagraha etc. are produced by the operation of different sense-organs and as such they are not required for īhā etc. This implies that avagraha etc. are independent knowledge and do not depend on the mediation of any other knowledge. Hence, the definition of pratyakṣa as clear knowledge stands proved.

Prabhācandra, however, argues that perception does not arise from the sense-object contact. If it arises from the sense object contact, then there would be no omniscience. Secondly, if perception arises from the sense object contact, then there is no contact between the sense-organ and pleasure pain etc. because, pleasure and pain etc. are known by itself. So, pratyakṣa-pramāṇa means only the clarity of knowledge.

By this definition of perception, Prabhācandra rejects the Buddhist point of view. The Buddhists hold that when there is cognition of fire immediately after seeing smoke, then there is the vyāptijñāna in the form of that, which has smoke, must have fire. This vyāptijñāna, though aspaṣṭa is regarded as pratyakṣa. But Prabhācandra points out that these are not perceptions, because these are aspaṣṭajñānas, whereas perception means only clear knowledge. It may be asked here what is apprehended in the knowledge of fire which arises from suddenly seeing the smoke? Is it sāmānya, i.e., generality or is it viśeṣa, i.e., a particular fire? If the knowledge is sāmānya, thenthat cannot be pratyakṣa, because according to the Buddhists sāmānya is not an object of perception. If the knowledge is viśeṣa, i.e., the knowledge of fire is not universal of firebut a particular fire, then there would not arise any doubt in the mind of the cogniser who apprehends the particular fire that whether this fire is from grass or from leaves? When one perceives nearby fire then one does not have any doubt. If any kind of doubt arises in case of nearby fire, then the knowledge which arises either from śabda or from a mark also will be doubtful. Then the Buddhist point of view that the knowledge of particular fire which arises from word or from a mark does not have any doubt will be fallacious. So, by seeing smoke, the knowledge of fire is not perception; it is only inferential knowledge. If one knows all smokes and all fires clearly, then nothing would be left for inference. Hence, inference will become useless. But, one cannot clearly know the knowledge of smoke and fire. So, vyāptijñāna is not perception. Thus, if the knowledge is not clear, then it is not perception.

The Buddhists, however, argue that if unclear knowledge is not perception, then this vagueness (aspaṣṭatā) will be the quality of either knowledge or object. If vagueness is the quality of knowledge, then how the object of knowledge is called vague? Vagueness of one thing cannot be attributed to another thing, because that will lead to over–pervasion. If vagueness is the quality of the object, then how can this vagueness be found in vyāptijñāna? The same difficulty arises also in the cause of clearness (spaṣṭatā). So, by vagueness and clearness of the object, one cannot know the knowledge as vague and clear. Prabhācandra replies here that clearness and vagueness are the qualities of knowledge and not of the object. Moreover, the Jainas maintain that clearness and vagueness depend on the destruction of the āvaraṇa or the veil. The destructions of spaṣṭajñānāvaraṇakarma and aspaṣṭajñānāvaraṇakarma are the causes of clarity and unclarity of knowledge. That means the knowledge which is clear is known as pratyakṣa and which is unclear is known as parokṣa.

Types of Pratyakṣa-pramāṇa:

Pratyakṣa-pramāṇa is divided into two categories, viz., (i) sāṃvyavahārika-pratyakṣa and (ii) mukhya-pratyakṣa. Now, the detail account of sāṃvyavahārika-pratyakṣa and mukhya-pratyakṣa are given in the following:

(i) Sāṃvyavahārika-pratyakṣa:

According to Māṇikyanandi, sāṃvyavahārikapratyakṣa or empirical perception means that clear knowledge which is caused by sense–organs and mind and which is partial. Explaining this sūtra, Prabhācandra says that the word saṃvyavahāra means right and uncontradicted action either of the nature of pravṛtti or nivṛtti. The knowledge which is the cause of such vyavahāra or action is known as saṃvyavahāra. The perception which has the necessity of this saṃvyavahāra is known as sāṃvyavahārikapratyakṣa.

