International Affairs: A Survey

The Russian Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean

The Russian presence in the Indian Ocean area has become item number one in discussions on South East Asian security of late. The issue is of particular relevance to Indian foreign and defence policies. What is the extent of Russian penetration? What are the motivations behind the Russian presence? And how does India perceive the presence? These are some of the questions that deserve attention.

The Extent of Russian Penetration

There can be no doubt that the Russian navy is much more active in the Indian Ocean than it was before. A squadron of the Pacific Fleet consisting of one heavy cruiser, three destroyers and one guided-missile vessel and other accompaniments are undertaking regular cruises since 1968 in the area extending from the Indonesian archipelago in the East to the Cape of Good Hope in the West. Originally part of the Vladivastok-based Pacific Fleet, the Soviet naval squadron in the Indian Ocean may have by now become a semi-autonomous tactical force. The Russians have also been active seeking fuelling facilities, if not much more, in a number of places along this, route. In the Andaman island ports, in Western Pakistan, in St. Brandon Islands off Mauritius, and in Sudan, the Russians have probably obtained such facilities. But reports of the Russians having gained bases in Indian ports, especially in Visakhapatnam, are repeatedly and emphatically denied. There is clearly a distinction between acceding occasional berthing and fuelling facilities and allowing naval bases.

It should also be remembered that the Indian Ocean is a part of the high seas over which all nations have an inherent right to move freely. Thus, when the Russian presence is talked about, what one is concerned really about are the motivations behind this fact, more so because the Russians had been least active in this region till a short while ago. A whole range of motivations, starting from the most innocent one of promoting Russian mercantile interests to the most sinister design of becoming the overlord of the area suggest themselves. It would be instructive to analyse some of these. Ofcourse, we can safely assume the Russian naval activity in the Indian Ocean area has much more to do than the mere promotion of commercial interests.

Possible Motivations

Many a Western observer visualises the present Russian interest in the framework of the historical Russian attempts at gaining access to the Persian Gulf area (and from thereon to the Indian Ocean) as also in the context of the Cold War struggles. Putting these two together they conclude that a new Russian threat has emerged. It is difficult to dismiss these views outright. For one, the Russians, the old Czars as well as the new communist leadership, had all along wanted to gain a footing in the area. For another, the emergence of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula as the present theatre of competition between the Russians and the Western powers, taken in the context of the British withdrawal from these areas, lends added credence to the theory that the Russian naval presence is a part of the effort to fill the power vacuum in the area. Ofcourse, even the Chinese confirmed that such indeed are Russian intentions. In May ’69, Peking’s official daily, Jenmin Jiba charged that “under the guise of paying visits to Indian naval bases, many warships of the Soviet revisionists have entered the Indian Ocean to carry out expansionist activities. They are thinking of filling the vacuum in the Ocean to be left by Britain in order to build up their sea supremacy from the Black Sea, via the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean to the Far East.” As against these it is possible to argue that while Moscow is certainly after acquiring a military footing, this attempt need not necessarily be viewed as part of a Russian grand design to dominate and swallow the powers of this region. The point is that the Russian naval activity, while certainly being conducive to the extension of great power rivalry in this area, can also be interpreted in a less dangerous light. After all, the British and American navies acquired considerable sway in different parts of the Indian Ocean and why, it can be asked, should one view the Russian entry with special apprehension. No doubt the less the rivalry the better are the prospects for peace. And on this basis one would wish that the Russians have not opted to extend their sphere of activity. But the fact that they had opted to do so does not necessarily constitute a threat in itself. This view needs to be canvassed as an alternative way of looking at the issue for there are strong grounds to believe that motivations other than domination are behind the Russian move.

(1) The influence of defence considerations cannot be ignored. It is now well-known that the Indian Ocean area has a network of American submarine-based missile systems directed against Russian land targets. A British naval affairs expert, who is also a lecturer in Soviet studies, admitted recently that “the Soviet Navy moved reluctantly into the Indian Ocean because it had to, and was operationally ill-prepared for, such a move. For submarine-based Polaris missile deployment against Russia, the Arabian Sea is second only to the Eastern Mediterranean in terms of target coverage; and the area becomes relatively more attractive as the missile range increases. A 3,000-nautical mile system would cover almost the whole of China and all the Soviet Union except the eastern provinces.” It is thus the presence of long-range sea-borne American weapons systems that accounts for changes in the Soviet Naval strategy. The Soviet answer to the Western threat is to keep its naval units in constant motion relying on the freedom of the seas in peace time. Thus it intends to frustrate the strike capabilities of the American Polaris and Poseidon missile systems. In this connection the significance of the Anglo-American agreement over American base in the Chagos group of islands should not be missed. These islands, Aldabra and Diego Gorcia, are situated midway between the South African coast and Australia, a thousand miles due south of India. Under the agreement, in the island of Aldabra a naval base is to be built and at Diego Garcia a big communications centre with missile tracking devices is to be established. These proposals were finalised as far as 1966. This American base also links the two mammoth communication centres which the Americans have in Western Australia in the East and in Asmara, in Ethiopia, in the West. All these could not but have confirmed Russian apprehensions about the American offensive potential.

