Triveni Journal

1927 | 11,233,916 words

Triveni is a journal dedicated to ancient Indian culture, history, philosophy, art, spirituality, music and all sorts of literature. Triveni was founded at Madras in 1927 and since that time various authors have donated their creativity in the form of articles, covering many aspects of public life....

The Indian Scene

Prof. M. Venkatarangaiya

The outstanding events in the quarter January-March 1971in our national affairs are the mid-term elections to the Lok Sabha and to the State Vidhan Assemblies in Tamil Nadu, Orissa and West Bengal and the reactions in the country to the independence movement in East Pakistan. Both are events of the greatest significance and it is of importance that we should know why they are so, what their outcome is likely to be and what new problems they are likely to create.

Mid-term Elections

In understanding the significance of the mid-term elections especially to the Lok Sabha it is necessary to keep in mind how from 1967 onwards there has been a sort of political set-in the country; though in a sense the set-began even much earlier from the time of the Chinese aggression in 1962. Both in the country as well as abroad there were grave misgivings about the future of Indian democracy and the prospects of peaceful change. Fears also were entertained as to whether the country’s integrity and unity could be maintained.

As a result of the fourth general elections held in 1967 the Congress party–the only well-organised all-India party–was returned with only a small majority to the Lok Sabha. It Won 279 seats in a House of 515. It had a strength of 375 in 1957 and of 358 in 1962. Its further decline in strength in 1967 was naturally understood as a clear proof of a progressive loss of confidence of the electorate in its capacity to rule the country effectively. It came to be considered by the thinking section of the public as having lost all its dynamism and as having become a party of the status quo. The situation became worse in several States where it lost its majority. Even where it was returned as the single largest party, several members defected to other parties. The result was the formation of coalition governments which remained in power-except in Orissa–only for short periods. Governmental instability interspersed by President’s rule and mid-term elections became inevitable. The political situation worsened. State ministries had to think constantly of how to retain their power. They had no time to think of policy-making which was their main function. With a civil service not known for a high standard of efficiency administration came to a stand still.

Then came the Congress split in 1969. The Union Government under the leadership of Indira Gandhi lost its majority and became the Government of a minority party. It had to depend for its very existence on other parties like the C.P.I., the Muslim League, and the D.M.K. This deprived it of the capacity to take an effective line of action on any matter of domestic or external affairs. People lost faith in the legitimacy of the democratic processes and resorted increasingly to violent direct action to bring pressure on Government to achieve their objectives. Law and order ceased to exist not only in West Bengal where the Naxalites and the other parties wedded to violence were growing in strength but also in most other parts of the country. In Federal-State relations the Union Government lost the capacity to bargain and was compelled to yield more and more to the threats of State Governments which demanded more and more autonomy. Corruption was on the increase. With the growth of defections political morality reached the lowest level. In the U. N. O. and other international forums very few cared to pay heed to India’s voice. It was feared that in the next general election no party would be returned in a majority and that coalition and unstable governments would become the rule at the Centre also and that this would inevitably lead to the erosion of the democratic system, to the setting up of some sort of military rule and even to the Balkanization of the country. There were many–and some of them were retired Chiefs of staff in the army–who openly advocated a military take over at least for a temporary period.

Many among the foreign political analysts–and they had several disciples in India–always believed that democracy which was a product of the special historical conditions and culture of the West could never thrive in countries of Asia and Africa and they found support for their beliefs in the situation as it came to develop in India. It was against all this ground that the mid-term election of 1971 was held and all this has to be kept in mind in evaluating its significance.

Its immediate significance consists in the formation of a strong, stable and one-party Government at the Centre and that under the dynamic leadership of Indira Gandhi who has earned the well-deserved reputation of being a states-woman determined on following radical policies and capable of taking quick decisions. The dangers of a coalition Government at the Centre–which would be more serious than those at the State level–have been averted. The eclipse of the Congress supremacy and of one-party domination has been proved to be only temporary. Indira Gandhi’s Government has, as a result of the, election, secured a majority of 350 in a House of 5l5–a more than two-thirds majority–which will enable her even to amend the Constitution; if she considers it to be absolutely necessary for implementing her radical and far-reaching socialistic policies and programmes. Political and governmental stability is a gain of the highest value.