From the definition of sāṃvyavahārika-pratyakṣa, it is clear that it is divided into two categories, viz., arising from indṛiya (sense-organ) and arising from anindṛiya (mind). Indṛiyasor sense-organs are sub-divided into two categories, viz., dravyendṛiya and bhāvendṛiya. Dravyendṛiya are made of matter (pudgala) which possess qualities of colour, taste, smell and touch and which have been transformed into definite shapes like eye, ear etc. Bhāvendṛiya is of the nature of consciousness. It is of two kinds, viz., labdhi and upayoga. Labdhi means the power of the sense–organ due to which the object is apprehended after the veils of karman is destroyed. If there is no labdhi, then the sense-organ cannot apprehend the object. Upayoga means the activity of consciousness of the self towards the object. If there is no upayaga, then the object cannot be apprehended. Thus, labdhi and upayoga are the special properties of bhāvendṛiya. Anindṛiya or mind is also divided into two categories, viz., dravyamana and bhāvamana. Hence, the clear knowledge which arises from indṛiya and anindṛiya is partial and it is called sāṃvyavahārikapratyakṣa.

Some opponents hold that the sense-organ and mind are not only the causes of sāṃvyavahārika-pratyakṣa, but also the self, the object and light are the causes thereof. Rejecting this Prabhācandra says that the self is not only the cause of sāṃvyavahārika-pratyakṣa but of parokṣa-pramāṇa also. As here the extraordinary cause of pratyakṣa is accepted, so the self is not mentioned here, self being a general cause of other pramāṇas also. Regarding object and light the sūtra clearly states that objects and light cannot be the cause of cognition, being objects of knowledge like darkness. Darkness is the pratibandhaka or obstruction of knowledge due to which it is not the cause of knowledge, but the object of knowledge. So, the self, the object and light are not the causes of knowledge.

The opponents ask Prabhācandra, what is the harm if the object and light are accepted as the causes of knowledge, though they are the objects of knowledge? Then Prabhācandra replies that if the object and light are accepted as the causes of knowledge, then they would not be the objects of knowledge at the same time; just as the eye, which is a cause of knowledge and not its object at the same time. The opponents argue that by an inference it is proved that the object and light are the causes of knowledge, because knowledge is the effect of the object and light. Because, there is a relation of anvaya-vyatireka (concomitance) between knowledge and object or light. When there is an anvaya-vyatireka relation between the two things, then those two things are known together as cause and effect; just like fire and smoke. Fire is the cause of smoke, because smoke is related by the relation of anvaya-vyatireka with fire. In the same way, knowledge is related by the relation of anvaya-vyatireka with the object and light. This anvaya-vyatireka is not a fallacious hetu, because if there are object and light, then there would be knowledge; but if there is no object and light, then there would be no knowledge. So, the object and light are the cause of knowledge, because knowledge is the effect of object and light. But Prabhācandra rejects this view. He says that knowledge is not the effect of object and light, because there is no relation of anvaya-vyatireka between them. As for example, when there is knowledge of snake in a rope, then there is not found the object of knowledge, i.e., snake, yet there is knowledge. In this example, knowledge is not the effect of object, because the object itself is absent. Again, the light is also not the effect of knowledge, because there is no relation of anvaya-vyatireka between them. As for example, nocturnal animals can see in darkness. Though there is no light, yet there is knowledge. Some kinds of perceptual knowledge are also possible in darkness, just as knowledge of taste. So, the object and light are not the causes of knowledge, because knowledge is possible in the absence of both object and light. Therefore, the object and light are not the causes of sāṃvyavahārikapratyakṣa. The sāṃvyavahārika-pratyakṣa is caused by the sense-organs and mind.

