Chapter II.a - Prabhācandra’s refutation of different views about knowledge

Prabhācandra, the great Jaina philosopher has critically discussed the nature of knowledge by refuting other philosophical points of view in his book Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa.

(i) First of all he has refuted the Buddhists view about knowledge. The Buddhists hold that knowledge possesses the form of an object, because it arises from the object. For example, the knowledge which arises from blue substance takes the form of blue. The Buddhists also say that if knowledge does not take the form of the object then the object would not be known. In that case, it will not be possible to differentiate between the knowledge of a ghaṭa and that of a paṭa. Hence, the form of the object gives rise to the knowledge of the object. So, knowledge possesses the form of object. This Buddhist theory about the nature of knowledge is known as sākārajñānavāda.

But the Jainas reject this view point. They point out that knowledge cannot be of the form of an object. In Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, Prabhācandra argues that knowledge cannot possess the form of an object, because it is not proved by perception. Everybody perceives the object cognized by his own knowledge which is without the form of that object. Nobody experiences knowledge as containing reflection of the object as in a mirror. If it would be accepted that knowledge has the form of an object, then there would be no difference of time and space of the objects. The objects will not be experienced as being far and near; past or present; because knowledge itself possesses that form. So, knowledge cannot possess the form of an object. Prabhacāndra also argues that if knowledge being produced from object takes the form of that object like blueness etc., then it should also take the materiality(jaḍatā) of the object. In that case, knowledge will be material. Just as a material object produces other material objects, similarly knowledge being produced by material object will be material. If it is said that knowledge does not take the form of materiality, then the question will naturally arise how materiality is apprehended? Because it is upheld by the Buddhists that for knowing an object, it is necessary for knowledge to take the form of that object. If materiality is not apprehended by knowledge, then the blueness also would not be apprehended by knowledge. If knowledge does not apprehend materiality, but it apprehends blueness, then either the two would be different or many-sided (anekānta). It cannot be said that knowledge apprehends blueness only and not the materiality. For in that case nobody can say this is a blue object which possesses materiality. If the blueness and the materiality are the same or identical, then the apprehension of the one may mean the apprehension of the other. In that case the apprehension of one pillar will include the whole universe though not apprehended. Thus, there will be no knowledge which will give rise to oneness; on the contrary there will be manyness. The Buddhists may here argue that just as knowledge apprehends blueness, similarly it apprehends its materiality. But while apprehending materiality, knowledge does not take its form. Prabhācandra refutes this argument on the basis that in that case knowledge can also apprehend blueness without taking its form. Hence, there is no necessity to hold that knowledge takes the form of an object.

The Buddhists, however, argue that if all knowledge were formless, then every knowledge would apprehend all objects at the same time and then there would be no difference between knowledge of different objects. Prabhācandra here replies that this is not true. Because, every knowledge has some limitations and powers due to which it apprehends only one particular object; it does not apprehend other objects. So, knowledge only apprehends an object, but it does not take the form of that object. Moreover, knowledge is the pramāṇa, and as such it cannot possess the form of the object. If knowledge possesses the form of the object, then it will become a prameya because object is prameya. Knowledge cannot be both pramāṇa and prameya which are two different things. Pramāṇa is internal, while prameya is external; so they are apprehended in two different ways. Prabhācandra also points out that knowledge is apprehended as knowledge and not in the form of the object. Knowledge is always of the form of “I know”; while the object is manifested without reference to the ‘I”. If the object is a form of knowledge, then one should feel “I am the jar”, but this is not possible. Therefore, knowledge does not possess the form of an object.