The election has also a long-period significance. It has restored faith in democratic values and this is good not only for India but also for the other countries in the third world. It has proved that the electorate in India has, in spite of its illiteracy and attachment to tradition, sufficient maturity to appreciate what is good for the country as a whole, to rise above the narrow loyalties of caste, language and region and to vote with a sense of discrimination. It has demonstrated that democracy is a plant which can thrive not merely in the Western but also in other soils. With 600 millions of people in an Asian country wedded to democracy the future of democracy may be asserted to be quite safe.

The election has also been hailed, and rightly also, as the inaugurator of a real revolution in the history of free India. The Congress under the leadership of Indira Gandhi has ceased to be the party of status quo. It now stands for great changes in the country’s economic and social system. Its manifesto as well as the President’s address to the joint session of the two Houses of Parliament after the election, the speech of the Finance Minister, Y. B. Chavan, while introducing the interim budget in the new Lok Sabha and the Prime Minister’s reply to the debate on the President’s address afford evidence of the determination of Government to implement programmes aimed at a more quickened pace of economic growth than the present 5.5 per cent of annual growth, the eradication of poverty, the removal of disparities between the rich and the poor, the provision of employment for the million, are unemployed today, the arrest of the increasing rise in prices and the speedy implementation of land reforms. Cynics may argue that all these have formed part of the programme of the party since 1952 and that there is nothing revolutionary in the party leaders including them in their programmes today. This is, however, an incorrect reading of the present situation. The party and especially its leader Indira Gandhi have realised that the people cannot be fed on mere slogans and promises, that they want rapid action by those in power and that if the promises are not fulfilled the electorate will disown them. The new generation is more sophisticated–and perhaps even more impatient–than the old one and in 1976, and perhaps even earlier, it is sure to judge the party’s claims to power and office more by what it performs than by what it promises.

Political analysts have been trying to answer the question of what contributed to the victory of Indira Gandhi. It was really her victory and not so much of the Congress party. The battle was between her on one side and the so-called democratic alliance of the four parties-the Congress (0), the Jan Sangh, the Swatantra and the S.S.P.–and it was an unequal battle. She had been preparing for it for nearly two years. During this period she built for herself the image of an all-India leader both by word and deed. She always reminded the people that she stood for socialism, for the weak, the poor and the downtrodden and she convinced the weaker sections of her sincerity when she nationalised the banks, called on the bank custodians to supply credit to those who were not considered credit-worthy by the Institutions wedded to tradition–to rickshawallas, taxi-drivers, small farmers and self-employed craftsmen and shop-keepers. The ordinance de-recognising the Princes created a similar impression on the minds of the masses who constituted her real clientele as distinguished from the classes. It was also during these years that she spoke of communalism and casteism and made bitter attacks on Jan Sangh and the R.S.S. This enabled her to win the confidence of the Muslims and the Harijans–the communities which became alienated from the Congress party in 1962 and much more in the 1967 election. All this was really a part of her election campaign on which she started not after the Lok Sabha was dissolved in the last week of December 1970 but two years earlier. The result was that when the electoral battle began in January 1971 she was the only all-India leader with a ready-made strategy and tactics to win it.
The alliance parties had very little of mass contact. The Jan Sangh was the only party in it that tried to create a mass base for itself. There were acute ideological differences among them–so acute that they could not even think of a common manifesto. They could not agree on a common leader. Even in the matter of setting up common candidates there was no complete agreement among them and in several constituencies they fought against each other. They approached the electorate with only one slogan, the slogan Gandhi Hatao and this had no appeal to the masses. They accused her of being in alliance with communists, communalists and regionalists like the C.P.I., the Muslim League and the D.M.K., but this fell on deaf ears as she fought the election battle without entering into any alliance with these parties except in certain areas. She, of course, had more financial resources at her disposal; she could use Government aircraft and other kinds of governmental machinery in carrying on her electioneering. All these were factors in her favour but more than any of these, it was her popularity that was her greatest asset. Even the conservatives and the intellectuals who did not usually participate in elections voted for her because they realised that what the country needed was a stable Government, that she and her party alone could provide it and that if the alliance won the battle, unstable coalition government would plague the country.