The Jainas further hold that the sense-organ and mind are the instruments by which sāṃvyavahārika-pratyakṣa is known. That means, the knowledge of sāṃvyavahārika-pratyakṣa arise through the sense-organs and mind. The nature of the knowledge of sāṃvyavahārika-pratyakṣa is analyzed in term of its stages. It has four stages, viz., (i) avagraha, (ii) īhā, (iii) avāya and (iv) dhāraṇā. These four stages actually come under mati-jñāna. Among these four stages, avagraha is the first stage of knowledge through which one catches the general features of an object after the contact of the object with the sense-organ and mind. For an example, in the stage of avagraha, a man is known simply as a man. It is divided into two types, viz., (a) vyañjanāvagraha and (b) arthāvagraha. The next stage is called īhā which means one has a desire to have the definite and specific knowledge of the object known by avagraha. As for instance, in avagraha, one knows a man simply as a man, while in the stage of īhā, he wants to know what kind of man he is, i.e., to which country he belongs etc. The third stage is called avāya which means the determinate and specific knowledge about an object. For an example, in the stage of avāya, one can get a clear knowledge about a man to be belonging to a particular place by observing some nature. The last stage, i.e., dhāraṇā means the condition of memory of the object by previous knowledge. It is because of dhāraṇā that a thing which is perceived at an earlier time is remembered at a later time. Hence, these four stages arise one after another. These four stages which arise one after another are not totally different, because the succeeding stage comes after the preceding one.

(ii) Mukhya-pratyakṣa:

According to Prabhācandra, mukhya or pāramārthikapratyakṣa or transcendental perception means that knowledge which arises in the self directly without the help of the sense-organ and mind. It arises when the obstruction of the karmans are destroyed. In the Parīkṣāmukhasūtra it is said, mukhya-pratyakṣa is that absolutely clear, non-sensuous and infinite knowledge in which all the obstructions or veils are removed completely by some special conditions (sāmagṛīviśeṣa). Explaining this sūtra, Prabhācandra says that special conditions are right faith, direct cognition, space, time etc. Among these, right faith is the internal condition, while cognition, space, time etc. are the external conditions. When all of these conditions are found as favorable, then the karmans are removed completely. After the destruction or subsidence of all the veils of karmans, there arises mukhya-pratyakṣa. Thus, after the destruction of the āvaraṇas of avadhijñāna, manaḥparyāyajñāna and kevalajñāna, the resulting avadhijñāna, manaḥparyāyajñāna and kevalajñāna arise. Hence, when all the veils are removed the knowledge of mukhya-pratyakṣa is known clearly.

The proof for mukhya-pratyakṣa is forwarded by Prabhācandra in the form of an inference. Thus, wherever there is clear and true knowledge, there is the destruction of all veils, just as in the case of perception of trees, which are being enveloped by clouds of mist or dust. When all kinds of dust or mist are removed the tree can be clearly perceived. So, mukhya-pratyakṣa means clear and true knowledge.

Mukhya-pratyakṣa is non-sensuous because it does not depend on mind and sense-organs. As it does not depend on mind and sense-organ it is free from all impurity. Hence, it is non-sensuous (atīndṛiya), perfect and infinite. Whatever knowledge is not non-sensuous, that knowledge is not independent, because it is dependent on sense-organ and mind, just like our ordinary knowledge of perception, i.e., sāṃvyavahārika-pratyakṣa which is caused by the sense-organ and mind. So, if a knowledge is not non-sensuous then that knowledge is also not mukhya.