(ii) According to Yogācāra Buddhists, there are no objects apart from cognition or knowledge. That means, if object exist, then it is as the object of knowledge through which it takes the form of object. Therefore, there is no difference between object and its knowledge, i.e., there is no difference between blue and the knowledge of blue. External objects are non-existent, they are fictitious. As due to some defect in eyes, one sees double moon in the sky, in the same way, the external objects seem to be real because of avidyā, but there is no existence of external objects apart from knowledge. So, the object and its knowledge are identical. This theory of the Yogācāra Buddhists about the nature of knowledge is known as vijñānavāda. The Jainas reject this view point. They hold that the objects exist apart from their knowledge. The object and its knowledge are not one. They believe that knowledge is self-revealing as well as object-revealing. Prabhācandra rejects the view point of the Yogācāra Buddhists in his Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa. He asks the Yogācāras how is it known that there exists only knowledge and not objects? Is it known by perception or by inference? It is not possible to apprehend knowledge only which is not related in any way to the external objects. Without first establishing the non-existence of external objects it is not possible to determinate the existence of knowledge only. Non-existence of objects also cannot be known by perception, because without an existent of external object perception is not possible. Moreover, if the existence of the object which is manifested by perception is denied, then non-existence of knowledge only (vijñaptimātra) will also have to be accepted. Like perception, inference also cannot prove the non-existence of objects. Inference is not applicable to such cases which are opposed to perception. The Yogācāra Buddhists, however, argue that the law of sahopalambha proves that the object and its knowledge are non- different. It is always seen that the objects are invariably perceived together with their knowledge. Hence, the blue and the knowledge of blue must be identical. The Buddhists also maintain that of these two, the objects are non-existent, only knowledge exists. But Prabhācandra refutes the view that knowledge and its object are non-different. He argues that sahopalambhaniyama is not established. Even without the perception of nīla etc. and even when the activities of the sense-organs are stopped, it is possible to perceive the knowledge of happiness etc. Moreover, in the day time, the colour of an object and the light of the sun are apprehended together, but they are different from each other. In the same way, though knowledge and its object are always apprehended together, they are different from each other. So, knowledge and its object are not one.

Prabhācandra again asks the Yogācāra Buddhists: what is meant by the word sahopalambha. Does it mean yogapadupalambha or krameṇopalambhābhāva or ekopalambha? In the first case, if sahopalambha is accepted as yugapadupalambha, i.e., the simultaneous apprehension of knowledge and its object, then the hetu would be viruddha. Because in the sentences like ‘the teacher comes with (saha) the disciple’, the word saha denotes yugapat, i.e., together but refers to two different entities and not one. So, sahopalambha does not mean yugapadupalambha. In the second case, if sahopalambha means krameṇopalambhābhāva, i.e., the mere absence of apprehending knowledge and its object one after another, then the hetu would be asiddha. Because both the Yogācāra Buddhists and the Jainas reject such non-existence. So, sahopalambha does not mean krameṇopalambhābhāva. In the third case, if sahopalambha means ekopalambha, then what is meant by ekopalambha? Does it mean the perception of only one? In that case, does it mean perception of knowledge or that of object? If ekopalambha means the perception of knowledge only, then the hetu would be asiddha, because there is no difference between knowledge and its object according to the Yogācāra Buddhists. If ekopalambha means the perception of object only, then how the objects would be apprehended without the existence of knowledge? So, sahopalambha does not mean ekopalambha. Hence, the meaning of sahopalambha also cannot be ascertained. In this way, Prabhācandra rejects the Buddhists view of sahopalambhaniyama. He says that knowledge and its object are not one. An object can exist apart from knowledge. There is a difference between knowledge and its object in their nature. Knowledge is of the nature of grāhaka (apprehender) and the object is of the nature of grāhya (apprehended). If there be no difference between them, then both can be the apprehender and apprehended without any difference. Again, there is a difference between them in their cause. Knowledge arises from the causes like indṛiya etc., while the object arises from other causes. So, knowledge and its objects are different from each other.

(iii) Prabhācandra also refutes the view of the Sāṃkhyas. He presents the Sāṃkhya view about knowledge as follows: knowledge or jñāna or buddhi is not svaparavyavasāyātmaka, i.e., it is not self–revealing and object- revealing, because knowledge is acetana. Just as, ghaṭa, paṭa, etc. being acetana, cannot know itself, so also knowledge is not self-revealing. Knowledge is inert,because it is the evolute of Pradhāna or Prakṛti. Pradhāna itselfis inert, so its evolutes are also inert.

Prabhācandra rejects this view. He argues that jñāna is the vivarta (evolutes) of ātman and not of Pradhāna. Inthe Sāṃkhya philosophy, Puruṣa or ātman is draṣṭā (cognizer).Itcan be inferred that knowledge is the vivarta of the self because it is draṣṭā. That which does not possess knowledge cannot be a cognizer (draṣṭā) like ghaṭa, paṭa etc. But ātman is the cognizer; hence, it must possess knowledge. If Pradhāna is admitted to possess knowledge, then it should be recognized as the cognizer, in which case there is no need to accept a ātman other than Pradhāna. Moreover, as it is inferred that the self is of the nature of consciousness because it feels that ‘I am conscious’, similarly it can be presumed that knowledge is the nature of the self, because it feels as ‘I am the knower’. The Sāṃkhyas may here argue that the self becomes the cognizer due to its relation (saṃsarga) with knowledge, and not because it is of the nature of knowledge. This is also not tenable, says Prabhācandra, because in that case, the self’s nature of consciousness will also be incompatible. This is not possible, for everybody directly perceives oneself as conscious.

