Tattvartha Sutra (with commentary)

by Vijay K. Jain | 2018 | 130,587 words | ISBN-10: 8193272625 | ISBN-13: 9788193272626

This page describes classification of substances (dravya) which is verse 5.2 of the English translation of the Tattvartha Sutra which represents the essentials of Jainism and Jain dharma and deals with the basics on Karma, Cosmology, Ethics, Celestial beings and Liberation. The Tattvarthasutra is authorative among both Digambara and Shvetambara. This is verse 2 of the chapter The Non-living Substances and includes an extensive commentary.

Verse 5.2 - Classification of substances (dravya)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Tattvartha sūtra 5.2:

द्रव्याणि ॥ ५.२ ॥

dravyāṇi || 5.2 ||

These–dharma, adharma, ākāśa and pudgala–are substances (dravya). (2)

Hindi Anvayarth:

अन्वयार्थ: ये चार पदार्थ [द्रव्याणि] द्रव्य हैं।

Anvayartha: ye cara padartha [dravyani] dravya haim |

Explanation in English from Ācārya Pūjyapāda’s Sarvārthasiddhi:

The term ‘substances’ (dravya) has appeared in some previous sūtra (e.g., sūtra 1-29). What are the substances (dravya)?

Those, which are attained by their own modes (paryāya) or which attain modes (paryāya), are substances (dravya). It may be contended that substance (dravya) is that which possesses ‘substancenesss’ (dravyatva) and that only should define the substance. No. This way both of these–dravya and dravyatva–cannot be established. The association of the stick (daṇḍa) and the man (possessor of the stick–(daṇḍī) takes place but they exist separately. The substance (dravya) and ‘substancenesss’ (dravyatva) do not exist separately in that manner. If there can be union of two things which do not exist separately, then there would be union of the non-existent-sky-flower (ākāśapuṣpa) and the sky (ākāśa), and of the normal person and the second head. If separate existence is admitted, then the invention of the ‘substanceness’ is useless. Some contend that the assemblage (samudāya) of qualities (guṇa) is a substance (dravya). Even here, if there be no distinction between the qualities and the assemblage of qualities, the name substance (dravya) is not justified. If distinction be admitted, it is open to the same defects as pointed out in reference to substance (dravya) and ‘substancenesss’ (dravyatva). But do the same defects not apply to the definition given, ‘that which attains attributes or is attained by attributes–undergoes modifications–is a substance’? No. For both, distinction (bheda) and non-distinction (abheda), are admitted between the substance (dravya) and the quality (guṇa), depending on the point of view. Hence the name ‘substance’ (dravya) is justified. Neither the substance (dravya) nor the quality (guṇa) exists without the other; there is, thus, non-distinction (abheda) between these. But the two have distinction (bheda) from the point of view of name (samjñā), mark (lakṣaṇa), purpose (prayojana), etc.

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