The Jainas further hold that there are three types of mukhya-pratyakṣa, viz., (i) avadhijñāna, (ii) manaḥparyāyajñāna and (iii) kevela-jñāna. Firstly, it is divided into two kinds, viz., (i) sakala- pratyakṣa and (ii) vikala-pratyakṣa. Under these two kinds of pratyakṣa, avadhi, manaḥparyāya and kevala come. Vikalapratyakṣa means partial knowledge. It is of two kinds, viz., avadhijñāna and manaḥparyāyajñāna, while sakala-pratyakṣa means the complete knowledge. Kevelajñāna comes under this pratyakṣa. Firstly, avadhijñāna means that kind of knowledge which arises after its own veil is destroyed or subsided. Avadhijñāna is non-sensuous. It is the knowledge of limited objects having some particular form of dravya, kṣetra, kāla and bhāva. It arises in the self without the help of the senseorgans and mind. It apprehends very fine objects, such as atoms. So, avadhi means that kind of knowledge by which one can apprehend the objects of limited form without the help of sense-organs and mind. It is of two kinds, viz., (a) bhāvapratyaya which belongs to the gods and (b) guṇa-pratyaya which belongs to man and other beings. Manaḥparyāyajñāna means the clear and definite knowledge of the thoughts of past, present and future of another’s mind without the help of the sense-organ and mind. It arises after the destruction or subsidence of its own āvaraṇa. It is of two kinds, viz., ṛjumati and vipulamati. Kevelajñāna means pure, perfect and infinite knowledge. By this knowledge, one apprehends all the substances and all their qualities directly without the help of the sense-organs and mind. This knowledge arises by the destruction of its own veil (kevalajñānāvaraṇa).

After that the self attains kevalajñāna. So, kevalajñāna is pure knowledge by which one can apprehend the true knowledge of all the objects. Hence, all of these three jñāna arise without the help of the sense-organs and mind.

(b) Parokṣa-pramāṇa:

Māṇikyanandi, defines parokṣa-pramāṇa as that which is other than pratyakṣa-pramāṇa. Prabhācandra explains parokṣa-pramāṇa or indirect knowledge as unclear knowledge. That means, it is not known clearly. By an inference it is proved that the knowledge of parokṣa-pramāṇa is unclear, because it is indirect. Whatever knowledge is not unclear, that knowledge is also not indirect, just like the knowledge of mukhya-pratyakṣa and sāṃvyavahārika-pratyakṣa. So, these are not indirect. Hence, parokṣa-pramāṇa means unclear knowledge. Its five categories are—smṛti, pratyabhijñāna, tarka, anumāna and āgama.

(i) Smṛti-parokṣa-pramāṇa:

Māṇikyanandi defines that the knowledge of an object which is known by earlier retention or dhāraṇā is called smṛti or recollection. It arises due to the awakening of the disposition (saṃskāra) and takes the form of “it is that”. That means, recollection is the revival state of disposition of the previous perception of an object. An example of recollection is “That is Devadatta”. Explaining this sūtra, Prabhācandra points out that whatever knowledge determines the real nature of an object, that knowledge is a valid pramāṇa. Just as perception, which determines the real nature of an object and so is a valid pramāṇa, in the same way, recollection also determines the real nature of an object perceived in the past. Hence, it is a valid pramāṇa. Prabhācandra also says that if smṛti is not a valid pramāṇa, then anumāna is also not a valid pramāṇa. Because anumāna is known by the recollection of vyapti-jnana. So, smṛti is a valid pramāṇa.

(ii) Pratyabhijñāna-parokṣa-pramāṇa:

In the Parīkṣāmukhasūtra pratyabhijñāna or recognition is defined as that knowledge which is produced by the combination of perception and recollection. It apprehends an object in the form: “this is that”, “this is like that”, “this is different from that”, “this is correlated to that” etc. The examples are: this is that Devadatta”; “gavaya is like a cow”; “a buffalo is different from a cow”; “that thing in the distance is the tree” etc. From this, it is clear that recognition apprehends the knowledge of an object of identity, similarity, difference, correlation etc.