Further, ever since the implementation of the American withdrawal from Vietnam, it is widely discussed that future American strategy may take the shape of ‘off shore presence.’ And this would not conflict with President Nixon’s Guam Doctrine under which Asians are to be left to fight against subversion by themselves. The Americans might have thought of withdrawing from all land commitments and to render assistance from outside. For this increased naval involvement would assume high priority. It cannot be that the Russians are unaware of this dimension. And not-withstanding the blunting of Cold War rivalries, the Russians could not but attempt to gain a footing in the Indian Ocean area to checkmate possible emergence of America as the prime legatee of the British power.

(2) The Russian concern to checkmate the Chinese cannot be underrated either. The southward thrust of China, the British withdrawal from Singapore, and the American withdrawal from Vietnam, together confirm the need to contain China in this region. The Chinese have also been active in establishing close relations with the Arabian and East African states and their stake in the Indian Ocean area is only too obvious. Consequently Moscow is as much concerned about this dimension as with the American dimension. When the Brezhnev proposal for Asian Security was mooted, Washington is reported to have conceded that Russia was more interested to prevent Chinese domination than to checkmate el America in the post-Vietnam era. Thus there is no reason to brush aside the view that Russia’s Indian Ocean policy has a strong anti-Chinese domination to it too.

Further there is the view that inter-services rivalries are being keenly fought out in Moscow. It seems that the navy has to assert itself by making a convincing case to defend against the Western challenge. Thus the recent Soviet challenge in the Indian Ocean area is partly “a reflection of the Soviet Navy’s internal struggle for independence within the Moscow defence establishment. Admiral Gorshkov has had to fight for his ships’ new oceanic freedom, against influential strategists who considered that the Navy’s correct role was to be a faithful helper of the Red Army, largely confined to coastal defence and support.” Viewed thus the imminence of the Russian threat recedes to a minor place. Of course, it is unwise to separate economic from political and military motivations. Yet, the overall evidence does not point to any Russian grand design to dominate the Indian Ocean area.

The British Arms Supplies to South Africa

No doubt, the foregoing analysis goes contrary to the premise behind the British policy of arms supplied to South Africa. The Conservative Government bases its policy on two grounds: (1) that there is a Russian threat which can be met by strengthening South Africa naval potential and (2) that under the Simonstown Agreement Britain is obliged to resume arms supplies to South Africa. It can be shown that both these grounds are baseless.

(1) The foregoing analysis to a great extent exposes the exaggerated nature of the views on the Russian naval threat. But more important is the American attitude. The U. S. A. is clearly against the British resumption of arms supplies to South Africa. Surely, the Americans are not given to ignoring even a remote chance of a Russian menace! The present evidence is that the Americans do not rate the Russian danger to be so great as to warrant resort to so unpalatable a bargain as an arms deal with South Africa. In fact, the former Labour Defence Minister Mr. Dennis Healey stated in the House of Commons in July 1970 that the Russian presence was not seen as a threat either by his military advisers or by NATO or by U. S. (See British Arms for South Africa by Merle Lipton in The World Today, London, October, 1970, p. 427) The limited extent of British assistance, however, makes all mockery of the reasons London is advancing. To soften the blow to African sentiments, Prime Minister Heath stresses that Britain would give South Africa only defensive items and replacements. If this be true, then it is difficult to see in what exact manner the Russian naval threat, particularly the submarine threat, is supposed to be contained. South Africa alone can hardly deal with any real Soviet challenge. British aid is too insignificant to contain the Russian presence but enough to provide racialist South Africa with more teeth to suppress freedom.