In all elections several irrational factors also influence the behaviour of voters. This was pointed out long ago by that well-known political psychologist, Graham Wallas. In our mid-term election the symbol of the cow and the calf chosen shrewdly and cleverly by Indira Gandhi’s party was one such factor especially in the rural areas. A large section of women voters who knew very little of politics voluntarily came to the polling booths to see that a woman became the Prime Minister of the country. They said, “For ages men ruled over the land. They never gave an opportunity for a woman, however talented, to rule. Why should men’s rule be perpetuated? Indira Gandhi must become our Prime Minister. We will all vote for her.” The solid vote of women contributed substantially to Congress being returned with a majority leastexpected and surprising even to the leaders of the party.

There are some who refer to the election of 1971 being less fair and less free than the previous elections and draw the conclusion that this also contributed to the victory of the Congress. There is some truth in their contention that there was more violence–even more political murders–in this than in previous elections, that there was more intimidation of voters, that even the polling officers were subject to intimidation and threats, that the electoral rolls were purposely tampered with, that bribery was resorted to on a large scale, and that money and wine flowed like water. Allegations like these have been made and they have been proved to be true in at least some cases. All this should cause profound regret and it should be the duty of the Election Commission to see that such malpractices do not recur. But it does not appear that these were the causes that contributed to the victory of the Congress. Their influence was only marginal.

Every well-wisher of the country should welcome the outcome of the mid-term election. It has given political stability to the country. It has given opportunity for the Government to bring about even the most radical kind of changes in a peaceful way. The installation of a stable Government has enhanced the prestige of the country in all international forums and even the great powers are now in a mood to pay greater heed to the views of India in world affairs however unpalatable they may be. It has also been pointed out that because of the weakness of the opposition it will not be in a position to defy the Chair as it often did in the previous Parliament, that the Speaker would be able to enforce discipline with greater effect, and that the proceedings will be more orderly. All this will strengthen the democratic forces in the country. The election has also brought to the Lok Sabha a large number of younger people who have new ideas and who can strengthen the hands of the Prime Minister in all the progressive policies she may happen to pursue.

Before we conclude this part of our survey it may not be inappropriate to refer to one or two results which are not quite welcome. One is the total eclipse of the opposition in Lok Sabha. It has only a strength of 165 in a House of 515. Besides this it is not united but divided into numerous groups–C.P.M. (25), C.P.I. (23), D.M.K. (23), Jan Sangh (22), Old Congress (16) and others (56). There is very little in common among them and they cannot serve as an effective check on Government. A strong opposition is as necessary in a democracy as a strong party in power. Its absence in the Lok Sabha may lead to some kind of authoritarianism and even of the dictatorship of the Prime Minister. It is also unfortunate that in this election stalwarts like Masani, Ranga, Madhu Limaye, George Fernandes, S. K. Patil, Sucheta Kripalani and Ram Subagh Singh got defeated. Their presence would certainly have been an asset to the Lok Sabha on any account.