According to Prabhācandra, recognition is a distinct kind of valid knowledge, though it is produced by the combination of perception and recollection. Recollection cannot apprehend an object of past and present simultaneously. It can only know past object. In the same way, perception apprehends only the object of present time and not of past. The knowledge of the object of past and present can be known simultaneously only by pratyabhijñāna. That means, pratyabhijñāna apprehends a present perceived object which is known in the past; as for example,“this is that Devadatta”. In this example, by perception only “this” part is known, while by recollection only “that”, by recognition the whole, i.e., “this is that” can be cognized. Hence, recognition means the knowledge of an object which is known jointly by perception and smṛti, i.e., recognition knows past and present objects simultaneously. So, it is a distinct kind of valid pramāṇa. He also says that upamāna-pramāṇa is included in recognition. It is not treated as a distinct kind of valid knowledge. Because in case of upamāna also there is the combination of the knowledge of similarity and oneness and as such this is not different from recognition. So, pratyabhijñāna-pramāṇa is a distinct kind of pramāṇa.

(iii) Tarka-parokṣa-pramāṇa:

Māṇikyanandi says that tarka or uha (reasoning) means the knowledge of universal concomitance or vyapti-jñāna between two things, i.e., the middle-term and the major-term in the past, present and future, which is caused by observation (upalambha) and non-observation (anupalambha) in relation to one another. It is not based upon frequent observation or infrequent observation, but it depends on the destruction and subsidence of one’s karman. Observation takes the form thus: if there is the existence of major-term (sādhya), then there is the existence of middle-term (sādhana or hetu). Non-observation points to the knowledge that when there is non-existence major-term, the middle-term also cannot exist. That means, tarka-pramāṇa arises in the form:“if this is, then that is”, “if this is not, then that is not”. As for instance, if there is smoke (sādhana) then there is fire (sādhya);while if there is no fire (sādhya), then there is any smoke (sādhana). So, tarka means vyāpti-jñāna.

Prabhācandra points out that vyāpti means inseparable relation (avinābhāva-sambandha) of sādhya and sādhana and its knowledge is called tarkapramāṇa, which is a distinct kind of valid pramāṇa. By an inference, Prabhācandra proves that tarka is a valid kind of pramāṇa, because it is the anugrāhaka (supporter) of other pramāṇa. Whatever knowledge is the anugrāhaka ofother pramāṇa, that knowledge is a valid pramāṇa; just like, the anugrāhaka of āgama is pratyakṣa or anumāna. So, tarka is a valid kind of pramāṇa.

Other Jaina philosophers also say that tarka is a distinct kind of pramāṇa, because the knowledge of vyāpti is known by tarka-pramāṇa, it is not known by perception;because perception knows only the present object. It also cannot be obtained by inference, because without vyāpti-jñāna inference is not being possible. Therefore, reasoning or tarka is a separate means of valid knowledge.

(iv) Anumāna-parokṣa-pramāṇa:

Inference or anumāna-pramāṇa means the knowledge of sādhya or probandum or major term which is derived from sādhana or probans or middle term. That means, anumāna means that kind of knowledge which arises from hetu or sādhana. As for example, fire is inferred from smoke. Here, smoke is the middle-term or sādhana and fire is the major-term or sādhya. A sādhana or hetu is ascertained from its being inseparably related with the sādhya. The knowledge of this inseparable relation or avinābhāva-sambandha of sādhya and sādhana is called vyāpti;which is derived from tarka. Vyāpti is the main feature of anumāna. So, inference is based on universal concomitance or vyāpti-jñāna of the middle-term with the major-term.