Prabhācandra also argues that knowledge is self–revealing because it reveals objects without depending on any other cause. If knowledge is not self–revealing, then it would not also be object–revealing. So, it is both svaparavyavasāyātmaka. Hence, jñāna or buddhi or knowledge is not acetana. It is cetana. It is the paryāya of ātman or Puruṣa not Pradhāna or Prakṛti.

(iv) According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, knowledge is not self-revealing. It is always parokṣa. They argue that if knowledge is perceived, then it would be the object of knowledge (karma). In that case another knowledge would be required as the instrument for this perception. Again, for the perception of this second knowledge a third knowledge should be required as the instrument. This will lead to infinite regress. If the second knowledge can be an instrument without itself being perceived, then the first knowledge also should be an instrument without itself being perceived like the second knowledge. Moreover, the same knowledge cannot be regarded both as the object an instrument of perception. Hence, Kumārila Bhāṭṭa holds that knowledge is neither self-revealing nor directly perceived.

Prabhācandra rejects this view on the ground that the reason advanced by Kumārila Bhāṭṭa is not satisfactory. He argues that just as the prameya, i.e., the object is perceived, likewise pramātā, pramāṇa, and pramiti are also perceived. Here the self is the pramātā or agent, pramāṇa is the instrument and pramiti or knowledge is the action. Māṇikyanandi has shown the perceptibility of all these in his sūtra. Thus, in the proposition “I know the jar by myself”, the kartā or agent, the karaṇa or instrument and kṛiyā or actions are all cognized just like the object. Prabhācandra points out that there is no rule that for being directly perceivable a thing must be a karma. For in that case the self will not be perceived, since it can never be the karma of knowledge. The Mīmāṃsakas do not accept the karmatva (objectivity) of the self, but accept it as a kartā (agent). They also accept the perceptibility of the self. But then, says Prabhācandra, if the self can be directly perceived without being recognized as a karma, knowledge can also be directly perceived being an instrument (karaṇa). He also argues that if knowledge cannot manifest itself, then it would not be able to manifest object also. The light of a lamp manifest its object only when it is itself manifested. If knowledge cannot be directly perceived, then its object also cannot be perceived. That means, whatever manifests an object, must be itself manifested first. So knowledge manifests an object only when it itself is manifested or perceived. Hence, knowledge is self-revealing and directly perceived.

(v) The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system believes in the theory of parataḥprakāśa. They hold that knowledge is not self-revealing. Knowledge is known by another knowledge, because it is prameya, just as ghaṭa, paṭa etc. are known by another knowledge, because these are prameyas. They also argue that knowledge cannot be known by itself, just as a sword cannot cut itself. If knowledge knows itself, then there arises the difficulty that it would be the object of its own activity which is not valid. So, knowledge is known by another knowledge.

Prabhācandra rejects this view of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. He argues that anobject is manifested by knowledge, because the manifestation of the object proves the manifestation of knowledge. The nature of knowledge is compared to a lamp. Just as a lamp manifests the object and itself, and does not need another light to manifest it, in the same way, knowledge also does not need another knowledge to manifest itself. If knowledge is known by another knowledge, then that another knowledge must be known by some another knowledge. In this way, there will be infinite regress. So, knowledge is self-revealing. Prabhācandra also argues that by inference it is proved that knowledge is to be self–revealing as well as object–revealing, because it is jñāna, or because it reveals objects without any distance or because it has the nature of knowing objects, like the knowledge of God. The knowledge of God reveals His self as well as other things, it reveals objects without any distance and it has the nature of knowing its object. So, knowledge is self–revealing as well as object-revealing. It is not known by another knowledge.

From all these points of discussion it is clear that according to the Jainas, knowledge does not possess the form of an object. It is different from its object. It is cetana. It is self-revealing as well as object–revealing. It is not known by another knowledge.