(2) As regards the Simonstown Agreement, this was the consequence of Britain relinquishing its naval base at Simonstown, in South Africa, in 1955. Apart from pledging to supply South Africa with twenty specified warships and a promise to cooperate in defending the sea lanes around South Africa, there are no more obligations cast upon Britain. In fact it was this aspect of the Agreement that made South Africa frequently criticise it as being ‘unequal’ and unfavourable to her. So, as it is, honouring Simonstown doesn’t involve supply of arms. That South Africa is demanding arms and would even want Britain to take her into a defence alliance, like NATO, has no bearing on the terms of the Simonstown Agreement. Under the pretext of the commercial and strategic importance of the Cape route, South Africa’s Prime Minister, Voster, wants a regional alliance, like the NATO, for the defence of South Atlantic and Indian Ocean areas with white nations like the U. K., Portugal, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina and Brazil as members. The real purpose is “to commit these powers to the defence of the present South African Government in the event of any armed conflict” (Merle Lipton, in the World Today, op. cit. p. 430). In other words, these nations are to bail out South Africa and its racialist policies in the event of confrontation with the African nations. There is thus little thought of safeguarding freedom against communism and much preoccupation with safeguarding racialism. Even without a larger alliance, British arms will be put to the same purpose. African nations are convinced that South Africa would use these weapons to suppress liberals and protest movements and might even start a pre-emptive expedition against radical black neighbours like Zambia, and Tanzania. This is the crux of the matter agitating most of the members of the Commonwealth. It is inconceivable that Britain is not aware that its arguments are untenable. The Conservative Government is pledged to its own South African lobby of vested trade and industrial interests to resume arms supply to South Africa. The influence of certain racialist woodsmen in England sympathising with South Africa’s apartheid is also evident in recent times.

It is also suggested that the effect of arms supply to South Africa would be to enable her to scuttle a future U. N. economic blockade in support of the U. N’s anti-apartheid resolutions. Some British commentators had also analysed that the immediate result of resumption of arms supply would be to frustrate the U. N. from deciding upon any such blockade. Viewed thus, the British decision is far more culpable–it is perfidious, for it seeks to frustrate any future U. N. action over South Africa and possibly over Rhoedisia too.

The Indian View

The Indian Government does not feel that the Russian presence is a matter for grave concern. While it has been rather unduly soft towards Soviet attitudes, in this instance its reaction seems to square with the facts. Emphatic denial by Prime Minister Gandhi that no naval bases have been given to Russia shows that India on the her part has not contributed to the Soviet presence. India also the has stated categorically that there can be no question of any power vacuum in the area consequent on the British withdrawal and it certainly does not encourage any outside power to fill this vacuum. Actually, New Delhi would welcome the neutralisation of the whole region. But, alas, this can never be accomplished. The United States since long, and the Soviet Union now, are there. We can only hope that the shift of the areas of rivalry from Europe to the Indian Ocean region will slowly die down as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks succeed. It is also to be hoped that the Government of India would not further compromise non-alignment by yielding to possible Russian pressures for the grant of such concessions which may amount to giving base facilities to the Soviet Navy. However, there is any amount of need for the Indian Navy to expand and to become a force in its own region. No stone should be left unturned in augmenting our naval potential. An active pursuit of co-ordinated effort for the joint defence of the Indian area by the nations of the region should be stepped up and the old Indian inhibition that we should strive for co-operation only on the economic front and not for military co-operation needs to be given up.

India and Nepal

The last few months once again disclosed how brittle and volatile India’s relations with Nepal have been. The controversy about the renewal of the trade pact which expired on 31st October last, and Nepal’s propaganda offensive to discredit us is but a surfacing of suspicions and misgivings that took deep roots during the last decade.

Other reasons for Indo-Nepalese frictions apart, it should be realised that, the very juxtaposition of these powers as neighbours invariably creates tensions. And remembrance of shared history and culture only makes these worse. The tiny neighbour is apt to be apprehensive that history and culture only buttress the Big Brotherly potentialities of its neighbour. Not that these apprehensions are always justified. The point is that even without expansionist motivations, the big neighbour is at a disadvantage, and all the more so if it has an image and reputation for responsible behaviour to safeguard. Psychologically viewing, the ‘ugly American’ has his counterparts in every case of big and small power relationship. The Government of India, to be sure, has been careful in minding Nepalese sensitivities but the Chinese hand, coupled with the internal political situation, manages to keep alive Nepalese suspicions.

Ever since 1960, when King Mahendra dismissed the Koirala Ministry, imprisoned the leaders of the Nepalese Congress and assumed full control, a new phase in Indo-Nepalese relations started. While there was no question of New Delhi interfering in the internal affairs of Nepal at the same time unhappiness on India’s part at the turn of events in Nepal could not be concealed. The presence of Nepalese exiles in India, which India in tune with her democratic professions could not prevent, only provoked King Mahendra’s ire making him openly accuse India of fomenting rebellion against his regime. Time and again the King’s policy of dealing harshly with his political opponents conflicted with India’s giving them entry and refuse. The latest instance has been Nepal’s refusal to give the ailing B. P. Koirala, a passport to go overseas for medical treatment and India’s decision to give him emergency travel documents on humanitarian grounds. There were of course instances of overbearing behaviour on the part of some Indian officials; and the attitude of our diplomatic corps in Khatmandu sometimes worsened matters.