Anumāna-pramāṇa is of two types, viz., (i) svārthānumāna and (ii) parārthānumāna. Svārthānumāna means that kind of knowledge of sādhya which is arising from sādhana by one’s own-self. That means, svārthānumāna is the knowledge of probandum which is caused by the recollection of the relationship and the knowledge of the proban by one’s own-self. As for example, when one person has perceived the smoke (sādhana) in the mountain (pakṣa) and has also recollected the vyāpti-jñāna that wherever there is smoke, there is fire (sādhya); then on the basis of that relation he says that “the mountain contains fire”. Here, three parts are necessary to know svārthānumāna, viz., sādhya, sādhana and pakṣa. Sādhya, pakṣa and hetu are the main basis of inference. Sādhya or major-term is that which has to be proved. Pakṣa or minor-term is that where one has to prove the sādhya. Hetu or middle-term is that by which one has to prove the sādhya, because there is a relation of vyāpti between hetu and sādhya. As for example: “All the places of smoke are the places of fire. The mountain has smoke. Therefore, the mountain has fire”. In the above example—sādhya is fire, pakṣa is mountain and hetu is smoke. Parārthānumāna means that cognition resulting from a statement that refers to the knowledge of svārthānumāna. In other words, it is the knowledge of the probandum or sādhya derived from the communication made by another person. As for instance, if a person knows the vyāpti-jñāna between sādhya and sādhana of fire and smoke that wherever there is smoke, there is fire, he derives the knowledge that the mountain contains fire seeing smoke in the fire. From the statement of this cognition, if another person cognizes the knowledge of the sādhya from the sādhana, then it is called parārthānumāna. Like the svārthānumāna, parārthānumāna has two parts, viz., (i) pakṣa (here it means pratijñā)—e.g., the hill is fiery and (ii) hetu—e.g., because it is smoky. But the Naiyāyikas accept five numbers of parārthānumāna. These are: (i) pakṣa or pratijñā—the hill is possessed of fire; (ii) hetu—because it is possessed of smoke; (iii) dṛṣṭānta—whatever is possessed of smoke, that is possessed of fire, like a kitchen; (iv) upanaya—the hill is possessed of smoke and (v) nigamana—therefore, the hill is possessed of fire. Of these five numbers pratijñā is āgama (tenet). Hetu is the anumāna proper, because the tenet or sādhya can be inferred only through this hetu. Dṛṣṭānta is pratyakṣa, i.e., it is based on perception. Upanaya is upamāna because it is based on the similarity between the dṛṣṭānta and sādhya. Nigamana is the result or conclusion that all these four are applicable to one thing only. So, parārthānumāna is known by these five avayavas. But Prabhācandra does not subscribe to this view of the Naiyāyikas and says that parārthānumāna consists only of two parts, viz., pakṣa or pratijñā and hetu. The example is not necessary for the recollection of vyāpti; because the recollection of vyāpti is known by the relation of sādhya and sādhana. Like dṛṣṭānta, upanaya and nigamana are also not necessary, because all kinds of doubts or errors are destroyed by the knowledge of inseparable relation or vyāpti-jñāna of sādhya and sādhana. So, for intelligent person, inference is known by the two parts, i.e., pakṣa and hetu. However, the Sūtrakāra makes some concession to the Naiyāyikas here and says that though anumāna consists of only two parts, yet the example (dṛṣṭānta), the application (upanaya) and the conclusion (nigamana) can be included in inference to convince persons of dull intellect who want to know the truth of an inference. This is done only in context of instruction and not for argumentation.

The example or dṛṣṭānta is that in which the middle term is perceived to be accompanied by the major term. The example is of two kinds, viz., (i) anvaya and (ii) vyatireka. That is called anvaya-dṛṣṭānta where the sādhana is pervaded by the sādhya. Thus wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in the kitchen is an example of anvaya-dṛṣṭānta. That is called vyatireka-dṛṣṭānta where the absence of sādhana is demonstrated wherever sādhya is absent. Thus wherever there is the absence of fire, there is the absence of smoke, e.g., a lake. The application or upanaya is reassertion of the presence of the middle-term in the minor-term in which the presence of the major-term is to be proved. The conclusion or nigamana is reassertion of the presence of the major-term in the minor-term. So, for dull intelligent persons, parārthānumāna consists of five parts: (i) The hill is fiery—pratijñāvacana;(ii) because the hill is smoky—hetuvacana; (iii) whatever is smoky is fiery, e.g., the kitchen— dṛṣṭāntavacana; (iv) the hill is smoky—upanayavacana and (v) therefore, the hill is fiery—nigamanavacana.