A second unhealthy outcome is the growth in the number of defectors from the various parties in the legislatures of States like Mysore, Gujarat and U.P., to the ruling Congress party, and the consequent fall of ministries in them. They try to defend their unprincipled and unscrupulous conduct by the curious and unsound argument that as the Lok Sabha elections had shown that the people have confidence only in Indira Gandhi and the Congress (R) they are following the popular verdict through defections. This argument has no sense. If it is accepted, there will be no need for elections to the State assemblies at all. The country may rest satisfied with elections to Lok Sabha and determine the composition of the State assemblies on the basis of such elections. It also implies that the great weight attached by Indira Gandhi to the de-linking of elections to Lok Sabha from those to State assemblies and the need to give to the electorate an opportunity to think of national issues as different from State issues has no meaning. It is a matter of regret that Indira Gandhi has welcomed the defectors into her fold forgetting that their real motive is to get Congress (R) tickets in the ensuing elections in States. It will be impossible for her to implement her policies as long as there are such unreliable people in her party. It is time that she realises that it is the presence in the Congress party of landlords who do not really believe in socialism or land reforms that has stood in the way of the land reforms being implemented. It is they who also stand in the way of the taxation of agricultural incomes so necessary if capital resources are to be mobilised. What she and the country need is a well-knit Congress party consisting of members with real faith in socialism and not of persons who indulge in defections and in sabotage.

It is also necessary to point out one other anamoly arising out of the present system of single member constituencies where a candidate getting the largest number of votes–not the majority of votes polled–is declared elected. The anamoly consists in the wide disparity between the total number of votes secured by a party in the country and the number of seats in the legislature which it secures. Of the 151 million votes cast by the present electorate of 272 millions, the Congress (R) polled 63 million votes (43 per cent) and won 350 seats (68 per cent). The Congress (O) polled 15 million votes (10.5 per cent) but captured only 16 seats (3.01 per cent). The Jan Sangh which polled 10.7 million votes (7.3 per cent) secured 22 seats (4.2 per cent.). The C.P.M. which just polled 7.3 million votes (5.1. per cent) got off with 25 seats (4.8 per cent). The S. S. P. which polled 3.5 million votes got only three seats while the P.S.P. won two with its 1.4 million votes. The Swatantra party did better. It got eight seats with its 3.5 million votes. The Congress (O) suffered its worst in Tamil Nadu where it polled 4.8 million votes and got only one seat, that of Kamaraj Nadar, while the D.M.K. polled 5.6 million votes and got 23 seats. These figures are highly revealing. They show how much support each party has in the electorate. All this strengthens the case for a system of proportional representation.

Independence Movement in East Pakistan

There is no space here to deal elaborately with the Indian response to the freedom movement in East Pakistan. It is gratifying to note that the movement has been universally welcomed and that both houses of Parliament passed unanimously a resolution extending to the movement the sympathy and the support of all sections of the people. Similar resolutions were passed in several State assemblies. Organisations have also been started to collect funds for helping the freedom fighters in every possible way. Government has also been busy in persuading the U.N.O. authorities and States, great and small, to use their good offices to put an end to the genocide indulged in by the military forces in East Pakistan. There is already a favourable response to this move from U.S.S.R. What is absolutely necessary is that our Government should be prepared to keep in its hands the initiative in all matters relating to the freedom movement. Our future is closely bound up with the success of this movement and our interests in it are far greater than those of any other country.

Several sections of the public are pressing the Government of Indira Gandhi to give recognition to the free Government of Bangla Desh. The arguments they have put forward in favour of the demand are convincing. Government, however, is not prepared to take such a step immediately. It has to be far more cautious than the non-official public but it should realise at the same time that over-caution in a matter like this will prove harmful. We will lose the goodwill of the people of Bangla Desh and delay and cautiousness will not bring to us the goodwill of the Government of West Pakistan. The wisest course for our Government to adopt is to recognise Bangla Desh as an independent, sovereign, democratic Republic the moment the freedom fighters establish a provisional Government with some territory under their control. Meanwhile it should be ready to give protection to any freedom fighters who may take refuge in Indian territory and aid them with arms and ammunition. Let us remember in this connection that for years Pakistan has been extending such aid and protection to the rebels in Nagaland and in Mizo Hills. Government should not also be influenced by the view that an independent Bangla Desh will encourage a movement for an independent West Bengal.

April 7, 1971

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