The Chinese role has always been to exploit Indo-Nepalese antagonisms. King Mahendra frequently admits the reality of the Chinese threat but he seems to be more concerned with Indian intentions.

Since the summer of June 1969, Nepal’s attitude seemed to have grown particularly hostile. Without any previous indication Nepal made much of the so-called border dispute over Susta, a 15 mile forest-clad stretch, on the Indo-Nepalese border, where the border markings get frequently washed away by floods in the Gandak. Close on the heals of this came Nepal’s Prime Minister Mr. Kirthinidhi Bista’s demand for the withdrawal of the few Indian military personnel who at Nepal’s request were manning her northern check-posts. Nepal also demanded the withdrawal of the Indian military group from Khatmandu (this so-called group consisted of 23 men). The Nepalese Prime Minister categorically wanted an end to ‘special relationship’ with India as “the theory of special relations for Nepal outside geographical, social and economic realities is out of step with modern developments in our relations (Quoted in ‘The Hindu’ Madras, June 25, 1969). Nepal also wanted that the Secret Protocols of 1950 and the Arms Sale Agreement 1965, be terminated. While Nepal had every right to ask for a new basis of relationship with India, the suddenness of the demand was what betrayed Nepal’s new mood. Some of the Nepalese leaders themselves were surprised at this sudden demand and a former Minister, Mr. Rishikesh Shah, wanted an explanation as to what caused this sudden stiffening in Nepal’s attitude. And finally came the bigger surprise, when in the same month, Nepal announced the completion of the Chinese built Khatmandu-Kodari road, which was kept a closely guarded secret. Indians were shown the road only at the opening ceremony.

The Trade and Transit Agreement

The controversy about the trade and transit negotiations itself is revelatory of the psychological complexities behind Indo-Nepalese relations. Basing ostensibly on International Law, under which a land-locked country has a right for trade and transit facilities from its neighbours, Nepal seems bent on browbeating India with demands that are more disconcerting to India than materially advantageous to Nepal. India feels that she could not be driven to make concession simply to keep Khatmandu in good humour. Nepalese past gimmicks seem to have made Delhi tough. A brief history of the controversy over the trade and transit agreement would clarify the situation.

In 1960, a ten-year Trade and Transit Agreement was signed. India agreed to receive Nepalese manufactured goods free of duty and guarantee transit facilities for Nepalese imports and exports from and to other countries.

While the treaty was to expire by the end of October 1970, negotiations for a fresh agreement commenced in January 1970. But these failed due to differences between two sides on two important issues. India wanted: (1) That the concession of free import of Nepalese goods into India should be specifically limited to goods wholly of Nepalese manufacture and not to those manufactured with imported raw materials. (2) That of the existing transit facilities, the direct road link to the East Pakistani border should be discontinued. Otherwise, India was prepared to continue the existing concessions. Nepal, on the other hand, insisted that there be no departure from the erstwhile treaty. The talks ended in a deadlock. Nepal blamed India for the failure of the negotiations. High level meetings between the Indian Foreign Minister and the Nepalese King during February 1970 appeared to have restored cordiality. But, within the few weeks of these the King administered a gratuitous insult to India by referring to Nepal’s “not getting the usual trade and transit facilities in accordance with customary international practice”, at the reception of the visiting dignitaries attending his son’s wedding, and in the very presence of the Indian President. Mollifying explanation followed from Nepal. In September, Mrs. Gandhi and King Mahendra met in New Delhi bringing down the communication barrier at the top. Thus was the ground prepared for the second round of talks in October 1970. By October 30th, on the very eve of the expiry of the treaty, it appeared that agreement was reached between the two sides. But suddenly Nepal terminated the negotiations accusing India of trying to squeeze Nepalese trade and commercial contracts with the outside world. India’s reaction was one of pained surprise at the unwarranted harshness of the Nepalese complaint. Still, India agreed to the continuation of the existing pattern of trade and transit arrangements as provided for in the expired treaty, hoping that negotiations would be resumed to hammer out a new treaty. Even the third round of talks in December 1970 had proved unsuccessful. Nepal again held India solely responsible for this. What is more, Khatmandu took the unusual step of complaining to
the world in the face of facts that India had stopped the flow of goods through the transit routes and thus violated the Barcelona Convention. In fact India took special care to see that the flow of essential imports like petrol, is not interfered with and repeatedly assured Nepal that the facilities under the old treaty would not be discontinued.