The Jainas hold that like the anumāna, hetu or sādhana is of two types, viz., (i) upalabdhi-hetu and (ii) anupalabdhi-hetu, which are both positive and negative. The former is divided into two types, viz., (i) aviruddhopalabdhi-hetu which is positive, i.e., it proves something positive and (ii) viruddhopalabdhi-hetu which is negative, i.e., it proves something negative. Aviruddhopalabdhi-hetu is sub-divided into six categories, viz., (a) aviruddhavyāpyopalabdhi-hetu; (b) aviruddhakāryopalabdhi-hetu; (c) aviruddhakāraṇopalabdhi-hetu; (d) aviruddhapūrvacaropalabdhi-hetu;(e) aviruddhottaracaropalabdhi-hetu and (f) aviruddhasahacaropalabdhi-hetu. Like aviruddhopalabdhi-hetu, viruddhopalabdhihetu is also of six kinds, viz., (a) viruddhavyāpyopalabdhi-hetu; (b) viruddhakāryopalabdhi-hetu;(c) viruddhakāraṇopalabdhi-hetu; (d) viruddhapūrvacaropalabdhi-hetu;(e) viruddhottaracaropalabdhi-hetu and (f) viruddhasahacaropalabdhi-hetu.

The later hetu, i.e., anupalabdhi-hetu is also of two types, viz., (i) aviruddhānupalabdhi-hetu which is negative, i.e., it proves something negative and (ii) viruddhānupalabdhi-hetu which is positive, i.e., it proves something positive. Again, aviruddhānupalabdhi-hetu is sub-divided into seven categories, viz., (a) aviruddhasvabhāvānupalabdhi-hetu;(b) aviruddhavyāpakānupalabdhi-hetu; (c) aviruddhakāryānupalabdhi-hetu; (d) aviruddhakāraṇānupalabdhi-hetu; (e) aviruddhapūrvacarānupalabdhi-hetu; (f) aviruddhottaracarānupalabdhi-hetu and (g) aviruddhasahacarānupalabdhi-hetu. The later viruddhānupalabdhi-hetu is sub- divided into three categories, viz., (a) viruddhakāryānupalabdhi-hetu; (b) viruddhakāraṇānupalabdhi-hetu and (c) viruddhasvabhāvānupalabdhi-hetu. Hetu or sādhana means that which exists in the presence of sādhya, but without the existence of sādhya, the existence of sādhana will not be possible. By this nature of tathopapatti and anyathānupapatti, the hetu is known. So, hetu means that which is related with sādhya by the inseparable relation. A question may arise here thus: what is the nature of this inseparable relation or avinābhāva? Avinābhāva means the constant regularity of sahabhāva, i.e., simultaneous accompaniment and kramabhāva, i.e., consecutive occurrence. Sahabhāva or yugapad events are those which are the co-products of the same set of causal conditions, such as colour and taste of a fruit; or which are related as vyāpya (middle-term) and vyāpaka (majorterm), such as śiśaṃpā or aśoka tree and vṛkṣa. Kramabhāva events are those which are found in the successive occurrence of preceding and succeeding things, such as the appearance of the star Kṛttikā after Śakaṭa; or which are related as effect and cause, such as smoke and fire.

Sādhya or major-term is to be inferred by the hetu or middle-term. Sādhya means that which is neither known, i.e., asiddha nor contradicted, i.e., abādhita and desirable, i.e., iṣṭa. The epithet of “neither known” excludes those objects which come under doubt. The epithet of “not contradicted” has been given here to avoid the acceptance of that object as sādhya, which is contradictory to direct perception etc. The epithet of “desirable” is given to prove that an undesirable thing cannot be an sādhya. So, sādhya is that which has the characteristics of asiddha, abādhita and iṣṭa. From the point of view of universal concomitance, dharma itself is sādhya, because otherwise it cannot be established; whereas from the point of view of inference, dharmī together with its dharma is sādhya. Dharmī is also called pakṣa. Pakṣa or dharmī is the object which is qualified to be proved by the quality of dharma. Though these two dharma and dharmī are related with sādhya, yet dharma is related with sādhya in universal concomitance, because otherwise it cannot be related with sādhya by avinābhāva relation.

Hetvābhāsa:

Among the five properties of anumāna, hetu is the most important, because if hetu is not proper, then the process of anumāna will not be possible. Faulty hetu will lead to faulty anumāna. Faulty or fallacious hetu is called hetvābhāsa. It has been mentioned that a false inference occurs due to the fault of hetu. That means, hetvābhāsa is that which appears to be as hetu but does not possess the characteristics of a hetu. There are four types of hetvābhāsa, viz., (a) asiddha, (b) viruddha, (c) anaikāntika and (d) akiñcitkara.

(a) Asiddha-hetvābhāsa: That hetu is called asiddha which is devoid of existence or certainty. It is of two types, viz., svarupāsiddha-hetvābhāsa and sandigdhāsiddhahetvābhāsa. Svarupāsiddha-hetvābhāsa means that which does not have existence. It means the hetu which is not proved by its very nature. The example here is: sound is changeable, because it is perceived by the eyes. Here ‘perceivable by the eyes’is absent by nature in case of śabda. Sandigdhāsiddha-hetvābhāsa means that hetu whose certainty is not proved. As for example, to a less intelligent person: there is fire here, as there is smoke. Here it is Sandigdha because the person confuses smoke with fog.

(b) Viruddha-hetvābhāsa: The hetu which is concomitant with opposite of the sādhya is called viruddha. As for example, śabda is not changeable, i.e., eternal, because it is produced. Here the sādhya is non-changeableness of śabda, while the hetu is kṛtakatva (produced). Now the hetu kṛtakatva has inseparable connection with changeableness which is opposite of the sādhya here.

(c) Anaikāntika-hetvābhāsa: The hetu whose existence in the vipakṣa also is not contradicted is called anaikāntika. Here two terms, viz., sapakṣa and vipakṣa are to be explained. A sapakṣa is that where the co-existence of hetu and sādhya is already established. A vipskṣa is that where the non-existence of the sādhya is already established. Hence, a true hetu cannot exist in a vipakṣa. Anaikāntikahetvābhāsa is of two kinds, viz., niścitavṛtti and śaṅkitavṛtti. Niścitavṛtti is that whose existence in the vipakṣa is certain. As for example sound is non-eternal, because it is knowable, just like ghaṭa. Here the hetu prameyatva exists in ākāśa also which is eternal. Śaṅkitavṛtti means whose existence in the vipakṣa is doubtful, e.g., the person under discussion is not an omniscient, because he is a speaker.Here thequality of being a speaker is not contradicted by the quality of being an omniscient person.

(d) Akiñcitkara-hetvābhāsa: The hetu which is applied to prove a sādhya that is already proved by other pramāṇas like perception etc. As for example, sound is audible, because it is śabda. This hetu does not prove the sādhya, i.e., śrāvaṇatva, because that is established by perception itself.

Prabhacāndra has merely explained the sutras dealing with hetvabhasa, refraining from adding anything of his own. However, he has added some sub–varieties of asiddha-hetvābhāsa and anaikāntika-hetvābhāsa.

(v) Āgama-parokṣa-pramāṇa:

The last division of parokṣa-pramāṇa is āgama. It is also known as śabda-pramāṇa. The knowledge which is produced by the word of a reliable person is called āgama-pramāṇa. He who possesses right knowledge and makes a right-judgment is said to be reliable or āpta. A reliable person is one who knows the real nature of the things and also expresses his ideas correctly. He cannot

tell a lie.

Āgama-pramāṇa is of two types, viz., (i) laukika and (ii) śāstraja. Laukika-āgama-pramāṇa means that kind of knowledge which is derived from the words of reliable persons. Śāstraja-āgama-pramāṇa means that kind of knowledge which is known from the scriptures, i.e. the records of the truth by the omniscient beings.

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