Ramifications of the ‘Trade and Transit’ Issue

On the trade issue the real difference was over the meaning of the term ‘Nepal-manufactured goods’, India understanding it as “items wholly manufactured in Nepal.” Her objection was that importing of goods produced in Nepal with foreign raw materials free of duty would hurt Indian industry. On the other hand, Nepal’s case in this aspect rests really on the ground that a small country with a struggling economy should be shown generosity by the big neighbour. Nepal cannot say that India is obliged under international law to exempt all Nepal’s manufactured goods from import duties.

The difference over transit facilities arises out of Nepal insisting on direct access to Pakistan. It is true that the erstwhile treaty did include this facility. India feels that Nepal cannot demand such facility as a matter of right and hence New Delhi’s unwillingness to accommodate. It is also a fact that during the past the volume of trade between Nepal and Pakistan through this route had not been significant. India sees a political motive in Khatmandu’s insistence on the perpetuation of this concession. Nepal sought to propagate that India is not even honouring the Barcelona Convention on the right of land-locked states to access to neighbouring countries. Nothing could be farther from truth, for the Barcelona Convention provides the transit facilities be given but does not provide for the land-locked state choosing her own routes. India had never denied transit facilities. In fact the operation of the erstwhile treaty more than amply reveals Indian bona fides and goodwill. For example, Nepal’s trade with third countries has increased ten-fold from $2 million to $20 million in six years since 1962 and this could not have happened without the benefits conferred by transit facilities through India. Again, out of the 8,000 sq. feet of warehouse facility offered by India at Calcutta Docks, barely an eighth had been used by Nepal. The most convincing fact of India’s goodwill is that India has waived last year the storage rent totalling Rs. 57 lakhs that Nepal owed.

A “New Pattern of Relationship” Needed

It is rather difficult to fathom Khatmandu’s motivations in playing David’s role against the alleged Indian Goliath. Possibly the ing of Peking and Pindi accounts for most of Nepal’s pride. Curiously enough, America too recognised Chinese special relations with Nepal, thus impliedly encouraging Nepal to stand up against India. The fact that Nepal’s behaviour showed a marked shift immediately after Vice-President Agnew’s visit in February 1970 should not be missed. There is also the possibility that India is being used as a scapegoat to divert the attention of the Nepalese people from internal troubles. Strangely enough, the Nepalese Prime Minister had categorically stated that many of the hostile statements made by Nepalese leaders “were meant for internal consumption and were not made at India.” This information was given by Mr. Dinesh Singh, the then Foreign Minister, while speaking to Parliament’s Consultative Committee of the External Affairs Ministry in February last. (‘The Statesman’, Calcutta, February 11, 1970) It is indeed odd that a nation allows itself to be pilloried to cater to the whims of the public opinion of another state.

However, the Government of India was right in not allowing hurt feelings get the better of realities. Rightly it gave up the concept of special relations, as that phrase always smacked of tutelage rather than interdependence. For example, both the Secret Protocol of 1950 and the Arms Sale Agreement of 1965 put restrictions on Nepal’s acquisition from other countries without India’s concurrence and this, it should be admitted, Nepal could not be expected to tolerate. India was also wise in conceding to Nepal’s demands over the withdrawal of Indian military group.

Still there is the need for India’s showing her tough side too. While it is to be hoped that a spirit of accommodation would prevail in the renewal of trade and transit agreement, there is no need to be specially nice to Khatmandu unless we are sure that gratuitous insults are stopped. Meanwhile, India should meet the propaganda offensive in foreign capitals Showing that it has more than observed the letter and spirit of the Barcelona Convention.

Need for Reviewing Indian Defence Position

Developments in Sino-Nepalese contacts added a new dimension to the Chinese threat. For the opening of the Khatmandu–Kodari road, means direct Chinese access to the Indian plains. On the North, Kodari directly connects Khatmandu with Lhasa and from thereon with Peking and on the South side Khatmandu is connected with Patna. China has made a major breakthrough in gaining access to the states on her southern borders by building all purpose and heavy duty highways. As Inder Malhotra pointed out: “Nepal’s basic interests in India are economic, India’s in Nepal strategic.” If Nepal is demanding more than its share to augment its economic interests, India’s strategic interests in Nepal ironically seem to have suffered in inverse proportion. The very nature of such relationship is embarrassing for it is only a short way from an equation, between economic aid and military strings. There is no escape from this situation in the short run. We cannot appear to be anxious about Nepal’s defences as that would prove to be counter-productive. While hoping that Nepal would take proper care of its border in the North, we must realise that the end of special relations makes it imperative to base our defence calculations on a new footing without the previous complacency of having Nepal as an alarm system.